Judgment : Rajani Dubey, J. 1. This appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the appellants against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.03.2019 passed by learned 3 rd Additional Sessions Judge Surajpur, District- Surajpur in Sessions Trial No. 39/2018 whereby the appellants have been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 of IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/- each, in default of payment of fine to further undergo R.I. for six months each. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the deceased Indramani Yadav is the wife of accused Basant Yadav. On the night of 11.02.2018, the deceased Indramani Yadav slept alone in her shop after closing the shutter. Next day in the morning, when the deceased's son-daughter-in-law Geeta Yadav went to give her tea, she saw that the shutter of the shop was open. When she went inside the shop, she found the deceased Indramani dead on the cot. Information regarding the incident was registered at the police station. The matter was taken into investigation. During the investigation, the husband of the deceased husband i.e. Accused- Basant Yadav was caught and when he was questioned, accused Basant Yadav admitted to killing his wife Indramani by strangling her with his scarf ¼xeNk½ in connivance with other accused. Memorandum statement of accused Basant Yadav was recorded. The scarf of accused Basant Yadav was seized in front of the witnesses. During investigation, the accused were arrested. Post mortem of the dead body of the deceased was got done. Spot map of incident was prepared. Statements of witnesses were recorded. After completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed. Judicial Magistrate First Class, Surajpur committed the case to Hon'ble Sessions Judge, Surajpur as it was within the jurisdiction of Hon'ble Sessions Judge, Surajpur for hearing. Thereafter, the case was transferred to the trial Court by Hon'ble Sessions Judge, Surajpur for proper disposal. Learned trial Court framed charge under Section 302/34 of IPC, to which appellants abjured their guilt and claimed to be tried. 3. So as to hold the accused/appellants guilty, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses. Statements of the accused/appellants were also recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which they denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. 3. So as to hold the accused/appellants guilty, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses. Statements of the accused/appellants were also recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which they denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. However, they did not adduce any evidence in their defence. 4. Learned trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 14.03.2019 finding evidence adduced by the prosecution trustworthy, convicted and sentenced the appellants as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. Hence, this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned trial Court failed to consider the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as the chain of circumstance is incomplete in this case. The case of the prosecution is full of doubts and suspicions and the appellants have been falsely implicated in this case. Appellants have been charged on the basis of memorandum statement of co-accused and there is no incriminating material against the present appellants. The learned trial Court has erred in the findings for not appreciating the unconnected circumstantial evidence as the motive in the instant crime is altogether missing. The evidence available on record does not constitute the offence against the appellants, so the story of prosecution agency cannot be relied and the conviction cannot be sustainable. The finding of the learned trial Judge is erroneous and contrary to rule of prudence. The prosecution witnesses did not support the case of the prosecution and their statements were contrary to each other. The learned trial Court arbitrarily passed the judgment of conviction and without even foregoing the testimonies of the witnesses and any stretch of imagination does not perceive the charge levelled against the present appellants. Even the case of the prosecution is taken as it is, then too the act of the present appellants would not fall within the ambit cum ingredients of Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Even the case of the prosecution is taken as it is, then too the act of the present appellants would not fall within the ambit cum ingredients of Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The finding of the learned trial Court are erroneous and the judgment is cryptic without assigning the reason because no material is there to implicate the present appellants in the aforesaid crime and the appellants are just the scapegoat of the prosecution to fulfill its lacuna with the deliberation thought and planning in order to implicate in such an heinous offence where the incident is based on surmises, seizures are doubtful and entire case is based on circumstantial evidence and no reasonable and substantial with prudent reason assigned by the trial Court as required under section 354 (2) of the Cr.P.C. The learned trial Court passed the judgment on the basis of some presumption of circumstantial evidence, though the presumption however be strong, it cannot take place of the legal proof. The learned trial Court failed to consider that this type of cases are very much common in our world and great care and cautious must be applied while deciding such facts and circumstances so that the innocent person must not be falsely implicated only on the basis of contradictory and afterthought statement. The learned trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence and wrongly admitted the evidence which are not at all reliable. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chandu Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh ; MANU/SC/0443/1992 and Ratnu Yadav Vs. State of Chhattisgarh ; MANU/SC/0581/2024. 6. On the other hand, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment and submits that the learned trial Court rightly appreciated oral and documentary evidence and convicted the appellant accordingly. Hence, the impugned judgment is well merited and does not call for any interference by this Court. Reliance has been placed on this Court’s order dated 16.02.2017 passed in Criminal Revision No. 87/2017 { Neelkanth Yadav and others Vs. State of Chhattisgarh } decision of Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad in the matter of Rammilan Bunkar; MANU/UP/2437/2024 and judgment dated 10.07.2024 passed by Division Bench of this Court passed in CRA No. 204 of 2018 in the matter of Rajkumar Sonkar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh. 7. State of Chhattisgarh } decision of Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad in the matter of Rammilan Bunkar; MANU/UP/2437/2024 and judgment dated 10.07.2024 passed by Division Bench of this Court passed in CRA No. 204 of 2018 in the matter of Rajkumar Sonkar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record including the impugned judgment. 8. It is clear from record of learned trial Court that the learned trial Court framed charges under Section 302 r/w 34 of IPC against both the appellants. Prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses and exhibited documents from Ex.P/1 to P/14. 9. It is not disputed before the learned trial Court that the deceased Indramani Yadav was wife of accused- Basant Yadav and she died in the night intervening 12.02.2018 - 13.02.2018. 10. The first question, we have to consider that as to whether the death of the deceased Indramani was homicidal or not? 11. Gopal (P.W.-4), brother of the appellant Basant Yadav, stated that he went to the house of accused Basant in the morning after hearing the commotion. The deceased Indramani was lying dead on a cot. He saw the dead body of the deceased, there were marks of strangulation on her neck. He went to file a report at Police Station- Odgi. Morgue intimation was lodged by police vide Ex.P/3 wherein he admitted his signature from A to A part of it. 12. Assistant Sub-inspector, Klement Tirky (P.W.-14) stated that he recorded the morgue intimation bearing No. 05/2018 vide Ex.P/3 as per information given by Gopal Yadav and admitted his signature on it from B to B part. During the inquest report, he went to the spot and completed the panchnama proceeding of deceased’s body for which the notice was issued to the witnesses vide Ex.P/4 and admitted his signature on it from B to B part. After completion of panchnama proceeding, he gave application for conducting post mortem of the body of the deceased vide Ex.P/7 and admitted his signature on it from A to A part and from B to B part. 13. Dr. Rakesh Singh (P.W.-11) conducted postmortem of body of deceased and he found following external injuries:- There were old burn marks on the chest, left breast, front and sides of stomach and on the upper part of both hips in the lower part of the body. 13. Dr. Rakesh Singh (P.W.-11) conducted postmortem of body of deceased and he found following external injuries:- There were old burn marks on the chest, left breast, front and sides of stomach and on the upper part of both hips in the lower part of the body. Left hand was shrunken due to burning. Tongue had come out of the mouth. The eyes were closed. Face was congested. Two ligature marks were present on the left side of the neck. The size of the ligature mark on the upper left side of the neck was 8 x 2 cm and the ligature mark present below was 12 x 2 cm. Both these ligature marks were above the thyroid cartilage on the left side of the neck and the hyoid bone of the neck was broken. Rigor Martis (strain) was present on the entire body. After conducting postmortem of the body of the deceased, he opined that mode of death is asphyxia caused due to strangulation and death was homicidal in nature. In his cross-examination, he admitted that the postmortem report has been given on the basis of the circumstances stated by the police in the PM report. 14. Looking to the statement of Dr. Rakesh Singh (P.W.-11) and postmortem report (Ex.P/4), prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. 15. Now we have to consider as to whether both the appellants committed murder of deceased by strangulation or not? 16. The trial Court relying upon the following circumstances, held the appellants guilty of commission of murder of Indramani Yadav:- 17. First condition as per above circumstances is last seen together and the trial Court found that on the date of incident, at about 12.00 - 12:30 a.m. Vishnu Yadav (P.W.-1) saw both the accused closing the shutter of the shop in which the deceased Indramani was sleeping. 18. Vishnu Yadav (P.W.-1) stated that at around 12-12:30 in the night, he saw that both the accused were closing the shutter of the shop. After closing it, both left the shop. Thereafter, he came back home and fell asleep. He further stated that his father Basant Yadav and mother Indramani used to fight with each other. One year before the incident, his father burnt his mother and was trying to kill her with a sword. After closing it, both left the shop. Thereafter, he came back home and fell asleep. He further stated that his father Basant Yadav and mother Indramani used to fight with each other. One year before the incident, his father burnt his mother and was trying to kill her with a sword. In his cross-examination, he admitted that a report was filed before the police station regarding burning of his mother which was caused by his father. The matter of burning was not mentioned in the report. The police did not take any action on the said report. 19. Rakesh Yadav (P.W.-2) who is son-in-law of the accused Basant Yadav stated that after committing the crime, both the accused fled. In the morning, his brother-in-law Vishnu Yadav (P.W.-1) told him about the incident over phone. 23. Shyambihari Yadav (P.W.-8) stated that in his presence, police interrogated the accused in custody. He admitted his signature from B to B part of the memorandum statement (Ex.P/1) of accused Basant Yadav. Police seized his scarf vide seizure memo Ex.P/2. 24. Kaushal Ram (P.W.-9) stated that Ramprakash, Rampuran, Shyambihari and other people were near the Chowk. Then Dashrath told that he and Basant both together killed Indramani by tying a scarf around her neck. In his cross-examination, he stated that in his police statement, he stated that near Baijnathpur Chowk the accused Dashrath had told that he and Basant together had killed Indramani by tying scarf ¼xeNk½ around her neck. If the above facts are not written in his police statement (Ex.D-5), then he cannot tell the reason. 25. Manbahal (P.W.-10) stated that at around 9.00-10.00 pm, both the accused went to his house and woke him up by calling him. When he heard their voice, he opened the door and came out. he saw that the accused were near the door and were asking about the liquor. Thereafter, both the accused left his house. The next day, he was going to Baijnathpur for work. Later, he came to know that Basant's wife had died. 26. Sunita Yadav (P.W.-12) who is daughter of the deceased Indramani and accused Basant Yadav, stated that the accused Basant used to say to the deceased that he would kill her. He had burnt her mother once in the past. The next day, he was going to Baijnathpur for work. Later, he came to know that Basant's wife had died. 26. Sunita Yadav (P.W.-12) who is daughter of the deceased Indramani and accused Basant Yadav, stated that the accused Basant used to say to the deceased that he would kill her. He had burnt her mother once in the past. Prosecution declared her hostile and cross-examined her then she admitted this suggestion that her father suspected her mother Indramani of having an illicit relationship with someone else. 27. Chandramani (P.W.-13) who is sister of the deceased stated that she was informed by the son of the deceased Vishnu Yadav about the death of the deceased- Indramani. In her cross-examination, she admitted that the deceased used to sleep in the shop because of the quarrel occurred between the accused/appellant Basant Yadav and her. 28. Close scrutiny of statements of all the witnesses makes it clear that son of the deceased- Vishnu Yadav (P.W.-1) saw his father and another accused closing the shutter of the shop at about 12:00 – 12:30 p.m.. All witnesses stated that the deceased used to sleep in shop. Manbahal (P.W.-10) stated that both the accused came to his house at about 9:00- 10:00 P.M., and asked about liquor. 29. Vishnu Yadav (P.W.-1) clearly stated that after seeing his father/accused and another accused person closing the shutter of the shop, he went to his house and fell asleep. On the next day, he came to know that his mother Indramani died. 30. All witnesses also admitted that the wall behind the shop was broken. 31. Investigating Officer -Klement Tirky (P.W.-14) admitted that he did not record the memorandum statement of the accused/appellant- Dashrath and also did not seize anything from him. He also admitted that when he met the accused Basant, he was wearing shirt and pants and the scarf ¼xeNk½ was tied around his neck. 33. Upon perusal of morgue intimation (Ex.P/3), it is clear that the date of incident is 13.02.2018 and memorandum statement of the accused Basant Yadav was recorded on 23.02.2018 and as per this memorandum statement, recovery was made as per Ex.P/2 and Investigating Officer- Klement Tirky (P.W.-14) also admitted that the accused tied the scarf (????(cid:4)) around his neck at the time of recording of his memorandum statement. 34. 34. As regards extra-judical confession, in the matter of Ratnu Yadav (supra) , Hon’ble Apex Court held in paras 9 and 10 as under:- “9. As regards the evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession, a bench of three Hon'ble Judges of this Court in the case of Devi Lal v. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/0034/2019: 2019:INSC: 29: (2019) 19 SCC 447 , in Paragraph 11, this Court held thus: 11. It is true that an extra-judicial confession is used against its maker but as a matter of caution, advisable for the court to look for a corroboration with the other evidence on record. In Gopal Sah v. State of Bihar [Gopal Sah v. State of Bihar, MANU/SC/8348/2008: (2008) 17 SCC 128 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 466], this Court while dealing with extra-judicial confession held that extra-judicial confession is, on the face of it, a weak evidence and the Court is reluctant, in the absence of a chain of cogent circumstances, to rely on it, for the purpose of recording a conviction. In the instant case, it may be noticed that there are no additional cogent circumstances on record to rely on it. At the same time, Shambhu Singh (PW 3), while recording his statement Under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure, has not made such statement of extra-judicial confession (Ext. D- 5) made by Accused Babu Lal. In addition, no other circumstances are on record to support it. (emphasis added) In paragraph 16 of the decision of this Court in the case of Nikhil Chandra Mondal v. State of West Bengal MANU/SC/0211/2023: 2023: INSC: 198 : (2023) 6 SCC 605 , this Court held thus: 16. It is a settled principle of law that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. It has been held that where an extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance. It has further been held that it is well-settled that it is a Rule of caution where the court would generally look for an independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon such extra-judicial confession. It has been held that there is no doubt that conviction can be based on extra-judicial confession, but in the very nature of things, it is a weak piece of evidence. (emphasis added) 10. It has been held that there is no doubt that conviction can be based on extra-judicial confession, but in the very nature of things, it is a weak piece of evidence. (emphasis added) 10. The normal Rule of human conduct is that if a person wants to confess to the crime committed by him, he will do so before the person in whom he has implicit faith. It is not the case of the prosecution that the Appellant had a close acquaintance with PW- 1 for a certain length of time before the incident. Moreover, the version of the witness in examination-in-chief and cross- examination is entirely different. Therefore, in our considered view the testimony of PW-1 is not reliable. Hence, the case of extra-judicial confession cannot be accepted.” 35. In view of above, it is also evident upon perusal of the statements of the witnesses that the relatives of the deceased were beating the accused persons and witnesses also admitted that at the time of recording of Extra Judicial Confession of the accused persons, the Station House Officer and Sub-Divisional Police Officer were present there. This type of Extra Judicial Confession is not admissible in evidence as per Sections 24 and 25 of Evidence Act. 36. The learned trial Court relied upon 17 circumstances but they all are not proved beyond reasonable doubt against the appellants. Looking to the cross-examination of the witnesses, only memorandum statement (Ex.P/1) and seizure memo (Ex.P/2) were proved by the prosecution against the appellants. 37. Investigating Officer- Klement Tirky (P.W.-14) stated that he did not sent the scarf of the accused Basant Yadav for chemical examination. 38. Appellant Basant Yadav stated in his statement recorded 313 of Cr.P.C. that he had gone out to visit relatives before the date of the incident. His son wants to forcibly get his land and money transferred in his name, hence he has falsely implicated him in the case. 39. Vishnu Yadav (P.W.-1) also admitted that he did not wake up his mother Indramani (deceased) on the night of the incident and went his home and fell asleep. 40. Manbahal (P.W.-10) saw the accused persons at about 9:00-10:00 P.M., 41. Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Sujit Biswas V. State of Assam reported in AIR 2013 SC 3817 held in para 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11 as under :- “6. 40. Manbahal (P.W.-10) saw the accused persons at about 9:00-10:00 P.M., 41. Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Sujit Biswas V. State of Assam reported in AIR 2013 SC 3817 held in para 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11 as under :- “6. Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large difference between something that may be proved, and something that 'will be proved. In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason that the mental distance between 'may be and 'must be is quite large, and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large distance between 'may be true and 'must be true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between may be true and must be true, the court must maintain the vital distance between mere conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny, based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. The court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided, and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense. (Vide: Hanumant Govind Nargundkar & Anr. v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 ; State through CBI v. Mahender Singh Dahiya, AIR 2011 SC 1017 ; and Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P., AIR 2012 SC 1979 ). 7. (Vide: Hanumant Govind Nargundkar & Anr. v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 ; State through CBI v. Mahender Singh Dahiya, AIR 2011 SC 1017 ; and Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P., AIR 2012 SC 1979 ). 7. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 2773 , this Court observed as under: "Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases where in the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence." 8. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 , this Court held as under: The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the ? guilt of the accused. There should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 9. In M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 , this Court held, that if the circumstances proved in a case are consistent either with the innocence of the accused, or with his guilt, then the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. When it is held that a certain fact has been proved, then the question that arises is whether such a fact leads to the inference of guilt on the part of the accused person or not, and in dealing with this aspect of the problem, benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, and a final inference of guilt against him must be drawn only if the proved fact is wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, and is entirely consistent with his guilt. Similarly, in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (Supra), this Court held as under: Graver the crime, greater should be the standard of proof. Similarly, in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (Supra), this Court held as under: Graver the crime, greater should be the standard of proof. An accused may appear to be guilty on the basis of suspicion but that cannot amount to legal proof. When on the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes in the favour of the prosecution and the other benefits an accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt. The principle has special relevance where the guilt or the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. 10. xxxx 11. This Court in Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 has dealt with the doctrine of innocence elaborately, and held as under: 27. Every accused is presumed to be innocent unless the guilt is proved. The presumption of innocence is a human right. However, subject to the statutory exceptions, the said principle forms the basis of criminal jurisprudence. For this purpose, the nature of the offence, its seriousness and gravity thereof has to be taken into consideration. The courts must be on guard to see that merely on the application of the presumption, the same may not lead to any injustice or mistaken conviction. Statutes like the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, provide for presumption of guilt if the circumstances provided in those statutes are found to be fulfilled and shift the burden of proof of innocence on the accused. However, such a presumption can also be raised only when certain foundational facts are established by the prosecution. There may be difficulty in proving a negative fact. 28. However, in cases where the statute does not provide for the burden of proof on the accused, it always lies on the prosecution. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as those of statutes as referred to hereinabove, that the burden of proof is on the accused. The statutory provision even for a presumption of guilt of the accused under a particular statute must meet the tests of reasonableness and liberty enshrined in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.” 42. Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Raja Naykar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh passed in CRA No. 902 of 2023 held in para 18 as under :- “18. Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Raja Naykar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh passed in CRA No. 902 of 2023 held in para 18 as under :- “18. Another circumstance relied on by the Trial Judge is with regard to recovery of blood-stained clothes on a Memorandum of the appellant. The said clothes were recovered from the house of the appellant’s sister-in-law. The alleged incident is of 21 st October, 2009, whereas the recovery was made on 25 th October, 2009. It is difficult to believe that a person committing the crime would keep the clothes in the house of his sister-in-law for four days.” 43. Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Banabihari Mohapatra and Anr. reported in (2021) 15 SCC 265 held in para 36, 38 and 39 as under :- “36. In Shanti Devi v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2012) 12 SCC 158 , this Court held that the principles for conviction of the accused based on circumstantial evidence are : “10.1The circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be proved must be cogently or firmly established. 10.2 The circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused. 10.3 The circumstances taken cumulatively must form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else. 10.4 The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.” 37. xxxx 38. It is well settled by a plethora of judicial pronouncement of this Court that suspicion, however strong cannot take the place of proof. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt. This proposition has been reiterated in Sujit Biswas V. State of Assam reported in AIR 2013 SC 3817 . 39. xxxx 38. It is well settled by a plethora of judicial pronouncement of this Court that suspicion, however strong cannot take the place of proof. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt. This proposition has been reiterated in Sujit Biswas V. State of Assam reported in AIR 2013 SC 3817 . 39. IN Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in AIR 1973 SC 2773 , this Court observed : “Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases where in the guilt of the accused is sought is to be established by circumstantial evidence.” 44. In the light of above judicial pronouncement of Hon’ble Apex Court and taking into consideration the overall evidence on record, it is quite vivid that there is no link of last seen proof that anyone saw both the accused persons before the death of the deceased. All witnesses also admitted that wall of the shop where deceased was sleeping, was broken and footprints were also there but Investigating Officer Klement Tirky (P.W.-14) did not investigate the matter properly. The memorandum statement of the accused Basant Yadav was recorded on 23.02.2018 i.e. after 11 days from the date of incident. Thus, it is clear that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the chain of circumstance but the learned trial Court did not appreciate the statements of all witnesses and documents properly. 45. The police recorded memorandum statement of the appellant Basant Yadav on 23.02.2018 i.e. after 11 days of the incident, and as per Raja Naykar (supra), it is difficult to believe that a person committing the crime would keep the clothes in his house for four days. The prosecution has also failed to prove FSL regarding scarf which was used to commit murder of the deceased Indramani. So, there is no any clinching and legally admissible evidence available on record against both the appellants to prove their complicity in the commission of crime beyond all reasonable doubt. 46. The prosecution has also failed to prove FSL regarding scarf which was used to commit murder of the deceased Indramani. So, there is no any clinching and legally admissible evidence available on record against both the appellants to prove their complicity in the commission of crime beyond all reasonable doubt. 46. Hon’ble Apex Court held in para 19 of Raja Naykar (supra) that only on the basis of sole circumstance of recovery of blood- stained weapon, it cannot be said that the prosecution has discharged its burden or proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. It is settled law that the suspicion howsoever strong cannot take place of evidence. 47. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is required to prove each incriminating circumstance to the hilt to rule out the possibility of any person other than the appellant being the perpetrator of the crime. However, in the present case, no such circumstantial evidence is there on record which could lead to the irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the appellants and the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt that it is the appellants only who are the author of crime. Therefore, in the light of afore-quoted judicial pronouncement of Hon’ble Apex Court and the discussion of evidence, the appellants deserve to be acquitted of the charge by extending them the benefit of doubt. 48. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is set aside and the appellants are acquitted of the charge levelled against them by extending them benefit of doubt. 49. Both the appellants are reported to be in jail. They be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. 50. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the B.N.S.S., both the appellants are directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- each with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 51. 51. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned and to the Superintendent of Jail where they are lodged and suffering jail sentence, forthwith for information and necessary action if, any.