2025:UHC:2290 IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE ASHISH NAITHANI FIRST BAIL APPLICATION NO. 1120 of 2024 Kanchan Singh Yadav …Applicant Versus State of Uttarakhand …Respondent Counsel for the Applicant : Mr. Mani Kumar, learned counsel. Counsel for the State : Mr. K.S. Bora, D.A.G. Hon’ble Ashish Naithani, J. This bail application has been moved by the applicant under Section 439 Cr.P.C., seeking enlargement on bail in connection with FIR No. 78 of 2024, registered under Sections 323, 376, 511 IPC and Sections 9 and 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) at Police Station Transit Camp, District Udham Singh Nagar. 2. The FIR, lodged on 27.03.2024, has been instituted at the instance of the victim’s mother, who is also the complainant. It is alleged that about a month prior to the incident, the applicant—who is the complainant’s former husband—took custody of the minor daughter of the complainant under the pretext of educating her. On 25.03.2024, at around 1:30 PM, the victim allegedly called her mother, stating that the applicant had attempted to sexually assault her and physically assaulted her upon resistance. The 1 2025:UHC:2290 complainant claims to have met the victim midway thereafter, and immediately approached the police. 3. It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that he has been falsely implicated owing to previous marital discord and hostility, following the grant of an ex-parte divorce decree in favour of the complainant dated 31.07.2023. The applicant draws attention to the delay of more than 60 hours in lodging the FIR, contending that such unexplained delay materially affects the credibility of the allegations. 4. He further asserts that there is no medical report substantiating the charge of attempted rape, and that the statements relied upon by the State are vague and circumstantial. It is contended that the complainant has misused the situation and tutored the child to implicate the applicant. The applicant also submits that continued incarceration would cause undue hardship and that he is ready to comply with any condition imposed by this Court. 5. The State, on the other hand, opposes the application with seriousness. It is argued that the victim’s statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. are consistent and categorical. The State submits that the applicant, in an inebriated condition, entered the victim’s room, shut the door, and attempted to sexually assault her by making inappropriate physical contact, which was resisted by the victim, resulting in physical assault. The State argues that the applicant’s proximity to the victim, being a former stepfather, poses a grave risk of intimidation, coercion, or manipulation of the 2 2025:UHC:2290 witnesses, if released. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record. 7. The statements of the victim recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. leave little room for ambiguity. The minor has specifically narrated that the applicant, under the influence of alcohol, entered her room, closed the door, made inappropriate physical advances, and subjected her to physical assault when she resisted. The consistency and specificity of these allegations, even at the bail stage, warrant serious consideration. 8. Prima facie, the conduct alleged attracts Section 376 read with Section 511 IPC, apart from constituting aggravated sexual assault under Sections 9 and 10 of the POCSO Act. The allegations, if accepted at face value for the limited purpose of bail, suggest a calculated attempt to violate the bodily integrity and dignity of a minor child. 9. This Court is also mindful of the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, which casts the burden upon the accused to rebut the allegations once the foundational facts are disclosed. At the stage of bail, unless cogent material is brought to the front to displace this presumption, the Court must tread with caution and must not readily lean in favour of bail. No such compelling circumstances have been shown by the applicant in the present matter. 10. The argument regarding delay in lodging the FIR does not, by itself, provide sufficient ground to doubt the prosecution version. It is well settled that in 3 2025:UHC:2290 cases involving sexual offences, especially where minors are involved, some delay in reporting is not unusual and must be examined in the context of trauma, familial pressure, and the fear of social ostracism. The explanation furnished in this case appears neither unreasonable nor motivated. 11. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madan Lal, (2015) 7 SCC 681, the Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned that in offences under the POCSO Act, the safety and psychological welfare of the child must outweigh the liberty of the accused. 12. Likewise, in X v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 7 SCC 1, it was held that the consistent testimony of a child victim, recorded under judicial supervision, is sufficient to deny bail at the pre-trial stage. 13. Additionally, the past relationship between the applicant and the victim, marked by close familial association, raises a legitimate apprehension of possible influence over the victim and other witnesses. In such cases, even the appearance of intimidation, subtle coercion, or retraumatisation of the minor victim must be guarded against in order to preserve the fairness of the trial. ORDER The protection of the child and the integrity of the investigative and trial process are paramount considerations under the POCSO regime. Given the nature of the allegations, the age of the victim, the familial equation between the parties, and the absence of any substantial mitigating circumstance in favour of 4 2025:UHC:2290 the applicant, this Court is not persuaded to exercise its discretion in favour of granting bail. Accordingly, the bail application stands rejected. (ASHISH NAITHANI, J. Dated:26.03.2025 NR/ 5