JUDGMENT : Rajani Dubey, J. 1. All the appeals arise from a single impugned judgment accordingly, they are heard collectively and disposed of by this common judgment. 2. These appeals under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been preferred assailing the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.07.2007 passed by the learned Special Judge, C.B.I., Raipur (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No. 35/2004. By the impugned judgment, the trial Court convicted the appellants - Indrajeet Solanki, Sudarshan Jain and Sudhirkshir Sagar and sentenced them as under:- A. Appellant – Indrajeet Solanki Conviction Sentence Under Section 120B of Indian Penal Code R.I. for 2 years and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo additional R.I. for 2 months Under Section 420 of Indian Penal Code R.I. for 2 years and 6 months & to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo additional R.I. for 3 months Under Section 468 r/w Section 471 r/w Section 120B of Indian Penal Code R.I. for 2 years and 6 months & to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo additional R.I. for 3 months Under Section 13(1)(d) r/w 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 R.I. for 2 years and 6 months & to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo additional R.I. for 3 months B. Appellants – Sudarshan Jain and Sudhirkshir Sagar Conviction Sentence Under Section 120B of Indian Penal Code R.I. for 2 years and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo additional R.I. for 2 months Under Section 420 r/w 120B of Indian Penal Code R.I. for 2 years and 6 months & to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo additional R.I. for 3 months Under Section 467 r/w Section 471 r/w Section 120B of Indian Penal Code R.I. for 2 years and 6 months & to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo additional R.I. for 3 months 3. 2,000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo additional R.I. for 3 months Under Section 467 r/w Section 471 r/w Section 120B of Indian Penal Code R.I. for 2 years and 6 months & to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo additional R.I. for 3 months 3. The prosecution case, in short, is that the accused Indrajeet Solanki, while serving as Branch Manager of Dena Bank, Industrial Branch, Raipur, in the capacity of a public servant during the period from 12.06.1989 to July 1992, is alleged to have entered into a criminal conspiracy with Accused Sudarshan Jain, proprietor of M/s Jai Durga Stores, and co-accused Sudhirkshir Sagar, the alleged proprietor of M/s Shilpa Enterprises and Alok Kumar Srivastava, the alleged proprietor of M/s Srivastava Traders, with the intention of cheating the bank. In furtherance of the said conspiracy, the accused are alleged to have forged documents, used them as genuine, and committed criminal misconduct by abusing the official position of Accused No. Indrajeet Solanki as a public servant. It is alleged that M/s Shilpa Enterprises and M/s Srivastava Traders were non-existent entities, yet the accused, by falsely projecting Sudhirkshir Sagar and Alok Kumar Srivastava as their proprietors, dishonestly and illegally procured sanction of loans of Rs.1,00,000/- in the name of Shilpa Enterprises and Rs.50,000/- in the name of Srivastava Traders. By doing so, they fraudulently induced the Dena Bank Industrial Estate Branch, Raipur, to disburse the said amounts on the basis of forged documents. All the accused persons, by impersonating the alleged proprietors of the fictitious firms, procured loan sanctions on the strength of bogus supply bills furnished in favour of accused Sudarshan Jain, proprietor of M/s Jai Durga Stores, without following mandatory legal procedures, without conducting inspection of the establishments, and without obtaining the requisite 25% margin money. The accused thereby dishonestly caused wrongful loss to the bank and corresponding wrongful gain to themselves. In pursuance of the criminal conspiracy, the accused obtained wrongful financial benefits of Rs.1,00,000/- and Rs.50,000/- by using forged bills and documents relating to non-existent business firms as genuine. Accused Indrajeet Solanki, being a public servant, is alleged to have obtained illegal gratification through corrupt and illegal means by facilitating the sanction and disbursement of the loans to co-accused persons without adherence to prescribed banking procedures. Accused Indrajeet Solanki, being a public servant, is alleged to have obtained illegal gratification through corrupt and illegal means by facilitating the sanction and disbursement of the loans to co-accused persons without adherence to prescribed banking procedures. During the pendency of the proceedings, accused Alok Kumar Srivastava passed away and therefore, the case abates insofar as he is concerned. The prosecution case further states that during the period from 1989 to July 1992 , accused Indrajeet Solanki, as Branch Manager of Dena Bank Industrial Estate Branch, Raipur, sanctioned a loan of Rs.1,00,000/- to Sudhirkshir Sagar, proprietor of the alleged Shilpa Enterprises, and Rs.50,000/- to Alok Kumar Srivastava, proprietor of Srivastava Traders. The accused failed to comply with mandatory loan procedures and did not verify the existence or functioning of the said firms, nor did he verify the genuineness of the supply of goods. Loans were sanctioned solely on the basis of fictitious invoices. Upon receiving information regarding these irregularities, the CBI, Jabalpur, registered an FIR, conducted an investigation, and upon finding a prima facie case against the accused persons, filed a charge-sheet before the competent court. The learned trial Court framed charges against accused Indrajeet Solanki for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Charges were also framed against accused Sudhirkshir Sagar and Sudarshan Jain for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, each read with Section 120-B IPC. All the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed to be tried. 4. In order to prove the charges against the accused/appellants, the prosecution examined 14 witnesses. The statements of the accused/appellants were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they denied all incriminating circumstances, asserting their innocence and alleging false implication. In defence, the appellants examined 4 witnesses namely Subhrato Kumar Rai (D.W.-1), Vijay Saluja (D.W.-2), Vijay Kumar Agrawal (D.W.-3), and B.B. Parida (D.W.-4). 5. Upon consideration and evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both sides, the learned trial Court found the prosecution story reliable and by judgment dated 31.07.2007, convicted and sentenced the appellants in the manner stated in paragraph 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 6. 5. Upon consideration and evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both sides, the learned trial Court found the prosecution story reliable and by judgment dated 31.07.2007, convicted and sentenced the appellants in the manner stated in paragraph 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 6. In CRA No. 712 of 2007 - Shri Kishore Bhaduri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment is contrary to law and evidence as the prosecution has failed to produce any documentary or admissible material to show violation of loan procedures or existence of any conspiracy involving the appellant. He contends that the loans were disbursed only after receipt of supply bills that even the appellant’s successor renewed the insurance of the stock after due verification, and that the trial Court ignored these vital facts. It is argued that the prosecution has not proved any act of conspiracy, forgery or use of forged documents and the conviction is based on mere assumptions and presumptions without credible evidence. Hence, the appellant being innocent and falsely implicated, seeks setting aside of the impugned judgment. 7. In CRA No. 767 of 2007 - Mr. Adil Minhaj, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment is contrary to the law and the facts of the case. The prosecution has failed to produce any documentary or admissible evidence to show that the appellant committed forgery, violated any banking procedure, or obtained the loan fraudulently. It is argued that the existence of M/s Shilpa Enterprises was never disproved and the loan was sanctioned only after receipt of supply bills and in compliance with all requisite procedures. Even after the transfer of the then Branch Manager, the successor renewed the insurance of the firm’s stock, which could have been done only after verification of the stock, a circumstance ignored by the trial Court. There is no evidence of conspiracy between the appellant and the co- accused, nor is there proof of any forged document being used by the appellant for cheating the Bank. The conviction rests merely on assumptions and inadmissible material. The appellant is innocent, has been falsely implicated and the prosecution has failed to produce any credible witness or evidence to justify the conviction. The impugned judgment suffers from material illegality and deserves to be set aside with additional grounds reserved for oral arguments. 8. The conviction rests merely on assumptions and inadmissible material. The appellant is innocent, has been falsely implicated and the prosecution has failed to produce any credible witness or evidence to justify the conviction. The impugned judgment suffers from material illegality and deserves to be set aside with additional grounds reserved for oral arguments. 8. In CRA No. 713 of 2007 - Mr. Pranjal Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment is contrary to the law, facts, and circumstances of the case. It is argued that the prosecution has not produced any documentary or oral evidence to establish the appellant’s involvement in the alleged offence. The trial Court failed to appreciate that not even a minimal amount of evidence has been brought on record to show any role of the appellant in the commission of the crime. It is further submitted that the statement of Rameshchandra Jain (P.W.11) clearly indicates that the consignment was duly delivered by the appellant, and there is no evidence to suggest that the receipts issued by him were forged or bogus. The appellant cannot be held responsible for the Bank’s inability to recover the loan amount from its creditors. As per routine procedure, bills under a loan account are cleared only after verification of delivery and prosecution witnesses themselves have stated that the consignment was insured and inspected by the insurance company’s agent. Counsel contends that the appellant ought to have been acquitted, as there is no concrete, admissible, or reliable evidence against him. Mere suspicion cannot form the basis of conviction, particularly when prosecution witnesses have not levelled any specific allegation against the appellant. Even the memorandum witnesses have not supported the prosecution story. The impugned judgment, therefore, suffers from material illegality and deserves to be set aside, with the appellant reserving the right to raise additional grounds during oral arguments. Reliance has been placed on behalf of all the appellants upon the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sheila Sabastian Vs. R. Jawaharaj and another ; (2018) 7 SCC 581, Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another ; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1950, Jagtar Singh vs. State of Punjab ; (2023) 19 SCC 498 and Vishal Noble Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another ; 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680. 9. R. Jawaharaj and another ; (2018) 7 SCC 581, Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another ; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1950, Jagtar Singh vs. State of Punjab ; (2023) 19 SCC 498 and Vishal Noble Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another ; 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the impugned judgment is well-reasoned and based on proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. It is argued that the prosecution has successfully established the fraudulent nature of the loans, the non-existence of the firms, the forged documents used for securing the loan amounts and the active involvement of the appellants in the criminal conspiracy. The renewal of insurance or receipt of supply bills does not negate the clear evidence showing manipulation of records, fabrication of documents and misuse of official position. It is contended that the trial Court rightly convicted the appellants based on credible evidence and no ground is made out for interference with the well-founded judgment. 10. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 11. It is evident from the record of the learned trial Court that charges were framed against appellant Indrajeet Solanki for offences punishable under Sections 120B, 420, 468/471 read with Section 120B of the IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Charges were also framed against appellants Sudhirkshir Sagar and Sudarshan Jain for offences punishable under Sections 120B, 420 read with Section 120B, and 468/471 read with Section 120B of the IPC. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Court convicted the appellants as detailed in para 2 of this judgment. 12. Before the trial Court, it was an admitted position that the accused Indrajeet Solanki was serving as the Branch Manager of Dena Bank, Industrial Branch, Raipur and was therefore, a public servant. Accused Sudarshan Jain was the proprietor of M/s Jai Durga Stores, while co-accused Sudhir Kshirsagar, the alleged proprietor of M/s Shilpa Enterprises and Alok Kumar Srivastava, the alleged proprietor of M/s Srivastava Traders had obtained loans from Dena Bank. M/s Shilpa Enterprises had availed a loan of Rs. 10 lakhs and M/s Srivastava Traders had obtained a loan of Rs. 5 lakhs from the said bank. 13. M/s Shilpa Enterprises had availed a loan of Rs. 10 lakhs and M/s Srivastava Traders had obtained a loan of Rs. 5 lakhs from the said bank. 13. It is the allegation of the prosecution that M/s Shilpa Enterprises and M/s Srivastava Traders were non-existent and fictitious entities and that the loans were fraudulently sanctioned in their names. It is further alleged that accused Indrajeet Solanki, being a public servant, illegally facilitated the sanction of the aforesaid loans in favour of the co-accused, thereby committing misconduct in discharge of his official duties. 14.The defence of accused Indrajeet Solanki is that the loans were sanctioned by him after due verification and in compliance with all requisite procedures. He asserts that there was no illegality or irregularity in the sanctioning process and that all RBI guidelines were duly followed. He further contends that after his transfer, M/s Shilpa Enterprises changed its address and only thereafter were the present proceedings initiated. 15. The other co-accused have stated that they obtained the loans after fulfilling all necessary formalities. They claim that M/s Shilpa Enterprises had changed its address and had duly informed the bank in that regard; however, the bank officials failed to verify the new address and filed incomplete information. They also produced various documents to establish the genuineness of the firms and several prosecution witnesses admitted that the firms existed. According to the defence, the learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate the oral and documentary evidence and, therefore, erroneously convicted the appellants. 16.The prosecution examined 14 witnesses and exhibited 13 documents. The defence examined 4 witnesses and exhibited documents marked D/1 to D/4, D/1 to D/12 and D/1 to D/6. 17. R.N. Dubey (P.W.-1) stated that he was posted as a Labour Inspector in the office of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Raipur. He deposed that Shri R.G. Pandey was serving as the Assistant Labour Commissioner at Raipur in March 1993 and had issued the letter vide Ex. P/1. He further identified the signature of Shri R.G. Pandey on Ex. P/1 from A to A part. As per the contents of the said letter, it was informed that the firms in question were not registered in the office of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Raipur. P/1. He further identified the signature of Shri R.G. Pandey on Ex. P/1 from A to A part. As per the contents of the said letter, it was informed that the firms in question were not registered in the office of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Raipur. In cross-examination, he stated that if a person conducts business in Ujjain and supplies goods directly from there without maintaining any office in Raipur, then obtaining registration in Raipur is not required. He further admitted that the Shops and Establishments Act, 1958 was not in force in Bagbahara. 18. J.P. Soni (P.W.-2) stated that he was posted as Chief Clerk in the Sales Tax Office, Circle No. 1, Raipur. He deposed that Ex.P/2 is not a document related to Sales Tax Circle No. 1, Raipur. He further stated that, as per Ex.P/3, a letter was issued from his office informing that M/s Shilpa Enterprises was not registered in the Sales Tax Office, Raipur. In cross-examination, he admitted that a businessman after obtaining registration at one place, could carry on business anywhere, but he would be required to submit his returns only at the place of registration. He further admitted that he had not made any statement in respect of Jai Durga Stores. He stated that Ex.D/2 is the assessment order dated 03.07.1991 pertaining to Circle No. 2. Ex.D/3 is another assessment order pertaining to Jai Durga Stores. Ex.D/4 is the professional tax invoice evidencing payment of professional tax by Jai Durga Stores. 19. B. Sai Kumar (P.W.-3) stated that he was posted as a Personal Officer at the Dena Bank Regional Office, Raipur, during the period from 1991 to 1992. He further stated that accused I.S. Solanki was posted as the Branch Manager at Dena Bank, Raipur, and that his appointment order is marked as Ex.P/3, while his joining report is marked as Ex.P/5. He deposed that, by means of the said letter (Ex.P/6), the Branch Manager, Industrial State Education, was directed to regularize the loans granted to the companies mentioned therein, including Jai Durga Stores, Abhishek Traders, Prabha Mishra & Bharat Gyan Vigyan Samiti, Naga Tyagi Cable Vision, Sanjay Traders and Khodiyar Traders. He also stated that during the said period, accused I.S. Solanki was functioning as the Branch Manager of Dena Bank and the said letter (Ex.P/6) was addressed to him. 20. He also stated that during the said period, accused I.S. Solanki was functioning as the Branch Manager of Dena Bank and the said letter (Ex.P/6) was addressed to him. 20. N.R. Daru (P.W.-4) stated that before sanctioning any loan, stock verification and completion of other essential formalities are required. 21. Jaidev Sharma (P.W.-5), Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax stated that in response to the inquiry made by the CBI and as per the memorandum seeking information (Ex.P/3), it was informed that Shilpa Enterprises was not registered in his office. 22. Sunirmal Pal (P.W.-6), Assistant General Manager, Dena Bank, stated that as per documents Ex.P/7 to Ex.P/20, loans had been sanctioned to the firms, namely Shilpa Enterprises and Jai Durga Stores. However, he clarified that the loan applications are accepted on the very same day they are submitted. In para 18 of his cross-examination, he stated that it is correct to say that as per Ex. P/22, the said branch was given a target of sanctioning loans amounting to Rs.5 lakh. He further stated that it is correct to say that on perusal of the account statement (Ex.P/20), it appears that certain amounts were disbursed from time to time in the said loan account by the party. 23. V.K. Shrivastav (P.W.-7) Assistant Commissioner (Commercial Tax) stated that in March 1993, he had been posted as Sales Tax Officer in Vikram Sales Tax Office, Circle No. 3, Raipur. He further stated that at that time, on being asked by the CBI to verify whether Varsh Shrivastava Traders, Raipur, was registered, he had examined the official records and informed that no firm was registered under that name in the office. He also stated that his aforesaid statement was marked as Ex.P/23. He further stated that a memorandum had been issued from his office pertaining to the transmission of information related to a concerned case, and pursuant to that memo, information was sent regarding Ravindra Sports, M/s Alpna Sports and Scientific Sports. In cross-examination, He admitted that registration under the Sales Tax Act is not mandatory at the time of commencing a business; rather, the requirement for registration arises only when the business attains the prescribed turnover. 24. In cross-examination, He admitted that registration under the Sales Tax Act is not mandatory at the time of commencing a business; rather, the requirement for registration arises only when the business attains the prescribed turnover. 24. R.G. Pandey (P.W.-8) stated that he had written a letter to CBI on 23-03-1993 and had sent the required information on the basis of the official records, which was forwarded vide Ex.P/1 and admitted his signature on it from A to A part. In cross-examination, he stated that it was not necessary to obtain registration before commencing a shop; however, it was mandatory to secure registration within 30 days of starting the shop. He further stated that registration could also be granted even after the expiry of 30 days upon receipt of an application, but in such cases, a compounding fee was leviable for the delay in accordance with the rules. 25. Sunil Kumar Rai (P.W.-9), the landlord of accused Sudhir Kshirsagar, stated that the accused used to run a medical shop on rent for selling medicines. He further stated that although there was no formal shop, the accused used to sell medicines. 26. Gulam Kudrat Ulla (P.W.-10) stated that the usual procedure prior to repayment of a bank loan was to sell the item purchased out of the loan amount. He further stated that loans were sanctioned for such purposes, and disbursements were made only after physical verification of the item. He clarified that such physical verification was carried out either by the Branch Manager himself or by an officer posted at the bank, in accordance with the directions of the Branch Manager. He also stated that he could not say as to who had conducted the physical verifications in the present case, as he was serving merely in the capacity of an officer and had not personally undertaken any physical verification. It is further stated that in Ex.P/9, there was no mention or note pertaining to any physical verification. In cross-examination, he admitted that no collateral security or guarantee is required for loans below Rs.25,000/-. In para 10, he admitted that in both these cases, since the value of the articles supplied was equal to the loan amount, there was no need to take any collateral security. In para 11, he stated that the payment voucher was prepared only after physical verification of the goods. In para 10, he admitted that in both these cases, since the value of the articles supplied was equal to the loan amount, there was no need to take any collateral security. In para 11, he stated that the payment voucher was prepared only after physical verification of the goods. He further stated that there was no requirement to record any separate note regarding such physical verification as the Branch Manager would release the payment only upon being satisfied with the verification. In para 13, he admitted that in July 1992, the accused Indrajit Solanki had been transferred from the Urla Branch to another place. In para 15, he admitted that in both these cases, he did not find any irregularity on record in the sanction of the loans. In para 7 of his cross-examination, he admitted that no rule prohibited the sanction of a loan application on the very same day, and that if the Branch manager was satisfied, the loan could be approved on that day itself. In para 10, he stated that it was correct to say that during his tenure, the stock of Shilpa Enterprises had remained insured until 14/06/1996. In para 22, he admitted his signature on Ex.D/1 letter dated 16.05.94 from A to A part. He admitted that in Ex.D/1, the address of Devendra Nagar was written, and the witness stated that it was the address of the proprietor's residence. In para 23, when questioned by showing the letter acknowledgment receipt to the witness, he admitted that the portion from A to A was his signature on the letter acknowledgment receipt (Ex.D/2). 28. Close scrutiny of statements of all prosecution witnesses makes it clear that loan was sanctioned by Indrajeet Solanki to various firms and bank officers admitted that in loan sanctioning proceedings all procedures were followed by Indrajeet Solanki. There is no illegality or irregularity was found. 30. Defence witness- Vijay Saluja (D.W.-2) stated that the accused Sudhir Kshirsagar had supplied ayurvedic medicines to him. 31. Defence witness- Vijay Kumar Agrawal (D.W.-3) stated that the accused Sudhirakshir Sagar used to supply him Ayurvedic medicines from Raipur. 32. Defence witness- B.B. Parida (D.W.-4) Branch Manager of Dena Bank filed insurance application vide Ex.D/1 for loan dated 13.05.1993 to 12.05.1994. Defence witness- Vijay Saluja (D.W.-2) stated that the accused Sudhir Kshirsagar had supplied ayurvedic medicines to him. 31. Defence witness- Vijay Kumar Agrawal (D.W.-3) stated that the accused Sudhirakshir Sagar used to supply him Ayurvedic medicines from Raipur. 32. Defence witness- B.B. Parida (D.W.-4) Branch Manager of Dena Bank filed insurance application vide Ex.D/1 for loan dated 13.05.1993 to 12.05.1994. Ex.D/2 is insurance application medicines and fridge of the Shilpa Enterprises and also filed Ex.D/3 insurance related document of shrivastava Tradersa nd bill of new india insurance (Ex.D/4) and application of insurance (Ex.D/5). He also filed bank application for filing civil suit against Shilpa Enterprises vide Ex.D/8. 33. The principal allegation of the prosecution is that the accused/appellant, Indrajeet Solanki, sanctioned the loan on the very same date on which the application was submitted, and that during verification no firm was found at the address furnished by the applicants, nor were the two firms registered with the Sales Tax Department or the Labour Office. However, the prosecution witnesses, particularly the bank officials, admitted the defence suggestion that there was no illegality or irregularity in sanctioning the loan on the same day. They also admitted that Shilpa Enterprises had submitted a letter seeking change of address. The bank officers further accepted that certain installments of the loan had been deposited from time to time and that the bank had instituted a civil suit for recovery of the outstanding loan amount. No evidence has been brought on record to establish any specific illegality or irregularity committed by the Branch Manager or the other accused persons. The defence witnesses also admitted that no departmental enquiry was ever initiated against Indrajeet Solanki for any such alleged illegality or irregularity. 34. In the matter of Sheila Sebastian (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has, in paras 26 to 30 of the judgment, held as under::- “26. The definition of "false document" is a part of the definition of "forgery". Both must be read together. "Forgery" and "fraud" are essentially matters of evidence which could be proved as a fact by direct evidence or by inferences drawn from proved facts. In the case in hand, there is no finding recorded by the trial court that the respondents have made any false document or part of the document/record to execute mortgage deed under the guise of that "false document". In the case in hand, there is no finding recorded by the trial court that the respondents have made any false document or part of the document/record to execute mortgage deed under the guise of that "false document". Hence, neither Respondent 1 nor Respondent 2 can be held as makers of the forged documents. It is the imposter who can be said to have made the false document by committing forgery. In such an event the trial court as well as the appellate court misguided themselves by convicting the accused. Therefore, the High Court has rightly acquitted the accused based on the settled legal position and we find no reason to interfere with the same. 27. A reasonable doubt has already been thoroughly explained in Latesh v. State of Maharashtra wherein "reasonable doubt" has been enunciated by this Court as (at SCC p. 83, para 46) "a mean between excessive caution and excessive indifference to a doubt, further it has been elaborated that reasonable doubt must be a practical one and not an abstract theoretical hypothesis". 28. In this case at hand, the imposter has not been found or investigated into by the officer concerned. Nothing has been spilled on the relationship between the imposter and Respondent 1. Law is well settled with regard to the fact that however strong the suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong suspicion, coincidence, grave doubt cannot take the place of proof. Always a duty is cast upon the courts to ensure that suspicion does not take place of the legal proof. In this case, the trial court as well as the appellate court got carried away by the fact that accused is the beneficiary or the executant of the mortgage deed, where the prosecution miserably failed to prove the first transaction i.e. PoA as a fraudulent and forged transaction. The standard of proof in a criminal trial is proof beyond reasonable doubt because the right to personal liberty of a citizen can never be taken away by the standard of preponderance of probability. 29. This case on hand is a classic example of poor prosecution and shabby investigation which resulted in the acquittal of the accused. The investigating officer is expected to be diligent while discharging his duties. 29. This case on hand is a classic example of poor prosecution and shabby investigation which resulted in the acquittal of the accused. The investigating officer is expected to be diligent while discharging his duties. He has to be fair, transparent and his only endeavour should be to find out the truth The investigating officer has not even taken bare minimum care to find out the whereabouts of the imposter who executed the PoA. The evidence on record clearly reveals that PoA was not executed by the complainant and the beneficiary is the accused, still the accused could not be convicted. The laches in the lopsided investigation goes to the root of the matter and fatal to the case of prosecution. If this is the coordination between the prosecution and the investigating agency, every criminal case tend to end up in acquittal. In the process, the common man will lose confidence on the criminal justice delivery system, which is not a good symptom. It is the duty of the investigating officer, prosecution as well as the courts to ensure that full and material facts and evidence are brought on record, so that there is no scope for miscarriage of justice. 30. Although we acknowledge the appellant's plight who has suffered due to alleged acts of forgery, but we are not able to appreciate the appellant's contentions as a penal statute cannot be expanded by using implications. Section 464 IPC makes it clear that only the one who makes a false document can be held liable under the aforesaid provision. It must be borne in mind that where there exists no ambiguity, there lies no scope for interpretation The contentions of the appellant are contrary to the provision and contrary to the settled law. The prosecution could not succeed to prove the offence of forgery by adducing cogent and reliable evidence. Apart from that, it is not as though the appellant is remediless. She has a common law remedy of instituting a suit challenging the validity and binding nature of the mortgage deed and it is brought to our notice that already the competent civil court has cancelled the mortgage deed and the appellant got back the property.” 35. Further in Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held in paras 18 to 20 as under:- “18. We are unable to accept her submission on this score too. Further in Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held in paras 18 to 20 as under:- “18. We are unable to accept her submission on this score too. There is nothing on record to show the appellant had manufactured the alleged fake document which is a sine qua non to attract Section 465 IPC [punishment for forgery]. In fact, the original fabricated document had not been recovered. 19. In Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj [ (2018) 7 SCC 581 , para 25], this Court held to attract Section 464 IPC [Making a false document], the prosecution must establish that the accused had made the fake document. No material connecting the appellant to the making of the fake document has been adduced in the impugned charge sheet. 20. Similarly, offences under Section 468 IPC [forgery for purpose of cheating] and Section 471 IPC are not attracted, as the requisite mens rea, i.e., dishonest intention to cause wrongful loss to the Education Department and wrongful gain to himself has not been demonstrated as the issuance of the recognition was not dependent on the production of the alleged forged NOC.” 36. In the matter of Jagtar Singh (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court held in paras 11 to 13 as under:- “11. In the case in hand, Jit Singh, complainant as well as Chamkaur (emphasis in original and supplied) Singh, shadow witness have turned hostile. The trial court had specifically held that there is no evidence produced on record to prove the demand of illegal gratification. It is not the case in which the demand was reiterated when the money was allegedly paid to him Gurjinder Singh (PW 8) is only a witness who stated that he had recovered the money from the appellant. The High Court has passed its judgment on the assumption that the money having been recovered from the appellant, there was demand of illegal gratification. This is not a case where there was circumstantial evidence to prove the demand. 12. If the evidence produced on record by the prosecution is examined in the light of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731 , the conviction and sentence of the appellant cannot be legally sustained. 13. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court and that of the trial court are set aside. 13. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court and that of the trial court are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges and his bail bond stands discharged.” 37.Further in the matter of Vishal Noble Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in paras 17 to 21 and 24 as under:- 17. On a reading of the FIR as well as the charge-sheet, we do not find that the offences aforestated is made out at all. We do not find any criminal breach of trust nor any cheating by impersonation. There is also no cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, nor has any documents referred to any forgery or security or any forgery for the purpose of cheating. There is no reference to any document which has been forged so as to be used as a genuine document and much less is as there any criminal conspiracy which can be imputed to the appellants herein in the absence of any offence being made out vis-a-vis the aforesaid Sections. 18. In this regard, our attention was drawn to paras 42- 44 and 46 of Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 , dealing with Sections 420 and 467 IPC, which are extracted hereunder with regard to Section 420 IPC, it was observed thus: "42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived In the first class of cases, the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning. 43. We shall now deal with the ingredients of Section 467 IPC. 44. The following ingredients are essential for commission of the offence under Section 467 1PC: 1. the document in question so forged; 2. the accused who forged it; 3. the document is one of the kinds enumerated in the aforementioned section. * 46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is Justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the Impugned judgment cannot be sustained. (emphasis by us) 19. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial dicta, we find that none of the offences alleged against the Accused-Appellants herein is made out. In fact, we find that the allegations of criminal intent and other allegations against the Accused-Appellants herein have been made with a malafide intent and therefore, the Judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of paragraph 102, extracted above, squarely apply to the facts of these cases. It is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution to continue. 20. It is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution to continue. 20. This Court, in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 , reasoned that the criminal process cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and held that while Entertaining an application for quashing an FIR at the initial stage, the test to be applied is whether the uncontroverted allegations prima facie establish the offence This Court also concluded that the court should quash those criminal cases where the chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and no useful purpose is likely to be served by continuation of a criminal prosecution. The aforesaid observations squarely apply to this case. 21. We find that in recent years the machinery of criminal justice is being misused by certain persons for their vested interests and for achieving their oblique motives and agenda. Courts have therefore to be vigilant against such tendencies and ensure that acts of omission and commission having an adverse impact on the fabric of our society must be nipped in the bud. 24. We also find that the reliance by the High Court upon the judgment of this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure is not apposite. The facts in the aforementioned case and the present case are quite different. The aforementioned case concerned a special leave petition filed by a complainant aggrieved by an interim order of the Bombay High Court that granted protection to the applicant therein from ‘coercive steps’. The grievance of the complainant in that case was that one-and-half-years after securing protection from arrest from the Sessions Court, the accused had filed a Writ Petition before the Bombay High Court to quash the FIR. Accordingly, this Court had quashed the interim order of 'no coercive steps’ and cautioned against the practice of directing 'no coercive steps’ while dismissing applications under Section 482 of CrPC. This Court had also clarified that it was not expressing any view on merits of the application for quashing of the FIR in the said case. Therefore, the High Court ought not to have relied upon the said judgment to deny the relief to the present Accused- Appellants.” 38. This Court had also clarified that it was not expressing any view on merits of the application for quashing of the FIR in the said case. Therefore, the High Court ought not to have relied upon the said judgment to deny the relief to the present Accused- Appellants.” 38. Upon due consideration of the entire evidence on record, including the statements of prosecution and defence witnesses and after evaluating the documentary material placed before the Court, it is crystal clear that the prosecution has only succeeded in establishing the undisputed fact that at the relevant point of time, the accused/appellant Indrajeet Solanki was serving as the Branch Manager of Dena Bank, Industrial Estate Branch, Raipur, and that he had sanctioned loans to various firms, including M/s Shilpa Enterprises and M/s Jai Durga Stores, whose proprietors are the co-accused persons. Although the prosecution alleged that the aforesaid firms were fictitious, the investigating officer Devendra Singh (P.W.-12) himself admitted during cross- examination that M/s Jai Durga Stores did exist and was carrying on business and therefore no charge-sheet was filed against that firm. The prosecution witnesses, particularly the bank officers, consistently admitted that there was no illegality or irregularity in sanctioning the loans, even when sanctioned on the same day, as no rule prohibited such sanction. 39. All requisite banking procedures and RBI guidelines had been duly followed by the Branch Manager. Insurance of the stocks was duly done and premium had been debited from the borrowers' accounts, which could not have been done without physical verification by the insurance company. Installments were deposited from time to time by Shilpa Enterprises, which supports the existence and functioning of the firm. Shilpa Enterprises had communicated change of address to the bank and the relevant acknowledgment receipts were proved by Rameshchandra Jain (P.W.-11). The investigating officer admitted that no enquiry was made from the guarantors. He had no knowledge regarding the correspondence between the bank and the borrowers, including address-change intimation. He did not investigate the insurance premium deductions, nor the civil recovery proceedings initiated by the bank. No criminality was found in the case of Jai Durga Traders and therefore no charge-sheet was filed. He had no knowledge regarding the correspondence between the bank and the borrowers, including address-change intimation. He did not investigate the insurance premium deductions, nor the civil recovery proceedings initiated by the bank. No criminality was found in the case of Jai Durga Traders and therefore no charge-sheet was filed. No evidence has been led by the prosecution to establish that the loan documents were forged, nor is there any evidence indicating as to how the accused persons entered into any agreement or acted in concert to commit any illegal act. The defence witnesses, including Subhrato Kumar Rai (D.W.-1) the Senior Manager of Dena Bank stated that no departmental enquiry was ever initiated against Indrajeet Solanki regarding sanction of the impugned loans, which further weakens the prosecution case alleging misconduct. The evidence of the bank officials indicates that loan procedures were regularly audited. No adverse remark was ever made during audit. No deviation from standard procedure was found in the present loan cases. The prosecution case rests merely on suspicion that the firms did not exist. However, suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. In the absence of cogent and legally admissible evidence regarding non-existence of firms or the forging of documents, the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational facts essential for sustaining charges under Sections 420, 468, 471, 120-B IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The essential ingredients of criminal conspiracy are wholly absent. There is no evidence of any meeting of minds, agreement, or concerted action between the accused persons to commit any illegal act. Mens rea, which is a mandatory component for the offences alleged, has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has not established any dishonest intention on the part of the Branch Manager at the time of sanctioning the loan. 40. In view of the deficiencies noted above and the overwhelming admissions made by the prosecution witnesses themselves, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The findings of the learned trial Court suffer from misappreciation of evidence and cannot be sustained. No offence is made out against the appellants under the IPC or the Prevention of Corruption Act. 41. Consequently, the appeals are allowed . The findings of the learned trial Court suffer from misappreciation of evidence and cannot be sustained. No offence is made out against the appellants under the IPC or the Prevention of Corruption Act. 41. Consequently, the appeals are allowed . The judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court are hereby set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. 42. Appellants are reported to be on bail and, therefore keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. (481 of the B.N.S.S.), appellants are directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- each with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 43. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for information and necessary action if, any.