[2025:RJ-JP:26616] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2178/2000 1. Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., Through its Chairman cum Managing Director, Vidyut Bhawan, Vidyut Marg, Jaipur 2. Executive Engineer (Rural Electricity Corporation), Jaipur Vidyut Vitaran Nigam Ltd., Naya Power House, Bharatpur (Raj.) ----Petitioners Versus 1. Kulshekar Vyas son of Shri Goverdhan Vyas through the General Secretary, RSEB, Shramik Sangh Bharatpur (Rajasthan) 2. The Judge, Industrial Tribunal, Bharatpur ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sandeep Singh Shekhawat with Mr. Chandra Vikram Singh For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL Order 16/07/2025 This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the award dated 15.07.1999 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Bharatpur (for brevity, ‘learned Tribunal’) in ITR No.31/1997 whereby, while partly answering the reference in favour of the respondent no.1/workman (for short, ‘workman’), the penalty of ‘stoppage of one annual grade increment with cumulative effect’ was substituted with the penalty of ‘censure’. The relevant facts in brief are that the workman was appointed on 14.04.1977 as ‘Bill Distributor’ with the petitioners/employer (for short, ‘employer’). He was served with a [2025:RJ-JP:26616] (2 of 10) [CW-2178/2000] charge sheet dated 23.07.1979 alleging insubordination and vide order dated 07.12.1979, he was punished with the penalty of ‘stoppage of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect’. However, in appeal, it was reduced to the penalty of ‘stoppage of one annual grade increment with cumulative effect’. In the aforesaid factual backdrop, the reference was made to the learned Tribunal as to whether the punishment was valid and reasonable which has been answered vide award dated 15.07.1999 in the manner as stated hereinabove. Assailing the award, learned counsel for the employer, inviting attention of this Court towards the provisions of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1947’), would submit that jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal to interfere with the punishment order could have been invoked only in the cases of the punishment of ‘discharge/dismissal’ of a workman and not otherwise. He, in support of his submission, relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of South Indian Cashew Factories Workers’ Union vs. Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors.-(2006) 5 SCC 201, a co-ordinate Bench judgement of this Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Labour Court & Ors.-MANU/RH/0128/1993; 1993 WLN (UC) 129 and a judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. Prabhashanker K. Acharya-MANU/GJ/0240/1988; 1992 GLH (2) 354. He, therefore, prays that the writ petition be allowed and the award impugned dated 15.07.1999 be quashed and set aside. None appears for the workman despite service. [2025:RJ-JP:26616] (3 of 10) [CW-2178/2000] Heard. Considered. Section 11A was introduced in the Act of 1947 by the Amendment Act of 1971 and it reads as under: "11-A. Powers of the Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunal to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen: Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and in the course of adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set-aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment, in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require: Provided that in any proceeding under this Section, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter". Thus, Section 11A confers jurisdiction upon the Labour Court or Tribunal to substitute the penalty with any lesser penalty only if it is of discharge or dismissal. Their Lordships have, in the case of The Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. (supra) after examining the statement of objects and reasons regarding [2025:RJ-JP:26616] (4 of 10) [CW-2178/2000] insertion of Section 11A and a catena of precedential law, held as under: “4. Regarding Section 11A, in the Statement of objects and reasons it is stated as follows :- In Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited and another v. their workmen MANU/SC/0084/1957 : (1958)ILLJ260SC , the Supreme Court, while considering the Tribunal's power to interfere with the management's decision to dismiss, discharge or terminate the services of a workman, has observed that in case of dismissal on misconduct, the Tribunal does not act as a court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management and that the Tribunal will interfere only when there is want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. on the part of the management. The International Labour Organisation, in its recommendation (No. 119) concerning termination of employment at the initiative of the employer, adopted in June 1963, has recommended that a worker aggrieved by the termination of his employment should be entitled to appeal against the termination among others, to a neutral body such as an arbitrator, a court, an arbitration committee or a similar body and that the neutral body concerned should be empowered to examine the reasons given in the termination of employment and the other circumstances relating to the case and to render a decision on the justification of the termination. The International Labour Organisation has further recommended that the neutral body should be empowered (if it finds that the termination of employment was unjustified) to order that the worker concerned, unless reinstated with unpaid wages, should [2025:RJ-JP:26616] (5 of 10) [CW-2178/2000] be paid adequate compensation or afforded some other relief. In accordance with these recommendations, it is considered that the Tribunal's power in an adjudication proceeding relating to discharge or dismissal of a workman should not be limited and that the Tribunal should have the power in cases wherever necessary, to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit or give such other relief to the workmen including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. For this purpose, a new Section 11A is proposed to be inserted in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.... 40. From those decisions, the following principles broadly emerge :- xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (9) Once the misconduct is proved either in the enquiry conducted by an employer or by the evidence placed before a Tribunal for the first time, punishment imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is so harsh as to suggest victimisation. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 41. The above was the law as laid down by this Court as on 15-12-1971 applicable to all industrial adjudication arising out of orders of dismissal or discharge. 42. The question is whether Section 11A has made any changes in the legal position mentioned above and if so, to what extent? The Statement of objects and reasons cannot be [2025:RJ-JP:26616] (6 of 10) [CW-2178/2000] taken into account for the purpose of interpreting the plain words of the section. But it gives an indication as to what the Legislature wanted to achieve. At the time of introducing Section 11A in the Act, the legislature must have been aware of the several principles laid down in the various decisions of this Court referred to above. The object is stated to be that the Tribunal should have power in cases, where necessary, to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement or award any lesser punishment. The Statement of objects and reasons has specifically referred to the limitation on the powers of an Industrial Tribunal, as laid down by this Court in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. [1958] 1 S.C.R. 667. 43. This will be a convenient stage to consider the contents of Section 11A To invoke Section 11A, it is necessary that an industrial dispute of the type mentioned therein should have been referred to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. In the course of such adjudication, the Tribunal has to. be satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified. If it comes to such a conclusion, the Tribunal has to set aside the order and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms as it thinks fit. The Tribunal has also power to give any other relief to the workman including the imposing of a lesser punishment having due regard to the circumstances. The proviso casts a duty on the Tribunal to rely only on the materials on record and prohibits it from taking any fresh evidence. Even a mere reading of the section, in our opinion, does indicate that a change in the law, as laid down by this Court, has been effected. According to the workmen the entire law has been completely altered; whereas according to the employers, a very minor change has been effected giving power to the Tribunal only to alter the punishment; after having held that the misconduct is proved. That is, according to the employers, the Tribunal has a mere power to alter the punishment after it holds that the misconduct is proved. The [2025:RJ-JP:26616] (7 of 10) [CW-2178/2000] workmen, on the other hand, claim that the law has been re written. (Emphasis mine) 51. Another change that has been effected by Section 11A is the power conferred on a Tribunal to alter the punishment imposed by an employer. If the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the misconduct is established, either by the domestic enquiry accepted by it or by the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the Tribunal originally had no power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management. Once the misconduct is proved, the Tribunal had to sustain the order of punishment unless it was harsh indicating victimisation. Under section 11A, though the Tribunal may hold that the misconduct is proved, nevertheless it may be of the opinion that the order of discharge or dismissal for the said misconduct is not justified. In other words, the Tribunal may hold that the proved misconduct does not merit punishment by way of discharge or dismissal. It can, under such circumstances, award to the workman any lesser punishment instead. The power to interfere with the punishment and alter the same has been now conferred on the Tribunal by Section 11A.” From the aforesaid observations, it is apparent that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the view that introduction of Section 11A in the Act has brought a change in the law and while, prior to its introduction, once the misconduct was found to be proved, the punishment imposed could not have been interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment was so harsh as to suggest victimisation; but, now, after the insertion of Section 11A, if the Tribunal is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it can substitute it by any lesser punishment having due regard to the circumstances. [2025:RJ-JP:26616] (8 of 10) [CW-2178/2000] In the case of South India Cashew Factories Workers Union (supra), reiterating and reaffirming the proposition of law as laid down in the case of The Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. (supra), it was held as under: “16. The Labour Court had earlier held that the enquiry was properly held and there was no violation of the principles of natural justice and that the findings were not perverse. The vitiating facts found by the Labour Court against the enquiry are erroneous and are liable to be set aside. If enquiry is fair and proper, in the absence of any allegations of victimization or unfair labour practice, the Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed. Section 11A of the Act gives ample power to the Labour Court to re-appraise the evidence adduced in the enquiry and also sit in appeal over the decision of the employer in imposing punishment. Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act is only applicable in the case of dismissal or discharge of a workman as clearly mentioned in the Section itself. Before the introduction of Section 11A in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. vs. Workmen-AIR 1958 SC 130, this Court held that the Tribunal does not act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management and that the Tribunal will interfere only when there is want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. on the part of the management. There is no allegation of unfair labour practice, victimisation etc. in this case. The powers of the Labour Court in the absence of Section 11A are illustrated by this Court in the Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. The Management & Ors.(1973) 1 SCC 813. When enquiry was conducted fairly and properly, in the absence of any of the allegations of victimisation or malafides or unfair labour [2025:RJ-JP:26616] (9 of 10) [CW-2178/2000] practice, the Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management. Since Section 11A is not applicable, the Labour Court has no power to re- appraise the evidence to find out whether the findings of the enquiry officer are correct or not or whether the punishment imposed is adequate or not. Of course, the Labour Court can interfere with the findings if the findings are perverse. But, here there is a clear finding that the findings are not perverse and principles of natural justice were complied with while conducting enquiry.” (Emphasis mine) Further, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court has, in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra), held that Section 11A empowers concerned Tribunal or the Labour Court, amongst others, to hold that the misconduct proved does not warrant the punishment imposed and alter the same in cases where the order passed in the domestic inquiry relates to dismissal or discharge of the workman. It was categorically held that the provisions of Section 11A have no relevance so far as other punishments imposed in a domestic inquiry which are covered by Sections 7and 10 read with Schedule II of the Act of 1947. In the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation (supra), the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat has held that the effect and change in the law as brought by Section 11A relates to punishment of discharge and dismissal only and not the other kinds of punishment. In the instant case, as already observed, the employer inflicted upon the workman the punishment of stoppage of one annual grade increment with cumulative effect which have been substituted by the learned Tribunal with the penalty of censure [2025:RJ-JP:26616] (10 of 10) [CW-2178/2000] exercising its jurisdiction, ostensibly, under Section 11A of the Act of 1947; but, in the backdrop of statutory provisions contained in the Section 11A and the aforesaid precedential law, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the learned Tribunal was not empowered to substitute the subject punishment invoking Section 11A as it did not relate to the discharge or dismissal. Resultantly, this writ petition deserves to be allowed. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. The award dated 15.07.1999 is quashed and set aside. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of accordingly. (MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL),J RS/3