2025:JHHC:14480-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI I.A. No. 2410 of 2024 In / And L.P.A. No. 122 of 2024 1. The State of Jharkhand. 2. The secretary, Personnel, Administrative Reforms & Rajbhasha Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, P.O. + P.S.- Dhurwa, Ranchi. 3. The Joint Secretary, Personnel, Administrative Reforms & Rajbhasha Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, P.O. + P.S.- Dhurwa, Ranchi. 4. The Dy. Secretary, Personnel, Administrative Reforms & Rajbhasha Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, P.O. + P.S.- Dhurwa, Ranchi. ... Respondents/Appellants Versus Vijay Kerketta, Aged about 40 years, Son of Suraj Kerketta, Resident of Village – Anandpur, Dunduriay, P.O. & P.S. Gumla, District – Gumla. ... Petitioner/Respondent --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------- For the Appellants: Mrs. Sunita Kumari, A.C. to Sr. S.C.-II For the Respondent: Mr. Aditya Kumar Choudhary, Advocate Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, Advocate Mr. Abhishek Kumar Sinha, Advocate --------- Reserved on: 05.05.2025 Pronounced on: 5/06/2025 Per M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J. 1. This application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by the applicants to condone the delay of 375 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal challenging the judgment dt. 08.05.2023 of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 3277 of 2019. 2. In the application seeking condonation of delay, it is stated that the respondent in the application had given a representation on 15.09.2023 enclosing a copy of the impugned judgment; it was then placed before the competent authority through proper channel on 30.10.2023; the competent authority directed to seek legal opinion on 02.01.2023 and thereafter the 2025:JHHC:14480-DB file was forwarded to the Law Department and a decision was taken to file the appeal against the impugned judgment. 3. It is then stated that the file was sent to the applicants’ Department for approval and after approval, the appeal was filed and the delay in filing the appeal is due to procedural technicalities and was not deliberate. It is also stated that the applicants are Government functionaries having several layers of decision-making which consumed time. 4. The facts on record indicate that though the judgment of the learned Single Judge was pronounced on 08.05.2023 in W.P. (S) No.3277 of 2019, the LPA was filed on 28.02.204 with enormous delay of 375 days. 5. Also, application for issuance of certified copy of the judgment of the learned Single Judge was made on 16.04.2024 (as can be seen from the same which is annexed to the accompanying paper book) - long after the judgment was pronounced on 08.05.2023, and no explanation is offered why the application for issuance of certified copy was made after such a long time. 6. Undoubtedly, the applicants are aware that the limitation for filing the Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is only 30 days and yet the file was sent from table to table in a leisurely manner occasioning the delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal. Thus they adopted a very casual and negligent approach in taking steps to file a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 7. Such a practice has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in several judgments. 2025:JHHC:14480-DB 8. In Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another1, the Supreme Court held: “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person- incharge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 1 (2012) 3 SCC 563 2025:JHHC:14480-DB 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai v. M/s Volex Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd.2, Pr. Commissioner Central Excise Delhi-1 v. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd.3, Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others4, Union of India & Others v. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another5, and State of Uttar Pradesh & Others v. Sabha Narain & others6. 10. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir7, the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible to look into the merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of long and inordinate delay; that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years; length of delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not; from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings 2 (2022) 3 SCC 159 3 (2022) 2 SCC 327 4 (2021) 11 SCC 557 5 (2022) 9 SCC 263 6 (2022) 9 SCC 266 7 2024 INSC 262 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 2025:JHHC:14480-DB for which law has prescribed a period of limitation; once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his long inaction, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. 11. This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary8. 12. In view of the above-mentioned decisions, we are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the applicants have not shown sufficient cause for condoning inordinate delay of 375 days in filing the appeal. 13. Therefore, the application for condonation of delay (I.A. No.2410 of 2024) is dismissed. Consequently, the Letters Patent Appeal is also dismissed. 14. All pending applications shall stand closed. (M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) Manoj/- 8 Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 48636 of 2024 dt.29.11.2024