Order : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. Heard Mr. Parag Kotecha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, learned Government Advocate assisted by Mr. Dashrath Prajapati, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the State/respondents. 2. Since all these writ petitions raise substantially similar questions of fact and law, they have been ordered to be clubbed together. Accordingly, with the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, the matters were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common order, in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to ensure consistency in the adjudication of the issues involved. 3. All the petitioners, in the present batch of writ petitions, seek a direction to the respondents to consider their cases for absorption in the School Education Department on the strength of the order dated 23.07.2020. Their contention is that upon completion of two years of service, they are entitled to be absorbed with all consequential benefits, in the same manner as extended to the Shiksha Karmis of Panchayat and the Local Bodies Teachers who were absorbed in the School Education Department with effect from 01.11.2020. 4. For the purpose of convenient adjudication, WPS No.1389/2021 is treated as the lead matter, as the reliefs claimed across all the petitions are identical in nature. Accordingly, the reliefs sought in WPS No.1389/2021 are taken to represent the reliefs claimed in the entire batch, and the same are being considered for adjudication herein, which are as follows :- “i. The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to reconsider the case of the petitioners for grant of benefit of increment and other benefit as they are the employee of the Education Department or in alternative the petitioner may also be absorb to Education Department. immediately on completion of 2 years of services, with all consequential benefit from initial date of appointment, ii. Any other relief which the Hon'ble court deems fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of the petitioner and the cost of the petition may awarded in favour of the petitioner.” 5. immediately on completion of 2 years of services, with all consequential benefit from initial date of appointment, ii. Any other relief which the Hon'ble court deems fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of the petitioner and the cost of the petition may awarded in favour of the petitioner.” 5. The facts, as projected in the writ petitions, reveal that the petitioners were initially appointed as Shiksha Karmi Grade-III [now re-designated as Assistant Teacher (Panchayat)], Shiksha Karmi Grade-II [now Teacher (Panchayat)] and Shiksha Karmi Grade-I [now Lecturer (Panchayat)] in different years, namely 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2016, respectively. Pursuant to the order dated 30.06.2018, the services of the petitioners, who had completed eight years of service in the Panchayat Department or in the Local Bodies came to be absorbed in the School Education Department. Upon such absorption, their nomenclature underwent a change. The Teachers absorbed from Panchayat/Municipal Corporation/Local Bodies were re-designated as “Teacher (Local Bodies)”. Similarly, the Teachers working in Schools run by the School Education Department were re-designated as “Teacher (E- LB)”, and those working in the ‘T’ category were renamed as “Teacher (T-LB)”. Separate cadres were also created corresponding to the revised nomenclatures. They were extended the benefits of the 7th Pay Commission with effect from 01.07.2018, along with other consequential service benefits from time to time. It was specifically provided that the date 01.07.2018 shall be treated as the cut-off date for determining pay fixation and other service-related benefits. 6. It was further stipulated that the Teachers shall not be entitled to claim arrears for any period prior to 01.07.2018. The Teachers absorbed under the Local Bodies cadre were also made subject to the New Pension Scheme. With these conditions, as enumerated in the order dated 30.06.2018, the services of all such Teachers including the present petitioners, were absorbed in the School Education Department. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners, as well as similarly situated Teachers who have not approached this Court, had consented to their absorption under the said terms and conditions. 7. The petitioners further assert that after their absorption, they continued to discharge functions under the School Education Department, and no grievance existed in that regard. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners, as well as similarly situated Teachers who have not approached this Court, had consented to their absorption under the said terms and conditions. 7. The petitioners further assert that after their absorption, they continued to discharge functions under the School Education Department, and no grievance existed in that regard. However, subsequently, the Additional Secretary, School Education Department issued an order dated 23.07.2020, wherein it was directed that the remaining Teachers of the Panchayat/Local Bodies cadre approximately 16,278 in number, would be absorbed upon completion of two years of service, with effect from 01.11.2020. It was further directed that other Teachers who had already completed eight years of service would also be absorbed from 01.11.2020. The other service conditions were to remain governed by the earlier order dated 30.06.2018. 8. The grievance of the petitioners, as discernible from the petitions, is that while they were absorbed only upon completion of eight years of service, a separate class of Teachers, who had completed merely two years of service in the Panchayat/Local Bodies, came to be absorbed under the order dated 23.07.2020, and were consequently extended the benefits of the 7th Pay Commission and other advantages equivalent to those who had completed eight years of service. This, according to the petitioners, has created an anomalous and discriminatory situation. They contend that the benefit of absorption on completion of two years of service ought to have been extended uniformly to all Teachers, including those who were absorbed earlier, failing which they suffer grave disparity and unequal treatment. 9. The petitioners further contend that Teachers who were absorbed earlier under the order dated 30.06.2018 ought to have been brought at par with those absorbed under the subsequent order dated 23.07.2020. It is submitted that the petitioners, who were appointed in the years 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2016, were receiving pay scales and increments under the 5th and 6th Pay Commissions, and became entitled to the 7th Pay Commission only after their absorption. In contrast, Teachers absorbed after completion of only two years of service under the order dated 23.07.2020 were directly placed in the 7th Pay Commission structure. This, according to the petitioners, causes substantial monetary loss to them despite longer service and seniority, and thereby results in unjust deprivation. 10. In contrast, Teachers absorbed after completion of only two years of service under the order dated 23.07.2020 were directly placed in the 7th Pay Commission structure. This, according to the petitioners, causes substantial monetary loss to them despite longer service and seniority, and thereby results in unjust deprivation. 10. It is further case of the petitioners that the order dated 23.07.2020 is contrary to the Chhattisgarh Shikshak Panchayat Samvarg Seva Ki Samanya Sharte Rules, 2018 (for short, “Rules of 2018”), which mandate that no relaxation shall be granted in a manner less favourable than the provisions contained in the Rules. According to the petitioners, absorption of Teachers upon completion of two years of service, while denying similar benefit to those already absorbed after eight years of service, violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. They, therefore, contend that they are also entitled to be treated as absorbed upon completion of two years of service and to be extended all consequential benefits at par with the Teachers absorbed under the order dated 23.07.2020. 11. Mr. Parag Kotecha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, submits that the petitioners have filed the present writ petition seeking a direction to the respondents to extend the benefit of absorption and all consequential service-related advantages from the date they completed two years of service, in strict compliance with the order dated 23.07.2020 issued by respondent No. 1. The said order clearly directs that all teachers appointed under the Panchayat and Nagriya Nikaya Cadre shall be absorbed into the School Education Department immediately upon completion of two years of service, with effect from 01.11.2020. 12. Mr. Kotecha submits that despite the petitioners having been appointed much earlier, in 2010, 2011, 2013, and 2016, the respondents have arbitrarily delayed granting these benefits, resulting in unjust discrimination against the petitioners in comparison to teachers appointed in 2018, who are already receiving the same pay scale and 7th Pay Commission increments. He contends that such action has caused serious prejudice to the petitioners, including loss of seniority, career advancement, and recognition of service, despite the petitioners having served diligently, with integrity, and fulfilling all responsibilities. He contends that such action has caused serious prejudice to the petitioners, including loss of seniority, career advancement, and recognition of service, despite the petitioners having served diligently, with integrity, and fulfilling all responsibilities. He further submits that the petitioners are willing to waive all past monetary benefits, if the Court deems it fit, and that their grievance is solely with regard to the notional fixation of seniority and correct pay scale from the date of eligibility. He emphasizes that this is essential to prevent continued injustice, safeguard the petitioners’ future promotions and service rights, and ensure parity with other similarly placed employees. 13. Mr. Kotecha contends that Rule 6 of the Rules of 2018, provides for absorption in the School Education Department only on completion of eight years of service, while Rule 14 empowers the Hon’ble Governor to deal with the case of any person to whom these rules apply in a manner as may appear just and proper, provided such relaxation is not less favourable to the employee than the provisions of the rules themselves. He further contends that the relaxation provided by the order dated 23.07.2020 is less favourable to the petitioners, who served the Panchayat/Nagri Nikaya Department for eight years before absorption, whereas employees appointed in 2018 are being absorbed immediately on completion of two years of service. 14. Mr. Kotecha further submits that the petitioners are not challenging the order dated 23.07.2020 but are asserting their legitimate expectation that their service rights be recognized in a similar manner, at least notionally, with respect to absorption and seniority. He submits that the respondents’ failure to consider the petitioners for absorption immediately upon completion of two years of service amounts to arbitrary and discriminatory action, contrary to the principles of equality and fairness. He emphasizes that the respondents, being a welfare State, ought to have considered the case of the petitioners for immediate absorption into the Education Department upon completion of two years of service in Panchayat/Nagri Nikaya, in order to prevent arbitrary discrimination and protect their service rights. 15. It is contended by Mr. Kotecha that the petitioners’ absorption ought to have been reckoned immediately upon completion of two years of service, in the same manner as has been done for teachers covered under the order dated 23.07.2020. 15. It is contended by Mr. Kotecha that the petitioners’ absorption ought to have been reckoned immediately upon completion of two years of service, in the same manner as has been done for teachers covered under the order dated 23.07.2020. He points out that under the earlier order dated 30.06.2018, the petitioners were absorbed only after completing eight years of service, whereas those covered by the order dated 23.07.2020 are being absorbed after two years, while being simultaneously placed in the 7th Pay Commission pay scale. He contends that this differential treatment confers a clear advantage to the latter category of teachers, who despite having shorter service tenure, are being accorded higher pay and benefits earlier than the petitioners. 16. Lastly, Mr. Kotecha submits that such differential treatment is arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, and that the petitioners are entitled to parity of treatment. He further submits that the petitioners must be accorded the same benefit of absorption upon completion of two years of service, along with all consequential monetary and service benefits, as has been granted to teachers absorbed under the order dated 23.07.2020. As such, a direction be issued to the respondents to absorb the petitioners notionally in the School Education Department immediately upon completion of two years of service; grant all consequential service and seniority benefits, ensuring parity with other similarly placed teachers; and prevent further arbitrary and discriminatory treatment by the respective respondents. 17. On the other hand, Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, learned Government Advocate, assisted by Mr. Dashrath Prajapati, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/respondents, opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners and submitted that the entire premise of the petitions is misconceived. He submitted that the State Government had earlier, vide its policy decision dated 30.06.2018, resolved to absorb the services of all Teachers of the Panchayat/Local Bodies cadre only upon completion of eight years of service. It was specifically provided that those who had completed eight years of service as on 01.07.2018 would stand absorbed in the School Education Department from that date and would be extended the benefits of the 7th Pay Commission and all consequential service entitlements, including the applicability of the New Pension Scheme. It was specifically provided that those who had completed eight years of service as on 01.07.2018 would stand absorbed in the School Education Department from that date and would be extended the benefits of the 7th Pay Commission and all consequential service entitlements, including the applicability of the New Pension Scheme. It is submitted that the absorption under the 2018 policy was itself the culmination of a long-standing demand of Shiksha Karmis for parity with Teachers of the School Education Department, as they were performing identical teaching duties but receiving substantially lesser remuneration. The policy dated 30.06.2018 was framed to address this demand, and the petitioners had consciously accepted the terms and conditions of their absorption. 18. Learned Government Advocate further pointed out that pursuant to this policy, the process of absorption of all Shiksha Karmis who had completed eight years of service by 01.07.2018 was initiated. During this process, several practical difficulties were encountered regarding fixation of pay, grant of annual increments for past services, and proper migration from the 6th to the 7th Pay Commission scales. Therefore, guidance was sought from the State Government. Considering these issues, the State issued a clarification dated 13.07.2018, directing that the annual increment due as on 01.07.2018 should first be added to the pay fixed under the 6th Pay Commission and thereafter the revised pay should be fixed under the 7th Pay Commission matrix. It is further submitted that in pursuance of this clarification, the pay fixation of Shiksha Karmi Grade-I, Grade-II and Grade-III was uniformly carried out throughout the State. Their pay in the 6th Pay Commission was fixed at Rs. 9300–34800 with Grade Pay Rs. 4300 (Grade-I), Rs. 9300–34800 with Grade Pay Rs. 4200 (Grade-II), and Rs. 5200– 20200 with Grade Pay Rs. 2400 (Grade-III). Correspondingly, under the 7th Pay Commission, their basic pay was fixed at Rs. 38,100/-, Rs. 35,400/- and Rs. 25,300/- respectively. To substantiate this, the State has placed on record copies of relevant pages from the service books of the concerned Teachers, showing the fixation of their pay under both the 6th and 7th Pay Commissions. 19. Learned Government Advocate also submitted that the subsequent order dated 23.07.2020 was issued only as a one- time administrative measure, intended to remove anomalies and to bring the remaining Teachers of the Panchayat/Local Bodies cadre approximately 16,278 in number, into a uniform service framework. 19. Learned Government Advocate also submitted that the subsequent order dated 23.07.2020 was issued only as a one- time administrative measure, intended to remove anomalies and to bring the remaining Teachers of the Panchayat/Local Bodies cadre approximately 16,278 in number, into a uniform service framework. The said order was prospective in nature and was never intended to reopen, unsettle, or retrospectively modify the absorption already carried out under the 2018 policy. He asserted that the petitioners, having been validly absorbed under the earlier policy and having accepted all benefits flowing therefrom, cannot now seek to invoke the 2020 policy as a means to re-determine their date of absorption or to claim parity with those absorbed subsequently. It is further submitted that, in order to maintain uniformity and avoid anomalies with respect to the remaining Panchayat Teachers numbering approximately 16,278, the State Government took a fresh policy decision on 23.07.2020. By this decision, all Shiksha Karmis who had completed two years of service as on 01.11.2020 were directed to be absorbed in the School Education Department. It was expressly provided that the terms and conditions governing such absorption would remain identical to those stipulated earlier under the order dated 30.06.2018. He emphasized that formulation of service policy, including determination of eligibility conditions for absorption, fixation of pay scales, and other service benefits, lies squarely within the exclusive domain of the State Government as an employer. The earlier absorption of Shiksha Karmis under the order dated 30.06.2018 and the subsequent absorption under the order dated 23.07.2020 both operate within this policy domain and are based upon administrative requirements and service exigencies. 20. It is further argued by Mr. Tamaskar that judicial interference with policy decisions is extremely limited, and the said decision of 23.07.2020 does not in any manner adversely affect the rights of the petitioners, who have already been absorbed under the 2018 policy and granted all consequential benefits, including fixation of seniority and pay. Their gradation and service position remain unaffected. Therefore, unless the petitioners succeed in demonstrating that the policy is arbitrary, discriminatory, irrational, or violative of constitutional mandates, the Court ought not to interfere with the policy prerogative of the State Government. Their gradation and service position remain unaffected. Therefore, unless the petitioners succeed in demonstrating that the policy is arbitrary, discriminatory, irrational, or violative of constitutional mandates, the Court ought not to interfere with the policy prerogative of the State Government. In support of the above submissions, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Federation of Railway Officers Association and others v. Union of India and others , (2003) 4 SCC 289 , wherein it has been held that the scope of judicial review in matters involving policy decisions is inherently limited. The Supreme Court observed that when the statute clearly articulates the purpose and framework within which the executive is required to exercise discretion, such discretion cannot be regarded as unfettered, and the Court will ordinarily refrain from substituting its own views for those of the competent authority unless the policy is demonstrably arbitrary or unconstitutional. 21. Lastly, it is submitted that the petitioners have already derived the benefits flowing from the earlier absorption order dated 30.06.2018, and their seniority/gradation position has remained intact and untouched even after issuance of the subsequent policy dated 23.07.2020. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim any prejudice or adverse civil consequences arising from the later policy decision, nor can they seek to challenge it merely on apprehensions which are unfounded and speculative in nature. Accordingly, the reliefs sought by the petitioners are misconceived and devoid of any substantive foundation. As they are in no manner affected by the subsequent order dated 23.07.2020, no interference is warranted in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed and have rightly been dismissed. 22. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length, who have meticulously advanced their respective submissions. I have also carefully gone through the pleadings, documents, and all material placed on record, and have duly considered the legal position applicable to the issues arising in the present batch of writ petitions. 23. From a bare perusal of the record, it is evident that the State Government had taken a comprehensive policy decision in response to long-standing demands of the Shiksha Karmis seeking their absorption. Considering these representations, the State issued an order dated 30.06.2018 providing for the absorption of Shiksha Karmis of Panchayats and Local Bodies who had completed eight years of continuous service. Considering these representations, the State issued an order dated 30.06.2018 providing for the absorption of Shiksha Karmis of Panchayats and Local Bodies who had completed eight years of continuous service. Their absorption was made effective from 01.07.2018 and was accompanied by several conditions. Two of the most significant conditions were: (i) that their services would be counted only from the date of absorption, i.e., 01.07.2018, for all service-related purposes; and (ii) that they would be entitled to the benefits of the 7th Pay Commission only from 01.07.2018. The order further clarified that no monetary benefits or arrears prior to 01.07.2018 would be admissible and that they would be governed by the New Pension Scheme upon absorption. 24. The petitioners, along with other categories of Shiksha Karmis, Teachers, and Lecturers engaged under Panchayats and Local Bodies, accepted and acted upon the said policy without raising any grievance regarding either the terms of absorption or the date from which benefits accrued. Their absorption in the School Education Department was thus voluntary, conscious, and with full knowledge of the conditions stipulated in the order dated 30.06.2018. Subsequently, the State Government, in furtherance of its uniform policy framework, issued another order dated 23.07.2020 extending absorption benefits to those Teachers of Panchayats and Local Bodies who had completed two years or more of service. The total number of such Teachers came to 16,278. This policy was intended to achieve uniformity, parity, and standardization across all categories of Teachers. Importantly, the conditions of their absorption were also made identical to those contained in the earlier order dated 30.06.2018. 25. A careful examination of the subsequent order dated 23.07.2020 reveals that it neither disturbs the service conditions of the petitioners nor causes any prejudice to them. Their seniority, pay scale, and related benefits remain unaffected by the absorption of these additional Teachers. The absorption of fresh batches of Teachers under the same conditions does not dilute or infringe upon the rights already accrued to the petitioners. There is also no violation of the Rules, 2018. Nothing has been shown on record to indicate arbitrariness, discrimination, or any deviation from the prescribed statutory framework in the formulation of this subsequent policy. 26. The absorption of fresh batches of Teachers under the same conditions does not dilute or infringe upon the rights already accrued to the petitioners. There is also no violation of the Rules, 2018. Nothing has been shown on record to indicate arbitrariness, discrimination, or any deviation from the prescribed statutory framework in the formulation of this subsequent policy. 26. Once the State Government, in its executive capacity, has taken a conscious policy decision to extend the benefit of absorption to Teachers who have completed two years of service, such a decision cannot be subjected to judicial interference unless it is demonstrated to be arbitrary, mala fide, irrational, or violative of statutory provisions. In the present case, the petitioners have not been able to show that the impugned policy causes any adverse civil consequences to them. A policy decision merely extending benefits to others, without causing prejudice to pre-existing beneficiaries, cannot be a ground for challenge. 27. The petitioners have entirely failed to establish that the policy decision dated 23.07.2020 suffers from arbitrariness or irrationality. Their own service conditions, benefits, and gradation remain wholly unaffected. The mere contention that other Teachers may receive similar benefits after shorter periods of service does not confer any enforceable right upon the petitioners to seek modification or quashing of the policy. Courts have consistently held that a policy granting benefits to others cannot be interfered with merely because earlier beneficiaries perceive it as reducing their relative advantage. 28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real Estate and Others , (2019) 10 SCC 738 , while considering the scope of interference by the Courts in matters falling within the exclusive domain of the State’s policy decisions, has held as under:- “13. In the present case, the learned Judges of the Division Bench have arrived at a finding that such a sanction was, in fact, granted. We will examine the correctness of the said finding of fact at a subsequent stage. However, before doing that, we propose to examine the scope of the powers of the High Court of judicial review of an administrative action. Though, there are a catena of judgments of this Court on the said issue, the law laid down by this Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 lays down the basic principles which still hold the field. Though, there are a catena of judgments of this Court on the said issue, the law laid down by this Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 lays down the basic principles which still hold the field. Para 77 of the said judgment reads thus. (SCC pp. 677- 78) “77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error of law, 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v. Secy. of State for Home Department, ex p Brind, (1991) 1 AC 696, Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases, the test to be adopted is that the court should, 'consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention"." 14. It could thus be seen that the scope of judicial review of an administrative action is very limited. Unless the Court comes to a conclusion that the decision-maker has not understood the law correctly that regulates his decision-making power or when it is found that the decision of the decision-maker is vitiated by irrationality and that too on the principle of "Wednesbury unreasonableness or unless it is found that there has been a procedural impropriety in the decision-making process, it would not be permissible for the High Court to interfere in the decision-making process. It is also equally well settled that it is not permissible for the Court to examine the validity of the decision but this Court can examine only the correctness of the decision making process. 15. This Court recently in W.B. Central School Service Commission v. Abdul Halim, (2019) 18 SCC 39 , had again an occasion to consider the scope of interference under Article 226 in an administrative action: "31. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there b may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137 . If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ court by issuance of writ of certiorari. 32. The sweep of power under Article 226 may be wide enough to quash unreasonable orders. If a decision is so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could have ever arrived at it, the same is liable to be struck down by a writ court. If the decision cannot rationally be supported by the materials on record, the same may be regarded as perverse. 33. However, the power of the Court to examine the reasonableness of an order of the authorities does not enable the Court to look into the sufficiency of the grounds in support of a decision to examine the merits of the decision, sitting as if in appeal over the decision. 33. However, the power of the Court to examine the reasonableness of an order of the authorities does not enable the Court to look into the sufficiency of the grounds in support of a decision to examine the merits of the decision, sitting as if in appeal over the decision. The test is not what the Court considers reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the Court thinks that no reasonable person could have taken, which has led to manifest injustice. The writ court does not interfere, because a decision is not perfect.” 29. In the light of the above authoritative principles, when the impugned policy dated 23.07.2020 is examined, it is manifest that the State Government, in exercise of its executive power, has framed a policy to extend the benefit of absorption to a fresh category of teachers upon completion of two years of service. This policy neither divests nor curtails any of the benefits already granted to the petitioners under the earlier policy dated 30.06.2018. The petitioners have also failed to demonstrate any illegality, procedural impropriety, or Wednesbury unreasonableness in the decision-making process. Mere dissatisfaction or a claim for perceived parity, without any infringement of legal or vested rights, cannot constitute a ground for judicial intervention. 30. The plea of the petitioners that they are entitled to notional absorption from the date they completed two years of service is wholly misconceived. The petitioners voluntarily accepted absorption under the 2018 policy after completion of eight years of service, and their absorption has long since attained finality. They cannot now seek to reopen settled service conditions by seeking a re-determination of their absorption date. Service jurisprudence is clear that once an employee accepts a policy and receives benefits thereunder without demur, he cannot subsequently approbate and reprobate by seeking more advantageous treatment under a later policy. The doctrine of estoppel squarely applies in the present case. 31. The petitioners’ apprehension that they have been placed at a disadvantage in comparison to those absorbed under the 2020 policy is also unfounded. The petitioners were extended the 7th Pay Commission benefits with effect from 01.07.2018, whereas the newly absorbed teachers receive such benefits only from 01.11.2020. The mere fact that the qualifying service for absorption has been relaxed for a subsequent group of employees does not adversely affect the petitioners’ service rights. The petitioners were extended the 7th Pay Commission benefits with effect from 01.07.2018, whereas the newly absorbed teachers receive such benefits only from 01.11.2020. The mere fact that the qualifying service for absorption has been relaxed for a subsequent group of employees does not adversely affect the petitioners’ service rights. Relaxation of criteria in favour of one class of employees does not automatically entitle another class to seek retrospective or notional extension of similar benefits. 32. It is also well-settled that a policy cannot be struck down merely because it grants concessions to another group. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raj Kumar , (2021) 2 SCC 713 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Article 14 does not envisage negative equality, and no employee can claim a benefit solely because another person has been granted such benefit under a relaxation or a one-time measure. The petitioners’ claim falls squarely within the realm of negative equality, which is impermissible in law. 33. Furthermore, the prayer of the petitioners seeking notional seniority and consequential benefits from the date they completed two years of service is untenable. Seniority is always governed by statutory rules and the date of entry into service of a particular cadre. The petitioners were inducted into the School Education Department only upon completion of eight years of service under the 2018 policy. Seniority cannot be remodelled to accommodate their claim, as doing so would not only contravene the Rules of 2018 but also create administrative and structural anomalies in the cadre. 34. Having considered the rival submissions, examined the policy decisions, and applied the settled principles of judicial review, this Court finds no arbitrariness, discrimination, illegality, or irrationality in the policy decision dated 23.07.2020. The said policy is a valid exercise of the State Government’s executive discretion and does not infringe any rights of the petitioners. 35. Accordingly, the petitioners are not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed. The prayers seeking notional absorption from the date of completion of two years of service, re-fixation of seniority, re- determination of pay scale, and parity with teachers absorbed under the 2020 policy are wholly devoid of merit and deserve to be rejected. 36. 35. Accordingly, the petitioners are not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed. The prayers seeking notional absorption from the date of completion of two years of service, re-fixation of seniority, re- determination of pay scale, and parity with teachers absorbed under the 2020 policy are wholly devoid of merit and deserve to be rejected. 36. In the result, all the writ petitions (WPS Nos.1389/2021, 2480/2023, 2253/2023, 2159/2023, 2498/2023, 2491/2023, 6236/2024, 2780/2023, 2801/2023, 2490/2023, 2260/2023, 3255/2023, 4042/2023, 4843/2023, 4910/2023, 4029/2023, 2252/2023, 4032/2023, 4080/2023, 2825/2023, 2140/2023, 3112/2023, 3134/2023, 3161/2023, 2424/2023, 2470/2023, and 2779/2023), being devoid of substance, are hereby dismissed There shall be no order as to costs.