JUDGMENT : RAJANI DUBEY, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 08.08.2019 passed by the learned 3 rd Additional Session Judge, Raipur (C.G.) in ST No. 216/2018, whereby the appellant has been convicted under Sections 302 and 498-A of IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with fine of Rs.2000/- and RI for 3 years with fine of Rs.500/- respectively, with default stipulations. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 13.02.2018 at about 11 am, the deceased Ritu Gupta consumed poison due to harassment and cruelty by the appellant and his family members for demand of dowry. She was hospitalized but died on the next day on 14.02.2018. She died within 7 years of her marriage with the appellant. After investigation police registered case against the accused and he was arrested and charge sheet was filed before the Magistrate concerned. On the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and material available on record, learned trial court convicted the accused/appellant, as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is contrary to law and material available on record. There are material omissions and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. The chain of circumstances is also not complete. The witnesses of the locality have also not supported the case of the prosecution. The appellant tried to save the deceased by hospitalizing her in hospitals but he could not save her, but all these aspects of the matter have not been considered by the learned Trial Court and the appellant has wrongly been convicted and sentenced. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed. The appellant tried to save the deceased by hospitalizing her in hospitals but he could not save her, but all these aspects of the matter have not been considered by the learned Trial Court and the appellant has wrongly been convicted and sentenced. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed. Reliance has been placed on the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Jasvinder Saini and others vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) , (2013) 7 SCC 256 , Jarnail Singh vs. State of Haryana , (2013) 7 SCC 263 , Sonali Mukherjee vs. Union of India , (2010) 15 SCC 25 , Rajbir Singh vs. State of Punjab , (2022) 20 SCC 670 , Karan Singh vs. State of Haryana , 2025 SCC Online SC 214, Chabi Karmakar and others vs. State of West Bengal , (2025) 1 SCC 398 , Shivaji Chintappa Patil vs. State of Maharashtra , (2021) 5 SCC 626 and Anees vs. State Govt of NCT , AIR 2024 SC 2297 . 4. Per contra, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment and submits that the learned Trial Court has minutely appreciated the evidence available on record and has rightly convicted the appellant. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. It is clear from the record of the learned Trial Court that the learned Trial Court framed charges under Sections 498-A & 304- B of IPC against the appellant and in alternate Section 306 of IPC and Section 302 of IPC and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the appellant under Section 306 of IPC and convicted and sentenced the appellant, as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. 7. It is not disputed in this case that the deceased Ritu is wife of appellant and their marriage was solemnized prior to 3 years of the date of incident. It is also an admitted position that Ritu died on 14.02.2018 due to poisoning. 8. PW-1 father of the deceased Bindul stated that Ritu was his daughter and her marriage with the appellant was performed prior to 3 years of the incident. The accused killed her by administering poison. 9. It is also an admitted position that Ritu died on 14.02.2018 due to poisoning. 8. PW-1 father of the deceased Bindul stated that Ritu was his daughter and her marriage with the appellant was performed prior to 3 years of the incident. The accused killed her by administering poison. 9. PW -2 mother of the prosecutrix Rajkumari stated that the deceased is her daughter and the accused killed her by administering rat poison. She also stated that prior to 1 year of the incident, she also tried to commit suicide on train track. 10. PW-7 Shesh Narayan Sen, ward boy of Mekahara Hospital, Raipur stated that he gave information about death of Ritu Gupta on 14.02.2018 to the Police Station Mekahara. The information is Ex-P/6 and he admitted his signatures on A to A part of the same. 11. ASI M. R. Banjare (PW-13) stated that on 14.02.2018 he received information (Ex-P/6) and thereafter he lodged merg intimation. He stated that he received intimation on 14.02.2018 and he recorded merg intimation on 15.02.2018, which is Ex-P/9 and also lodged FIR vide Ex-P/10 under Section 304-B and 306 of IPC and he gave application to SDO, Raipur for preparing inquest memo vide Ex-P/11 and he admitted his signatures on A to A part of the same. He also gave application to Tahsildar for inquest memo (Ex-P/12). 12. Jyoti Singh (PW-6) Tahsildar stated that on 15.02.2018, she issued notice for inquest (Ex-P/1) and before punch witnesses, she prepared inquest memo (Ex-P/2) of deceased Ritu Gupta. 13. Dr. Shivnarayan Manjhi (PW-10) conducted postmortem of deceased Ritu Gupta. He opined that the death was due to cardio respiratory failure as a result of poisoning and gave his report (Ex-P/8) and viscera was sent for chemical examination and as per Ex-P/19 FSL report, in viscera Article A & B, pieces of stomach and small intestine of deceased were found. Thus the prosecution has successfully proved this fact that Ritu died within 7 years of her marriage and death was unnatural as she died due to poisoning. 14. The learned Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 304-B and 302 of IPC, which provide as under:- “302. Punishment for murder - Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 14. The learned Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 304-B and 302 of IPC, which provide as under:- “302. Punishment for murder - Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. Section 304B of IPC – Dowry death (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.” 15. The father of deceased PW-1 stated that the accused killed his daughter by administering poison to her. The prosecution declared him hostile and cross-examined him, then he admitted this suggestion of the prosecution that it is true that the accused and his family members used to torture her daughter for demand of dowry and accused and his family members used to object her daughter to talk to her mother as she used to tell the entire incident to her. In para 4, he also admitted this suggestion of defence that it is true that accused had performed love marriage with his daughter. He also admitted this suggestion that on 07.10.2014, her daughter and accused performed marriage at Arya Samaj Temple. In para 5, he also admitted that it is true that they never went to the matrimonial house of the daughter and her inlaws never called them on any function or festival. They also used to object her daughter for going to her parental house and used to torture her. He also admitted that they did not call for any social meeting or did not report the matter to the police station. In para 7 he admitted that regarding demand of dowry, he did not lodge any report at the police station. He also admitted that police told him that in the dead body of her daughter, poison was found. 16. PW-2 mother of the deceased Rajkumari stated that the accused and his family members used to torture her for demand of dowry and killed her daughter by administering rat poison to her. He also admitted that police told him that in the dead body of her daughter, poison was found. 16. PW-2 mother of the deceased Rajkumari stated that the accused and his family members used to torture her for demand of dowry and killed her daughter by administering rat poison to her. She also admitted that prior to 1 year of the incident, the deceased also tried to commit suicide on railway track. In the cross- examination, she admitted that whatever she stated in her examination-in-chief she did not tell the same in her police statement. She admitted that the accused and his family members used to harass her daughter but they never called any social meeting. She also admitted that she did not report the matter after knowing that her daughter consumed poison. She self stated that she did not opportunity to do so. She also admitted that she also did not lodge any report to the police station which was situated in the hospital. 17. PW-3 Sunita Singh, neighbor of deceased and accused, stated that they performed love marriage. She did not know that how deceased Ritu died. She also stated that the deceased never talked about with her regarding accused and his family members. She only admitted her signatures on notice (Ex-P/1) and inquest memo (Ex-P/2). 18. PW-4 Mukesh, brother of deceased stated that the accused administered poison to her sister, as a result of which she died. The deceased whenever met him she always told that the accused commits maarpeet with her. In para 2, he stated that prior to some days of the incident, the accused committed maarpeet with the deceased, then the deceased went to her maternal uncle’s home without informing anybody. He also admitted that the in hospital, the deceased told him that the accused used to commit maarpeet with her, as a result of which she consumed poison. He admitted his signatures on notice (Ex- P/1) and inquest memo (Ex-P/2). In para 10 of cross- examination, he admitted that Ritu told him that accused used to commit maarpeet with her and administered poison to her was not stated by him in his police statement. He is telling the same for the first time before the court. He denied this suggestion that her sister took wrong medicine and from reaction of the same she died. 19. He is telling the same for the first time before the court. He denied this suggestion that her sister took wrong medicine and from reaction of the same she died. 19. PW-13 M. R. Banjare admitted this suggestion of defence that it is true that firstly the deceased was taken to Doctor Sahu and thereafter she was taken to Suyash Hospital. He also admitted this suggestion that the deceased and accused performed love marriage and the deceased did not lodge any kind of report at police station of maarpeet. PW-10 Dr. Shivnarayan Manjhi admitted the suggestion of defence that it is true that there was no injury found on the external body of the deceased. 20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Sonali Mukherjee (supra) held in para 39 as under:- “39. The only two other possibilities of the introduction of the tablets to Biswajit could be the forcible opening of his mouth by the accused and putting the tablets into his mouth and compel him to swallow the same or, secondly, Biswajit himself taking the tablets. It must be noted here that when we see the medical evidence and more particularly, the injuries described by Dr. Sahay, there is no injury on the face of Biswajit. The injuries were on the other parts of the body and they were extremely insignificant injuries. At least the injuries nowhere suggest that his mouth was forced open and then the tablets were put into his mouth compelling him to swallow the same. That does not appear in the tenor of evidence of Subbash Dass (PW- 5). For that matter, if we accept the evidence of Subbash Dass (PW-5) on the aspect as to what exactly happened on that night in that room, then there would be no other view possible excepting to exonerate Assadid Poddar (A-2) at least insofar as the introduction of the tablets to Biswajit is concerned. The witness very clearly says that all the time till the door was closed, Assadid Poddar (A-2) was outside and it was only Sonali Mukherjee (A-1), who was with Biswajit. 21. In Rajbir Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held in paras 43, 44 & 46 as under:- “43. This is a murder case of circumstantial evidence by poisoning. The witness very clearly says that all the time till the door was closed, Assadid Poddar (A-2) was outside and it was only Sonali Mukherjee (A-1), who was with Biswajit. 21. In Rajbir Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held in paras 43, 44 & 46 as under:- “43. This is a murder case of circumstantial evidence by poisoning. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the five golden principles as laid down by this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra² as stated in para 153 of the report read as follows: (SCC p. 185) "153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may be" established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra³, wherein the following observations were made: (SCC p. 807, para 19) 19. Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between "may be" and "must be" is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 44. Before laying down the five aforesaid principles, Fazal Ali, J. speaking for the Court in para 152 extracted a paragraph from Hanumant v. State of M.P. as stated by Mahajan, J. Para 152 is reproduced hereunder: (Sharad Birdhichand Sarda case, SCC pp. 184-185) "152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of M.P. This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail v. State of U.P. and Ram Gopal v. State of Maharashtra. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant case: (SCC pp. 76-77, para 12) 12.... It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 46. With respect to the case of poisoning, this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda further laid down four important circumstances for recording a conviction in para 165 which is reproduced hereunder: (SCC pp. 188-89) "165. 46. With respect to the case of poisoning, this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda further laid down four important circumstances for recording a conviction in para 165 which is reproduced hereunder: (SCC pp. 188-89) "165. So far as this matter is concerned, in such cases the court must carefully scan the evidence and determine the four important circumstances which alone can justify a conviction: (1) there is a clear motive for an accused to administer poison to the deceased, (2) that the deceased died of poison said to have been administered, (3) that the accused had the poison in his possession, (4) that he had an opportunity to administer the poison to the deceased." 22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Karan Singh (supra) held held in para 6 as under:- “6. The following are the essential ingredients of Section 304-B: a) The death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; b) The death must have been caused within seven years of her marriage; c) Soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of her husband; and d) Cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.” 23. In Chabi Karmakar (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held in paras 19 & 20 as under:- “19. In paragraph 9 of Rajinder Singh (Supra), this Court had discussed the ingredients of Section 304B of IPC as follows: “9. The ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B IPC have been stated and restated in many judgments. There are four such ingredients and they are said to be: (a) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or her death must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (c) soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and (d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand for dowry. 20. The evidence placed before us, in the case at hand, is not sufficient to prove the fourth ingredient i.e. cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand for dowry, as laid down by the abovementioned case.” 24. 20. The evidence placed before us, in the case at hand, is not sufficient to prove the fourth ingredient i.e. cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand for dowry, as laid down by the abovementioned case.” 24. In light of the above, in the present case, it is clear that the PW-1 father of the deceased, PW-2 mother of the deceased and PW-4 brother of the deceased stated that the deceased died as she was harassed and tortured due to demand of dowry but they admitted this fact that the accused and the deceased performed love marriage at Arya Samaj and after marriage the deceased did not come to her parental house and they also did not go to her matrimonial house. PW-4 brother of the deceased stated in the examination-in-chief that the deceased told her that the accused administered poison to her, but he did not stated the same in his police statement. However, the mother, father and brother of the deceased signed at the inquest memo Ex-P/2 but they did not allege that the accused administered poison to deceased. Dr. Shivnarayan Manjhi (PW-10) also did not find any external injuries on the body of the deceased. 25. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shivaji Chintappa Patil (supra) held in para 25 as under:- “25. Another circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is, that the appellant failed to give any explanation in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. By now it is well-settled principle of law, that false explanation or non-explanation can only be used as an additional circumstance, when the prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused. However, it cannot be used as a link to complete the chain. Reference in this respect could be made to the judgment of this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra).” 26. However, it cannot be used as a link to complete the chain. Reference in this respect could be made to the judgment of this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra).” 26. The learned Trial Court based its conviction upon Section 106 of the Evidence Act that the accused has failed to offer any plausible explanation about the death of the deceased, but as per above legal position, it is clear that the prosecution has failed to prove the chain of circumstances leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused and false explanations are no explanations and cannot be used as a link to complete the chain of circumstances and looking to the postmortem report and the statement of PW-10, it is also not clear that the death was suicidal or homicidal, as such the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court based on Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not sustainable. In this case, it is clear that the accused was trying to save the deceased and the Investigating Officer admitted that firstly she was admitted to private doctor and thereafter was admitted at Suyash Hospital and thereafter at Medical College, Raipur. The prosecution agency also did not try to record dying declaration of the deceased. 27. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Anees (supra) held in paras 36, 43, 44 & 47 as under:- “36. Section 106 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Evidence Act. Section 101 with its illustration (a) lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish the facts which are, "especially within the knowledge of the accused and which, he can prove without difficulty or inconvenience. 43. Thus, from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is evident that the court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases with care and caution. It cannot be said that it has no application to criminal cases. 43. Thus, from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is evident that the court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases with care and caution. It cannot be said that it has no application to criminal cases. The ordinary rule which applies to criminal trials in this country that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the provisions contained in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 44. Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. This section cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the elements necessary to establish the offence. It does not absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was committed even though it is a matter specifically within the knowledge of the accused and it does not throw the burden on the accused to show that no crime was committed. To infer the guilt of the accused from absence of reasonable explanation in a case where the other circumstances are not by themselves enough to call for his explanation is to relieve the prosecution of its legitimate burden. So, until a prima facie case is established by such evidence, the onus does not shift to the accused. 47. But Section 106 of the Evidence Act has no application to cases where the fact in question, having regard to its nature, is such as to be capable of being known not only to the accused but also to others, if they happened to be present when it took place. The intention underlying the act or conduct of any individual is seldom a matter which can be conclusively established; it is indeed only known to the person in whose mind the intention is conceived. Therefore, if the prosecution has established that the character and circumstance of an act suggest that it was done with a particular intention, then under illustration (a) to this section, it may be assumed that he had that intention, unless he proves the contrary.” 28. In the present case, all these above situations are not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, all these above situations are not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has failed to prove any motive or any act committed by the accused which may show that the deceased committed suicide due to demand of dowry. 29. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Jasvinder Saini (supra) held in paras 13, 14 & 15 as under:- “13. A reading of the order which the trial Court subsequently passed on 23rd February 2011 directing addition of a charge under Section 302 IPC makes it abundantly clear that the addition was not based on any error or omission whether inadvertent or otherwise in the matter of framing charges against the accused. Even the respondents did not plead that the omission of a charge under Section 302 IPC was on account of any inadvertent or other error or omission on the part of the trial Court. The order passed by the trial Court, on the contrary directed addition of the charge under Section 302 IPC entirely in obedience to the direction issued by this Court in Rajbir’s case (supra). Such being the position when the order passed by the trial Court was challenged before the High Court the only question that fell for determination was whether the addition of a charge under Section 302 IPC was justified on the basis of the direction issued by this Court in Rajbir’s case (supra). The High Court has no doubt adverted to that aspect and found itself to be duty bound to comply with the direction in the same measure as the trial Court. Having said so, it has gone a step further to suggest that the autopsy surgeon’s report was prima facie evidence to show that the offence was homicidal in nature. The High Court has by doing so provided an additional reason to justify the framing of a charge under Section 302 IPC. 14. Be that as it may the common thread running through both the orders is that this Court had in Rajbir’s case (supra) directed the addition of a charge under Section 302 IPC to every case in which the accused are charged with Section 304-B. That was not, in our opinion, the true purport of the order passed by this Court. The direction was not meant to be followed mechanically and without due regard to the nature of the evidence available in the case. The direction was not meant to be followed mechanically and without due regard to the nature of the evidence available in the case. All that this Court meant to say was that in a case where a charge alleging dowry death is framed, a charge under Section 302 can also be framed if the evidence otherwise permits. No other meaning could be deduced from the order of this Court. 15. It is common ground that a charge under Section 304B IPC is not a substitute for a charge of murder punishable under Section 302. As in the case of murder in every case under Section 304B also there is a death involved. The question whether it is murder punishable under Section 302 IPC or a dowry death punishable under Section 304B IPC depends upon the fact situation and the evidence in the case. If there is evidence whether direct or circumstantial to prima facie support a charge under Section 302 IPC the trial Court can and indeed ought to frame a charge of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, which would then be the main charge and not an alternative charge as is erroneously assumed in some quarters. If the main charge of murder is not proved against the accused at the trial, the Court can look into the evidence to determine whether the alternative charge of dowry death punishable under Section 304B is established. The ingredients constituting the two offences are different, thereby demanding appreciation of evidence from the perspective relevant to such ingredients. The trial Court in that view of the matter acted mechanically for it framed an additional charge under Section 302 IPC without adverting to the evidence adduced in the case and simply on the basis of the direction issued in Rajbir’s case (supra). The High Court no doubt made a half hearted attempt to justify the framing of the charge independent of the directions in Rajbir’s case (supra), but it would have been more appropriate to remit the matter back to the trial Court for fresh orders rather than lending support to it in the manner done by the High Court.” 30. The High Court no doubt made a half hearted attempt to justify the framing of the charge independent of the directions in Rajbir’s case (supra), but it would have been more appropriate to remit the matter back to the trial Court for fresh orders rather than lending support to it in the manner done by the High Court.” 30. In light of the above, in the present case also, the prosecution only proved this fact that the deceased died within 7 years of her marriage and death was unnatural, but the prosecution has failed to prove that the death of deceased was homicidal or suicidal. The statement of the prosecution witnesses are not reliable relating to allegation that the accused administered poison to the deceased so the prosecution has utterly failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant, as such the offence under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 302 of IPC is not made out against the appellant, thus the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court is not sustainable. 31. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges under Sections 498-A and 302 of IPC. 32. The appellant is in jail. He be released forthwith if he is not required to be detained in any other offence. 33. Keeping in view the provisions of section 481 of BNSS 2023, the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- before the court concerned forthwith, which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 34. The Trial Court’s record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. The copy of this judgment be also sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent for information and necessary action.