{W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} 2025:CGHC:41124 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 6003 of 2010 Order reserved on: 30-7-2025 Order delivered on: 14-8-2025 1. Vijay Kumar Patel, S/o Late Indal Ram Patel, Aged about 45 years. 2. Chandrashekhar Patel, S/o Yuvraj Patel, Aged about 52 years. 3. Nohar Lal Patel, S/o Jai Singh Patel, Aged about 56 years. 4. Jhanak Ram Nishad, S/o Daityari Nishad, Aged about 50 years. 5. Vishram Nishad, S/o Daityari Nishad, Aged about 60 years. 6. Dukhi Ram Nishad, S/o Daityari Nishad, Aged about 66 years. 7. Tejram, S/o Tekram, Aged about 45 years. All R/o Village Chhote Bhandar, Post Bade Bhandar, Tahsil Pussor, Distt. Raigarh (C.G.) ... Petitioners versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh, through the Secretary, Department of Revenue, Mantralaya, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur (C.G.) 2. Collector/Incharge Land Acquisition Officer, Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.) 3. Land Acquisition Officer/S.D.O. Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.) 4. Jila Vyapar @ Udyog Kendra Raigarh, Through its Managing Director, Raigarh (C.G.) SISTA SOMAYAJULU Digitally signed by SISTA SOMAYAJULU Date: 2025.08.15 11:15:09 +0530 {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} 5. Adani Power Limited Raigarh, Through its Managing Director, Registered Office at 31, Jamadar Khana, Gwalior (M.P.) ... Respondents For Petitioners : Ms. Deepali Pandey, Advocate. For Respondents No.1 to 4/State: Mr. Sharad Mishra, Panel Lawyer For Respondent No.5 : Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, Senior Advocate with Mr. Pankaj Singh, Advocate. For Intervener CSIDC : Mr. Kashif Shakeel, Advocate. Single Bench:- Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal CAV Order 1. The petitioners herein have filed the instant writ petition calling in question legality, validity and correctness of notification dated 3-7-2010 (Annexure P-2) issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act of 1894’) and also notification dated 3-9-2010 (Annexure P- 3) issued under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 and eventually seeks to quash the award dated 14-1-2011 (Annexure P-7) passed by the Sub Divisional Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, Raigarh, on the ground that while making acquisition Section 5A(2) of the Act of 1894 has not been followed in its letter and spirit and the land in question has not been acquired for public purpose, it has been acquired for respondent No.5/Private Company. 2. The aforesaid challenge has been made on the following factual backdrop:- {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} 3. It is the case of the petitioners that the lands bearing Khasra Nos.151/1, area 0.138 hectare; 151/5, area 0.105 hectare; 155/8, area 0.044 hectare; 149/7, area 0.029 hectare; 148/1, area 0.202 hectare; 148/4, area 0.235 hectare; 110/1, area 0.045 hectare; 155/2, area 0.057 hectare; 153/2, area 0.263 hectare; 155/5, area 0.093 hectare; 102/10, area 0.090 hectare; 155/1, area 0.125 hectare; 102/308/5, area 0.020 hectare, was sought to be acquired for private purpose. It is the further case of the petitioners that the land is sought to be acquired for a private company/respondent No.5 which cannot be said to be the public purpose. It is also the case of the petitioners that respondent No.2 herein issued notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 for acquisition of land for industrial purpose vide Annexure P-2 and immediately after issuance of the said notification, objection under Section 5A(2) of the Act of 1894 was filed by the petitioners, however, the Land Acquisition Officer whose power has been conferred to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) heard the matter, but did not make any recommendation to the appropriate Government under Section 5A(2) and himself has disposed of the objection in terms of reply dated 13-8-2010 filed by the General Manager, District Trade and Industries Centre, Raigarh, as such, neither recommendation was made under Section 5A(2) to the {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} appropriate Government nor decision has been taken by the appropriate Government, therefore, the entire proceeding and subsequent notice is vitiated. It is also the case of the petitioners that the same company (respondent No.5) for which the lands have been acquired has purchased lands from the private owners on higher rates in the close vicinity of the lands of the petitioners and subsequently, lands of the petitioners are sought to be taken for the alleged public purpose. Furthermore, the resolution of the Gram Panchayat regarding the periphery within which the lands are to be acquired have been ignored and violated while taking lands of the petitioners for acquisition. It is also the case of the petitioners that the lands of the petitioner are agricultural lands as per the revenue records in khasra entries having crop of paddy over it, however, at the time of preparing documents for acquisition, the same has been considered and mentioned to be land of type TIKARA, which is devaluating the lands of the petitioners. In the aforesaid background, the writ petition has been filed seeking quashment of notifications under Sections 4(1) & 6 of the Act of 1894 and also seeking quashment of award dated 14-1-2011 rejecting the objection. 4. Return has been filed by respondents No.1 to 4/State stating inter alia that the acquisition process was carried out strictly {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} in accordance with law and as per the provisions contained in the Act of 1894. It is further submitted that the Sub- Divisional Officer (Revenue) acting as the Land Acquisition Officer duly considered the objections raised by the petitioners under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 and after providing opportunity of hearing and considering all relevant issues, passed reasoned award dated 14-1-2011 addressing concerns related to compensation, rehabilitation and employment, and thus all procedural safeguards mandated under the Act of 1894 have been complied with in fair and objective manner. The State has also filed documents along with the return stating that power under Section 5A(2) of the Act of 1894 to hear objection has been conferred to the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) vide notification dated 6-3-1987 and that is the reason that the SDO has heard the objection in place of the Collector and furthermore, notification dated 3-9-2003 has been filed which states that power of the appropriate Government has been conferred to the Collector, therefore, in place of the appropriate Government, the Collector has taken decision on the alleged recommendation made by the SDO. 5. 5. Respondent No.5 – Korba West Power Company Limited, Raigarh, now Adani Power Limited, has filed return stating inter alia that the land acquisition proceedings under Section {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} 4(1) of the Act of 1894 for acquisition of the subject lands were initiated by the Office of the Collector, Raigarh on 1-7-2010 and notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was issued on 3-9-2010. It has been further stated that the landowners, whose lands were proposed to be acquired, filed detailed objections before the SDO(R) on various dates and the General Manager, District Trade and Industries Centre, Raigarh, has submitted replies to the said objections and thereafter, the Land Acquisition Officer-cum-SDO(R) heard the objections and forwarded the same to the Collector for further proceedings under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 and thereafter, notification under Section 6 was published on 3-9-2010 and subsequently the award was passed and land was sought to be acquired for industrial purpose. It has also been stated that the State Government has acquired the subject lands for a public purpose and compensation was paid from public funds. Thereafter, the lands were agreed to be leased to the respondent Company for the purpose of setting up a coal based thermal power plant in accordance with the prevailing industrial policy. According to this policy, the Government acquired the land and transferred it to Chhattisgarh State Industrial Development Corporation (CSIDC), which, in turn, {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} executed a lease deed in favour of the respondent Company and as such, the acquisition is strictly in accordance with law. 6. Intervener CSIDC has also supported the acquisition made by the State Government for industrial purpose stating inter alia that acquisition has been made strictly in accordance with law and no interference is called for. 7. Ms. Deepali Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, would submit that the lands are acquired for private company and Part VII of the Act of 1894 has not been complied with. She would further submit that the lands in question are irrigated lands and the petitioners are willing to continue their livelihood by irrigating the aforesaid lands, therefore, it would not be appropriate to take the lands by compulsory acquisition, otherwise, their livelihood would be effected if the lands are taken by way of compulsory acquisition. She would also submit that the petitioners’ objections were not considered in accordance with Section 5A(2) of the Act of 1894 and the Collector-cum-Land Acquisition Officer did not make any recommendation on their objections and straightway decided the objections himself and, therefore, the appropriate Government whose power has been delegated to the Collector did not have an opportunity to consider their objections and without there being any {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} recommendation, proceeded to pass order and issuance of notification under Section 6(1) of the Act of 1894 which is illegal and bad in law. She would rely upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of Union of India and others v. Shiv Raj and others1 (relevant paragraphs 15 to 17), Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal and others2 (relevant paragraphs 94 to 99), Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.3 (relevant paragraph 14) and Lajja Ram and others v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others4 (relevant paragraphs 19 to 26) in support of her contention. 8. Mr. Sharad Mishra, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/respondents No.1 to 4, would submit that the acquisition has been made strictly in accordance with law and the SDO(R) acting as Land Acquisition Officer has duly considered the objections raised by the petitioners under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 and after affording opportunity of hearing and considering all relevant issues passed reasoned order addressing concerns related to compensation, rehabilitation and employment and as such, the grounds raised under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 are not made out in favour of the petitioners. He would further submit that nature and purpose 1 (2014) 6 SCC 564 2 (2017) 11 SCC 601 3 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2991 4 (2013) 11 SCC 235 {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} of acquisition is industrial purpose and not for a Company. The land was acquired by the State and thereafter, allotted to the CSIDC and thereafter, it was leased out to respondent No.5 Company. The appropriateness of such acquisition by the State for industrial or public purposes has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. District Collector5. He would also submit that the land is not acquired for a company, as the entire compensation has been paid by the State instrumentality. The writ petition suffers from delay, acquiescence and public interest considerations and as such, it is liable to be dismissed. 9. Mr. Pankaj Singh, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5 Company, would submit that the land has been given to respondent No.5 Company by CSIDC on lease and no amount of compensation has been paid by respondent No.5. 10.Mr. Kashif Shakeel, learned counsel appearing for intervener CSIDC, would submit that the entire cost of acquisition has been paid by CSIDC, and the land has been acquired for industrial purpose by CSIDC which has been given to respondent No.5 on lease, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 5 (2008) 9 SCC 552 {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} 11.I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 12.After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after going through the record, following two questions arise for consideration:- 1. Whether the provisions contained in Section 5A of the Act of 1894 have been followed in its letter and spirit by the Land Acquisition Officer/Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue)? 2. Whether the impugned acquisition has been made under Part-VII of the Act of 1894 for private company and the entire cost has been borne by the company? Answer to Question No.1 13.In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to notice Section 5A(2) of the Act of 1894, which states as under: - “5A. Hearing of objections.—(1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be. (2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or by any person authorised by him in this behalf or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (1), or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land, to the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of that Government. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final.” 14.Section 5A of the Act of 1894 is in two parts. First part i.e. sub-section (1) of Section 5A deals with filing objection by the “person interested” defined in Section 3(b) of the Act of 1894, in any land which has been notified under Section 4, sub- section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company within thirty days from the date of the publication of the notification and may object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be. Second part i.e. sub-section (2) of Section 5A deals with objections. It mandates that every objection to the Collector shall be made in writing and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or by any person authorised by him in this behalf or by pleader and upon receipt of objections, the Collector is required to make such further inquiry as he may think necessary whereupon he must submit a report to the appropriate Government in respect of {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} the land which is the subject-matter of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894. The said report would also contain recommendations on the objections filed by the owner of the land. He is required to forward the records of the proceedings held by him together with the report. On receipt of such a report together with the records of the case, the Government is to render a decision thereupon. However, considerations of the objections by the owner of the land and the acceptance of the recommendations by the Government must precede a proper application of mind on the part of the Government. The State is required to apply its mind not only on the objections filed by the owner of the land but also on the report which is submitted by the Collector upon making other and further enquiries therefor as also the recommendations made by him in that behalf. It is open to the State Government to make further inquiry into the matter, if any case is made out therefor, for arriving at its own satisfaction that it is necessary to deprive a citizen of his right to property. 15.It is appropriate to mention here that by notification dated 6- 3-1987, power and jurisdiction to hear objection has been conferred to the SDO and similarly, power of the appropriate Government has been conferred to the Collector vide notification dated 3-9-2003. Page 13 of 29 {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} 16.In the matter of Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of U.P.6, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the right to file objections under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 is a substantial right when a person’s property is being threatened with acquisition. 17.In the matter of Munshi Singh v. Union of India7, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have highlighted the importance of the rule of hearing embodied in Section 5A of the Act of 1894 by observing as under: - “7. Section 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. We may refer to the observation of this court in Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of U.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1217 : (1964) 3 SCR 425] that the right to file objections under Section 5-A is a substantial right when a person's property is being threatened with acquisition and that right cannot be taken away as if by a side wind. Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A makes it obligatory on the Collector to give an objector an opportunity of being heard. After hearing all objections and making further inquiry he is to make a report to the appropriate Government containing his recommendation on the objections. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections is then final. The declaration under Section 6 has to be made after the appropriate Government is satisfied, on a consideration of the report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5-A(2). The legislature has, therefore, made complete provisions for the persons interested to file objections against the 6 AIR 1964 SC 1217 7 (1973) 2 SCC 337 {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their objections.” 18.Subsequently, in the matter of State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh8, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that while making compulsory acquisition of land, denial of administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons and observed as under: - “16. … it is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man’s property is a serious matter and the smaller the man the more serious the matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and pre-emptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons.” 19.In the matter of Surinder Singh Brar and others v. Union of India and others9, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the earlier decisions and held that hearing contemplated under Section 5A(2) of the Act of 1894 to a person who is sought to be deprived of his land and who has filed objections under Section 5A(1) must be effective and not an empty formality. It has been further held that it is the substantive right of the landowners and/or other interested persons to file objections. Their Lordships observed as under: - “84. What needs to be emphasised is that hearing required to be given under Section 5-A(2) to a person who is sought to be deprived of his land and who has filed objections under Section 5-A(1) must be effective 8 (1980) 2 SCC 471 9 (2013) 1 SCC 403 {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} and not an empty formality. The Collector who is enjoined with the task of hearing the objectors has the freedom of making further enquiry as he may think necessary. In either eventuality, he has to make report in respect of the land notified under Section 4(1) or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land to the appropriate Government containing his recommendations on the objections and submit the same to the appropriate Government along with the record of proceedings held by him for the latter's decision. The appropriate Government is obliged to consider the report, if any, made under Section 5-A(2) and then record its satisfaction that the particular land is needed for a public purpose. This exercise culminates into making a declaration that the land is needed for a public purpose and the declaration is to be signed by a Secretary to the Government or some other officer duly authorised to certify its orders. The formation of opinion on the issue of need of land for a public purpose and suitability thereof is sine qua non for issue of a declaration under Section 6(1). Any violation of the substantive right of the landowners and/or other interested persons to file objections or denial of opportunity of personal hearing to the objector(s) vitiates the recommendations made by the Collector and the decision taken by the appropriate Government on such recommendations. The recommendations made by the Collector without duly considering the objections filed under Section 5-A(1) and submissions made at the hearing given under Section 5-A(2) or failure of the appropriate Government to take objective decision on such objections in the light of the recommendations made by the Collector will denude the decision of the appropriate Government of statutory finality. To put it differently, the satisfaction recorded by the appropriate Government that the particular land is needed for a public purpose and the declaration made under Section 6(1) will be devoid of legal sanctity if statutorily engrafted procedural safeguards are not adhered to by the authorities concerned or there is violation of the principles of natural justice. The {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} cases before us are illustrative of flagrant violation of the mandate of Sections 5-A(2) and 6(1). Therefore, the second question is answered in the affirmative.” 20.In Lajja Ram (supra), Surinder Singh Brar (supra) has been considered and it has been held that sub-section (2) of Section 5A of the Act of 1894 envisages the rule of audi alteram partem and makes it sine qua non to the acquisition proceedings under the Act, and it has been observed as under: - “19. … Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A envisages the rule of audi alteram partem and makes it sine qua non to the acquisition proceedings under the Act. It mandates the LAO to first provide an opportunity of hearing to the objector(s) in respect of their objections to the acquisition of lands notified under Section 4(1) of the Act. The LAO or the Collector may also conduct a further enquiry in this regard, if he deems it necessary, and thereafter decide upon the objections raised by such objector(s) and submit his recommendations to the State Government in the form of a report, on the basis of which the State Government is to formulate its opinion in respect of acquisition of lands notified under Section 4(1) of the Act and issue appropriate notification under Section 6 of the Act. The purpose is to afford an opportunity of making representation to the aggrieved person before any order, which may adversely affect his interest in any immovable property, may be passed by the LAO and subsequent notification be issued by the State Government. 25. In our considered opinion, before passing the said order, opportunity of hearing ought to have been granted to the landowners who have immovable property rights in the lands acquired. Since that has not been done, the action of the respondent authorities is contrary to the statutory provisions and also in violation of the principles of natural justice. Page 17 of 29 {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} 26. In view of the above, we set aside the notification issued under Section 6 of the Act by the State Government qua the petitioners only. However, we permit the State Government and its authorities, if they so desire, to proceed from the stage from which we have pointed out the mistake/defect in the course of acquisition proceedings insofar as the lands of the appellants. We clarify that the award in respect of other lands shall stand as it is and is not disturbed.” 21.Similarly, in Shiv Raj’s case (supra), it has been held that the limited right given to an owner/person interested under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 to object to the acuqisition proceedings is not an empty formality and is a substantive right, and observed as under: - “15. Therefore, Section 5-A of the 1894 Act confers a valuable right in favour of a person whose lands are sought to be acquired. It is trite that hearing given to a person must be an effective one and not a mere formality. Formation of opinion as regard the public purpose as also suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind having due regard to the relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The State in its decision- making process must not commit any misdirection in law. It is also not in dispute that Section 5-A of the 1894 Act confers a valuable important right and having regard to the provisions, contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution of India has been held to be akin to a fundamental right. Thus, the limited right given to an owner/person interested under Section 5-A of the 1894 Act to object to the acquisition proceedings is not an empty formality and is a substantive right, which can be taken away only for good and valid reason and within the limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the 1894 Act. 16. The Land Acquisition Collector is duty-bound to objectively consider the arguments advanced by the objector and make recommendations, duly supported by brief reasons, as to why the particular piece of land should {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} or should not be acquired and whether the plea put forward by the objector merits acceptance. In other words, the recommendations made by the Land Acquisition Collector should reflect objective application of mind to the entire record including the objections filed by the interested persons. [See Munshi Singh v. Union of India [(1973) 2 SCC 337], Union of India v. Mukesh Hans [(2004) 8 SCC 14], Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai [(2005) 7 SCC 627 : AIR 2005 SC 3520], Anand Singh v. State of U.P. [(2010) 11 SCC 242 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 423], Dev Sharan v. State of U.P. [(2011) 4 SCC 769 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 483], Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana [(2012) 1 SCC 792 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 402], Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana [(2013) 4 SCC 210 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 556] and Women's Education Trust v. State of Haryana [(2013) 8 SCC 99 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 721].]” 22.Similarly, in Kedar Nath Yadav (supra), relying upon the decision in the matter of Babu Ram v. State of Haryana10, it has been held that a right under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 is not merely statutory but also has the flavour of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution and observed as under: - “97. In Babu Ram v. State of Haryana [(2009) 10 SCC 115 : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 69], this Court observed as under : (SCC p. 122, para 30) “30. As indicated hereinabove in the various cases cited by Mr Pradip Ghosh and, in particular, the decision in Krishan Lal Arneja case [Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja, (2004) 8 SCC 453], in which reference has been made to the observations made by this Court in Om Prakash case [Om Prakash v. State of U.P., (1998) 6 SCC 1], it has been emphasised that a right under Section 5-A is not merely statutory 10 (2009) 10 SCC 115 : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 69 {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} but also has the flavour of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Such observations had been made in reference to an observation made in the earlier decision in Gurdial Singh case [State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471] and keeping in mind the fact that right to property was no longer a fundamental right, an observation was made that even if the right to property was no longer a fundamental right, the observations relating to Article 14 would continue to apply in full force with regard to Section 5-A of the LA Act.” (emphasis supplied) 98. From a perusal of the proceedings before the Collector, which are made available to this Court, it becomes clear that the same have been rejected without assigning any clear reasons or application of mind. Thus, the report of the Collector is not a valid report in the eye of the law. The State Government has mechanically accepted the same without application of mind independently before issuing the notification under Section 6 of the LA Act declaring that the lands are required for establishment of automobile industry by TML.” 23.Very recently, in Abhishek Gupta’s case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the scheme of Section 5A of the Act of 1894 and held that Section 5A codifies the fundamental safeguard of audi alteram partem by which landowners have the opportunity to demonstrate that the acquisition is against public purpose or marred by mala fides and it has been further held that Section 5A envisions a modus of deliberation and consultation, which must therefore be {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} construed to be mandatory, akin to a right. It has been observed by their Lordships as under: - “13. It would be pertinent to understand the object that Section 5A of the 1894 Act seeks to fulfil. A plain reading of the provision indicates that it codifies the fundamental safeguard of audi altrem partem. Landowners have the opportunity to demonstrate that the acquisition is against public purpose or marred by mala fides. In the event the landowner presents a cogent case, the appropriate government may exempt such land from acquisition. By enabling landowners to put forward their perspective and elucidate their remonstrances, Section 5A envisions a modus of deliberation and consultation, which must therefore be construed to be mandatory, akin to a right.11 14. Objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act most often proceed in four distinct stages: i. The filing stage : Landowners can file objections within thirty days of the notification issued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act;12 ii. The hearing stage : The Collector must provide an oral hearing to the objecting landowners, either in person or through a pleader/authorized representative;13 iii. The recommendation stage : The Collector—after hearing objections and upon further inquiry—makes a report to the appropriate government containing their recommendations; and iv. The decision stage : The appropriate government considers the Collector's report and takes a final decision on the objections.” 24.Coming to the facts of the present case, it is quite evident that in the instant case, objections were filed under Section 5A(1) of 11 Women's Education Trust v. State of Haryana, (2013) 8 SCC 99, para 1. 12 Section 5A (1), 1894 Act. 13 NOIDA v. Darshan Lal Bora, 2024 INS 508. Page 21 of 29 {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} the Act of 1894 to the SDO(R) being the authority under Section 5A in place of Collector, as power has been delegated to him upon which the Land Acquisition Officer sought reply of the District Trade and Industries Centre, Raigarh, on the objections of the petitioners, which was replied by the General Manager, District Trade and Industries Centre, Raigarh on 13- 8-2010 duly recorded by the SDO(R)-cum-Land Acquisition Officer in his order dated 17-8-2010 and thereafter, the SDO(R) heard the counsel for the petitioners herein/objectors on 26-8-2010 and rejected the objections of the petitioners in terms of letter dated 13-8-2010, vide order dated 26-8-2010, which states as under: - 26-08-2010 izdj.k izLrqrA egkizca/kd ftyk O;kikj ,oa m|ksx dsUnz] jk;x<+ dh vksj ls izca/kd mifLFkrA izdj.k esa /kkjk 5 d vk{ksiksa dh lquokbZ dh xbZ gSA vkifRrdrkZ Jh dqUnuyky iVsy firk dUgkbZ iVsy] uksgjyky iVsy firk t;flga iVsy] gseUr dqekj iVsy firk dUgkbZ yky iVsy] [kq’khjke iVsy ,oa /kus’oj fu"kkn] bUnyjke iVsy ,oa 07 vU;] yhyk/kj pkS/kjh }kjk izLrqr vkifRr ds lanHkZ esa dk;kZy; ftyk O;kikj m|ksx dsUnz] jk;x<+ ds i= Ø- 3255@ft-O;k-m-ds-&jk@Hkw&vtZu@2010]fnukad 13-08-2010 }kjk tokc esa crk;k gS fd vkifRrdrkZ uksgjyky] dqUnuyky iVsy] gseUr dqekj iVsy] bUnyjek iVsy oxSj] [kq’khjke iVsy o yhyk/kj pkS/kjh }kjk eq[;r% flafpr Hkwfe dks vflafpr n’kkZ;k tkuk] isM+ksa dh la[;k dh lgh x.kuk ugha djuk laca/kh vkifRr djrs gq, orZeku [kjhn fcØh nj@vkn’kZ iquZokl uhfr 2007 ds rgr vkS|ksfxd iz;kstu gsrq ?kksf"kr ubZ nj ds vuq:i vf/kdre jkf’k rFkk jkstxkj] orZeku ch&1 vuqlkj HkwfeLokeh dk uke vafdr djus dh ek¡x dh xbZ gSA izLrqr vkifRr ds laca/k esa Hkwfe dks flafpr gksus] isM+ksa dh lgh x.kuk djus ,oa jktLo vfHkys[k ds vuqlkj Hkwfe dk uke vafdr djus ds laca/k esa lR;kiu gYdk iVokjh }kjk djk;k tkuk crk;k gSA Hkw&vtZu vf/kfu;e&1894 xkbZM&ykbZu nj@vFkok N-x- jkT; dh vkn’kZ iquokZl uhfr 2007 ¼;Fkkla’kksf/kr½ esa vkS|ksfxd ifj;kstukvksa ds fy;s ?kksf"kr ubZ nj Page 22 of 29 {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} tks Hkh vf/kd gks ds vuqlkj eqvkotk jkf’k fu;ekuqlkj ns; gksxhA vkn’kZ iquokZl uhfr 2007 ds izko/kku vuqlkj izHkkfor ifjokj ds ,d lnL; dks mu m|ksxksa esa ik=rk vuqlkj jkstxkj miyC/k djk;k tkosxk] ftUgsa Hkwfe vkcafVr dh tkosxhA vkifRrdrkZ }kjk vf/koDrk mifLFkrA fyf[kr rdZ izLrqr dk euu fd;k x;kA vkifRr esa flafpr Hkwfe dks vflafpr] isM+ksa dh lgh x.kuk ugha djuk] jktLo vfHkys[k ds vuqlkj HkwfeLokeh dk uke vafdr djus bl mYysf[kr vkifRr ds laca/k esa vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk&9 esa HkwfeLokfe;ksa dh lquokbZ ds nkSjku vf/kxzfgr dh tk jgh Hkwfe LFky fujh{k.k dj Hkwfe ds ¼flfpar@vlafpr½ gksus o Hkwfe ij fLFkr laifRr rFkk iVokjh vfHkys[k ch&1 esa HkwfeLokeh dk uke ntZ dk tk¡p o ijh{k.k dj eqvkotk fu/kkZj.k fd;k tkosxkA egkizca/kd ftyk O;kikj ,oa m|ksx dsUnz] jk;x<+ }kjk i= fnukad 13-08-2010 esa fujkdj.k fd;k tk pqdk gSA vr,o izLrqr vkifRr dk mijksDrkuqlkj fujkdj.k fd;k tkrk gSA izdj.k esa /kkjk&6 dh vf/klwpuk esa mYysf[kr [k-ua- o jdck gYdk iVokjh ls tk¡p mijkar vf/klwpuk i= izk:i is’kA lgh@& vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh ,oa Hkw&vtZu vf/kdkjh jk;x<+ ¼N-x-½ 25.A careful perusal of order dated 26-8-2010 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer would show that on objection filed by the petitioners/landowners within thirty days from the date of publication of the notification, the Land Acquisition Officer/ SDO(R) has afforded oral hearing to the petitioners/objectors through his Advocate in terms of Section 5A(2) of the Act of 1894. But, however, it appears that after hearing on the objections, no further enquiry was conducted by the Land Acquisition Officer and the Land Acquisition Officer did not make report in respect of the land which has been notified under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894, and did not make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land, to {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of that Government, and himself decided the objections on his own that too in terms of reply dated 13-8-2010 filed by the District Trade and Industries Centre. As such, Stage-I of Section 5A proceedings i.e. objection has been filed by the landowners within 30 days from the date of the publication of the notification and Stage-II i.e. the objection has been heard by the Land Acquisition Officer through the Advocate, but did not make any recommendation after hearing the objection and did not make any enquiry and did not make any report to the appropriate Government containing his recommendations on the objection along with the record of the proceedings held by him, and himself has taken decision on the objections so filed by the petitioners. A perusal of the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer would show that objections have been rejected by the Land Acquisition Officer without making any recommendation and without making any further inquiry which smacks non- application of mind, as the report of the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer is sine qua non so that the appropriate Government, in this case the Collector, should have taken a decision under Section 5A(2) of the Act of 1894 before issuing {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} notification under Section 6(1) of the Act of 1894 declaring that the lands are required for industrial purpose. As such, before issuing the notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, no recommendation has been made by the Land Acquisition Officer to the appropriate Government against the lands of the petitioners who have immovable property rights in the lands sought to be acquired and therefore the appropriate Government (Collector being the delegated authority) had no occasion to consider the objection/recommendation made by the SDO(R) and without having any report from the SDO(R), proceeded to issue notification under Section 6(1) of the Act of 1894, which is absolutely illegal. Therefore, action of the respondents is not only contrary to the statutory provisions, but also in violation of the principles of natural justice, even it is in violation of the statutory and fundamental rights of the petitioners. Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court, the provisions contained in Section 5A of the Act of 1894 have not been followed in its letter and spirit while making the subject acquisition of the petitioners’ property, as the right to property is a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Answer to Question No.2 {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} 26.It has vehemently been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the acquisition is for private company and the entire cost was borne by respondent No.5 Company, therefore, Part VII of the Act of 1894 was required to be followed. It is the case of the petitioners that the provisions of the Land Acquisition (Company) Rules, 1963, which have been framed by the Central Government under the provisions of Section 55 of the Land Acquisition Act are applicable in the instant case which are mandatory in nature, but the same have not been complied with by respondents No.1 to 4/State. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab14 and the order passed by this Court in the matter of Gaukaran Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh and others15. 27.In the matter of Pandit Jhandu Lal and others v. The State of Punjab and another16 it has been held that "acquisition for a company may also be made for a public purpose, within the meaning of the Act, if a part or the whole of the cost of acquisition is met by public funds. Therefore, it was not necessary to go through the procedure prescribed by Part-VII. It is only where the acquisition is for a company and its cost is 14 (2008) 1 SCC 728 15 WP(C)No.5924/2007, decided on 17-6-2008 16 AIR 1961 SC 343 {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} to be made entirely by the company itself, then the provisions of Part-VII apply”. 28.In the matter of Pratibha Nema and others v. State of M.P. and others17 drawing the distinction between acquisition under Part-II of the Act of 1894 and acquisition under Part VII, it has been held thus:- “22. Thus the distinction between public purpose acquisition and Part VII acquisition has got blurred under the impact of judicial interpretation of relevant provisions. The main and perhaps the decisive distinction lies in the fact whether the cost of acquisition comes out of public funds wholly or partly. Here again, even a token or nominal contribution by the Government was held to be sufficient compliance with the second proviso to Section 6 as held in a catena of decisions. The net result is that by contributing even a trifling sum, the character and pattern of acquisition could be changed by the Government. In ultimate analysis, what is considered to be an acquisition for facilitating the setting up of an industry in the private sector could get imbued with the character of public purpose acquisition if only the Government comes forward to sanction the payment of a nominal sum towards compensation? In the present state of law, that seems to be the real position." Considering the fact of that case that the amount deposited by the company towards the advance lease premium which was utilized for payment of compensation, it was held that the same satisfies the requirement of second proviso to Section 6(1) read with Explanation 2 of the Act of 1894. The genesis of fund is not the determinative factor, but its ownership in paresenti that matters. 17 (2003) 10 SCC 626 {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} 29.In the matter of Daulat Singh Surana and others v. First Land Acquisition Collector and others18 it has been held that "the public purpose is not static. It also changes with the passage of time, needs and requirements of the community. Public purpose is bound to vary with times and prevailing conditions in the community or locality and, therefore, the legislature has left it to the State (Government) to decide what is public purpose and also to declare the need of a given land for the purpose. The legislature has left the discretion to the Government regarding public purpose. The Government has the sole and absolute discretion in the matter." 30.In Devinder Singh (supra), the Supreme Court has made distinction between acquisition for public purpose under Part- II and Part-VII of the Act of 1894 for company itself. 31.Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light of the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that it is the case of the State that acquisition proceeding was initiated after receiving letter dated 14-9-2009 from the Commissioner, Directorate of Industries, Raipur addressed to the State and by the said letter, the Commissioner of Industries had given his consent for acquisition of 64.03 hectares of private lands situated at four villages namely, 18 (2007) 1 SCC 641 {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} Chhote Bhandar, Bade Bhandar, Amalibhavana and Sarwani under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for industries purposes. Thereafter, the State gave its consent vide letter dated 27-10- 2009 and after acquisition of lands, lands have been transferred to CSIDC for allotment to deserving industries which according to the policy of CSIDC deserve to be allotted. 32.Furthermore, it is not the case of the petitioners pleaded in the writ petition that the entire cost of acquisition has been borne by the private company. No pleading at all has been made in the writ petition to that effect. It was absolutely necessary to plead and establish that the entire cost of acquisition has been borne by the private company and out of which compensation has been sought to be paid to the landowners in absence of which it cannot be held that the acquisition is made for the private company and Part-VII of the Act of 1894 was required to be followed. In that view of the matter, it cannot be held that acquisition is for private company and therefore the procedure prescribed under Part-VII of the Act of 1894 would not be applicable in the impugned acquisition, as such, this ground is not available to the petitioners to question acquisition. 33.The submission on behalf of the State that award has been passed therefore no interference can be called in the land {W.P.(C)No.6003/2010} acquisition proceeding, deserves to be rejected, as mere passing of award would not vest the acquired land in the State within the meaning of Section 16 of the Act of 1894 unless further it is pleaded and established that possession of land has been taken from the landowners which has neither been pleaded nor demonstrated, therefore, this ground is not available to the State Government. 34.Consequently, the petition succeeds only on the ground of non- compliance of Section 5A(2) of the Act of 1894 and notification issued under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, order dated 26-8- 2010 rejecting the objections of the petitioners filed under Section 5A(1) of the Act of 1894 and award dated 14-1-2011 to the extent of the petitioners’ land are hereby quashed. However, the appropriate authorities, if so desire, may proceed further from the stage of Section 5A of the Act of 1894 qua the petitioners. It is hereby clarified that the award in respect of other lands shall remain as it is and it is not being disturbed. 35.In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed to the extent sketched herein-above reserving liberty in aforesaid terms, leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s). Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) Judge Soma