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2025 DAILYLAW 7861 (CHH)

SMT. DILIP KAUR v. SHRI GAGANDEEP SINGH HANSPAL

WP227/159/2025 · 2025-02-18

Shri Rakesh Mohan Pandey

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Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:8256 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 159 of 2025 Smt. Dilip Kaur W/o Late Harbhajan Singh Matharu Aged About 74 Years R/o P.R. State Colony, Behind Chandrakar Dairy, Amlidih, Raipur Distt. Raipur (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. Shri Gagandeep Singh Hanspal S/o Late Nirmal Pratap Singh Hanspal, R/o Gurugovind Nagar Ravi Ward Pandri Raipur, Distt. Raipur (C.G.) 2. Gurupreet Singh S/o Late Charanji Singh Hanspal, R/o L. Pocket B-1, Marouda Sector, Risali Bhilai, Distt. Durg (C.G.) 3. Digvijay Singh Hanspal S/o Late Jagjeet Singh Hanspal, R/o C-9, Adarsh Grih Nirman, Sector-1, Avanti Bihar, Raipur (C.G.) 4. Surendra Singh Hanspal S/o Late Jagjeet Singh Hanspal, R/o C- Block, Flat No. 301, 302 Third Floor, Om Complex Fafadih, Raipur, Distt. Raipur (C.G.) 5. Rajshree Builders Through Partner Ashok Kumar Jain S/o Hukum Chand Jain, R/o Lal Ganga Chambers, Patwa Complex, Moudaha Para, Raipur, Distt. Raipur (C.G.) 6. Board Of Revenue Chhattisgarh (Circuit Court, Raipur) Having Principal Seats At Bilaspur, Distt. Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Ms. Rajni Soren, Advocate For State/Respondent No. 6 : Mr. Lav Sharma, P.L. Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment On Board Digitally signed by AJINKYA PANSARE Date: 2025.02.19 14:22:33 +0530 2 18/02/2025 1) The petitioner has filed this petition assailing the order dated 23.10.2024 passed by the Board of Revenue, State of Chhattisgarh in R.N./14/R-A- 6/(A) 255/2024, whereby the revision preferred by the petitioner under Section 50 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 has been dismissed being barred by limitation. 2) Facts of the present case are that the petitioner filed an application for correction in the land records under Section 115 read with 32 of the Code, 1959 before the Naib Tahsildar, Raipur challenging the mutation and illegal entries with respect to Khasra No. 23/1 situated at Village Puraina. The Naib Tahsildar, Raipur vide order dated 31.12.2018 rejected the petitioner's application. The petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 44 of the Code, 1959 before the S.D.O. Raipur which was allowed by the S.D.O. (R), Raipur vide order dated 30.01.2020 and the order passed by the Naib Tahsildar, Raipur was set-aside and the authority concerned was directed to examine the land records from the year 1954-55 to present with respect to transfer/acquisition/ceiling. Thereafter, respondent No. 4 filed an appeal against the order passed by the S.D.O. (R), Raipur which was allowed by the Commissioner, Raipur Division vide order dated 25.05.2023. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner, Raipur Division, the petitioner filed a revision under Section 50 of the Code, 1959 before the Board of Revenue, which has been dismissed being barred by limitation vide order dated 23.10.2023. 3) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner applied for 3 the certified copy of the order dated 23.10.2023 on 01.02.2024 but she could collect the same on 15.07.2024 owing to her ill health. She further submits that the petitioner was unable to make a sufficient case for the delay due to miscommunication with the counsel engaged by her before the Board of Revenue. She also submits that the delay caused in filing the revision before the Board of Revenue was bona-fide and therefore, there was sufficient cause to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Act, 1963. She prays to set aside the order dated 23.10.2024. 4) On the other hand, the learned State counsel opposes. He submits that the petitioner has not explained the delay caused in filing the revision therefore the Board of Revenue has rightly dismissed the revision. 5) Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on the record. 6) Evidently, the Board of Revenue has elaborated in the order impugned that after passing of the order by the Commissioner, Raipur Division on 25.05.2023, the petitioner applied for the certified copy only on 01.02.2024 and she was directed to collect it on 15.02.2024 but she failed to appear. It is further stated in the order impugned that the petitioner appeared on 15.07.2024 and collected the certified copy and thus a delay of more than five months was caused in doing so. 7) Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the 4 object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 8) The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on 5 the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 9) In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- 6 “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 7 10) In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 11) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 12) In the present case the petitioner was not vigilant. The order was passed by Commissioner, Raipur Division on 25.05.2023, the petitioner applied for the certified copy only on 01.02.2024 and thereafter petitioner 8 appeared on 15.07.2024 and collected the certified copy. Thereafter, petitioner preferred revision before the Board of Revenue on 25.09.2024 and delay in this regard has not properly been explained by the petitioner. 13) Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the instant petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE Ajinkya