2025:HHC:26121 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 297 of 2012 Reserved on: 29.7.2025 Date of Decision: 05.08.2025. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Pawan Kumar ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent : Ms. Akansha Chauhan, Advocate, vice Mr. Anubhav Chopra, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 22.3.2012, passed by learned Special Judge (Forests), Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 13(2) read 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:26121 with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (e) of the PC Act. It was asserted that a preliminary inquiry was conducted, and it was found that Pawan Kumar, Senior Assistant, office of Director, Health Services, H.P., constructed a house consisting of six rooms and got his daughter Neetu Sood admitted to Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar Medical College, Bangalore. He paid ₹16,42,000/- as her fee between 17.8.2000 to 23.5.2001. The accused had an income of ₹7,97,351/- between June 1993 and August 2001, and he had spent ₹8,44,649/- more than his known source of income. He could not give a satisfactory answer for spending excess money. Photocopies of (Ex.PW6/A to Ex.PW6/D) were seized. An FIR (Ex.PW8/A) was registered. Daulat Ram (PW9) conducted the investigation. He seized a copy of the deposit slip (Ex.PW2/A) vide memo (Ex.PW9/A). He seized 3 2025:HHC:26121 the documents (Ex.PW1/A1 to Ex.PW1/A9) related to the admission, undertaking and fee receipt.The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Sarla (PW1) produced the record. Chikkamuthaiah (PW2) was working as a cashier in Ananda Cooperative Bank. S. Gurrappaji (PW3) was the Chairman of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Trust for the year 2000-01. Amar Nath (PW4) prepared the evaluation report of the house of the accused. Siddappaji (PW5) produced the requisitioned record. V.M. Chinnaswami (PW6) was working as a cashier in Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Medical College. Mrs. Sulakshna Puri (PW7) accorded the prosecution sanction. Vinod Kumar (PW8) signed the FIR and seized the documents. Daulat Ram (PW9) conducted the investigation. 4 2025:HHC:26121 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was appointed as a Clerk and was posted as Senior Assistant. He admitted the salary received by him and the various Bank accounts maintained by him. He denied the payment of any donation or the filing of any undertaking. He stated that he was falsely implicated. He examined himself (DW1). 6. Learned Trial Court held that the deposit of ₹26.00 lacs on behalf of Chetan Chauhan and Neetu Sood was not proved. Mere deposit of this amount by the Medical College with the Bank is not sufficient to implicate the accused. The accused claimed that he had constructed the house in the year 1973 and sought assistance from his family members. His salary from 1973 to 1999 was not taken into consideration. Amar Nath, J.E., made the valuation after applying HPSR 1999. He did not apply the earlier HPSR, and no reliance could be placed upon his report. Hence, the accused was acquitted. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to properly 5 2025:HHC:26121 appreciate the evidence on record. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses were discarded without any reason. The accused paid ₹13.00 lacs as donation for admission of his daughter against the management quota. He had also furnished an undertaking regarding the future payment. S. Gurrappaji (PW3) handed over ₹26.00 lacs to Chikkamuthaiah (PW2), which corroborates the payment made by the accused. The statements of witnesses and documentary evidence were wrongly ignored. Chikkamuthaiah (PW2) and S. Gurrappaji (PW3) admitted that no donation could be received by the College, and the receipt of the donation would lead to complications. Therefore, they had a reason to retract from their earlier statements. This aspect was ignored by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant-State and Ms. Aakansha Chauhan, learned vice counsel representing the respondent/accused. 6 2025:HHC:26121 9. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. It was duly proved by the evidence on record that the accused had deposited ₹13.00 lacs as donation for the admission of his daughter. He had also invested money in the construction of the house. The prosecution had proved the possession of money beyond the known source of income. The burden would shift upon the accused to explain the money. The accused asserted that he had taken financial assistance from his relatives; however, there is no proof to this effect. The learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the report of Amar Nath (PW4). Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Ms. Aakanksha Chauhan, learned vice counsel representing the respondent/accused, submitted that there is no proof of the payment of ₹13.00 lacs as donation. Amar Nath had considered HPSR 1999, and not HPSR 1987 and HPSR 1979, which were notified earlier. This vitiated the report. Learned Trial Court had rightly ignored the report in these 7 2025:HHC:26121 circumstances. Hence, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person would have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the 8 2025:HHC:26121 field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate, and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. 9 2025:HHC:26121 (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed, and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 10 2025:HHC:26121 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. A similar view was taken in Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 523, wherein it was observed: - “6. It is true that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court has to reappreciate the evidence. After re-appreciating the evidence, the first question that needs to be answered by the Appellate Court 11 2025:HHC:26121 is whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a plausible view that could have been taken based on the evidence on record. Perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court shows that this question has not been adverted to. The Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it is satisfied after reappreciating the evidence that the only possible conclusion was that the guilt of the accused had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal only on the ground that another view is possible. In other words, the judgment of acquittal must be found to be perverse. Unless the Appellate Court records such a finding, no interference can be made with the order of acquittal. The High Court has ignored the well-settled principle that an order of acquittal further strengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused. After having perused the judgment, we find that the High Court has not addressed itself to the main question.” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Sarla (PW1) stated in response to the Court’s question that she was dealing with the collection and deposit of the amount and had only handed over the documents. Hence, she is not the best witness to depose about the payment of ₹13.00 lacs. She identified the signatures of Manchaiya and P.L. Nanjudaswami. This is not sufficient as the bare proof of the signatures without the examination of the person will be hearsay and insufficient to implicate any person. It was laid down by the Bombay High Court in Sir Mohammed Yusuf v. D, 12 2025:HHC:26121 1961 SCC OnLine Bom 5: AIR 1968 Bom. 112 that the evidence of the contents of the documents is hearsay unless the author is examined. It was observed: “20. …… The evidence of the contents contained in the document is hearsay evidence unless the writer thereof is examined before the Court. We, therefore, hold that the attempt to prove the contents of the document by proving the signature or the handwriting of the author thereof is to set at nought the well-recognised rule that hearsay evidence cannot be admitted. This question has been discussed by Halsbury at paragraph 533 at p. 294 (Halsbury's Law of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 15) under the heading 'Hearsay'. Says Halsbury : ".. .. .. Statements in documents may also be hearsay. So, if A had taken counsel's opinion before acting, the contents of the opinion would be admissible for the same purpose, but not to prove the truth of any statement of fact therein". 21. In paragraph (534), Halsbury has discussed the reasons for the rejection of hearsay evidence and says : "The reasons advanced for the rejection of hearsay are numerous, among them being the irresponsibility of the original declarant, the depreciation of truth in the process of repetition, the opportunities for fraud which its admission would offer, and the waste of time involved in listening to idle rumour. The two principal objections, however, appear to be the lack of an oath administered to the originator of the statement, and the absence of opportunity to cross-examine him." 13 2025:HHC:26121 22. The Advocate General drew our attention to a decision of the House of Lords in Maria Sturla v. Filippo Freccia, (1879) 5 A.C. 623. In that case, the report of a committee appointed by a public department in a foreign state was admitted in evidence as a public document. It was, however, held that it was not admissible as evidence of all the facts stated therein. In that case, the facts were: The document in question, a report of certain persons called the Ginunta di Marina at Genoa, was sought to be put in evidence for the purpose of proving that person who was formerly consul for the Genoese Republic in London, and the succession to whose daughter, Mrs Brown, was in question, was a native of Quarto near Genoa and at the time that report was made, aged about forty-five years. The document was tendered for that purpose and for that purpose only. 23.It was conceded that the report was an authentic public document of the Genoese Government. The statements, however, contained in the report were not based on the evidence of any of the relatives of the consul at Genoa. The information contained therein did not appear to have been received from any member of Mangini's family. One of the well-recognised exceptions under the English Law of Evidence to the reception of hearsay evidence is the evidence relating to pedigree. The only question, which their Lordships of the House of Lords were considering was, whether the contents of the report fell within the purview of the above exception and their Lordships held that it did not, because the statements contained in the report were not based on the evidence given before the dispute started by any of the members of the deceased's family. We are not concerned with that part of the decision of the House of Lords in the present case. The point to be noted is that the statements contained in the report were treated as hearsay, and since they did not fall within the well-recognised 14 2025:HHC:26121 exceptions, they were excluded from evidence. To conclude this part of the discussion, we hold, in the first place, that what has been formally proved is the signature of Abreo and not the writing of the body of the document at Ex. 28 and secondly, that even if the entire document is held formally proved, that does not amount to a proof of the truth of the contents of the document. The only person competent to give evidence on the truthfulness of the contents of the document was Abreo.” 16. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.D. Jain v. State Bank of India, (1982) 1 SCC 143, that the statement of a witness made to a person, who is not called as a witness is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It was observed: - “20. The next question is, is the evidence in the domestic enquiry really hearsay, as held by the Tribunal? 21. The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on the information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence). 22. The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, (1956) 1 WLR 965 observed: "Evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible 15 2025:HHC:26121 when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made. The fact that it was made quite apart from its truth is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made." 17. In Madholal Sindhu v. Asian Assurance Co. Ltd., 1945 SCC OnLine Bom 44= AIR 1954 Bom. 305 the documents were proved by examining the persons acquainted with the hand- writing of the person. This was held to be hearsay and inadmis- sible. It was observed: “As I have already observed, it was futile for Mr Somjee to merely prove the signatures or the handwriting of the persons who signed or wrote the various documents without calling the said persons, who were the only per- sons who could depose to the correctness of the contents of those Various documents. Whether Deshpande, Paranjape or Jamnadas signed or wrote the various doc- uments was not the only issue before me. If that had been the only issue, the proof of the signatures or the handwriting of Deshpande Paranjape or Jamnadas would have been enough. What was in issue, however, before me was apart from Deshpande, Paranjape or Jamnadas having signed or written those documents, whether the contents of those various documents were correct. This certainly could not be proved by Balkrishna Bhagwan Deshmukh, who had no personal knowledge whatever about the contents of those various documents. It would have served no purpose what- soever to admit those documents in evidence with the reser- vation as suggested by Mr. Taraporewalla. I was supported in this conclusion of mine by the remarks of the appeal Court in - '11 Bom HCR 242 at p. 246, and I accordingly declined to 16 2025:HHC:26121 admit in evidence the said various documents in spite of Balkrishna Bhagwan Deshmukh deposing before me that the said various documents were signed by or were in the hand- writing of Deshpande, Paranjape or Jamnadas.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. Therefore, the contents of the documents (Ex.PW1/A to Ex.PW1/D) cannot be read in evidence without the examination of the person who had written them. 19. She stated in her cross-examination that the amount mentioned in Mark-C was deposited in the account of the College by Mr. Manchaiya, but she could not tell who had paid the amount. Thus, she is not the best person to speak about the payment of the money, and her testimony will not help the prosecution. 20. Chikkamuthaiah (PW2) was working as a cashier in the Ananda Cooperative Extension Counter. The money was deposited with him by S. Gurrappaji (PW3). He did not support the prosecution case and was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that Gurrappaji called him to his office on 18.8.2000 and asked him to deposit ₹26.00 lacs in the name of Neetu Sood and Chetan Chauhan. He stated in his cross-examination by learned counsel for the accused that the bank is not concerned with the source of the money but only with the money. The 17 2025:HHC:26121 money was deposited in the account of the Principal, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Medical College, and he could not say anything about the source of the money. His testimony also does not prove that the payment was made by the accused on behalf of his daughter. He has only deposed about the deposit of the money in the account of the Bank, which is not sufficient to implicate the accused. 21. S. Gurrappaji (PW3) was the Chairman of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Trust. He did not support the prosecution case regarding the payment of the donation and stated that the amount of ₹26.00 lacs was not paid by Neetu Sood and Chetan Chauhan. They had not paid any amount except the tuition fees of ₹92,000/- and hostel charges. He was permitted to be cross- examined. He denied that he had called Chikkamuthaiah (PW2) and handed over ₹26.00 lacs to be deposited in the name of Chetan Chauhan and Neetu Sood. He did not know whether the receipt of ₹26.00 lacs was issued or not. He stated in his cross- examination by learned counsel for the accused that Chetan Chauhan and Neetu Sood did not pay any money in the form of a contribution fee or underhanded payment. They only paid the tuition fee and hostel charges. He had no knowledge that ₹26.00 18 2025:HHC:26121 lacs was the consolidated amount of different collections. Neetu Sood and Chetan Chauhan had never paid ₹26.00 lacs to him at any point in time. There was no record of the receipt of ₹26.00 lacs in the receipt register. He stated in response to the Court’s question that the amount deposited with the College is subject to the audit, and in case ₹26.00 is received illegally, recognition could be cancelled, and the Chairman and Trustee could be prosecuted. 22. This witness has also not supported the prosecution’s version regarding the payment of ₹26.00 lacs made by Neetu Sood and Chetan Chauhan. He categorically stated that only the tuition fee of ₹92,000/- each was deposited by these students. Hence, no advantage can be derived by the prosecution from his testimony. 23. V.M. Chinnaswamy (PW6) stated that the Chairman called him and Manchiya for remitting the donation related to Neetu Sood and Chetan Chauhan, i.e., ₹13.00 lacs each to the bank. He and Manchiya deposited the amount in the Bank account. He stated in his cross-examination that payment was not made to him directly. Only the Chairman had handed over 19 2025:HHC:26121 the money to him. He also admitted that parents had not made any payment in his presence. The chairman had also not given any document regarding the deposit of ₹26.00 lacs. 24. This witness categorically stated that the payment was not made to him or in his presence. Therefore, he is not the best person to prove the payment of ₹26.00 lacs. The money was paid to him by the Chairman, and since the Chairman has not supported the prosecution version regarding the payment of ₹26.00 lacs, the conviction cannot be recorded based on the statement made by V.M. Chinnaswamy (PW6). 25. The copy of the register (Ex.PW6/A) shows an entry dated 18.8.2000 and reads that ₹26.00 lacs were remitted to the Bank by the Chairman, GCAMC and mentions the names of Neetu Sood/Chetan Chauhan. It was submitted that this entry shows that the payment was made on behalf of Chetan Chauhan and Neetu Sood. Similarly, an entry (Ex.PW6/C) reads that the amount remitted to the Bank towards GC Remittance, Neetu Sood ₹1.00 lac. It was submitted that these entries are sufficient to prove the payment of the money. This submission is not acceptable. Section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act makes the 20 2025:HHC:26121 entry in the books of account relevant, but it also provides that a person cannot be charged with liability merely based on the entry. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CBI v. V.C. Shukla, (1998) 3 SCC 410, that a person cannot be held criminally liable based on an entry made in the books of account. It was observed: - 35. The probative value of the liability created by an entry in the books of account came up for consideration in Chandradhar Goswami v. Gauhati Bank Ltd. [AIR 1967 SC 1058 : (1967) 1 SCR 898: 37 Comp Cas 108] That case arose out of a suit filed by Gauhati Bank against Chandradhar (the appellant therein) for recovery of a loan of Rs 40,000. In defence, he contended, inter alia, that no loan was taken. To substantiate their claim, the Bank solely relied upon a certified copy of the accounts maintained by them under Section 4 of the Bankers' Book Evidence Act, 1891 and contended that certified copies became prima facie evidence of the existence of the original entries in the accounts and were admissible to prove the payment of the loan given. The suit was decreed by the trial court, and the appeal preferred against it was dismissed by the High Court. In setting aside the decree this Court observed that in the face of the positive case made out by Chandradhar that he did not ever borrow any sum from the Bank, the Bank had to prove the fact of such payment and could not rely on mere entries in the books of account even if they were regularly kept in the course of business in view of the clear language of Section 34 of the Act. This Court further observed that where the entries were not admitted, it was the duty of the Bank, if it relied on such entries to charge any person with liability, to produce evidence in support of the entries to show that the money 21 2025:HHC:26121 was advanced as indicated therein, and thereafter the entries would be of use as corroborative evidence. 36. The same question came up for consideration before different High Courts on a number of occasions, but to eschew prolixity, we would confine our attention to some of the judgments on which Mr Sibal relied. In M.S. Yesuvadiyan v. P.S.A. Subba Naicker [AIR 1919 Mad 132: 52 IC 704], one of the learned Judges constituting the Bench had this to say: “Section 34, Evidence Act, lays down that the entries in books of account, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant, but such a statement will not alone be sufficient to charge any person with liability. That merely means that the plaintiff cannot obtain a decree by merely proving the existence of certain entries in his books of account, even though those books are shown to be kept in the regular course of business. He will have to show further by some independent evidence that the entries represent real and honest transactions and that the moneys were paid in accordance with those entries. The legislature, however, does not require any particular form or kind of evidence in addition to entries in books of account, and I take it that any relevant facts which can be treated as evidence within the meaning of the Evidence Act would be sufficient corroboration of the evidence furnished by entries in books of account if true.” While concurring with the above observations, the other learned Judge stated as under: “If no other evidence besides the accounts were given, however strongly those accounts may be supported by the probabilities, and however strong may be the evidence as to the honesty of those who kept them, such consideration could not alone with reference to Section 34, Evidence Act, be the basis of a decree.” (emphasis supplied) 22 2025:HHC:26121 37. In Beni v. Bisan Dayal [AIR 1925 Nag 445: 89 IC 371] it was observed that entries in books of account are not by themselves sufficient to charge any person with liability, the reason being that a man cannot be allowed to make evidence for himself by what he chooses to write in his own books behind the back of the parties. There must be independent evidence of the transaction to which the entries relate, and in the absence of such evidence, no relief can be given to the party who relies upon such entries to support his claim against another. In Hira Lal v. Ram Rakha [AIR 1953 Pepsu 113] the High Court, while negativing a contention that it having been proved that the books of account were regularly kept in the ordinary course of business and that, therefore, all entries therein should be considered to be relevant and to have been proved, said that the rule as laid down in Section 34 of the Act that entries in the books of account regularly kept in the course of business are relevant whenever they refer to a matter in which the Court has to enquire was subject to the salient proviso that such entries shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability. It is not, therefore, enough merely to prove that the books have been regularly kept in the course of business and the entries therein are correct. It is further incumbent upon the person relying upon those entries to prove that they were in accordance with facts. 38. The evidentiary value of entries relevant under Section 34 was also considered in Hiralal Mahabir Pershad [ILR (1967) 1 P&H 435]. I.D. Dua, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court, observed that such entries, though relevant, were only corroborative evidence, and it is to be shown further by some independent evidence that the entries represent honest and real transactions and that monies were paid in accordance with those entries. 39. A conspectus of the above decisions makes it evident that even correct and authentic entries in books of 23 2025:HHC:26121 account cannot, without independent evidence of their trustworthiness, fix a liability upon a person. Keeping in view the above principles, even if we proceed on the assumption that the entries made in MR 71/91 are correct and the entries in the other books and loose sheets (which we have already found to be not admissible in evidence under Section 34) are admissible under Section 9 of the Act to support an inference about the former's correctness still those entries would not be sufficient to charge Shri Advani and Shri Shukla with the accusations levelled against them for there is not an iota of independent evidence in support thereof. In that view of the matter, we need not discuss, delve into or decide upon the contention raised by Mr Altaf Ahmed in this regard. Suffice it to say that the statements of the four witnesses, who have admitted receipts of the payments as shown against them in MR 71/91, can at best be proof of the reliability of the entries so far as they are concerned and not others. In other words, the statements of the above witnesses cannot be independent evidence under Section 34 as against the above two respondents. So far as Shri Advani is concerned, Section 34 would not come in aid of the prosecution for another reason also. According to the prosecution case itself, his name finds a place only in one of the loose sheets (Sheet No. 8) and not in MR 71/91. Resultantly, in view of our earlier discussion, Section 34 cannot at all be pressed into service against him. 26. Therefore, it is impermissible to hold the accused guilty based on the entries in the books of account. 27. Heavy reliance was placed upon the undertaking (Ex.PW1/A3) in which Pawan Kumar Sood had agreed to pay ₹2.00 lacs before 28.2.2001, ₹1.00 lac before 1.2.2002 and ₹1.00 lac before 1.2.2003. The mere undertaking is not sufficient, and 24 2025:HHC:26121 it was required to be proved that this amount was actually paid. There is no such evidence, and the learned Trial Court was justified in not recording the conviction based on the mere undertaking. 28. The further case of the prosecution is that the accused constructed a palatial house at Dehra. Amar Nath (PW4) made the assessment and issued a report (Ex.PW4/A) estimating the value of the house and boundary wall as ₹18,47,853. He admitted in his cross-examination that he had evaluated the house of the accused on the basis of HPSR 1999. He admitted that HPSR 1987 and HPSR 1979 were in force before HPSR 1999. He did not carry out any assessment to determine the age of the house. He admitted that HPSR was revised due to price escalation. 29. Accused Pawan Kumar (DW1) stated that he applied for a House Building Loan. An estimate of ₹1,36,000/- was prepared. ₹82,000/- were sanctioned in his favour. He withdrew different amounts from his General Provident Fund (GPF) in different years. His testimony is corroborated by the sanction order (Ex.DA3), which was issued in the year 1992, clearly 25 2025:HHC:26121 suggesting that the construction of the house was started before 1999. Therefore, Amar Nath (PW4) erred in applying HPSR 1999 to the present case, and he should have applied HPSR 1987 to determine the value of the house. There is no proof of the evaluation in the year 1992, and the learned Trial Court was justified in rejecting the evaluation made by Amar Nath (PW4). 30. There is no other evidence to show that the accused possessed disproportionate income, and the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused; hence, no interference is required with it while deciding an appeal against acquittal. 31. Consequently, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed. 32. A copy of the judgment and the record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 5th August 2025 (Chander)