2025:HHC:2244 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No. 4123 of 2009 Reserved on 02.01.2025 Date of Decision: 09.01.2025 ______________________________________________________ UCO Bank …….Petitioner Versus Presiding Officer and another … Respondents ______________________________________________________ Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1Yes. For the Petitioner: Mr. P.P.Chauhan, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, Senior Advocate with Mr. Rakesh Chauhan, Advocate, for respondent No.2. ______________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral): Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with award dated 01.01.2009 passed by Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court-1, Chandigarh (for short ‘Labour Court’) in case No ID 59/1992, titled as State Secretary, UCO Bank Employees’ Association, Post Box-38, The Mall Shimla versus Assistant Manage, UCO Bank, Zonal Office, Hotel Himland Circular Road, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, whereby workmen i.e. respondent herein came to be held entitled for full back wages and continuity of service, employer i.e. petitioner herein has approached this Court in 1Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2025:HHC:2244 the instant proceedings filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying therein to set-aside aforesaid award. 2. For having bird’s eye view, facts in brief, but relevant for adjudication of the case at hand, are that respondent-workmen, who were appointed as Class-IV employees in the petitioner-Bank, were terminated by the petitioner-bank without compliance of mandatory provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Being aggrieved on account of illegal termination, respondent-workmen rasied an industrial dispute. Though, at first instance, conciliation was tried, but since parties were unable to settle their dispute amicably, appropriate Government while exercising power under section 10(2) of the Act, made following reference to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chandigarh (Annexure P-9):- “ Whether the action of the united commercial Bank, Zonal Office, Shimla in terminating the services of S/Sh. Prem Singh, Surinder Kumar, Kuldeep Chand and Mohinder Singh, Peons at their branches w.e.f. 1.9.1995, 20.10.1985, 18.8.1985 and 1.9.1985 respectively is justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workmen are entitled and from what date?.” 3. Before afore reference could be answered on the basis of the pleadings as well as evidence led on record by the respective parties, representative of the workmen made a statement that 3 2025:HHC:2244 respondent-workmen do not want to prosecute the reference in view of the undertaking given by the management, but they reserve their right to claim the back wages and continuity of service. Learned Tribunal below taking note of aforesaid statement made by the representative of the workmen passed award dated 21.6.1989, which read as under:- “ On a dispute raised by the workmen against the management of United Commercial Bank Limited Shimla, Central Govt. had vide No.L-12911/49/87-D-II(A) dated 9th November 1987 referred the following dispute to the Tribunal for decision:- “ Whether the action of the United Commercial Bank, Zonal Office, Shimla in terminating the services of S/Sh. Prem Singh, Surinder Kumar, Kuldeep Chand and Mohinder Singh, Peons at their branches w.e.f. 1.9.1995, 20.10.1985, 18.8.1985 and 1.9.1985 respectively is justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workmen are entitled and from what date?.” During the pendency of the proceedings the representative of the workmen made a statement that workmen does not want to prosecute the reference in view of the undertaking given by the management but they reserve their right to the claim of back wages and continuity of service. In view of the statement of the representative of workmen, a No Dispute Award is returned.” 4. After passing of afore award dated 21.6.1989, petitioner-management appointed respondent-workmen against Class-IV post, with a direction to join/report within two weeks from the date i.e. on or before 29th July, 1989 in different branches, as 4 2025:HHC:2244 mentioned in the appointment letters placed on record by the petitioner-bank (Annexure P-10 colly). Since benefit of continuity of service and back wages was not granted in favour of the respondent-workmen, they again rasied demand. Since parties are unable to settle their matter through conciliation, appropriate government, while exercising power under Section 10(2) of the Act, again referred the matter to Central Government Industrial Tribunal- cum-Labour Court, Chandigarh in following manner:- “Whether the action of the management of UCO bank in not granting the continuity of service and back wages to their workmen (list given herein in below) is legally just and valid? If not, then to which relief the workmen are entitled to and from which date?” 5. In the afore proceedings, respondent-workmen submitted that since earlier reference i.e. Case No. I.D.101/87 was not pressed by the respondent-workmen, subject to reserving their right to claim back wages and continuity of service and such benefit despite there being undertaking/assurance given by the petitioner- management was not granted to the respondent- workmen, while issuing appointment letters, necessary direction is required to be issued to the petitioner-management for grant of benefit of continuity of service and back wages from the date, services of the workmen were illegally terminated in the years 1985 and 1995, respectively. Learned tribunal below vide impugned 5 2025:HHC:2244 award dated 1.1.2009 (Annexure P-18), answered the reference in affirmative and held respondent-workmen entitled to the benefit of back wages and continuity of service and accordingly directed the petitioner-management to accord aforesaid benefit within a period of one month from the date of passing of the award, failing which, respondent-workmen shall also entitled for the interest on the entire amount from the date of accrual till final payment at the rate of 8% per annum. In the aforesaid background, petitioner-management has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set aside aforesaid award. 6. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner-management as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. P.P. Chauhan, learned counsel representing the petitioner- management, is that Labour Court has erred in holding respondent- workmen entitled to the benefit of back wages and continuity of service because earlier termination orders passed in the years 1985 and 1995 were never set-aside by the Labour Court, rather a reference i.e. case No. ID 101 of 1987 made in that regard vide order dated 9.11.1997 was not taken to its logical end on account of the statement made by the representative of the respondent- workmen that they do not want to prosecute the reference in view of the undertaking given by the petitioner-management. While 6 2025:HHC:2244 making this Court peruse order dated 21.6.1989 (Annexure P-9), learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though respondent- workmen reserved their right to claim back wages and continuity of service, but there is nothing in the afore order to suggest that undertaking, if any, was ever given by the representative of the petitioner- management. He submitted that though in aforesaid award, there is nothing to suggest that petitioner-bank had actually agreed to take the services of the respondent-workmen back, but it is not in dispute that after passing of award, respondent-workmen were taken back by the petitioner-management, as a fresh candidate. While referring to appointment letters dated 15th July, 1989 (Annexure P-10 colly), learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued that after disposal of Case No. ID 101/87, petitioner-management decided to reengage the respondent- workmen afresh and it was specifically made clear that appointment in subordinate cadre shall be subject to withdrawing their dispute from the Labour Court unconditionally and no further right for back wages and benefit of seniority should be raised. While referring to Clause 11 of the appointment letter placed on record, learned counsel for the petitioner-management contended that once respondent-workmen, while joining, pursuant to afore appointment letters had agreed to terms and conditions contained in the 7 2025:HHC:2244 appointment letters, they could not have claimed benefit of seniority alongwith back wages. While seriously refuting the claim of the respondent-workmen that they were absorbed with the petitioner- bank from the date of their retrenchment, learned counsel for the petitioner, strenuously argued that neither any undertaking was given to the Labour Court at the time of disposal of Case No. I.D 101/87, nor respondent-workmen had made it condition precedent for withdrawing their dispute. He submitted that bare perusal of award dated 21.6.1989 itself suggests that respondent-workmen of their own volition after having pondered upon offer of fresh appointment given by petitioner-bank decided not to pursue earlier dispute rasied by them, if it is so, they cannot be permitted to raise the plea of continuity of service and back wages that too on the basis of liberty, if any, reserved to them by Labour Court, while passing award dated 21.06.1989. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner-management submitted that once there is nothing on record to suggest that alleged termination of the respondent- workmen in the years 1985 and 1995 was ever set aside or held bad by the Labor Court, no order thereby granting continuity of service and back wages could have been passed by learned Labour Court. 7. While making this Court peruse impugned award, learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to argue that direction 8 2025:HHC:2244 issued by the Labour Court, thereby calling upon the petitioner to grant benefit of continuity of service and back wages to the respondent-workmen is not supported by any reasons, rather same appears to have been passed merely on account of alleged liberty reserved by the Labour Court, while permitting respondent-workmen not to pursue their earlier dispute i.e. case No. I.D 101/1987, which otherwise never came to be decided on its own merit. 8. To the contrary, Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel duly assisted by Mr. Rakesh Chauhan, Advocate representing the respondent-workmen, supported the impugned award. He submitted that bare perusal of award dated 21.6.1989 itself suggests that earlier dispute registered as case No. I.D.101/1987 was withdrawn by the respondent-workmen, subject to undertaking/assurance given by the petitioner-management that services of the respondent-workmen shall be taken back. He submitted that having taken note of aforesaid undertaking given by petitioner-management, respondent-workmen decided not to pursue their dispute registered as case No.ID 101/1987, but they specifically reserved their right to claim back wages and continuity of service. Since despite there being re-engagement of the respondent-workmen, benefit of earlier services rendered by them was not given and they were prevented from the work, no illegality 9 2025:HHC:2244 can be said to have been committed by the Labour Court, while passing the impugned award. While seriously disputing the claim of the counsel for the petitioner-management that appointment made pursuant to order dated 15th July, 1989 was a fresh appointment, learned counsel for the respondent-workmen specifically referred to the pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by the petitioner-management, to state that as per their own case, decision to make fresh appointments was taken by the petitioner-bank pursuant to circular dated 19.10.1989. He further submitted that at the time of issuance of appointment letter dated 15.6.1989, circular dated 19.10.1989, wherein policy decision was taken by the bank to regularize the part time services of the daily wagers/contractual workers was not in existence, petitioner-management cannot be permitted to claim appointment given to the respondent-workmen in terms of order dated 15.6.1989 as a fresh appointment, rather same was given to the respondent-workmen in continuity of their initial appointment in the years 1985 and 1995, but to prevent respondent- workmen from claiming benefit of continuity of service and back wages it purposely came to be mentioned in letter dated 15.6.1989 that they are being offered appointment against Class-IV post pursuant to their having participated in written examination as well as interview. 10 2025:HHC:2244 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record vis-à-vis reasons assigned in the impugned award, this Court finds no illegality or infirmity in the same and as such, no interference is called for. 10. Careful perusal of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record reveals that respondent- workmen herein were initially appointed as Class-IV employees in various branches of the petitioner-bank in the years 1985 and 1995 respectively, however, their services were subsequently terminated without compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. On account of illegal termination, respondent-workmen raised industrial dispute, which ultimately came to be registered as case No. ID 101/1987. In the afore case, Labour Court specifically came to be called upon to adjudicate upon the issue that “whether the action of United Commercial Bank, Zonal Office, Shimla in terminating the services of S/Shri Prem Singh, Surinder Kumar, Kuldeep Chand and Mohinder Singh, Peons at their branches w.e.f.1.9.1995, 20.10.1985, 18.8.1985 and 1.9.1985, respectively is justified, if not, to what relief the concerned workmen are entitled and from what date?”. 11. During aforesaid proceedings, petitioner-management seriously refuted the claim of the respondent-workmen that their 11 2025:HHC:2244 services were illegally terminated in violation of section 25-F and 25- G of the Act, but before afore proceedings could be decided on its own merit, some settlement was arrived interse petitioner- management and the respondent-workmen, whereby an assurance came to be made to respondent-workmen by the petitioner- management that they shall be given appointment. Taking note of aforesaid undertaking/assurance or settlement interse parties, representative of the workmen made a statement before the Labour Court that workmen do not want to prosecute the reference in view of the undertaking given by the petitioner-management, but they reserve their right to claim back wages and continuity of service. Though, in terms of the settlement, as referred hereinabove, petitioner-management re-engaged the respondent-workmen against class-IV post in different branches of the bank, but since no benefit of continuity of service and back wages qua the services rendered by the respondent-workmen prior to their disengagement on 1.9.1995, 20.10.1985, 18.8.1985 and 1.9.1985 were given, they again raised dispute, which is subject matter of the present case. 12. Vide Notification dated 24.6.1992 appropriate Government under Section 10(2) of the Act made following reference to the Labour Court, “whether action of the management of UCO Bank in not granting the continuity of service and back 12 2025:HHC:2244 wages to their workmen is legally just and valid. If not, then to which relief the workmen are entitled to and from which date?”. Learned Labour Court having taken note of the fact that at the time of passing of award dated 21.6.1989 (Annexure P-9), whereby earlier dispute came to be settled interse parties on account of amicable settlement, held respondent-workmen entitled for continuation of service and back wages from the date of their termination. 13. In nutshell, grouse of the petitioner- management is that at no point of time petitioner -management had made a statement before learned Labour Court that it would be re-engaging the respondent-workmen from back date, rather representative of the workmen itself made a statement that respondent-workmen do not want to prosecute the reference, but they reserved their right to claim continuity of service and back wages. As per the petitioner since at no point of time, earlier termination of the respondent- workmen vide order dated 1.9.1995, 20.10.1985, 18.8.1985 and 1.9.1985 were held to be in violation of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act and subsequently as per the settlement arrived interse parties, respondent-workmen were given fresh appointment vide appointment letter dated 15.6.1989 specifically clarifying therein that respondent-workmen would not claim further right of back wages 13 2025:HHC:2244 and continuity of service, learned Labour Court ought not have answered the reference in favour of the respondent-workmen. 14. Though, careful perusal of award dated 21.6.1989 passed in earlier dispute i.e. case No. ID 101 of 1987 clearly reveals that no statement at the behest of the management was ever made with regard to engagement of the respondent-workmen from back date, rather on that date, representative of the workmen made a statement that workmen do not want to prosecute the reference, but while doing so, workmen reserved liberty to themselves to claim back wages and continuity of service. 15. Learned counsel representing the petitioner- management, while referring to appointment letter dated 15.6.1989, vehemently argued that appointment given to the respondent- workmen after passing of award dated 21.6.1989 against Class-IV post is a fresh appointment and it cannot be said to be in continuation of earlier engagement of the respondent-workmen in the years 1985 and 1995 respectively. While making this Court peruse aforesaid communication, especially para -11 of the same, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that fresh appointment given to the respondent-workmen pursuant to order dated 15.6.1989 was subject to withdrawal of dispute, which at the relevant time was pending before learned Labour Court. 14 2025:HHC:2244 16. Though, having perused the appointment letter dated 15.6.1989(Annexure P-10 colly), there appears to be force in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that after passing of award dated 21.6.1989, respondent-workmen were given fresh appointments, but if the stand taken by the petitioner in its reply to the claim petition as well as statement made by the witnesses adduced on record are read in conjunction, there appears to be fallacy in the aforesaid submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner. Admittedly, in the reply to the claim petition as well as statement given by the witnesses adduced on record by the petitioner, it came to be stated on behalf of the petitioner that petitioner had decided to re-engage the respondent workmen in terms of circular dated 19.10.1989 . 17. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of para-5 of the reply filed by the petitioner to the claim petition herein below:- “5. The statement in paragraph five is also denied. The management till this date feels that there is absolutely no merit in the case and their grievances have been settled with the offering of permanent employment with the bank as per guidelines of the bank. It is wrong and misleading to state that “ the management of UCO bank fully realizing that the termination of the workmen illegal and void ab-initio decided to absorb the said employees on regular basis.” It is humbly submitted in this connection that at the tine instance of the union the bank took sympathetic view and revived the earlier panel and issued letters of appointment to these persons. The 15 2025:HHC:2244 appointments were therefore prospective in effect. It transpires from the records that the bank representative did not make any statement as alleged by the union in the paragraph five of the claim statement. The bank on withdrawal of the cases by the applicants issued letters of appointment with the very clear understanding with the union that they will not be given back wages, continuity in service. These terms were aged and they signed the letters of appointment in token of their having accepted all the terms and conditions contained therein unconditionally. It is on a second thought they initiated the case. The bank once again submits that some of these persons filed writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court at Shimla and some raised Industrial Disputes before the Industrial Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central)Chandigarh claiming permanent absorption in Bank’s service. The bank contested these writ petitions and Industrial disputes. It is also to be mentioned here that the bank could not issue letters of appointment firstly there was ban on recruitment imposed by government and secondly the matter became subjudice in the court of law. Subsequently when the petitioners withdrew their cases unconditionally and on verbal assurance by them that they will not claim back wages, seniority, continuity of service etc. then only the bank issued letters of appointment. Since these persons accepted the terms and conditions contained in the letter of appointment unconditionally, they are now estopped from claiming continuity of service, back wages and seniority etc. These being fresh appointments, there cannot be any continuity in service and seniority or back wages. We enclose a photocopy of our Head Office circular No. CHO/PAS/16/89, dated 19.10.1989 and the same should be treated as part and parcel of this reply. From the contents of this circular it will be amply clear that our Head Office was seized with this problem with regard to the casual hands much before issuance of the circular, the court cases, Industrial disputes etc. were there and the bank was making efforts to sort out the problems amicably with the unions at the 16 2025:HHC:2244 apex level. Hence the problem has to be viewed from the authorized addition of manpower in the bank and financial burden upon the bank. The bank once again submits and certifies that the bank representative never made any statement as alleged in paragraph five of the claim petition. The Hon’ble Court no doubt had in its judgment stated that they reserve their right to claim back wages and continuity in service, the same stood surrendered as soon as they signed the letter of offer of appointment. The bank had never agreed to the benefits as claimed now at any stage as they never worked from 1985 nor were they issued with any letter of employment even earlier to 1985.” 18. If aforesaid reply filed by the petitioner-management is read in its entirety, it clearly suggests that petitioner- bank was already dealing with this problem with regard to casual hands, Court cases and industrial disputes etc. and as such to solve the problem for all times to come, it proceeded to take conscious decision to offer appointment to such persons on regular basis. Decision to offer appointment on regular basis to persons, who at one point of time were engaged on causal basis, came to be taken by the Head Office on 19th October, 1989, copy whereof has been also placed on record by the petitioner(available at page No.42 of the record.). 19. Since decision to offer appointment on regular basis to employees, who at one point of time were given appointments on casual basis came to be taken vide circular dated 19.10.1989, there appears to be merit in the submission of learned Senior counsel representing the respondent-workmen that appointment letter 17 2025:HHC:2244 15.10.1989, thereby offering appointments to the respondent- workmen is nothing, but an attempt on behalf of the petitioner-bank to defeat the rightful claim of the respondent-workmen. Moreover, after having perused Clause 11 contained in the appointment letter, this Court has reason to believe and presume that aforesaid condition came to be incorporated subsequently. In case respondent-workmen were issued appointment letters without granting the benefit of continuity of service and back wages, there was otherwise no occasion for them to state before learned Labour Court that they do not want to prosecute the reference and as such, same may be disposed of, with liberty to claim back wages and continuity of service subsequently. At the same time, it is also not understood that what prevented petitioner-management at the relevant time to bring it to the notice of the learned Labour Court that as per agreed terms, appointment letters were issued to the respondent-workmen and they had agreed to join the bank as fresh candidates. It appears that though in award dated 21.6.1989 there is no specific reference about the contents of compromise and undertaking, if any, given by the petitioner-Management, but having perused letter adduced on record dated 15.6.1989, this Court can well presume that during the pendency of earlier dispute raised by the respondent-workmen, petitioner management agreed to give 18 2025:HHC:2244 them appointment, subject to withdrawal of the dispute, which they ultimately withdrew on 21.6.1989, but with liberty to claim back wages and continuity of service, if denied. 20. Since respondent workmen were out of service for long and dispute raised by them was pending adjudication, petitioner- management taking undue advantage of situation not only made respondent-workmen to withdraw their earlier dispute, but also offered them appointment against Class-IV post w.e.f. 15.6.1989. Neither petitioner nor respondent-workmen has placed on record settlement/ compromise, if any, arrived interse parties during the pendency of earlier dispute, but after having carefully perused Clause 11 as contained in the appointment letter dated 15.6.1989, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned Senior counsel representing the respondent-workmen that though decision was taken to take services of the respondent-workmen back from the due date, but after passing of award dated 21.6.1989, condition No.11 was inserted in the appointment letter to defeat the claim, if any, of the respondent-workmen of back wages and continuity of service. 21. 21. If the statement of PW-1 is read in its entirety, he nowhere denied factum with regard to amicable settlement arrived interse parties, rather in his cross-examination, he specifically 19 2025:HHC:2244 denied that there was no meeting of the Union with the bank officials. If the cross-examination conducted upon this witness is read in its entirety, he repeatedly attempted to establish that before arriving at an amicable settlement, meetings were held interse Union and petitioner. It also emerges from the cross-examination of this witness that there was discussion and arrangement in the meeting with regard to right of the respondent-workmen to claim seniority and back wages. Leaving everything aside, no cogent and convincing material ever came to be placed on record by the petitioner with regard to consent, if any, given by the respondent- workmen for not staking their claim qua back wages and continuity of service. 22. Leaving everything aside, once it is claimed by the petitioner-bank that services of the respondent-workmen were taken afresh pursuant to order dated 19.10.1989, which at the relevant time was not in existence, coupled with the fact that appointment letter issued in favour of the respondent-workmen is dated 15.6.1989, there appears to be force in the claim of the respondent-workmen that their re-engagement with the petitione - bank in the year 1989 was not fresh appointment, rather they pursuant to settlement arrived interse them and petitioner- management were absorbed in the petitioner-bank, if it is so, no 20 2025:HHC:2244 illegality can be said to have been committed by learned Labour Court, while holding respondent-workmen entitled to back wages and continuity of service. 23. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo Workers Union and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 374, wherein Hon’ble Apex Court categorically held that Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal can grant relief in case it finds that contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employer and there is in fact a direct employment, by applying tests like; who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service or initiate disciplinary action, who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done. In the case at hand, factum with regard to initial employment of respondent-workmen in the years 1985 and 1995, respectively with petitioner-bank never came to be disputed, rather the petitioner has admitted factum with regard to initial employment of the respondent-workmen in the years, as detailed hereinabove. 24. In the case at hand, specific evidence came to be led by the respondent-workmen that they remained unemployed during the period of disengagement, whereas no cogent or convincing 21 2025:HHC:2244 evidence ever came to be led on record by the petitioner- management to rebut the claim of unemployment of the respondent- workmen. Being so, this Court does not find any error of facts and law committed by learned Labour Court, while granting the benefit of continuity of service and back wages. 25. Reliance in this regard is placed upon judgment passed in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and others (supra). In the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that denial of back wages would amount to indirectly punishing the employee and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back-wages and where an employer wants to deny back-wages to an employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, it is required to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period, the employee was gainfully employed. Since in the case at hand, petitioner failed to prove factum of gainful employment, if any of the respondent-workmen during the period of disengagement, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the learned Labour Court, while holding them entitled for reinstatement with back wages. 26. Reliance is also placed upon judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. M/s 22 2025:HHC:2244 Hindalco Industries Ltd. (2014) 11 SCC 85, wherein it has been held that courts while examining correctness and genuineness of the Award passed by Tribunal has very limited powers to appreciate the evidence adduced before the Tribunal below, especially the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal below and same cannot be questioned in writ proceedings and writ court cannot act as an appellate Court. It would be profitable to reproduce following paras of the judgment: “16. ………The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is no entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened for questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be 23 2025:HHC:2244 corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. 27. It is quite apparent from the aforesaid exposition of law that writ court while examining the correctness and genuineness of the award passed by Tribunal has very limited powers to appreciate the evidence adduced before the Tribunal below, especially the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal below and same cannot be questioned in writ proceedings and writ court cannot act as an appellate court. As per the aforesaid judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court, error of law, which is apparent on the face of record, can be corrected by writ court but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. Hon’ble Apex Court further held in the aforesaid judgment that if findings of fact is based upon no evidence that would be regarded as error of law, which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Writ of certiorari can be issued, if it is shown that in recording said findings, Tribunal erroneously refused to admit admissible evidence or erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence, which influenced impugned findings. 24 2025:HHC:2244 28. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove as well as law taken into consideration, this Court finds no merit in the present petition and accordingly same is dismissed alongwith pending applications, if any. (Sandeep Sharma), Judge January 09, 2025 (shankar)