Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
1 Reserved on : 14.07.2025 Pronounced on : 30.07.2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF JULY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.19590 OF 2025 (GM - CPC)
BETWEEN:
SRI H.S.LOKESH S/O SHIVANNA AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS R/AT NO.313/314 SRIGANDHA NAGRA MAIN ROAD HEGGANAHALLI, BENGALURU – 560 091.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI PRAKASH B.N., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . SRI K.S.MOORTHY S/O LATE K.SUBBARAO AGED ABOUT 84 YEARS THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE BANGALORE TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES HOUSE BUILDING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LIMITED NO.83/2/44, SRIGANDHADA KAVALU SUNKADAKATTE, BENGALURU – 560 091. R
2 2 . SRI G.N.KUMAR S/O NAGARAJA AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS R/AT NO.004, BHINDUZEERWALA APARTMENT, IV BLOCK RAJAJINAGARA, BENGALURU – 560 010.
3 . SRI A.MANJAPPA S/O LATE KALEGOWDA AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS R/AT NO.124, 2ND CROSS KARNATAKA BADAVANE MAHALAKSHMIPURAM BENGALURU – 560 086.
4 . SMT.K.H.ANU W/O SRI K.M.SATHISH AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS R/AT SONALLE POST HOSANAGARA TALUK SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT – 577 201.
5 . SMT. BHOOMI REDDY SUREKHA W/O SRI CHANDRASHEKAR REDDY AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS R/AT NO.629, SRI RAMANAKRUPA 3RD CROSS, SUNKADAKATTE VISHWANEEDAM POST BENGALURU – 560 091.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI ABHINAV R., ADVOCATE FOR C/R-2;
SRI MANOHAR B. K., ADVOCATE FOR C/R-4 AND R-5)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO SET-ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
ORDER DATED 21.04.2025, PASSED VIDE I.A. NO. 1/2022, IN O.S.
3 NO. 1102/2017, BY THE II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE, BENGALURU RURAL, BENGALURU AT ANNEXURE – A.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 14.07.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner/plaintiff in O.S.No.1102 of 2017 is before this Court calling in question an order dated 21-04-2025 passed by the II Additional Civil Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, Bengaluru rejecting I.A.No.1 of 2022 filed by the plaintiff under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC seeking amendment of the plaint.
2. Heard Sri B.N. Prakash, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri R.Abhinav, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 and Sri B.K.Manohar,
learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.4 and 5.
4
3. Facts, in brief, adumbrated are as follows: -
The petitioner/plaintiff originally invokes the jurisdiction of the civil Court seeking a decree of permanent injunction praying that the defendants be restrained from interfering with his possession over the suit schedule property. The suit, instituted in 2017, progressed through the usual adversarial course. On 14-03-2018 defendant No.1 files his written statement and on 11-04-2018 defendants 2 and 3 filed their written statement. On 28-11-2018 the remaining defendants i.e., defendants 4 and 5 filed their written statement. The concerned Court, framed its issues on 26-11-2019 and the trial was in full stride, evidence having been led in and the case being at the stage of cross-examination. The plaintiff, after a lapse of nearly 5 years, brings in an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC having filed it on 09-11-2022 seeking amendment of the plaint. The defendants put up vehement defense by filing objections to the said application on three different dates i.e., 26-08-2023, 13-08-2024 and 13-02-2025. Considering the entire
submissions in the application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC and the objections thereon, the concerned Court rejects the application. The
5 rejection of the application is what has driven the plaintiff to this Court in the subject petition. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that what the petitioner has sought is only an amendment to the plaint by adding a prayer of declaration. The learned counsel would submit that the amendment sought would not change the nature of the suit, as he has sought only a declaration to declare that he is the owner of the suit schedule property. He would submit that even in a case of permanent injunction the Court can enter into the issue of ownership. To be on the safer side, the petitioner has sought the amendment of the plaint. He would seek the order of the concerned Court be set aside and the application be allowed. 5. Per contra, the defendants put up vehement opposition to the application by contending that, if the relief of declaration is sought after 6 years of filing the suit, it would amount to a new case being set up by the petitioner with regard to ownership. Even a suit for declaration has to be filed within three years from the date of cause of action. The cause of action, in the case at hand,
6 has arisen when the suit for permanent injunction had been preferred 5 years ago. Therefore, in a clever way the plaintiff wants to get away with limitation. They would seek to contend that Article 58 of the Limitation Act would clearly bar a suit beyond the period of three years for declaration. Therefore, the defendants would seek dismissal of the petition. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The petitioner/plaintiff claims to be the absolute owner and in possession of suit schedule property bearing site Nos. 11 and 12 as averred in the petition. On 31-12-1990 the vendors of the plaintiff one Smt. Akkamahadevamma and K.H. Manjappa purchase 6 acres of land which included the suit schedule properties. Smt. Akkamahadevamma on 19-02-1999 executes a general power of attorney in favour of K.H. Manjappa.
On 08-03-1999 the vendors of the plaintiff apply for conversion of land measuring 2 acres and
7 20 guntas which was acceded to and the suit schedule property became a part of the converted land. It is the case of the plaintiff that his vendors retained the suit schedule properties bearing Site Nos. 11 and 12 while conveying other sites in favour of defendant No.1. On 02-11-2017 the suit schedule properties are said to have been purchased by the plaintiff from his vendors in terms of a registered sale deed. Ownership claim re-springs from the said date. 8. On 18-11-2017, barely two weeks after the said sale deed being registered, the defendants are alleged to have interfered with the possession of the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property. Therefore, the plaintiff institutes a suit for permanent injunction in O.S.No.1102 of 2017. Cause of action for the said suit, according to the plaintiff, has sprung on 18-11-2017, but files the suit for permanent injunction. All the defendants at different dates file their respective written statements. Issues are framed by the concerned Court on 26-11-2019. The plaintiff, after framing of issues, led his examination-in-chief and further examination. Thereafter the matter got posted for his cross-examination. 8
9. It is the case of the plaintiff that during the examination of the 1st defendant the ownership of the petitioner/plaintiff of the suit schedule property i.e., site Nos. 11 and 12 comes to be doubted. Therefore, the petitioner files an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment of the plaint to incorporate a prayer seeking the relief of declaration declaring himself to be the absolute owner of the suit schedule properties and for a declaration that several sale deeds and rectification deeds are not binding on him. Since the entire issue revolves round the amendment sought, it becomes necessary to notice the contents of the application.
The application seeking amendment reads as follows:
“APPLICATION UNDER ORDER VI RULE 17 READ WITH SECTION 151 OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE. For the reasons mentioned in the accompanying affidavit, it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to permit the Plaintiff to amend the plaint by incorporating the following in the interest of justice and equity. After prayer (ii) to add Prayer (iii) & (iv) as follows:
Prayer-iii: Pass a Judgment and Decree of declaration that the Plaintiff is the absolute owner of the Schedule Property. Prayer-iv: Pass a Judgment and Decree of declaration that the following sale deeds to pertaining Schedule A Property and Schedule B property as illegal, void and the same is not binding upon the plaintiff:
9 Schedule-A Property
(a) Sale deed dated: 09-03-2005 Registered as Document No.BLN-1-56125-2005-05, Book-1, Stored in CD No.BLND142 registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bangalore North, executed by Sri K.S.Murthy in favour o f Sri T.Hanumantharayappa. (b) Sale deed dated 27-07-2006 Registered as Document No.BLN-1-24444-2006-07, Book-1, Stored in CD No.BLND299 registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bangalore North, Bangalore executed by Sri T.Hanumantharayappa in favour of G.N.Kumar. (c) Sale deed dated 27-07-2006 Registered as Document No.BLN-1-24452-2006-07, Book-1, Stored in CD No.BLND299 registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bangalore North, executed by Sri T.Hanumantharayappa in favour of A.Manjappa. Schedule-B Property:
(a) Sale deed dated 28-03-2005 registered as Document No.BLN-1-60878-2004-05, Book-1, Stored in CD No.BLND157 registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bangalore North, executed by K.S.Moorthy in favour of Sri Venkatappa. (b) Sale deed dated 15-06-2006 Registered as Document No.BLN-1-16422-2006-07, Book-1, Stored in CD No.BLND281 registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bangalore North, executed by Sri Venkatappa in favour of Smt. H.S. Shalini.
(c) Rectification Deed dated 17-01-2013 Registered as Document No.NGB-1-09754-2013-14, Book-1, Stored in CD No.NGVD230 registered in the office of the Sub- Registrar, Bangalore North, executed by Sri Venkatappa in favour of Smt. H.S. Shalini. (d) Sale deed dated 19-01-2013 Registered as Document No.NGB-1-09894-2012-13, Book-1, Stored in CD No.NGBD231 registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar,
10 Nagarbhavi, executed by Smt. H.S.Shalini in favour of Smt. Boomi Reddy Surekha. (e) Sale deed dated 28-03-2005 Registered as Document No.BLN-1-60878-2004-05, Book-1, Stored in CD No.BLND157 registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bangalore North, executed by Sri K.S.Moorthy in favour of Sri Venkatappa. (f) Sale deed dated 15-06-2006 registered as Document No.BLN-1-16426-2006-07, Book-1, Stored in CD No.BLND281 registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bangalore North, executed by Sri Venkatappa in favour of Sri K.H. Anu. (g) Rectification deed dated 12-07-2014 Registered as Document No.NGB-1-01019-2014-15, Book-1, Stored in CD No.NGBD262 registered in the office of the Sub- Registrar, Nagarbhavi, Bangalore North, executed by Sri Venkatappa in favour of Sri K.N. Anu. (h) Sale deed dated 28-03-2005 Registered as Document No.BLN-1-60872-2004-05, Book-1, Stored in CD No.BLND157 registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bangalore North, executed by Sri K.S.Moorthy in favour of Smt. H.Lakshamma. (i) Sale deed dated 27-07-2006 Registered as Document No.BLN-1-24448-2006-07, Book-1, Stored in CD No.BLND299 registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bangalore North, executed by Smt. Lakshamma in favour of Sri G.N.Kumar.”
In juxtaposition, the prayer that was sought at the time of institution of the suit is required to be noticed. The prayer in the suit is as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully prays that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass judgment and decree:
11 (i) of permanent injunction restraining the Defendants and their henchmen, agents, representatives or any other third parties acting for them or on behalf of them from interfering with the physical possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties by the Plaintiff, in any manner.
(ii) and to grant such other reliefs as this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the circumstances of the case and allow the above with costs, in the interest of justice and equity.”
What was earlier sought was relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the physical possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties by the plaintiff. What is now sought is a complete change seeking the relief of declaration that the sale deeds pertaining to A and B Schedule property are not binding upon the plaintiff and consequently declare him to be the owner of the suit schedule property. Several items in Schedule-A and Schedule-B properties are sought to be incorporated in the prayer by way of amendment. The averment was that it would not change the nature of the suit and the petitioner was ready and willing to pay court fee payable by virtue of the amendment of the plaint. The defendants put up vehement opposition by detailed statement of objections. 12
10. The issue now would be, whether the amendment under
Order VI Rule 17 CPC must be permitted to seek the relief of declaration that the petitioner is the absolute owner of the property and ancillary reliefs, plethora in number. The concerned Court, on the averments in the application and the objections, rejects the application filed under Order VI Rule 17 CPC by the following order:
“…. …. ….
R E A S O N S
7.Point No.1: The Plaintiff has filed the present suit against the defendants for the relief of Permanent Injunction in respect of the suit schedule property.
8. Before I proceed further it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C.
“ORDER 6 Rule 17: Amendment of pleadings- The court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties:
Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial”.
9. The object of the amendment is that, the court should try the merits of the cases that come before them and should consequently allow all amendments that may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. Ultimately, the courts exist for doing justice between
13 the parties and not for punishing them, and they are empowered to grant amendments of pleadings in the larger interest of doing full and complete justice to parties. Provisions for the amendment of pleadings are contained to promote end of justice and not for defeating them. Keeping these principles I would like to discuss the facts of the present case on hand.
11. In this regard I would like to bestow upon the
Judgment reported in 2012 (119) AIC 669. Between Minor Balakumaran Vs Gunasekaran. In this case it is held that, prior to insertion of Proviso clause to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, it was permissible for the Court to allow belated amendment by compensating the other side by awarding costs. But, pursuant to the insertion of the Proviso, no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. In view of the insertion of the Proviso, the entire object of the amendment introduced 2002 in CPC is to stall filing of Application for amending the pleading subsequent to commencement of trial to avoid surprises and that the parties had sufficient knowledge of other’s case. In the instant case also the plaintiff filed the application after adducing her evidence and when the case was posted for cross examination of P.W-1. The defendants have appeared before the court and have filed their written statement on 06.06.2018. The plaintiff has not filed any such application from the date of filing the written statement and after leading the evidence and when the case was posted for cross examination has come up with this application. This appears that the plaintiff was aware of the claim of the defendants. When the plaintiff was aware of the defendants claim what made the plaintiff to sit quiet till
2022. The plaintiff though was diligent about the defendants claim kept quiet and has come up with this application only with an intention to protract the proceedings. Therefore, the above said decision squarely applicable to the case on hand.
12. The alleged amendment sought by the plaintiff is belated one and it will introduce the new case and it
14 will change the entire nature of the suit. If the alleged amendment application is allowed, then the very plaint pleadings will be changed and both the parties have to lead fresh trial. The plaintiff has not made out ground to allow the application. If the application is allowed it will cause injustice to the other side. Hence, considering all these aspects, this court in the touchstone of reasons ventilated above, answered Points No.1 in the Negative.
13. Point No.2: In view of my findings on Point No.1, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
I.A No.I/2022 filed by the plaintiff under Order 6 Rule 17 R/w section 151 of C.P.C. is hereby rejected.”
(Emphasis added)
The Court holds that the stage at which the application is preferred cannot be permitted, as trial had already commenced and it was in advance stage and the concerned Court comes to conclude that the plaintiff has sought to set up a new case which would change the nature of the suit. On the said reasons, the amendment comes to be rejected. 11. What is sought by the plaintiff is amendment seeking relief of declaration declaring him to be the absolute owner and several ancillary prayers. As observed hereinabove, the cause of
15 action for filing the suit arose on 18-11-2017. Therefore, for every relief that he seeks, the said date would be the date for cause of action. Initially permanent injunction is sought. By way of amendment, the relief of declaration is now sought, 5 years after the cause of action. The learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff projects as if it is an innocuous amendment and does not change the nature of the suit. The said submission, to say the least, is preposterous, as it is a product of clever drafting. A suit for declaration, is trite, should be filed within 3 years of springing of cause of action. 12. The cause of action, in the case at hand, has sprung on 18-11-2017. The amendment now sought is in the year 2022, 5 years after the cause of action having arisen. It, therefore, becomes necessary to notice the limitation for seeking the relief of declaration. Article 58 of the Limitation Act deals with limitation to file a suit for declaration. It reads as follows:
2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— …
…
… (j)
“period of limitation” means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the
16 Schedule, and “prescribed period” means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act;
3. Bar of limitation.—(1) Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. …
…
… SCHEDULE
…
…
…
58. To obtain any other
declaration.
Three years When the right to sue first accrues.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 58 mandates that in suits for declaration, the suit should be instituted within 3 years from the date of arising of cause of action. The rigour of the statute, on the face of it, is not met in the case at hand. As stated earlier on 18-11-2017 the cause of action arose. The amendment to the plaint sought is on 09-11-2022. The amendment introduces a new case. If a suit for relief of declaration is not even entertainable on the plain interpretation of Article 58, as it is beyond the period of limitation, the amendment can hardly be said to be justifiable. By bringing in an amendment undoubtedly, the petitioner/plaintiff is wanting to set up a new case which he cannot seek independently. Therefore, what cannot be done directly
17 is sought to be done indirectly by way of amendment. If the petitioner has no right in law to institute an independent suit for declaration, he can hardly be said to have a right to bring in relief of declaration by projecting it as an innocuous amendment. The amendment sought cuts at the root of the matter. The amendment sets up a new case, undoubtedly. 13. It becomes necessary to notice the law laid down by the Apex Court or other High Courts with regard to amendments not to be permitted which change the nature of the suit itself. The amendment is sought under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC. It reads as follows:
“17.
Amendment of pleadings.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleading in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties:
Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18 The Apex Court has interpreted the said provision i.e., Order VI Rule 17 CPC holding that allowing the amendment should not be working injustice to the other side. The Apex Court in the case of DINESH GOYAL v. SUMAN AGARWAL1, has held as follows:
“…. …. …. 11. At this juncture, before proceeding to the merits of the case, let us consider the law relating to the amendments of pleadings. 11.1 The settled rule is that the Courts should adopt a liberal approach in granting leave to amend pleadings, however, the same cannot be in contravention of the statutory boundaries placed on such power. In North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur v. Bhagwan Das it was held as under:
“16. Insofar as the principles which govern the question of granting or disallowing amendments under
Order 6 Rule 17 CPC (as it stood at the relevant time) are concerned, these are also well settled. Order 6 Rule 17 CPC postulates amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil [AIR 1957 SC 363] which still holds the field, it was held that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions: (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. [Also see Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi v. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar (1990) 1 SCC 166.]”
11.2 Over the years, through numerous judicial precedents certain factors have been outlined for the application
1 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2615
19 of Order VI Rule 17. Recently, this Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Pvt. Ltd.7, after considering numerous precedents in regard to the amendment of pleadings, culled out certain principles:—
(i) All amendments are to be allowed which are necessary for determining the real question in controversy provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as is apparent from the use of the word “shall”, in the latter part of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC. (ii) In the following scenario such applications should be ordinarily allowed if the amendment is for effective and proper adjudication of the controversy between the parties to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided it does not result in injustice to the other side. (iii) Amendments, while generally should be allowed, the same should be disallowed if -
(a) By the amendment, the parties seeking amendment does not seek to withdraw any clear admission made by the party which confers a right on the other side. (b) The amendment does not raise a time-barred claim, resulting in the divesting of the other side of a valuable accrued right (in certain situations)
(c) The amendment completely changes the nature of the suit;
(d) The prayer for amendment is malafide,
(e) By the amendment, the other side should not lose a valid defence.
(iv) Some general principles to be kept in mind are -
20 (I) The court should avoid a hyper-technical approach; ordinarily be liberal, especially when the opposite party can be compensated by costs. (II) Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is intended to rectify the absence of material particulars in the plaint or introduce an additional or a new approach. (III) The amendment should not change the cause of action, so as to set up an entirely new case, foreign to the case set up in the plaint.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court holds that where it causes injustice to the other side and raises a time barred claim, the amendment should be refused. 14. The Apex Court, later, in the case of MALLAVVA v. KALSAMMANAVARA KALAMMA2, has held as follows:
“…. …. …. 28. This Court in Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and Sons, (2009) 10 SCC 84, laid down some basic principles which the Court should keep in mind while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment. Para 63 of the said judgment reads thus:
“63. On critically analysing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which
2 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3846
21 ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment:
(1) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case; (2) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide;
(3) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money;
(4) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigations;
(5) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; and
(6) as a general rule, the Court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amendment claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application.”
(Emphasis supplied)
29.
Thus, the dictum as laid in the above referred judgment of this Court is that the Court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amendment claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application.” (Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court, following the judgment in the case of REVAJEETU BUILDERS holds that, as a general rule the Court should decline amendment if a fresh suit on the amendment claims would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. 22 The Apex Court further amplifies and reiterates that Courts should decline amendments if fresh suit would be barred by limitation. The Apex Court in the case of BASAVARAJ v. INDIRA3 holds as follows:
“…. …. …
10. The proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC provides that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. In the case in hand, this is not even the pleaded case of Respondents 1 and 2 before the trial court in the application for amendment that due diligence was there at the time of filing of the suit in not seeking relief prayed for by way of amendment. All what was pleaded was oversight. The same cannot be accepted as a ground to allow any amendment in the pleadings at the fag end of the trial especially when admittedly the facts were in knowledge of Respondents 1 and 2-plaintiffs. 11. The relevant paragraphs of the application seeking amendment of the plaint are reproduced hereunder:
“2. That, due to oversight and by mistake the plaintiff was unable to sought relief declaration of decree as null and void and unable to pay required court fee some unavoidable circumstances and the proposed amendment is very essential for deciding the matter in dispute. 3. * * *
4. That, if the proposed amendment is allowed no prejudice will be cause to the other side, on the other hand if it is not allowed then the deponent will be put to great loss and will also leads multiplicity of litigations. Hence it is
3(2024) 3 SCC 705
23 just and proper to allow the proposed amendment to meet the ends of justice.” (sic)
12.
This Court in M. Revanna v. Anjanamma [M. Revanna v. Anjanamma, (2019) 4 SCC 332 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 338] opined that an application for amendment may be rejected if it seeks to introduce totally different, new and inconsistent case or changes the fundamental character of the suit. Order 6 Rule 17CPC prevents an application for amendment after the trial has commenced unless the Court comes to the conclusion that despite due diligence the party could not have raised the issue. The burden is on the party seeking amendment after commencement of trial to show that in spite of due diligence such amendment could not be sought earlier. It is not a matter of right. Para 7 thereof is extracted below : (SCC p. 335)
“7. Leave to amend may be refused if it introduces a totally different, new and inconsistent case, or challenges the fundamental character of the suit. The proviso to Order 6 Rule 17CPC virtually prevents an application for amendment of pleadings from being allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial. The proviso, to an extent, curtails absolute discretion to allow amendment at any stage. Therefore, the burden is on the person who seeks an amendment after commencement of the trial to show that in spite of due diligence, such an amendment could not have been sought earlier. There cannot be any dispute that an amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right, and under all circumstances. Though normally amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid multiplicity of litigation, the court needs to take into consideration whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide and whether the amendment causes such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money.” (emphasis supplied)”
(Emphasis supplied)
24
15.
Long before the said judgment, the Apex Court in the case of ABDUL REHMAN v. MOHD. RULDU4, has held as follows:
“…. …. …. 13. Next, we have to see whether the proposed amendments would alter the claim/cause of action of the plaintiffs. In view of the same, we verified the averments in the unamended plaint. As rightly pointed out by Ms Manmeet Arora, learned counsel for the appellants that the entire factual matrix for the relief sought for under the proposed amendment had already been set out in the unamended plaint. We are satisfied that the challenge to the voidness of those sale deeds was implicit in the factual matrix set out in the unamended plaint and, therefore, the relief of cancellation of sale deeds as sought by the amendment does not change the nature of the suit as alleged. It is settled law that if necessary factual basis for amendment is already contained in the plaint, the relief sought on the said basis would not change the nature of the suit. In view of the same, the contrary view expressed by the trial court and the High Court cannot be sustained. It is not in dispute that the relief sought by way of amendment by the appellants could also be claimed by them by way of a separate suit on the date of filing of the application. Considering the date of the sale deeds and the date on which the application was filed for amendment of the plaint, we are satisfied that the reliefs claimed are not barred in law and no prejudice should (sic would) have been caused to Respondents 1-3 (Defendants 1-3 therein) if the amendments were allowed and would in fact avoid multiplicity of litigation. …
…
…
18.
We reiterate that all amendments which are necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties should be allowed if it does not change the basic nature of the
4 (2012) 11 SCC 341
25 suit. A change in the nature of relief claimed shall not be considered as a change in the nature of suit and the power of amendment should be exercised in the larger interests of doing full and complete justice between the parties.” (Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court holds, that if the relief that is sought in the application seeking amendment, can also be claimed by filing a fresh suit, as on the date of the filing the amendment application, such amendments, on reasons recorded therein could be allowed, as such relief would not be barred by law. As a corollary, if an amendment would seek to project a claim that cannot be made even by filing a fresh suit, the amendment so sought would be barred by law, such amendment cannot be allowed. 16. In the case at hand, Article 58 becomes a statutory bar. The period of limitation for a suit for declaration under Article 58 is three years. The Apex Court in the case of NIKHILA DIVYANG MEHTA v. HITESH P.SANGHVI5, has held as follows:
“…. …. …. 20. The use of the words “when the right to sue first accrues” as mentioned in Article 58 is very relevant and important. It categorically provides that the
5 2025 SCC OnLine SC 779
26 limitation of three years has to be counted from the date when the right to sue first accrues. …
…
…
24. There is no dispute to the fact that the limitation for filing of the suit falls under Article 58 of the Schedule to the Act wherein the limitation prescribed is three years. It may be pertinent to note that the limitation of three years is from the date when the cause of action first arose.
So, according to the plaintiff's case, the cause of action first arose on 04.02.2014 and, therefore, the limitation would end on 04.02.2017. However, even if the limitation is calculated from the date of knowledge of the Will and/or the Codicil, it would run from the first week of November, 2014 and would end in the first week of November,
2017. The suit admittedly was instituted on 21.11.2017; much beyond the first week of November, 2017 and as such is apparently barred by limitation, for which neither any defence is required to be looked into nor any evidence in support is needed to be adduced. …
…. …
28. The other contention that the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the Will and Codicil in the first week of November, 2014, but that was not a complete knowledge as probably he could read the same subsequently. In dealing with the submission, the appellate Court distinguished between
“having knowledge” and “full knowledge” to hold that the suit is not barred by limitation as the limitation would reckon from the date of full knowledge. It is a complete fallacy to make any distinction between “knowledge” and
“full knowledge”. First of all, the limitation has to run from the date when the cause of action first accrued and not any subsequent date for the cause of action. According to the plaintiff himself, the cause of action for the suit had arisen much earlier. Secondly, the plaintiff has not pleaded any date on which he acquired complete knowledge and that such argument is only an afterthought and appears to be a simple creation of the first appellate Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
27 The Apex Court affirms the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC since the cause was barred by limitation. The Apex Court holds that right to sue begins from the date on which the cause of action first arose. The limitation period cannot be calculated from the date of knowledge of the cause of action. 17.
If on the bedrock of the elucidation of law by the Apex Court the facts of the case are noticed, what would unmistakably emerge is, that the amendment sought cannot even be sought in a fresh suit which would be barred by limitation qua Article 58. The date of cause of action, in the case at hand, arose on 18-11-2017. The amendment, as observed hereinabove, is filed beyond the period of 5 years. An independent suit itself was barred by limitation. Therefore, there can be no question of permitting the amendment which seeks to indirectly bring in institution of suit for declaration, which cannot be independently filed. 18. The learned counsel for the respondents has also contended that registered sale deeds of the years 2005 and 2006
28 are sought to be challenged in 2022. Even here the period of limitation is three years and a fresh suit could not have been filed challenging the sale deed of 15 years vintage. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the plaintiff was not aware of the sale deeds being registered, though it is by the mother of the plaintiff. Even the said submission is noted only to be rejected, as other causes that are projected in the alleged innocuous amendment cannot seek to challenge sale deeds of 15 years, which ought to have been challenged within three years. The petitioner being ignorant of registration of sale deeds is of no avail, as a document of registration gives notice to the entire world that such a document has been executed. This is the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of UMA DEVI v. ANAND KUMAR6, in the following paragraphs:
“…. …. …. 13. A registered document provides a complete account of a transaction to any party interested in the property. This Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana [Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 351 : (2012) 169 Comp Cas 133 : (2012) 340 ITR 1] held as under : (SCC pp.
664-65, para 15)
6 (2025) 5 SCC 198
29
“15. … ‘17. … Registration of a document [when it is required by law to be, and has been effected by a registered instrument] [Ed. : Section 3 Explanation I TPA, reads as follows:“S. 3 Expln. I—Where any transaction relating to immovable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration….”(emphasis supplied)]] gives notice to the world that such a document has been executed. 18. Registration provides safety and security to transactions relating to immovable property, even if the document is lost or destroyed. It gives publicity and public exposure to documents thereby preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to transactions and execution of documents. Registration provides information to people who may deal with a property, as to the nature and extent of the rights which persons may have, affecting that property. In other words, it enables people to find out whether any particular property with which they are concerned, has been subjected to any legal obligation or liability and who is or are the person(s) presently having right, title, and interest in the property. It gives solemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or relevance by recording them, where people may see the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars are and as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regard to them. It ensures that every person dealing with immovable property can rely with confidence upon the statements contained in the registers (maintained under the said Act) as a full and complete account of all transactions by which the title to the property may be affected and secure extracts/copies duly certified.’ [Ed.
: As observed in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (1) v. State of Haryana, (2009) 7 SCC 363, pp. 367- 68, paras 17-18.] ”
14. Applying this settled principle of law, it can safely be assumed that the predecessors of the plaintiffs had notice of the registered sale deeds (executed in 1978), flowing from the partition that took place way back in 1968, by virtue of them being registered documents. In the lifetime of
30 Mangalamma, these sale deeds have not been challenged, neither has partition been sought. Thus, the suit (filed in the year 2023) of the plaintiffs was prima facie barred by law. The plaintiffs cannot reignite their rights after sleeping on them for 45 years. 15. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant- defendants, Mr Sundaram, relied upon the decision of this Court in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Chhatrapati UdayanRajePratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle [Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Chhatrapati UdayanRajePratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, (2024) 15 SCC 675 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844] to substantiate the contention that the suit was barred by limitation. It was observed as follows : (SCC paras 22 & 25)
“22. When a portion of the property has been conveyed by court auction and registered in the first instance and when another portion has been conveyed by a registered sale deed in 1952, there is a constructive notice from the date of registration and the presumption under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, comes into operation. The possession, in the present case, also has been rested with the appellant before several decades, which operates as notice of title. …
23.-24. ***
25. Continuing further with the plea of limitation, the Courts below have held that the question of the suit being barred by limitation can be decided at the time of trial as the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and
facts. Though the question of limitation generally is mixed question of law and facts, when upon meaningful reading of the plaint, the court can come to a conclusion that under the given circumstances, after dissecting the vices of clever drafting creating an illusion of cause of action, the suit is hopelessly barred and the plaint can be rejected under
Order 7 Rule 11.” (Emphasis supplied)
31 The Apex Court holds that once a document is registered, it gives notice to all and sundry that a document has been executed particularly between the members of the families of the respective parties to the document. The property and the transaction cannot be said to be unknown to the plaintiff, as the defendants are not strangers to the transaction nor the family of the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff is deemed to have had knowledge of the registered sale deeds executed in favour of the defendants. The amendment for cancellation of sale deeds or rectification deeds that have happened 15 years ago is also a clever ploy to get over limitation. If the suit for declaration and suit challenging the sale deeds are to be preferred within 3 years in terms of law and anything preferred beyond the said date being liable for rejection, cannot be sought by way of amendment, that too after 5 years and 15 years respectively.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:
The cause of action as pleaded arose on 18-11-2017. The application for amendment is filed on 09-11-2022.
32 The statutory prescription under Article 58 is clear: a declaration suit must be brought within 3 years from accrual of cause of action.
The amendment seeks to breathe life into a claim long extinguished by law.
What is thus impermissible directly cannot be permitted obliquely through amendment.
To permit the amendment would amount to reopening of pleadings, issues and evidence – a course fraught with procedural prejudice.
The amendment sought is neither just nor timely nor tenable, it is an attempt to resurrect a claim that law no longer recognizes and to rescript a suit whose original frame was never conceived of such declaratory relief.
The concerned Court in rejecting the amendment has not erred in law or exercised discretion perversely. On the
33 contrary, the order is in harmonious accord with binding precedent and foundational tenets of civil procedure and therefore, would not warrant any interference at the hands of this Court.
19. The petition thus stands rejected.
SD/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE
bkp CT:SS