2025:HHC:26120 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 282 of 2012 Reserved on: 29.7.2025 Date of Decision: 05.08.2025. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Sukh Ram ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Appellant : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent : Ms. Akansha Chauhan, Advocate, vice Mr. Anubhav Chopra, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 22.3.2012, passed by learned Special Judge (Forests), Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 13(2) read 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:26120 with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (e) of the PC Act. It was alleged that a preliminary inquiry was conducted against Sukh Ram Chauhan, Deputy Director of Health Services, and it was found that an amount of ₹16,50,000 was deposited in the name of his son Chetan Chauhan, at B.R. Ambedkar Medical College, Bangalore, for admission into MBBS. Sukh Ram Chauhan admitted the deposit of ₹1,42,000/- and claimed that the remaining amount was deposited by some person to falsely implicate him. The information was sought from the College and it was found that an amount of $ 50,000/- U.S. Dollars or equivalent was required to be deposited for admission against the management seat. Sukh Ram Chauhan claimed an income of ₹2.00 lacs per annum from his ancestral land, whereas Tehsildar, Bilaspur, issued a report that the 3 2025:HHC:26120 income from the ancestral land was ₹21,750/- per annum from 1997 till 2001. The accused could not explain the deposit of ₹16,50,000/- and took a false defence that this amount was deposited by some unknown person to implicate him. Hence, FIR (Ex.PW6/A) was registered in the Police Station. Daulat Ram (PW7) investigated the matter. He seized the photocopy of the bank challan (Ex.PW2/A) vide memo (Ex.PW7/A). He also seized the record of the admission of Chetan Chauhan vide memo (Ex.PW1/A). He recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. After the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e)of the PC Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its case. Sarla (PW1) was working as a Clerk in Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Medical College, who produced the record. Chikkamuthaiah (PW2) was posted as a cashier and proved the deposit of ₹16,50,000/-. S. Gurrappaji (PW3) is the Chairman of Dr. B.R. 4 2025:HHC:26120 Ambedkar Trust and proved that Chetan Chauhan had taken admission in the College. Siddappaji (PW4) produced the requisitioned record. V.M. Chinnaswami (PW5) proved the deposit of the amount. Vinod Kumar (PW6) signed the FIR. Daulat Ram (PW7) conducted the investigation. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was posted as Deputy Director, Health Services in the year 1997 and was promoted as Director, Health Services. He admitted that his son had taken admission in the MBBS Course in Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Medical College, Bangalore. He denied that he had given any undertaking regarding the payment of the money. He stated that he had only paid the tuition fee. He claimed that Chetan Chauhan had appeared in the PET in Karnataka and got admission against the SC/ST Quota. He admitted various amounts deposited in his account. He stated that a false case was made against him. He did not produce any defence evidence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the payment of money by the accused in the name of his son was not proved. The prosecution witnesses relied upon the entry made in the account 5 2025:HHC:26120 books, which is not sufficient to implicate the accused. Therefore, the accused was acquitted. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The judgment is based on hypotheses, conjectures, and surmises. The evidence was not appreciated in its proper perspective. Statements of prosecution witnesses were discarded without any reason. The accused had paid ₹13.00 lacs as donation at the time of admission of his son. He had furnished an undertaking to deposit the rest of the amount. It was duly proved that the medical college had deposited ₹26 lakh in the bank account, which included ₹ 13 lakh deposited by the accused at the time of admission of his son. This evidence was ignored by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant-State and Ms. Aakansha 6 2025:HHC:26120 Chauhan, learned vice counsel representing the respondent/accused. 9. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. It was duly proved by the statements of prosecution witnesses that the money was deposited on behalf of the son of the accused. The plea taken by the accused that he had only deposited the tuition fee is not correct because the admission of the petitioner’s son was made against the management quota. It is highly improbable that any person would deposit a huge amount of ₹13.00 lacs to implicate the accused. Learned Trial Court erred in discarding the cogent evidence led before it. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Ms. Aakansha Chauhan, learned vice counsel representing the respondent/accused, submitted that there is no proof of the payment of the actual amount made by the accused or on his behalf. Mere entries in the books of accounts are not sufficient to charge any person with the liability. In the present 7 2025:HHC:26120 case, there is no evidence of the payment of the money on behalf of the son of the accused in Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Medical College, Bangalore. Learned Trial Court rightly held that the deposit of ₹26.00 lacs in the bank account is not sufficient and the payment made by the accused or on his behalf was required to be proved. Such evidence is missing. Hence, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person would have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: 8 2025:HHC:26120 “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate, and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to 9 2025:HHC:26120 curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed, and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 10 2025:HHC:26120 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 11 2025:HHC:26120 13. A similar view was taken in Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 523, wherein it was observed: - “6. It is true that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court has to reappreciate the evidence. After re-appreciating the evidence, the first question that needs to be answered by the Appellate Court is whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a plausible view that could have been taken based on the evidence on record. Perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court shows that this question has not been adverted to. The Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it is satisfied after reappreciating the evidence that the only possible conclusion was that the guilt of the accused had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal only on the ground that another view is possible. In other words, the judgment of acquittal must be found to be perverse. Unless the Appellate Court records such a finding, no interference can be made with the order of acquittal. The High Court has ignored the well-settled principle that an order of acquittal further strengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused. After having perused the judgment, we find that the High Court has not addressed itself to the main question.” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Sarla (PW1) stated in her cross-examination that, as per the record, Chetan Chauhan had paid ₹92,000/- at the time of admission. Any payment received by the institution is evidenced by a receipt showing the amount received. She could 12 2025:HHC:26120 not say who had paid the amount mentioned in the receipt (Ex.PW1/B). She clarified in response to the Court’s question that she did not deal with the collection and deposit of the amount and had handed over the documents from the office. 16. The statement of this witness does not show that the accused had made the payment. She categorically stated that she was not dealing with the collection of the money and could not tell who had paid the amount. 17. Sarla (PW1) identified the signatures of Manchaiya and P.L. Nanjudaswami. This is not sufficient as the bare proof of the signatures without the examination of the person will be hearsay and insufficient to implicate any person. It was laid down by the Bombay High Court in Sir Mohammed Yusuf v. D, 1961 SCC OnLine Bom 5: AIR 1968 Bom. 112 that the evidence of the contents of the documents is hearsay unless the author is examined. It was observed: “20. …… The evidence of the contents contained in the document is hearsay evidence unless the writer thereof is examined before the Court. We, therefore, hold that the attempt to prove the contents of the document by proving the signature or the handwriting of the author thereof is to set at nought the well-recognised rule that hearsay evidence cannot be admitted. This question has been discussed 13 2025:HHC:26120 by Halsbury at paragraph 533 at p. 294 (Halsbury's Law of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 15) under the heading 'Hearsay'. Says Halsbury : ".. .. .. Statements in documents may also be hearsay. So, if A had taken counsel's opinion before acting, the contents of the opinion would be admissible for the same purpose, but not to prove the truth of any statement of fact therein". 21. In paragraph (534), Halsbury has discussed the reasons for the rejection of hearsay evidence and says : "The reasons advanced for the rejection of hearsay are numerous, among them being the irresponsibility of the original declarant, the depreciation of truth in the process of repetition, the opportunities for fraud which its admission would offer, and the waste of time involved in listening to idle rumour. The two principal objections, however, appear to be the lack of an oath administered to the originator of the statement, and the absence of opportunity to cross-examine him." 22. The Advocate General drew our attention to a decision of the House of Lords in Maria Sturla v. Filippo Freccia, (1879) 5 A.C. 623. In that case, the report of a committee appointed by a public department in a foreign state was admitted in evidence as a public document. It was, however, held that it was not admissible as evidence of all the facts stated therein. In that case, the facts were: The document in question, a report of certain persons called the Ginunta di Marina at Genoa, was sought to be put in evidence for the purpose of proving that person who was formerly consul for the Genoese Republic in London, and the succession to whose daughter, Mrs Brown, was in question, was a native of Quarto near Genoa and at the time that report was made, aged about forty-five 14 2025:HHC:26120 years. The document was tendered for that purpose and for that purpose only. 23.It was conceded that the report was an authentic public document of the Genoese Government. The statements, however, contained in the report were not based on the evidence of any of the relatives of the consul at Genoa. The information contained therein did not appear to have been received from any member of Mangini's family. One of the well-recognised exceptions under the English Law of Evidence to the reception of hearsay evidence is the evidence relating to pedigree. The only question, which their Lordships of the House of Lords were considering was, whether the contents of the report fell within the purview of the above exception and their Lordships held that it did not, because the statements contained in the report were not based on the evidence given before the dispute started by any of the members of the deceased's family. We are not concerned with that part of the decision of the House of Lords in the present case. The point to be noted is that the statements contained in the report were treated as hearsay, and since they did not fall within the well-recognised exceptions, they were excluded from evidence. To conclude this part of the discussion, we hold, in the first place, that what has been formally proved is the signature of Abreo and not the writing of the body of the document at Ex. 28 and secondly, that even if the entire document is held formally proved, that does not amount to a proof of the truth of the contents of the document. The only person competent to give evidence on the truthfulness of the contents of the document was Abreo.” 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.D. Jain v. State Bank of India, (1982) 1 SCC 143, that the statement of a witness made to a person, who is not called as 15 2025:HHC:26120 a witness is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It was observed: - “20. The next question is, is the evidence in the domestic enquiry really hearsay, as held by the Tribunal? 21. The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on the information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence). 22. The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, (1956) 1 WLR 965 observed: "Evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made. The fact that it was made quite apart from its truth is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made." 19. In Madholal Sindhu v. Asian Assurance Co. Ltd., 1945 SCC OnLine Bom 44= AIR 1954 Bom 305, the documents were proved by examining the persons acquainted with the 16 2025:HHC:26120 handwriting of the person. This was held to be hearsay and inadmissible. It was observed: “As I have already observed, it was futile for Mr Somjee to merely prove the signatures or the handwriting of the persons who signed or wrote the various documents without calling the said persons, who were the only persons who could depose to the correctness of the contents of those Various documents. Whether Deshpande, Paranjape or Jamnadas signed or wrote the various documents was not the only issue before me. If that had been the only issue, the proof of the signatures or the handwriting of Deshpande Paranjape or Jamnadas would have been enough. What was in issue, however, before me was apart from Deshpande, Paranjape or Jamnadas having signed or written those documents, whether the contents of those various documents were correct. This certainly could not be proved by Balkrishna Bhagwan Deshmukh, who had no personal knowledge whatever about the contents of those various documents. It would have served no purpose whatsoever to admit those documents in evidence with the reservation as suggested by Mr. Taraporewalla. I was supported in this conclusion of mine by the remarks of the appeal Court in - '11 Bom HCR 242 at p. 246, and I accordingly declined to admit in evidence the said various documents in spite of Balkrishna Bhagwan Deshmukh deposing before me that the said various documents were signed by or were in the handwriting of Deshpande, Paranjape or Jamnadas.” (Emphasis supplied) 20. Therefore, the prosecution cannot derive any advantage from her testimony. 21. Chikkamuthaiah (PW2) did not support the prosecution case and was permitted to be cross-examined by the 17 2025:HHC:26120 learned Pubic Prosecutor. He stated in cross-examination by the accused that the amount was deposited in the account of Principal, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Medical College, Bangalore and he could not say about the source. He is an employee of the bank, and the money was not deposited with him or in his presence. Therefore, his testimony also does not prove that the money was deposited by the accused on behalf of his son. 22. S. Siddappaji (PW3) is the Chairman of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Trust. He stated that a student has to pay a fee of ₹92,000/- per year. He has to pay other charges and University fee, Laboratory fee, hostel fee, etc. Chetan Chauhan had not paid any amount except the tuition fee of ₹92,000/- and Hostel charges. ₹26.00 lacs was not paid by Neetu Sood and Chetan Chauhan to the Medical College. He was permitted to be cross- examined by the learned Public Prosecutor. He admitted that the receipt for the amount paid by the guardian of the student was issued. He denied that he had handed over ₹26.00 lacs to his cashier Chikkamuthaiah with a direction to deposit it in the bank account. He stated in cross-examination by the accused that Chetan Chauhan and Neetu Sood had not paid any amount in the form of a contribution fee except the tuition fee and University 18 2025:HHC:26120 charges. Neetu Sood and Chetan Chauhan had not paid the amount of ₹26.00 lacs to him at any point in time. The receipt register does not have any record of the payment of ₹26.00 lacs by the students. He stated in reply to the Court question that the amount deposited with the College is subject to the audit, and the recognition of the College could have been cancelled in case of receipt of the unaccounted money. 23. This witness has also categorically denied that the accused had deposited the money. Hence, his testimony is not sufficient to prove the prosecution’s case. 24. V.M. Chinnaswami (PW5) was working as a cashier in Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Medical College, Bangalore. He stated that he made an entry in the remittance register. The Chairman called him and Manchiya and told them to deposit the amount at the bank. Neetu Sood and Chetan Chauhan had made the payment of ₹13.00 lacs each. No receipt for the donation was issued. He and Manchiya deposited ₹26.00 lacs with the bank. He stated in his cross-examination by the accused that a receipt is issued for the payment received by the College. The payment was not made to 19 2025:HHC:26120 him or in his presence. The payment was handed over to him by the Chairman. 25. The statement of this witness will not help the prosecution. He categorically stated that the payment was not made in his presence or to him. He was told about the payment by the Chairman; however, the Chairman, S. Gurrappaji, denied the receipt of any payment from the guardians of Neetu Sood and Chetan Chauhan. Therefore, the statement of this witness is not sufficient to conclude that the accused had made a payment of ₹13.00 lacs to the Medical College for the admission of his son. 26. A heavy reliance was placed upon the entry (Ex.PW5/A), which reads amount remitted to the bank by Chairman, GCAMC ₹26.00 lacs, Neetu Sood/Chetan Chauhan. It was submitted based upon this entry that the payment of ₹26.00 lacs was made on behalf of Neetu Sood and Chetan Chauhan. This submission is not acceptable. Section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act makes the entry in the books of account regularly kept in the course of the business relevant. However, it also provides that such an entry by itself is not sufficient to charge a person with liability. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme 20 2025:HHC:26120 Court in CBI v. V.C. Shukla, (1998) 3 SCC 410 that a person cannot be charged with criminal liability merely based on an entry recorded in the books of account. It was observed: - 35. The probative value of the liability created by an entry in the books of account came up for consideration in Chandradhar Goswami v. Gauhati Bank Ltd. [AIR 1967 SC 1058 : (1967) 1 SCR 898: 37 Comp Cas 108] That case arose out of a suit filed by Gauhati Bank against Chandradhar (the appellant therein) for recovery of a loan of Rs 40,000. In defence, he contended, inter alia, that no loan was taken. To substantiate their claim, the Bank solely relied upon a certified copy of the accounts maintained by them under Section 4 of the Bankers' Book Evidence Act, 1891 and contended that certified copies became prima facie evidence of the existence of the original entries in the accounts and were admissible to prove the payment of the loan given. The suit was decreed by the trial court, and the appeal preferred against it was dismissed by the High Court. In setting aside the decree this Court observed that in the face of the positive case made out by Chandradhar that he did not ever borrow any sum from the Bank, the Bank had to prove the fact of such payment and could not rely on mere entries in the books of account even if they were regularly kept in the course of business in view of the clear language of Section 34 of the Act. This Court further observed that where the entries were not admitted, it was the duty of the Bank, if it relied on such entries to charge any person with liability, to produce evidence in support of the entries to show that the money was advanced as indicated therein, and thereafter the entries would be of use as corroborative evidence. 36. The same question came up for consideration before different High Courts on a number of occasions, but to eschew prolixity, we would confine our attention to some 21 2025:HHC:26120 of the judgments on which Mr Sibal relied. In M.S. Yesuvadiyan v. P.S.A. Subba Naicker [AIR 1919 Mad 132: 52 IC 704], one of the learned Judges constituting the Bench had this to say: “Section 34, Evidence Act, lays down that the entries in books of account, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant, but such a statement will not alone be sufficient to charge any person with liability. That merely means that the plaintiff cannot obtain a decree by merely proving the existence of certain entries in his books of account, even though those books are shown to be kept in the regular course of business. He will have to show further by some independent evidence that the entries represent real and honest transactions and that the moneys were paid in accordance with those entries. The legislature, however, does not require any particular form or kind of evidence in addition to entries in books of account, and I take it that any relevant facts which can be treated as evidence within the meaning of the Evidence Act would be sufficient corroboration of the evidence furnished by entries in books of account if true.” While concurring with the above observations, the other learned Judge stated as under: “If no other evidence besides the accounts were given, however strongly those accounts may be supported by the probabilities, and however strong may be the evidence as to the honesty of those who kept them, such consideration could not alone with reference to Section 34, Evidence Act, be the basis of a decree.” (emphasis supplied) 37. In Beni v. Bisan Dayal [AIR 1925 Nag 445: 89 IC 371] it was observed that entries in books of account are not by themselves sufficient to charge any person with liability, the reason being that a man cannot be allowed to make evidence for himself by what he chooses to write in his 22 2025:HHC:26120 own books behind the back of the parties. There must be independent evidence of the transaction to which the entries relate, and in the absence of such evidence, no relief can be given to the party who relies upon such entries to support his claim against another. In Hira Lal v. Ram Rakha [AIR 1953 Pepsu 113] the High Court, while negativing a contention that it having been proved that the books of account were regularly kept in the ordinary course of business and that, therefore, all entries therein should be considered to be relevant and to have been proved, said that the rule as laid down in Section 34 of the Act that entries in the books of account regularly kept in the course of business are relevant whenever they refer to a matter in which the Court has to enquire was subject to the salient proviso that such entries shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability. It is not, therefore, enough merely to prove that the books have been regularly kept in the course of business and the entries therein are correct. It is further incumbent upon the person relying upon those entries to prove that they were in accordance with facts. 38. The evidentiary value of entries relevant under Section 34 was also considered in Hiralal Mahabir Pershad [ILR (1967) 1 P&H 435]. I.D. Dua, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court, observed that such entries, though relevant, were only corroborative evidence, and it is to be shown further by some independent evidence that the entries represent honest and real transactions and that monies were paid in accordance with those entries. 39. A conspectus of the above decisions makes it evident that even correct and authentic entries in books of account cannot, without independent evidence of their trustworthiness, fix a liability upon a person. Keeping in view the above principles, even if we proceed on the assumption that the entries made in MR 71/91 are correct and the entries in the other books and loose sheets (which 23 2025:HHC:26120 we have already found to be not admissible in evidence under Section 34) are admissible under Section 9 of the Act to support an inference about the former's correctness still those entries would not be sufficient to charge Shri Advani and Shri Shukla with the accusations levelled against them for there is not an iota of independent evidence in support thereof. In that view of the matter, we need not discuss, delve into or decide upon the contention raised by Mr Altaf Ahmed in this regard. Suffice it to say that the statements of the four witnesses, who have admitted receipts of the payments as shown against them in MR 71/91, can at best be proof of the reliability of the entries so far as they are concerned and not others. In other words, the statements of the above witnesses cannot be independent evidence under Section 34 as against the above two respondents. So far as Shri Advani is concerned, Section 34 would not come in aid of the prosecution for another reason also. According to the prosecution case itself, his name finds a place only in one of the loose sheets (Sheet No. 8) and not in MR 71/91. Resultantly, in view of our earlier discussion, Section 34 cannot at all be pressed into service against him. 27. Therefore, this entry by itself is insufficient to charge the accused with any liability. 28. A heavy reliance was placed upon the undertakings (Ex.PW1/A4 and Ex.PW1/A5) in which the accused had undertaken to pay ₹2.00 lacs on or before 28.2.2001, ₹1.00 lac on or before 1.2.2002, ₹1.00 lac on or before 1.2.2003 and ₹5.00 lacs on or before 20.9.2000. This undertaking by itself is not 24 2025:HHC:26120 sufficient in the absence of proof of the fact that the amount mentioned in the undertaking was, in fact, paid. 29. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the prosecution version regarding the payment of ₹13.00 by the petitioner to the Medical College for admission of his son was not proved. This was a reasonable view which could have been taken based on the material placed on record, and no interference is required with it while deciding the appeal against acquittal. 30. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed. 31. A copy of the judgment and the record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 5th August 2025 (Chander)