2025:HHC:27002 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA LPA No: 240 of 2025 Decided on: 19.05.2025 __________________________________________________________ H.P. State Forest Development Corporation Limited and another. .... Appellants Versus Jagdish Ram and another ...Respondents Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge. 1Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the appellants: Ms. Kiran Dhiman, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Vinod Thakur, Advocate, for Respondent No.1. Ms. Priyanka Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General, for Respondent No.2. Ranjan Sharma, Judge Himachal Pradesh State Forest Development Corporation, being the appellant, has come up before this Court, in instant Appeal, assailing the Judgement dated 24.09.2024 [hereinafter referred to as Impugned Judgement] passed by Learned Single Judge, in CWP No. 4793 of 2024, In re: Jagdish Ram versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, wherein, communication dated 11.1.2024 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2025:HHC:27002 - 2 - [Annexure P-1 in writ file] was quashed and set- aside; and the retirement of the Respondent-writ petitioner Jagdish Ram at the age of 58 years was held to be bad ; with further directions to the appellants to allow the Respondent to serve till the age of 60 years, upto 31.05.2026, with all consequential benefits including wages etc. FACTUAL MATRIX BEFORE WRIT COURT: 2. In CWP No 4793 of 2024, Respondent -writ petitioner, namely Jagdish Ram has set up a case, that he was engaged on daily wage basis as an unskilled worker on 1.11.1990 in Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur and he was regularized as an ‘unskilled worker’ against a temporary post on 25.11.2004 [Annexure R-2 in writ file] and he joined as such on 27.11.2004. He was promoted on the post of Semi-Skilled Employee, on 17.08.2009 [Annexure P-3] in Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur. On the other hand, the appellant-corporation had another unit i.e. Fiber Board Factory at Baijnath, in which, besides other employees, one Shri Vipan Kumar 2025:HHC:27002 - 3 - and Sanjeev Kumar-II, were engaged as unskilled workers, on daily wage basis on 3.6.1987 and on 27.7.1987. They were regularized as “unskilled worker” against the temporary posts on 12.02.1998 and on 1.12.2000 [Annexure R-1, colly in writ file]. The Fiber Board Factory was closed and after its closure, these employees were redeployed in Rosin and Turpentine Factory at Bilaspur. These two incumbents were promoted as Semi-Skilled Employees on 17.8.2009 {Class-IV} along-with the Respondent-writ petitioner in Rosin and Turpentine Factory. Thereafter, the appellant-corporation issued Common Seniority List of factory workers working in Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur on 15.10.2008 [Annexure P-2 writ file], and another common Seniority List of Semi-skilled Employees on 17.5.2017 [Annexure P-3 in the writ file] placing the redeployed employees, including Vipan and Sanjeev Kumar and respondent-writ petitioner in the said common list. It is further averred that once all these Semi-Skilled Workers [Class-IV], formed 2025:HHC:27002 - 4 - part of one cadre, with common seniority, same nomenclature, same job profile and functions, were in same pay scale, then, the Appellant-Corporation could not retire the Respondent-writ petitioner at the age of 58 years vide communication dated 11.1.2024 [Annexure P-1 in the writ file] w.e.f. 31.05.2024, whereas, other two incumbents, Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar-II, {who were erstwhile employees of Fiber Board Factory and upon its closure were deployed in Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur} were allowed to serve till the age of 60 years on 30.09.2024 and 31.07.2024, respectively. It is averred that appellant corporation could not apply/invoke two different age(s) of retirement between one homogenous class of Class-IV Employees ;and applying different age of retirement within the same unit {i.e. Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur} and for same set of Class-IV Employees under the same Corporation ; was alleged to be discriminatory, arbitrary, malafide and violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India with the prayer, to direct the Corporation to allow 2025:HHC:27002 - 5 - Respondent writ petitioner-Jagdish Ram to continue in service upto the age of 60 years {i.e. 31.05.2026}, with all consequential benefits. STAND OF STATE AUTHORITIES BEFORE WRIT COURT 2(i). In Reply, the Corporation filed a Reply -Affidavit dated 12.06.2024, stating that the Respondent-Jagdish Ram was regularized as an Unskilled Worker against a temporary basis in pay scale of Rs. 2520-4140 on 25.11.2004 and his terms and conditions were governed by Standing Orders notified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and as per Clause 32 (e) of Standing Orders, the age of retirement was 58 years. Reply-Affidavit states that two incumbents Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar-II were regularized as an Unskilled Worker against temporary post on 12.02.1998 and on 1.12.2000 [Annexure R-1 colly] and their conditions of service were governed by “Employees Service Bye-Laws’ and as per Amended Bye-law 3.5(b) (i) notified on 10.09.2001 [Annexure R-4], employees 2025:HHC:27002 - 6 - who were in position, before coming into force of Himachal Pradesh Government Notification No. FIN (C)A(III)-3/98 dated 10.05.2001 were to retire at the age of 60 years. REBUTTAL BY WRIT PETITIONER: 2(ii). In Rebuttal, Respondent-Writ Petitioner, reiterated his version that based on the decision of Board of Directors, the Respondent and the redeployed employees of Fiber Board Factory, including Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar, who were Semi Skilled Employees, {all Class-IV} were integrated in Rosin and Turpentine Factory at Bilaspur with parity almost in all respects then, the appellant corporation could not prescribe and apply two different age of retirement i.e. by retiring the Respondent-writ petitioner at the 58 years while allowing others to retire at the age of and 60 years, within once homogenous class of Class-IV employees, who were working in the same unit-factory and also under the same employer-corporation. Carving out disparity merely on the source of recruitment or birth mark and 2025:HHC:27002 - 7 - by adoption of two criteria is neither based on a valid differentia nor such differentia has any rationale sought to be achieved is asserted to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. AFFIDAVIT DATED 13.08.2024 FILED BEFORE WRIT COURT: 2(iii). Appellant-Corporation filed an Affidavit dated 13.08.2024, before the Writ Court, admitting that the appellant-Corporation has two Rosin and Turpentine Factories, one at Bilaspur and second at Nahan. Affidavit states that there was a Fiber Board Factory at Baijnath with total incumbency of 23 workers and this Unit was commissioned in year 1984-1985. Since, this factory was running in losses, therefore, the Board of Directors, in its meeting held on 03.01.2006 decided to close the Fiber Board Factory and all workers were deployed in Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur. Affidavit further indicates that employees of Fiber Board Factory were governed by the Employees Service Bye-Laws of the Corporation. Affidavit states that 2025:HHC:27002 - 8 - pursuant to the decision of Board of Directors dated 3.1.2006, the erstwhile employees of Fiber Board Factory at Baijnath, including Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar-II were redeployed in Rosin and Turpentine Factory at Bilaspur, in which the Respondent-writ petitioner, was already working. IMPUGNED JUDGEMENT PASSED BY LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE DATED 24.09.2024: 3. Learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the communication dated 11.1.2024 [Annexure P-1 in writ file] with the directions to the appellant-Corporation to allow the Respondent-Writ Petitioner to serve till he attains the age of 60 years i.e. upto 31.5.2026 with all consequential benefits including wages. Learned Single Judge held that the appellant-Corporation cannot discriminate between similar situated persons. It was further held that non-amendment of the Standing Orders in-sync with the age of retirement of employees of Forest Department and appellant Corporation had resulted in discrimination between similarly situated persons. In these circumstances, 2025:HHC:27002 - 9 - the Learned Single Judge held the discrimination intra the employees, serving in the same factory as not tenable. The operative part of the judgement reads as under: 13. This Court is of the considered view that the act of the respondent-Corporation of retiring the petitioner on attaining the age of 58 years on the grounds taken by the Corporation is not sustainable. The respondent-Corporation has to act as an modal employer and it cannot discriminate between similarly situated persons. The age of superannuation of Unskilled or Semi-skilled employees of the Corporation irrespective of the fact whether they are serving in the offices or in the factories of the respondent Corporation cannot be different. The employees like the petitioner cannot be discriminated with their counter-parts as far as the age of superannuation is concerned. Even if, the standing orders provide that the age of superannuation of employees of the Corporation serving in the factories is 58 years, then also, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the standing orders need amendment by the Corporation, so that the same are made in-sync with the age of superannuation of the employees of the Forest Department and there is no discrimination between similarly situated persons. 14. Not only this, in the present case, there is discrimination even intra the employees of Forest Corporation serving in the factories. Whereas, 2025:HHC:27002 - 10 - employees serving in some factories are being superannuated on attaining the age of 58 years, the employees of other factories are being retired on attaining the age of 60 years. This also clearly demonstrates that there is glaring discrimination as far as the age of superannuation of Skilled and Unskilled serving in the respondent-Corporation is concerned. 15. Accordingly, in light of above discussion, this Writ Petition is allowed. The communication dated 11.01.2024 (Annexure P-1) qua the petitioner is quashed and set aside. The retirement of the petitioner at the age of 58 years is held to be bad and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioner to serve till he attains the age of 60 years, with all consequential benefits including wages etc. CHALLENGE TO IMPUGNED JUDGEMENT DATED 24.09.2024: 4. Appellant-Corporation has assailed the Impugned Judgement dated 24.09.2024, on the grounds, that firstly, the Impugned Judgement has been passed on wrong appreciation of the facts and law and is devoid of any reason ; and secondly, Single Judge has erroneously equated the erstwhile employees of the Fiber Board Factory Baijnath including Vipan Kumar, Sanjeev Kumar, with the Respondent-writ petitioner; and thirdly, the finding 2025:HHC:27002 - 11 - qua discrimination in age of retirement is erroneous, when Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar who were governed by Employees Service Bye-laws [amended on 10.09.2001 enabling them to retire at the age of 60 years, whereas, the Respondent-writ petitioner Jagdish Ram, who was allegedly governed by the Standing Orders No 32 (2) was to retire from service at the age of retirement of 58 years. 5. Heard, Ms. Kiran Dhiman, Advocate for Appellant-Corporation, Mr. Vinod Thakur, Advocate for Respondent-Writ Petitioner Jagdish Ram and Ms. Priyanka Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General and have gone through the case records. 6. Based on material on record, following question arises for determination, in the instant appeal:- Whether the appellant corporation could apply- invoke two different age(s) of retirement between one homogenous class of Class-IV employees serving in same factory-unit ; solely based on source of recruitment or birth-mark or non- amending of norms or erroneous application of norms ? 7. Before answering the question formulated, this Court proceeds to analyze the contentions of 2025:HHC:27002 - 12 - Learned Counsel for the Appellant-Corporation and Learned Counsel for the Respondent-writ petitioner herein. ANALYSIS OF CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT- CORPORATION: 7(i). First contention of Learned Counsel for Appellant-Corporation is that Impugned Judgement has been passed without appreciating facts and is devoid of any reason. The above contention has been raised, just to be negated, in view of the fact that while passing the Impugned Judgement on 24.09.2024, Learned Single Judge has taken into account the factual matrix, the stand of appellant-corporation in Reply-Affidavit and the additional affidavit dated 12.06.2024 filed by corporation, indicating that the Board of Directors dated 03.01.2006 closed one of its unit i.e. Fiber Board Factory Baijnath and erstwhile employees of said unit, including Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar were redeployed in Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur, where, the Respondent-writ petitioner Jagdish Ram was already 2025:HHC:27002 - 13 - serving. These redeployed employees were permitted to continue in service upto the age of 60 years whereas, the Respondent-writ petitioner was retired from service at the age of 58 years. This action of the corporation in applying two different ages of retirement amongst the employees of the same category and that too within the same employer -corporation was ex-facie discriminatory, therefore, the Learned Single Judge had validly allowed the writ petition and directed the appellant corporation to allow the Respondent-writ petitioner Jagdish Ram, to serve till he attains the age of 60 years i.e. 31.05.2026 with all consequential benefits. 8. Second contention of Learned Counsel for the appellant-corporation is that the Learned Single Judge has erroneously equated the erstwhile employees of the Fiber Board Factory Baijnath including Vipan Kumar, Sanjeev Kumar, with the Respondent-writ petitioner, by ignoring that the erstwhile employees of Fiber Board Factory were governed by Employees Service Bye-Laws and as per amendment dated 10.09.2001 [Annexure R-4] 2025:HHC:27002 - 14 - the age of retirement was raised from 58 to 60 years, whereas the Respondent-writ petitioner, who was appointed in Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur was governed by Standing Order of 1974 and Clause 32(e) [Annexure R-3], which prescribed age of retirement as 58 years. In nutshell, it is contented that the Impugned Judgement equating incumbents who were governed by different norms is erroneous. The above contention is misconceived, in view of the fact, that the Appellant-Corporation has itself integrated and fused both the category of incumbents {viz. redeployed incumbents with the existing Incumbents} in one cadre, which is borne out from the discussion made hereinbelow. CORPORATION ITSELF GRANTED INTEGRATION REVEALING EQUALITY IN ONE CADRE: 8(i). Firstly, it is not in dispute that there was a Fiber Board Factory at Baijnath, which was commissioned by the appellant corporation in the year 1984-1985. This unit had a total incumbency of 23 workers. Since, this factory was running 2025:HHC:27002 - 15 - in losses, therefore, the Board of Directors, in its meeting held on 03.01.2006 decided to close the Fiber Board Factory and all the workers of this unit, were also decided to be redeployed in Rosin and Turpentine Factory, at Bilaspur. Based on this decision of the Board of Directors, the erstwhile employees of Fiber Board Unit, including Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar-II were redeployed as regular Unskilled Worker Class-IV in Rosin and Turpentine Factory at Bilaspur, where the Respondent-writ petitioner was appointed and was serving ; and secondly, it is not in dispute that pursuant to the decision of Board of Directors dated 03.01.2006, the erstwhile employees of the Fiber Board Factory, upon redeployment in the new unit i.e. in the Rosin and Turpentine Factory at Bilaspur joined the transferee-redeployed unit ; and thirdly, the appellant-corporation had treated all its employees {viz. the category of redeployed incumbents including Vipan Kumar, Sanjeev Kumar -II as well as category of existing incumbent(s) including the Respondent-writ petitioner herein} 2025:HHC:27002 - 16 - as members of one cadre, in the same unit [Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur] and under the same employer-Corporation; and fourthly, even after redeployment in one cadre, the appellant- corporation and its officials had issued a seniority list on 15.10.2008 [Annexure P-2] of the regular and other unskilled workers-employees and both category of incumbents i.e. “redeployed incumbents and existing incumbents” were placed in the common seniority list; and fifthly, after integration-fusion both category of incumbents namely Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar-II and the Respondent-writ petitioner Jagdish Ram, were thereafter promoted as “Semi- Skilled Employees on 17.08.2009 in the new unit i.e. Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur” ; and sixthly, the appellant corporation issued another common seniority list of Semi-Skilled Employees of Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur on 17.05.2017 [Annexure P-3] in which, both the category of employees were placed in the common seniority list; and seventhly, after redeployment on the basis of decision of Board of Directors all these 2025:HHC:27002 - 17 - incumbents performed the same work, job and functions, were granted the same pay scale and were promoted as Semi-Skilled Employees on 17.08.2009 in the redeployed-new unit i.e. Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur and both were treated as members of one homogenous cadre of Class IV Employees, as Semi Skilled Employees and the appellant Corporation treated them at par for all functional purposes, and for extending accruable benefits, incentives and for governing all other conditions of service {except for disparity in age of retirement} ; and eighthly, the appellant -Corporation has failed to place on record any material to establish functional dissimilarity nor placed any supporting documents to establish any distinctive differentiation, which had a reasonable nexus, sought to be achieved by prescribing two different age of retirement between same category and one homogenous class of Class-IV Employees- Semi Skilled Employees, whereby, the redeployed incumbents, namely Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar were to retire from service of the same unit- 2025:HHC:27002 - 18 - factory on attaining the age of 60 years vis-à- vis the existing incumbent i.e. the Respondent-writ petitioner, who was serving in same unit-factory was made to retire from service on attaining the age of 58 years. In this backdrop, pursuant to the decision taken by Board of Directors, for approving redeployment of the erstwhile employees of Fiber Board Factory at Baijnath in the new unit i.e. Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur and its practicable and functional implementation of this decision, once, the “redeployed incumbents” as well as the “existing incumbents” both were treated as members of one homogenous cadre of Class IV Employees, with functional parity for all purposes and for extending accruable benefits, incentives and for governing all other conditions of service, work, job and functions, pay scales. Even appellant corporation has failed to establish any distinctive differentiation, which had a reasonable nexus, which was sought to be achieved by prescribing two different age of retirement between same category 2025:HHC:27002 - 19 - and one homogenous class of Class-IV Employees- {Semi Skilled Employees}, serving in the same unit -factory, and that too under the same employer- corporation. In these circumstances, the functional and practical parity-equation is inferable and is established from material on record and pleadings including the affidavit dated 13.08.2024 of the appellant-corporation therefore, the contention of Learned Counsel for the appellants is turned down. 9. Third contention of the Learned Counsel for the appellant Corporation is that the finding qua discrimination in the age of retirement is erroneous, when Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar who were governed by Employees Service Bye-laws [amended on 10.09.2001 enabling them to retire from service of the Corporation at the age of 60 years whereas, the Respondent-writ petitioner Jagdish Ram, who was governed by the Standing Order No 32 (2) was made to retire from service at the age of retirement of 58 years. The above contention was duly examined and was negated by the Learned Single Judge 2025:HHC:27002 - 20 - on facts of instant case. Learned Single Judge has mandated that the similarly situated persons, forming part of one homogenous class of employees, cannot be subjected to differential treatment, qua the age of retirement within the same unit-factory and also under the same employer-corporation. The Learned Single Judge considered another vital aspect that once appellant Corporation amended its Employees Service Bye-Laws on 10.09.2001 [Annexure R-4] in conformity with the notification dated 10.05.2001 issued by State Govt, enhancing the age of retirement from 58 to 60 years for those Class-IV Employees who are in position before 10.05.2001. The action of the appellant-corporation in not amending the Standing Order No 32 (2) dated 01.04.1974 [Annexure R-3] has resulted in retiring the Respondent-writ petitioner from post of Class-IV Employees at the age of 58 years. Learned Single Judge has validly held the action of not amending the Standing Orders of 1974 in sync with the Employees Service Bye-laws of 1974 on the basis of amendments carried out 2025:HHC:27002 - 21 - in Employees Service Bye-laws on 10.09.2001, Annexure R-4 and further amended on 27.06.2018 is an act of discrimination between similarly situated incumbents. Ex-facie discrimination is borne out in the teeth of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, due to non-amendment of the Standing Orders, which had resulted in invoking two different age of retirement between one homogenous class of Class-IV Employees {i.e. Semi-Skilled Employees of Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur} by retiring the Respondent-writ petitioner Jagdish Ram at age of 58 years, whereas, the other redeployed incumbents {namely, Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar-II} were allowed to retire at the age of 60 years. Accordingly, the contention of Learned Counsel for the appellant-Corporation, being devoid of any merit, is turned down. 10. Fourth contention of the Learned Counsel for the appellant corporation is that two different age(s) of retirement were invoked in view of the fact that the employees of erstwhile Fiber Board Factory Baijnath, {even after redeployment in Rosin 2025:HHC:27002 - 22 - and Turpentine Factory at Bilaspur} i.e. Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar-II were governed by the Employees Service Bye-laws [amended on 10.09.2001 enabling them to retire at the age of 60 years whereas, the Respondent-Writ Petitioner Jagdish Ram, being the existing incumbent in Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur was governed by the Standing Order No 32(2), prescribing the age of retirement to be 58 years. In this backdrop, the Learned Counsel for the appellant-corporation contented that since the Respondent-writ petitioner who was governed by Standing Order No 32 (2) therefore, he was validly retired from service at the age of 58 years. 10(a). For appreciating the above contention of Learned Counsel for appellant corporation, as to whether, the conditions of service of Respondent -writ petitioner, Jagdish Ram were to be governed by the Standing Orders or the Employees Service Bye-Laws, this Court, requested Learned Counsel to furnish the Employees Service Byelaws of 1974. Accordingly, the appellant counsel has furnished 2025:HHC:27002 - 23 - the same, which forms part of records of instant case. 10(b). Firstly, let us deal with the scope and applicability of Standing Orders dated 1.4.1974, Annexure R-3, in facts of instant matter. As a sequel to this, it is pertinent to note that in terms of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946 and the provisions of Section 3 to 5 & 7, the appellant corporation certified-notified its Standing Orders on 1.4.1974 {Annexure R-3}, by prescribing norms for regulating the conditions of service of workmen in Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur/Nahan. The operative part of Standing Order of 1974, is reproduced hereinbelow:- 1. These orders shall come into force on and from 1.07.1974 2. (a). Factory, means the Rosin and Turpentine Factory, a unit of Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation Ltd, the Mall, Willow Bank, Shimla. (e). Muster-roll, means the attendance register or the register maintained under the provisions of the Factories Act or time being in force. (f). Operative, means all work people, male or female, employed in a factory or factory’s premises, whether for payment or not whose names and tickets or token number are included in the 2025:HHC:27002 - 24 - muster-roll (operatives not covered by this definition viz, ministerial establishment would be excluded from the application of these orders). 3. Classification of operatives: The operative shall be classified as: (i). Permanent operative; (ii). Probationer operative; (iii). Casual operative; (iv). Apprentice; (v). Badlis; (vi). Temporary; (i). Permanent Operatives; means a person employed directly or through any agency whether for wages or not in any agency whether for wages or not in any manufacturing process or on cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for the manufacturing processes or in any other kind of work incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process, who has completed 1 year continuous service in the factory. (ii). Probationer operative; means a person employed directly or through any agency whether for wages or not in any manufacturing process or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process or in any other kind of work incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process who has not completed one year’s continuous service in the factory. (iii). Casual operative; means an operative whose employment is of casual nature. 2025:HHC:27002 - 25 - (iv). Apprentice: means as defined in the Apprentices Act, 1961. (v). Badli: is a workman who is appointed in the post of a permanent workman or probationer who is temporarily absent; (vi) Temporary: workman is a workman who has been engaged for work which is of an essentially temporary nature likely to be finished within a limited period. 4. Enrolment Muster Roll Tickets, Cards or Tokens; (a) Every operative on enrolment shall sign the prescribed form appended to these orders. (b) The name of every operative; without exception shall be entered on the Muster Roll. (c) In the Muster Roll against the name of every operative without exception shall be clearly indicated the classification to which he belongs. (d) Every operative without exception shall be provided with a ticket card or token bearing his name and any other particular which the factory at its discretion may require. (e) Every operative on attendance each shall show or deliver up his ticket, card or token at the place provided and also at such time or place as may be prescribed by the factory through a notice posted on the notice board. (f) Every operative when he ceases to be in the employment of the factory or is granted leave or is played off or is suspended shall deliver up his 2025:HHC:27002 - 26 - ticket, card or token. (g) Should an operative loose or at the time of ceasing to be employed fail to deliver up his ticket, card token, he shall be liable to pay the sum of Rs. 0.25 for the cost thereof. 20. Termination of service by will: (a). The employment of any permanent operative may be terminated by the DM by giving one months notice or by payment of one months wages in lieu of notice. If he draws wages on a piece rate basis one month’s wages shall be computed on the average earning of such operative for the days actually worked during the period. The reasons for the termination of services shall be recorded in writing by the DM and shall be communicated to the operative. (b) to (d) ..not relevant… 24. Penalties for misconduct: (a). any operative who is adjudged by the DM to be guilty of misconduct is liable to be dismissed or alternatively to be suspended for a period not exceeding 4 days. (b) to (d)…not relevant… 32. Other Conditions: (a). Pay and Allowances Pay and allowances of the labour and supervisory staff will be as per the orders of the Ministry of Labour issued for their workshop staff from time to time. (b) Leave Leave will be regulated in accordance 2025:HHC:27002 - 27 - with the Factory Act 1948 as amended from time to time or in accordance with the orders or instructions issued by the Management. (e). Retirement. The age of retirement in respect of workers/supervisory staff is 58 years. (g). General Terms and Conditions: The General terms and conditions of service, discipline, retirement, retrenchment, dismissal, will be governed by the Labour Law and Acts and Rules made thereunder by the State and Central Govt from time to time. STANDING ORDER OF 1974 {ANNEXURE R-3} APPLICABLE FOR WORKERS & SUPERVISORS AND NOT FOR REGULAR EMPLOYEES : 10(c). Perusal of the Standing Orders dated 01.04.1974 {Annexure R-3} indicates that standing orders shall govern the conditions of service of workers and supervisory staff, employed in Rosin and Turpentine Factory at Bilaspur. These Standing orders apply to five categories of workers-operatives, who were enrolled and issued muster-roll and who were liable to be retrenched and laid off. Permanent operatives are those workers, who are issued muster-roll and are paid wages for usual working days and have rendered more than one 2025:HHC:27002 - 28 - years’ of continuous service. Such workers are liable for misconduct, for which the penalty of dismissal is accruable, besides imposition of fine and censure. The workers and supervisory staff were to be given leave as per Factory Act. Standing Order No 32 (e) provides that the workers and supervisory staff [all five categories of operatives, including permanent operatives, who had rendered continuous service of more than one year on muster-roll], shall retire from service at the age of 58 years. This Standing Order of 1974, did not govern the conditions of service of those incumbents, who were appointed/regularized against sanctioned posts and in regular pay-scales. EMPLOYEES SERVICE BYE-LAWS OF 1974 APPLICABLE FOR REGULATING CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF REGULAR EMPLOYEES : 10(d). Secondly, let us now deal with scope and applicability of the Employees Service Bye-laws dated 01.04.1974, framed by the Board of Directors, which were duly approved by State Government under Article 33 (16) of Articles of Association of Himachal State Forest Development 2025:HHC:27002 - 29 - Corporation, {Taken on record}, for regulating the conditions of service of persons appointed to all posts under the Corporation, carrying a regular pay scale, on probation etc. and operative part thereof as applicable in instant case, reads as under Preliminary: 1.1 These bye-laws may be called the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation Ltd, Employees Service Bye-Laws. 1.2 The Bye-laws as approved by the Himachal Pradesh Government shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from 1/4/1974. 1.3 These Bye-law shall apply to every officer or other employees of the Corporation except workers and supervisory staff working in the Factories. 1.4 (a) to (e). (f) “employees” means a person (whether in or any other employee) employed on any post under the corporation but does not include a casual worker or a daily wage earner; (j) Permanent employee means an employee appointed on a permanent basis against a permanent post; (k) “Temporary employee” means an employee appointed for a limited period for work which is essentially of a temporary nature or appointed against a temporary post or vacancy for a specified or unspecified period ; 2025:HHC:27002 - 30 - (m) “posts” means the posts which may be sanctioned time to time by the Board of Directors in pursuance of specified in bye-laws 3(i); 2.2 The Board shall have power to make from time to time, such additions, deletions, alterations and amendments in these bye-laws, as it may deem fit and to relax any of the provisions contained therein. 2.3 For the purpose of these bye- laws, the posts under the Corporation shall be classified into the following two categories: (a) Officers (b) Other employees Amended vide Board decision dated 18.08.2001 2.3 For the purpose of these bye- laws, the posts under the Corporation shall be classified into the following two categories: Class-I : Posts in initial entry revised scale of pay having maximum Rs 11660 and above Class-II: Posts in initial entry revised scale of pay with maximum ranging between Rs 10640/- to Rs 11659/- Class-III: Posts in initial entry revised scale of pay with maximum ranging between Rs 5160/-to Rs 10639/- Class-IV: Posts in initial entry revised scale of pay with maximum of which is less than Rs 5160/-. 3.1 Recruitment: (a). Recruitment to various posts under the Corporation shall be made by the Board by any one or more of the following methods:- (i) to (iv) 2025:HHC:27002 - 31 - (b). Appointment to all posts under the Corporation shall be made by the Board of Directors or Managing Director any other officer so authorised by the Managing Director. (i) The period of probation shall be follows: 1. In case of direct recruits : 2 years 2. In case of others :1 year Inserted vide Board decision dated 30.03.2001: Clause 3.1. The Board approved the amendment in the Service Bye Laws of the Corporation as per the instruction issued by the Government of Himachal Pradesh vide letter No. PER (AP) (2)-2/95 dated 28.11.1998. The Board further authorised the Managing Director to adopt and insert /amend any such instructions issued by the Government of Himachal Pradesh from time to time. 3.5 Superannuation and Retirement: Every officer or other employees of the Corporation shall retire on attaining the age of 58 years. An employee may, however, be given extension on year, basis, with the prior approval of Board provided he/she is mentally alert and physically sound and his/her retention in the Corporation is in the interest of the Corporation and that no suitable substitute can be found easily to replace him/ her Normally no extension will be given beyond the age of 60 years. Amended vide Board decision dated 18-08- 2001 Clause-3.5(b) (i):- Those Class-IV employees who are 2025:HHC:27002 - 32 - in position before coming into force of H.P Govt. Notification No. FIN (C)A (III)-3 /98 dated 10.5.2001 shall retire at the age of 60 years. (ii) Those who are appointed in Class-IV posts after coming into force of H.P. Govt. Notification No. FIN (C) A (III)-3/98 dated 10-05-2001 shall retire at the age of 58 years. (Amended vide Board decision dated 27.06.2018) Clause 3.5(b) (iii) Provided further that a Class IV employee appointed on part time / daily wage basis prior to 10.05.2001 and regularized on or after 10-05-2001 shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 60 years. 4.1 Pay and Allowances 4.2 An officer or other employee of the Corporation shall be eligible to the minimum of the scale of the post to which he/she is appointed. 4.6 An increment in a time scale may be drawn as a matter of course by an officer or other employee of the Corporation, unless it is withheld or deferred by the appointing authority on the ground of suspension or extraordinary leave without pay or punishment. 4,13. Fixation of pay of the officers or other employees of the Corporation shall be regulated under FR 22. 10(e). Based on the Standing Orders vis-a-vis the Employees Service Bye-Laws, as referred to 2025:HHC:27002 - 33 - above and the factual matrix, the contention of Learned Counsel for the Appellant-Corporation that the Respondent-writ petitioner was retired at the age of 58 years, by invoking and applying the Standing Order No 32 (e), does not pass the test of judicial scrutiny, for the reason, that Standing Orders of 1974, Annexure R-3, were wrongly and illegally invoked/applied, so as to retire the Respondent-writ petitioner from service at the age of 58 years when, Firstly, in facts of instant case, Standing Order of 1974 {vide Annexure R-3} was applicable for the workers and supervisory staff, who were enrolled on muster-roll, were paid wages and were liable to be retrenched and laid off and the age of retirement for such workers was 58 years; and secondly, the Standing Order No 3 & 4 in Annexure R-3, categorizes its workers into five categories, by naming its worker (s) as operatives, which includes, the category of permanent operative, who had rendered one year’s continuous service on muster roll ; and thirdly, the appellant corporation, has itself restricted the applicability 2025:HHC:27002 - 34 - of terms and conditions contained in the standing orders, in case of those workers who came within the ambit of 5 categories of workers {named as operatives} who were employed on muster roll basis and there is no provision in the Standing Orders of 1974 to cover, within its fold regular employees, who were appointed against sanctioned post(s), in the pay scale, who were put on probation and whose pay was governed by the Fundamental Rules. These standing orders do not provide for grant of other service benefits like increments, higher scales, promotion etc. 10(f). On other hand, the appellant-Corporation has notified the Employees Service Bye-Laws of 1974 so as to govern the conditions of service of “officers” and “other employees,”, who were appointed to various posts permanent or temporary, in the Corporation. A perusal of Clause 1.3 and Clause 1.4(f) of the Bye-laws covered within its ambit “employees” those persons, who were appointed on sanctioned posts, in regular pay scale, were put on probation with other admissible attending 2025:HHC:27002 - 35 - service benefits like increments, higher pay scales, seniority, promotion, punishments for misconduct and retiral benefits, including family pension. These bye-laws specifically excluded its applicability in case of those persons who were employed as workers, supervisory staff workers, casual and daily wage workers. Even as per Clause 3.5 of Service Bye-laws, the age of superannuation of “officers and other employees” was prescribed as 58 years but by virtue of the amended Clause 3.5 (b) (i) dated 18.08.2001, which was notified on 10.09.2001, Annexure R-4, and was further amended by the Board of Directors vide decision dated 27.06.2018, by inserting Clause 3.5 (b) (iii), a Class-IV employee appointed as part time/daily wage basis prior to 10.5.2001 and was regularized on or after 10.5.2001 shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 60 years. The claim of the Respondent-writ petitioner, Jagdish Ram, which was accepted by Learned Single Judge vide judgement merits approval in this intra-court appeal also. Firstly, by virtue 2025:HHC:27002 - 36 - of Clause 3.5 (b) (iii) dated 27.06.2018, once the Respondent-writ petitioner was engaged/appointed as daily wager prior to 10.05.2001 and was regularized on 25/27.11.2004, therefore, the Respondent-writ petitioner had acquired a right to continue in service till the age of 60 years {upto 31.05.2026} and such a right could neither be curtailed nor taken away abruptly; and secondly, once unskilled employees of Fiber Board Factory Baijnath, namely Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar-II, {referred to as redeployed employees} upon closure of said unit, as per the decision of BOD dated 03.01.2006, were redeployed in Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur, where, the Respondent writ petitioner was serving {referred to as existing employee} and after fusion in one cadre in R & T Factory Bilaspur, once all were promoted from the post of regular unskilled worker to the post of Semi- Skilled Employee on 17.08.2009. The appellant- corporation could not carve out two different ages of superannuation within one homogenous class of regular Semi-Skilled Workers/Class-IV Employees, 2025:HHC:27002 - 37 - working in the same unit {Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur} and under the same corporation, by retiring the redeployed employees, namely Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar-II, at the age of 60 years while retiring the Respondent-writ petitioner, Jagdish Ram herein, at the age of 58 years was “discriminatory and such an action amounts to treating “equals as unequal”, being violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India; and thirdly, upon integration-fusion of redeployed employees with the existing employees of Rosin and Turpentine Factory at Bilaspur, no differential treatment could have been extended to one set of Class-IV Employees i.e. those who were redeployed as Unskilled Employees and were later promoted as Semi-Skilled Workers-Employees therefore, all were to retire from service at the uniform age of 60 years ; and fourthly, after integration-fusion in one cadre, appellant-corporation cannot carve out two different ages of retirement amongst its employees forming one cadre, and one homogenous class of Semi-Skilled Class IV-Employees, in the same unit- 2025:HHC:27002 - 38 - factory merely on the basis of the source of recruitment or birthmark was impermissible ; and fifthly, after integration, the corporation cannot be permitted to carve out an artificial, fanciful, illusionary or superfluous discrimination on the basis of the norms governing conditions of service including age of retirement, which were applicable at the time of appointment /regularization; and sixthly, even in the Reply affidavit and additional affidavit filed before the writ court, the Corporation has failed to point out any valid classification for differential treatment, when, the work, job, functions, pay scales and conditions of service of all employees {i.e. redeployed employees and existing employees in Rosin and Turpentine unit-factory} were similar; and seventhly, an in depth analysis of Standing Orders of 1974 Annexure R-3, reveals that it primarily applies to “workers-operatives, who are issued muster-rolls” and age of retirement of such workers-operatives, as per Clause 32 (e) has been prescribed as 58 years and once such of these workers-operatives are appointed 2025:HHC:27002 - 39 - or regularized against sanctioned posts, are granted pay scale and are put on probation then, such incumbents are categorized as “employees”, who shall be governed by Employees Service Byelaws and as per Clause 3.5 (b) (iii) of Byelaws, are to continue in service upto 60 years. 11. In backdrop of the discussion made in Paras 10 (a) to Para 10 (f) supra, and in order to ensure parity and also to obviate disparity and unequal treatment amongst employees belonging to one homogenous class in same unit-factory, under the same corporation. The norms i.e. the Standing Order of 1974 and the Employees Service Bye-Laws of 1974 are to be harmoniously construed, whereby, the terms and conditions of workers-operatives {who were engaged on muster- roll} shall be regulated by the Standing Orders whereas, upon regular appointment/regularization of such erstwhile workers-operative, on a post, in regular pay scale, being put on probation, they shall be governed by the Employees Service Bye- laws. The action of the appellant corporation in 2025:HHC:27002 - 40 - prescribing two different ages of retirement {of 60 and 58 years within one homogenous class of Semi-Skilled Class-IV Employees is discriminatory, arbitrary, is not based on any valid classification, having no rationale with the object sought to be achieved, is artificial and superfluous. Application of two different norms, amongst the same class of employees was validly interdicted by the Learned Single Judge, by extending benefit of continuity in service to Respondent-writ petitioner, Jagdish Ram, upto the age of 60 years {upto 31.05.2026}, is in conformity with Clause 3.5 (b) (iii) of the Bye-laws dated 27.06.2018, which mandates that persons who were engaged on daily wage basis before 10.05.2001 and were regularized any time after 10.5.2001, would retire at the age of 60 years. Impugned Judgement passed by Learned Single Judge does not warrants any interference in instant appeal, as the same was validly passed, so as to remove patent and inglorious disparity which had arisen due to wrong/illegal application of two norms by prescribing two different ages 2025:HHC:27002 - 41 - of retirement between one homogenous class of employees. Accordingly, the contention of Learned Counsel for the appellant corporation, being devoid of any merit, is turned down. CONTENTIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT-WRIT PETITIONER COUNSEL: 12. Learned Counsel for the Respondent-writ petitioner has supported the Impugned Judgement dated 24.09.2024 passed by Learned Single Judge; contending that after integration of the redeployed employees with existing employees in same unit- factory, Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur by Board of Directors of the appellant corporation on 03.01.2006, then, no further discrimination could have been made between one homogenous class of unskilled Class-IV Employees. Once the reemployed as well as the existing employees both were promoted as Semi Skilled Employees in the integrated unit on 17.08.2009 and both continued to serve in same unit, under the same corporation then, source of recruitment or birth- mark cannot be the basis for invoking/applying 2025:HHC:27002 - 42 - two different norms between the same class of employees ; and the wrong and illegal application of Standing Orders to regular employees of Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur, when, the regular employees were to be governed by the Employees Service Byelaws. Even otherwise, non-amendment of Standing orders in sync with Employees Service Bye-laws has resulted in carving out discrimination within one homogenous class of employees cannot be permitted to operate. Accordingly, the contentions carry weight in view of above discussion and the mandate of law spelt out herein. APPLYING TWO DIFFERENT AGES OF RETIREMENT BETWEEN ONE HOMOGENOUS CLASS- IMPERMISSIBLE: 13. The issue as to whether after integration of incumbents, further discrimination can be carved out regarding the conditions of service between members of one cadre-homogenous class, on artificial and superfluous differentia, which is not based on a valid and legally tenable classification, has been deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B. Manmad Reddy and others versus Chandra 2025:HHC:27002 - 43 - Prakash Reddy and others (2010) 3 SCC 314, in the following terms: “12. In Roshan Lal Tandon versus Union of India 1968 (1) SCR 185, one of the questions that fell for consideration was whether the who formed one class in Grade ‘D’ could thereafter be classified again depending upon the source from which they were drawn for the purpose of promotion to the next higher Grade ‘C’, promotees and direct recruits This Court observed: “5……. In our opinion, the constitutional objection taken by the petitioner to this part of the notification is well-founded and must be accepted as correct. At the time when the petitioner and the direct recruits were appointed to Grade ‘D’, there was one class in Grade ‘D’ formed of direct recruits and the promotees from the grade of artisans. The recruits from both the sources to Grade ‘D’ were integrated into one class and no discrimination could thereafter be made in favour of recruits from one source as against the recruits from the other source in the matter of promotion to Grade ‘C’. To put it differently, once the direct recruits and promotes are absorbed in one cadre, they form one class and they cannot be discriminated for the purpose of further promotion to the 2025:HHC:27002 - 44 - higher Grade ‘C’.” 13. The above decision was noticed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Triloki Nath’s case (supra). In that case diploma holder engineers had challenged the validity of certain service rules, inter alia, on the ground that inasmuch as the said Rules made a distinction between Degree Holder members of the Engineering service and Diploma Holders for purposes of promotion to the post of Executive Engineers the same was unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Rules in that case provided for promotion of only such of the Assistant Engineers as possessed a bachelor’s degree in engineering or qualification of A.M.I.E. and as had put in seven years of service in the J & K Engineering Service. 14. The High Court had allowed the petitions of Diploma Holders and struck down the Rule as unconstitutional, holding that the Diploma Holders and the Degree Holders having been integrated into one category, no distinction or classification based on educational qualification could thereafter be made between them. In an appeal to this Court that view was reversed. 15. This Court held that a classification must be truly founded on substantial differences that distinguish persons grouped together from those left out of the group and such differential attributes must bear a just and rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. Having said so, this Court observed: “33. Judged from this point of view, it seems to us impossible 2025:HHC:27002 - 45 - to accept the respondents’ submission that the classification of Assistant Engineers into degree-holders and diploma holders rests on any unreal or unreasonable basis. The classification, according to the appellants, was made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency in the Engineering services. If this be the object, the classification is clearly co-related to it, for higher educational qualifications are at least presumptive evidence of a higher mental equipment. This is not to suggest that administrative efficiency can be achieved only through the medium of those possessing comparatively higher educational qualifications but that is beside the point. What is relevant is that the object to be achieved here is not a mere pretence for an indiscriminate imposition of inequalities and the classification cannot be characterized as arbitrary or absurd. That is the farthest that judicial scrutiny can extend.” The Court also observed that the classification made on the basis of educational qualifications with a view to achieving administrative efficiency cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous circumstance and that one has always to bear in mind the facts and circumstances of the case in order to judge the validity of a classification. 16. The ratio of the decision in Roshan 2025:HHC:27002 - 46 - Lal Tandon’s case (supra) was reiterated by their Lordship in the following words: “44. The key words of the judgment are: “The recruits from both the sources to Grade ‘D’ were integrated into one class and no discrimination could thereafter be made in favour of recruits from one source as against the recruits from the other source in the matter of promotion to Grade ‘C’, (emphasis supplied). By this was meant that in the matter of promotional opportunities to Grade ‘C’, no discrimination could be made between promotees and direct recruits by reference to the source from which they were drawn. That is to say, if apprentice train examiners who were recruited directly to Grade ‘D’ as train examiners formed one common class with skilled artisans who were promoted to Grade ‘D’ as train examiners, no favoured treatment could be given to the former merely because they were directly recruited as train examiners and no discrimination could be made as against the latter merely because they were promotees. This is the true meaning of the observation extracted above and no more than this can be read into the sentence next following: “To put it differently, once the direct recruits and promotees 2025:HHC:27002 - 47 - are absorbed into one cadre, they form one class and they cannot be discriminated for the purpose of further promotion to the higher Grade ‘C’.” In terms, this was just a different way of putting what had preceded.” 13(i). While dealing with issue as to whether two different ages of retirement could be prescribed amongst same class of employees solely on the basis of source of entry or birth-mark has been negated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh versus Dayanand Chakrawarty and others, (2013) 7 SCC 595, in the following terms: 14. Further, as employees appointed from different source, after their appointment were treated alike for the purpose of superannuation under Regulation 31, subsequently solely on the basis of source of recruitment no discrimination can be made and differential treatment would not be permissible in the matter of condition of service, including age of superannuation, in absence of an intelligible differentia distinguishing them from each other. We therefore hold that the High Court by impugned judgment rightly declared Regulations, 2005 unconstitutional and ultra wires of Article 14 of the Constitution 2025:HHC:27002 - 48 - of India. 49.1 The employees including respondents who moved before a court of law irrespective of fact whether interim order was passed in their favour or not, shall be entitled for full salary up to the age of 60 years. The arrears of salary shall be paid to them after adjusting the amount if any paid. 49.2 The employees, who never moved before any court of law and had to retire on attaining the age of superannuation, they shall not be entitled for arrears of salary. However, in view of Regulation 31 they will deem to have continued in service up to the age of 60 years. In their case, the appellants shall treat the age of superannuation at 60 years, fix the pay accordingly and re-fix the retirement benefits like pension, gratuity etc. On such calculation, they shall be entitled for arrears of retirement benefits after adjusting the amount already paid. 13(ii). While dealing with the issue as to whether method and mode of recruitment or entry into same cadre-rank in government service or public employment could be made the basis for differential treatment in age of superannuation has been outlined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others versus Atul Shukla and others, (2014) 10 SCC 432, in the following 2025:HHC:27002 - 49 - terms: 28. It is trite that birthmark of an officer who is a part of the cadre of Group Captains cannot provide an intelligible differentia for the classification to be held valid on the touchstone of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. We may in this regard gainfully refer to the decision of this Court in Col. A.S. Iyer & Ors. V. Bala Subramanyan & Ors. (1980) 1 SCC 634, where Krishna Iyer J. as his Lordship then was rejected a somewhat similar argument to justify a classification based on the birthmarks of the members of a cadre. He said: “Let us eye the issue from the egalitarian angle of Articles 14 and 16. It is trite law that equals shall be treated as equals and, in its application to public service, this simply means that once several persons have become members of one service they stand as equals and cannot, thereafter, be invidiously differentiated for purposes of salary, seniority, promotion or otherwise, based on the source of recruitment or other adventitious factor. Birth-marks of public servants are obliterated on entry into a common pool and bur country does not believe in official casteism or blue blood as assuring preferential treatment in the future career. The basic assumption for the application of this principle 2025:HHC:27002 - 50 - is that the various members or groups of recruits have fused into or integrated as one common service. Merely because the sources of recruitment are different, there cannot be apartheidisation within the common service.” (emphasis supplied) 29. In Air India v. Nargesh Mirza and Ors. (1981) 4 SCC 335, a three- Judge Bench of this Court was examining whether a rule that permitted retirement of Hostesses, within four years of her joining service, was reasonable. This Court held that if the factors or circumstances that are taken into consideration while fixing the age of superannuation are inherently irrational or illogical, the decision fixing the age of retirement will be flawed. The Court observed: “There can be no cut and dried formula for fixing age of retirement. It is to be decided by the authorities concerned after taking into consideration various factors such as the nature of the work, the prevailing conditions, the practice prevalent in other establishments and the like. But the factors to be considered must be relevant and should bear a close nexus to the nature of the organisation and the duties of the employees. So where the authority concerned takes into account factors or circumstances which are inherently irrational or illogical or tainted, the decision fixing the age of 2025:HHC:27002 - 51 - retirement is open to serious scrutiny.” 30. In Kamlakar and Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1999) 4 SCC 756, this Court was examining whether a distinction could be made between direct recruits and promotees as regards equal treatment in the matter of pay scales admissible to them. Rejecting the contention that such distinction would be justified this Court held that once officers are placed in one cadre the distinction between direct recruits and promotees disappears. The birthmarks have no relevance for classification of Data Processing Assistants who are directly recruited and others who are promoted. This Court observed: “12……Once they were all in one cadre, the distinction between direct recruits and promotees disappears at any rate so far as equal treatment in the same cadre for payment of the pay scale given is concerned. The birthmarks have no relevance in this connection. If any distinction is made on the question of their right to the post of Data Processing Assistants they were holding and to its scale which were matters common to all of them before the impugned order of the Government of India was passed on 2-7-1990, then any distinction between Data Processing Assistants who were direct recruits and those who were promotees, is not permissible. We, therefore, reject the respondents’ contention…” 2025:HHC:27002 - 52 - 31. The principles stated in the above decisions lend considerable support to the view that classification of Group Captains (Select) and Group Captains (Time Scale) in two groups for purposes of prescribing different retirement ages, is offensive to the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. These appeals must, on that basis alone, fail and be dismissed, but, for the sake of a fuller treatment of the subject, we may as well examine whether the classification has any nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Government decision taken in the wake of the AVS Committee recommendations. 43. More importantly, the respondents have asserted that Group Captains (TS) and Group Captains (Select) perform the same functions and duties which are higher than the duties and functions performed by the Wing Commanders, they wear the same uniform and rank which is higher than the Wing Commanders apart from drawing the same pay scale as Group Captains, which too is higher than the one admissible to Wing Commanders. On the question of posting profile of Group Captains (TS) and Group Captains (Select), the respondents have, on affidavit, denied not only the alleged difference in the nature of duties and functions performed by the two but specifically claimed that Group Captains (TS) have been posted and have held positions and appointments that are ordinarily given to Group Captain (Select). 2025:HHC:27002 - 53 - In answer to para 11 of the counter- affidavit extracted earlier, the respondents have given the following instances, where Time Scale Officers have held appointments also held by Select Officers: 46. Suffice it to say that the basis for classification in question for purposes of age of superannuation which the appellant has projected is much too tenuous to be accepted as a valid basis for giving to the Time Scale Officers a treatment different from the one given to the Select Officers. We are also of the view that concerns arising from a parity in the retirement age of Time Scale and Select Officers too are more perceptional than real. At any rate, such concerns remain to be substantiated on the basis of any empirical data. The upshot of the above discussion is that the classification made by the Government of India for purposes of different retirement age for Time Scale Officers and Select Officers does not stand scrutiny on the touchstone of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as rightly held by the Tribunal. 13(iii). While dealing with a similar issue as to whether the members of one homogeneous class could be governed by two different conditions of service for purpose of retirement after having been integrated-fused in one cadre, merely on the basis of source of recruitment or birthmark cannot 2025:HHC:27002 - 54 - be permitted, as has been held by the Full Bench of this Court in CWP No. 2711 of 2017, titled as Baldev and others versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 22.02.2022, in the following terms: 7. There is now no confusion regarding employees falling in para 6(ii)(a) above. These employees can continue to serve till they attain the age of 60 years. However, an anomalous situation has developed amongst the employees falling in para 6(ii) (b) & 6(ii)(c). The employees falling in above para 6 (ii)(b) and 6 (ii)(c) for all practical purposes belong to the same category and are similarly situated. Both sets of employees were engaged on daily wage basis prior to 10.05.2001 and regularized after 10.05.2001. Such of the employees engaged on daily wage basis prior to 10.05.2001 and regularized after 10.05.2001, if were in service on 21.02.2018, will continue to serve till they attain the age of 60 years. On the other hand, such of the employees, who were engaged on daily wage basis prior to 10.05.2001 and regularized after 10.05.2001, but have retired before the issuance of notification dated 21.02.2018, will not get the benefit of notification dated 21.02.2018. This to our mind is wholly discriminatory. Similarly situated employees are being treated differently. The employees, who were engaged on daily wage basis 2025:HHC:27002 - 55 - prior to 10.05.2001 and regularized after 10.05.2001, constitute one homogenous class. Differential treatment to the employees falling in same homogenous class is impermissible. In fact, amendment carried out in F.R. 56 (e) on 21.02.2018 suggests that the date of regularization will have no impact upon the superannuation age. Date of engagement is the determinative factor. If a daily wager is engaged prior to 10.05.2021, then he is entitled to serve till 60 years of age irrespective of date of his regularization. This was held so in Bar Chand’s case, decided on 21.10.2010. However, at the time of decision in Bar Chand’s case, the amendment dated 21.02.2018 had not been carried out in F.R. 56(e). Therefore, though later judgment in Chuni Lal’s case dated 22.11.2011, holding the decision in Bar Chand’s case as per incuriam cannot be faulted as it was based upon strict interpretation of F.R. 56(e) as amended by the State at that time. However, in view of subsequent amendment of F.R. 56(e) on 21.02.2018 in the interregnum, situation has undergone further change. Reference made to the larger Bench is not only to decide about the inconsistency in the decisions referred therein, but also to put at rest related issues coming or likely to arise before different benches. Therefore, we hold that:- (i). There is an apparent inconsistency or conflict between the decisions referred to in the reference order dated 28.12.2019, 2025:HHC:27002 - 56 - which lies in a very narrow compass, as noticed in para 6(i) above. In Chuni Lal’s case, the decision rendered in Bar Chand’s case was held to be per incuriam. The decision in Chuni Lal’s case was based upon interpretation of F.R. 56(e) as it existed in the State at that time. But the judgment delivered in Tara Chand’s case did not notice the decision in Chuni Lal’s case. The judgment in Gian Singh’s case in respect of continuation in service was based upon the verdict in Tara Chand’s case. In both these judgments, learned Single Judges did not notice the judgment delivered in Chuni Lal’s case. In Letters patent appeal, the Division Bench while affirming the judgment passed by the ld. Single Judge in Gian Singh’s case though did not notice the judgment rendered in Chuni Lal’s case however the amendment dated 10.5.2001 reducing the superannuation age from 60 to 58 years was held to be not applicable to the writ petitioner, who was held entitled for regularization prior to 10.5.2001. (ii). Inconsistency between Bar Chand and Chuni Lal now stands, not just resolved, but rather dissolved, in view of notification dated 21.02.2018 amending F.R. 56 (e), issued by the State, which has now reinforced and reiterated what was held in Bar Chand’s case, i.e. date of regularization of a class IV daily wager whether prior or after 10.05.2001, will make no difference to the age of his continuing in service. It is the date of engagement, 2025:HHC:27002 - 57 - which is the decisive factor. If date of engagement/appointment is prior to 10.05.2001, the Class-IV employee will continue to serve till 60 years of age. In case, it is later than 10.05.2001, then restriction in age upto 58 years will apply. (iii). There cannot be any discrimination amongst similarly situated Class-IV employees belonging to one homogenous class. Therefore the retirement date, of such of those employees, who had been engaged on daily wage basis prior to 10.05.2001, but regularized after 10.05.2001 and have actually been retired prior to the issuance of notification dated 21.02.2018 at the age of 58 years, shall be deemed to be the date when they otherwise attained the age of 60 years. Since these employees have not actually worked beyond the age of 58 years, therefore, they will not be entitled to the actual monetary benefits of wages/salary etc. for the period of service from the date of their actual retirement till deemed dates of their retirement. However, they will be entitled to notional fixation of their pay for the period in question for working out their payable pension and payment of consequential arrears of pension accordingly. 13(iv). Principle of “Equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India”, mandates, that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated 2025:HHC:27002 - 58 - alike in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Differential treatment between the similarly situated incumbents, is permissible only on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes the persons who are grouped together from others who are left out and differentia must have a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by such a classification, as has been spelt out in Prem Chand Somchand Shah and another versus Union of India and another (1991) 2 SCC 48, in the following terms:- 8. As regards the right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 the position is well settled that the said right ensures equality amongst equals and its aim is to protect persons similarly placed against discriminatory treatment. It means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Conversely discrimination may result if persons dissimilarly situate are treated equally. Even amongst persons similarly situate differential treatment would be permissible between one class and the other. In that event it is necessary that the differential treatment should be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others 2025:HHC:27002 - 59 - left out of the group and that differential must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. RIGHT TO SERVE TILL ATTAINING OF AGE OF SUPERANNUATION IS AN OBJECT OF SOCIAL SECURITY: 14. Once pragmatic, practical and functional uniformity is borne out amongst members of one homogenous class then, prescribing the conditions of service, including age of superannuation is a step towards achieving social goal. Prescribing or invoking two dissimilar ages of superannuation, amongst employees forming part of one cadre, one service, one homogenous class in the Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur by making the redeployed employees i.e. regular employees namely Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar to retire from service at the age of 60 years, in terms of the amendment carried out in the Employees Service Byelaws on 10.09.2001, Annexure R-4, which was further amended by the Board of Directors on 27.06.2018, by inserting Clause 3.5 (b) (iii) whereas the existing employees of the Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur i.e. the Respondent-writ petitioner 2025:HHC:27002 - 60 - Jagdish Ram, a regular similarly placed incumbent was retired at the age of 58 years by wrongly and illegally applying and invoking the age of retirement contained in the Standing Orders, by ignoring the material aspect that these standing orders were to apply to those workers-operatives who were issued muster-roll but upon grant of regular status {regular appointment/regularization} on a post, in regular pay scale, after being put on probation, with other service benefits, including pay fixation as per the Fundamental Rules, the conditions of service were to be governed by the Employees Service Bye-Laws and not by Standing Orders. Nothing has been spelt out in the Reply affidavit before the writ court and even in instant appeal that the age of retirement of the regular employees, was also to be governed by Standing orders. Perusal of Standing Orders, which are on record as Annexure R-3, do not suggest that these standing orders shall govern the age of retirement of the regular employees in Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur. Conversely, a perusal of the 2025:HHC:27002 - 61 - Employees Service Byelaws, which were furnished to this Court, by Learned Appellant Counsel, reveals that these Bye-laws prescribe the conditions of service including the age of retirement of regular employees to be 60 years. The action of appellant corporation in applying two dissimilar and different ages of retirement amongst members forming part of one homogenous class of employees, who were working in same unit, in same cadre, and were performing same work, job, duties, functions, in the same pay scale, same status, having pragmatic, practical and functional similarity, cannot be treated differently under same employer-corporation, when, such differential treatment is not based on a valid and legally tenable classification. The differentia, if any, is artificial, superfluous, not real, but the same has been sought to be carved out on the basis of source of recruitment or birth-mark. The social goal of uniformity in age of superannuation being sacrosanct, in facts of instant case, cannot be permitted to operate, so as to treat equals as unequal, which is ex-facie discriminatory and 2025:HHC:27002 - 62 - violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. This action of the appellant corporation cannot sustain the test of judicial scrutiny and therefore, in order to obviate the disparity and to avoid the charge of discrimination and to ensure parity in age of retirement amongst members of one homogenous class of regular employees i.e. Semi-Skilled {Class-IV} Employees; therefore, the Learned Single Judge has validly passed the Impugned Judgement by quashing the impugned order ; and by directing the appellant-Corporation, to allow the Respondent-writ petitioner, Jagdish Ram, to serve upto the age of 60 years with all service benefits accruing therefrom. Based on the discussion made herein, the contentions of the Learned Counsel for the appellant corporation are devoid of any merit and the impugned judgment does not call for any interference and the same is upheld. ANSWER TO QUESTION FORMULATED: 15. In reference to the question formulated, this Court is conscious of the fact that in normal 2025:HHC:27002 - 63 - parlance, the prescription of the age of retirement lies within the exclusive domain of an employer. Indulgence or judicial review is permissible, in a situation where, the prescription of the age of retirement is artificial, illusionary, superfluous discriminatory. In case the discrimination is real, valid and is based on valid classification and such classification has a rationale sought to be achieved then, same is not liable to be interfered with by Courts. However, in facts of instant case appellant-corporation had two factories-establishment i.e. Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur and Nahan and one Fiber Board Factory at Baijnath. Corporation took a decision on 03.01.2006 for integrating and fusing employees of Fiber Board Factory Baijnath with Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur. After integration-fusion into one cadre, in the Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur no differential treatment could have been extended to redeployed employees, namely Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar by retiring them at the age of 60 years while retiring the existing employee, alike 2025:HHC:27002 - 64 - Respondent-writ petitioner of Rosin and Turpentine Factory to retire at age of 58 years. Upon integration -fusion of employees in one cadre, two different ages of retirement cannot be invoked, between the employees forming part of one homogenous class of employees working in same unit-establishment merely on the basis of source of recruitment or birthmark or by applying the norms existing prior to such integration-fusion. After integration-fusion in one cadre, the appellant-corporation cannot carve out an artificial, fanciful, illusionary or superfluous discrimination. Even the corporation has not spelt out any valid/legally tenable reason for differential treatment, having a reasonable nexus sought to be achieved, by retiring its redeployed employees at age of 60 years, whereas, the existing employee alike Respondent-writ petitioner Jagdish Ram was made to retire at age of 58 years. Upon integration-fusion, the redeployed and the existing employees, who were made to work on similar posts, and were later promoted as semi-skilled employee-worker in the year 2009 in transferee 2025:HHC:27002 - 65 - unit i.e. Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur and who indisputably perform same work, job, functions, and who were in same pay scale [revised from time to time], in one unit, under the same employer corporation could not be regulated by two different norms, by prescribing/invoking two different ages of retirement [58 years and 60 years] is ex-facie discriminatory and same cannot sustain. The appellant-Corporation has not brought any material on record, in writ proceedings and even in these proceedings so as point out any clear, valid, rationale and substantial basis for differential treatment. The action of the corporation, in treating “equals as unequal” qua the age of retirement is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Article 14 encompasses substantive equality, which cannot be defeated by way of an artificial, fanciful, illusionary or superfluous differential treatment which has no rationale with the object sought to be achieved. The Rosin and Turpentine Factory at Bilaspur and Fiber Board Factory at Baijnath had a uniform date of retirement of 2025:HHC:27002 - 66 - 58 years for its regular employees upto 09.09.2001. However, in terms of amendment dated 10.09.2001, Annexure R-4, and the further amendment carried out by inserting Clause 3.5(b) on 27.06.2018 in Employees Service Bye-Laws, the age of retirement of one section of Class-IV Employees who were engaged on daily wages before 10.05.2001 and were also regularized on or after 10.05.2001 was enhanced to 60 years. Based on above amended Employees Service Bye-laws, benefit of enhancement in retirement age was granted to the redeployed employees namely, Vipan Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar [erstwhile employees of Fiber Board Factory] who were redeployed in Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur as per BOD Decision in 2006]. Conversely, another section of Class-IV employees i.e. “existing regular employees of Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur, were deprived of benefit of enhancement in retirement age, [by retiring them at age of 58 years] by wrongly and illegally applying/invoking the Standing Orders of 1974, which on facts of this case and material on record, were only applicable 2025:HHC:27002 - 67 - for the workers-operatives who were issued muster- roll, whereas, the regular post holders were to be governed by Employees Service Bye-laws, as discussed above. Besides, even if, the standing orders were applicable to the regular employees of Rosin and Turpentine Factory Bilaspur, (though nothing has been brought on record by appellant to assert this) then also, the action of appellant corporation in not amending the Standing Order of 1974 at par with the Employees Service Bye- Laws of 1974, as amended on 10.09.2001, Annexure R-3, and was further amended on 27.06.2018, by enhancing the age of retirement to 60 years, for one section of regular Class-IV employees while denying this benefit to another section of regular Class-IV Employees i.e. Semi-Skilled Employees, within the same unit-factory and under the same corporation cannot sustain. Non amendment of norms, qua one section of Class-IV employees has resulted in disparity in age of retirement. Action of non-amending the norms, stands deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Sadashiv 2025:HHC:27002 - 68 - Bendre and another versus State of Maharashtra and others, 2025 INSC 400, mandating that all similarly placed incumbents shall retire at uniform age of 60 years. Accordingly, the question so formulated is answered in the negative that two different ages of retirement could not be carved out between one homogeneous class of Class IV employees in absence of any clear and rationale substantial basis for differential treatment exists. An artificial, illusionary or superfluous discrimination or differential treatment which leads to substantive inequality cannot be permitted to operate when, nature of work, job, duties, functions, pay scales etc of “reemployed employees” and existing employees”, Semi-Skilled Class-IV Employees serving in Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Bilaspur is similar in all respects. In these circumstances, the Impugned Judgement does not warrant any interference in these proceedings. 16. Given as above, the Impugned Judgement does not suffer from any perversity or illegality and the same is upheld. 2025:HHC:27002 - 69 - 17. No other point was argued/raised. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS: 18. In view of the above discussion and for reasons recorded hereinabove, the instant Letters Patent Appeal, being devoid of any merit, shall stand dismissed, in the following terms:- (i). Instant appeal i.e. LPA No 240 of 2025 is dismissed; (ii). Impugned judgement dated 24.09.2024 passed in CWP No 4793 of 2024, In Re: Jagdish Ram versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others is upheld ; (iii). Appellant-Corporation is directed to extend the benefit of continuity in service to Respondent-writ petitioner Jagdish Ram herein, upto the age of 60 years i.e. 31.05.2026 with all consequential benefits ; (iv). Appellants shall take consequential action for releasing all the accruable benefits within six weeks from the receipt of copy of this judgement; (v). Costs made easy for the respective parties. In aforesaid terms, the Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and all pending miscellaneous 2025:HHC:27002 - 70 - application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly. (G.S. Sandhawalia) (Ranjan Sharma) Chief Justice Judge May 19, 2025. (™)