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High Court of Karnataka · body

2025 DAILYLAW 76572 (KAR)

SRI MANJAPPA G v. SMT INDRAMMA

CRP/420/2025 · 2025-08-18

M Nagaprasanna

body2025

Judgment text

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- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:32198 CRP No. 420 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO. 420 OF 2025 (IO) BETWEEN: SRI MANJAPPA G AGED 63 YEARS, (IN FACT AGED 60 YEARS), SON OF LATE BASAPPA. G, RESIDING AT SAMSKRUTHI NILAYA, 4TH MAIN ROAD, JNANAJYOTHI NAGAR, JNANABHARATHI, BENGALURU-560 05 …PETITIONER (BY SRI. N JAGADISH BALIGA.,ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SMT INDRAMMA AGED 66 YEARS, WIFE OF SRI. GOPALAPPA.K RESIDING AT KAGINALI VILLAGE, SHIKARIPURA TALUK- 577 427 SHIVAMOGA DISTRICT 2. SMT. JAYAMMA. G, AGED 64 YEARS, WIFE OF SRI. H.M. MAHESHWARAPPA, RESIDING AT NO. 135, 5TH CROSS, NEAR ANJANEYA BADAVANE, OLD HARALAPURA, HARIHARA TALUK- 577 601 DAVANAGERE DISTRICT 3. SRI. CHANDRASHEKAR. G, AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS, Digitally signed by NAGAVENI Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:32198 CRP No. 420 of 2025 SON OF LATE BASAPPA. G RESIDING AT NO.18, 6TH CROSS, NEAR STANDARD SCHOOL, T. DASARHALLI, BENGALURU NORTH, BENGALAURU-560 057 4. SRI. RAMESHAPPA. B. G, AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS, SON OF LATE BASAPPA. G, RESIDING AT KAGINALE VILLAGE, SHIKARIPURA TALUK- 577 427 SHIVAMOGA DISTRICT 5. SMT. ANITHA. J.P, AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS, WIFE OF SRI. PALAKSHAPPA. J, RESIDING AT NO.38, MALENAKERI, OPP. B. S. YADIYURAPPA HOUSE, SHIKARIPURA, SHIMOGA -577 427 6. SRI. HARISH. B. V, AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS, SON OF LATE RADHAMMA.G, RESIDING AT JAMBUR VILLAGE, SHIKARIPURA TALUK-577 427, SHIMOGA DISTRICT …RESPONDENTS THIS CRP FILED UNDER SEC.115 OF CPC., AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 17.03.2025 PASSED ON IA NO.II IN OS NO.2314/2024 ON THE FILE OF VII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU, DISMISSING THE IA NO.II FILED UNDER ORDER VII RULE 11(A) AND (B) OF CPC., FOR REJECTION OF PLAINT. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:32198 CRP No. 420 of 2025 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioner – defendant No.1 is before this Court calling in question an order dated 17.03.2025 rejecting an application filed by the petitioner under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (b) of C.P.C. 2. Heard Sri. N.Jagadish Baliga, learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material on record. 3. The suit is the one instituted seeking declaration, partition and separate possession. In the suit for partition, it is settled principle of law that there cannot be an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (b) of the CPC, unless exceptional circumstances exist seeking rejection of the plaint. In the case at hand, the petitioner seeks rejection of the plaint on the score that the plaint lacks cause of action. - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:32198 CRP No. 420 of 2025 4. The issue in the lis need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter as it stands answered by the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of P.KUMARAKURUBARAN v. P.NARAYANAN reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 975, has held as follows: “12.1. However, we are of the considered view that the issue as to whether the appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the transaction at an earlier point of time, or whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are matters that necessarily require appreciation of evidence. At this preliminary stage, the averments made in the plaint must be taken at their face value and assumed to be true. Once the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily. It becomes a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead evidence, is legally unsustainable. 12.2. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the following decisions of this Court, which have consistently held that when the question of limitation involves disputed facts or hinges on the date of knowledge, such issues cannot be decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC: (i) Daliben Valjibhai v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai7 “10. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the defendants made an application for correcting the revenue records only in the year 2017 and on the said application the Deputy Collector issued notice to the plaintiffs in March 2017 and that was the time when the plaintiffs came to know about the execution of the sale deed. It is under these circumstances that the suit was instituted in the - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:32198 CRP No. 420 of 2025 year 2017. While the High Court came to the correct conclusion that under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, a suit can be instituted within 3 years of the knowledge, it proceeded to return a finding that in cases where the document is registered, the knowledge must be presumed from the date of registration. 11. 12. Further, in Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar where again a suit for cancellation of sale deed was opposed through an application under Order 7 Rule 11, on ground of limitation, this Court specifically held that limitation in all such cases will arise from date of knowledge. The relevant portion is as follows: “15. What is relevant for answering the matter in issue in the context of the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, is to examine the averments in the plaint. The plaint is required to be read as a whole. The defence available to the defendants or the plea taken by them in the written statement or any application filed by them, cannot be the basis to decide the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d). Only the averments in the plaint are germane. It is common ground that the registered sale deed is dated 18- 10-1996. The limitation to challenge the registered sale deed ordinarily would start running from the date on which the sale deed was registered. However, the specific case of the appellant-plaintiffs is that until 2013 they had no knowledge whatsoever regarding execution of such sale deed by their brothers, original Defendants 1 and 2, in favour of Jaikrishnabhai Prabhudas Thakkar or Defendants 3 to 6. They acquired that knowledge on 26-12-2012 and immediately took steps to obtain a certified copy of the registered sale deed and on receipt thereof they realised the fraud played on them by their brothers concerning the ancestral property and two days prior to the filing of the suit, had approached their brothers (original Defendants 1 and 2) calling upon them to stop interfering with their possession and to partition the property and provide exclusive possession of half (½) portion of the land so designated towards their share. However, when they realised that the original Defendants 1 and 2 would not pay any heed to their request, they had no other option but to approach the court of law and filed the subject suit within two days therefrom. According to the appellants, the suit has been filed within time after acquiring the knowledge about the execution of the registered sale deed. In this context, the trial court opined that it was a triable issue and declined to accept the application filed by Respondent 1- Defendant 5 for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). That view commends to us. … 19. In the present case, we find that the appellant- plaintiffs have asserted that the suit was filed immediately after getting knowledge about the fraudulent sale deed executed by original Defendants 1 and 2 by keeping them in the dark about such execution and within two days from the refusal by the original Defendants 1 and 2 to refrain from obstructing the peaceful enjoyment of use and possession of the ancestral property of the appellants. We affirm the - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:32198 CRP No. 420 of 2025 view taken by the trial court that the issue regarding the suit being barred by limitation in the facts of the present case, is a triable issue and for which reason the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold in exercise of the power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.” (emphasis supplied) 13. In view of the above, there was no justification for the High Court in allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 11, on issues that were not evident from the plaint averments itself. The High Court was also not justified in holding that the limitation period commences from the date of registration itself. In this view of the matter the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable.” (ii) Salim D. Agboatwala v. Shamalji Oddhavji Thakkar8 “11. As observed by this Court in P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy [(2015) 8 SCC 331 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 100], the rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 is a drastic power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action at the threshold. Therefore, the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power are stringent and it is especially so when rejection of plaint is sought on the ground of limitation. When a plaintiff claims that he gained knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action only at a particular point of time, the same has to be accepted at the stage of considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11. 12. Again as pointed out by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar [(2018) 6 SCC 422 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 524], the plea regarding the date on which the plaintiffs gained knowledge of the essential facts, is crucial for deciding the question whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold. 13… 14. But a defendant in a suit cannot pick up a few sentences here and there from the plaint and contend that the plaintiffs had constructive notice of the proceedings and that therefore limitation started running from the date of constructive notice. In fact, the plea of constructive notice is raised by the respondents, after asserting positively that the plaintiffs had real knowledge as well as actual notice of the proceedings. In any case, the plea of constructive notice appears to be a subsequent invention.” - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:32198 CRP No. 420 of 2025 (iii) Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India9 “6. The central question is : whether the plaint as filed by the appellant could have been rejected by invoking Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC? 7. Indeed, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC gives ample power to the court to reject the plaint, if from the averments in the plaint, it is evident that the suit is barred by any law including the law of limitation. This position is no more res integra. We may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta [(2007) 10 SCC 59]. In paras 13 to 20, the Court observed as follows : (SCC pp. 65- 66) “13. As per Order 7 Rule 11, the plaint is liable to be rejected in the following cases: ‘(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9;’ 14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, [(2003) 1 SCC 557] it was held with reference to Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code that: ‘9. … the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power … at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage.…’ (SCC p. 560, para 9). 15. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:32198 CRP No. 420 of 2025 16. “The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful—not formal—reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise its power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, [it has to be nipped] in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC.” (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467], SCC p. 468.) 17. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982) 3 SCC 487], only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be rejected. 18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed that the averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 was applicable. 19. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr. [(2004) 3 SCC 137] this Court held thus : (SCC pp. 146-47, para 15) ‘15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities.’ 20. For our purpose, clause (d) is relevant. It makes it clear that if the plaint does not contain necessary averments relating to limitation, the same is liable to be rejected. For the said purpose, it is the duty of the person who files such an application to satisfy the court that the plaint does not disclose how the same is in time. In order to answer the said question, it is incumbent on the part of the court to verify the entire plaint. Order 7 Rule 12 mandates where a plaint is rejected, the court has to record the order to that effect with the reasons for such order.” - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:32198 CRP No. 420 of 2025 8. On the same lines, this Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust [(2012) 8 SCC 706 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612], observed as follows : (SCC pp. 713-15, paras 10-12) “10. … It is clear from the above that where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently stamped and not rectified within the time fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no other option except to reject the same. A reading of the above provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either before registering the plaint or after the issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial. 11. This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1 SCC 557], in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under : (SCC p. 560, para 9) ‘9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.’ It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the court to scrutinise the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express [(2006) 3 SCC 100]. - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:32198 CRP No. 420 of 2025 12. It is also useful to refer the judgment in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467], wherein while considering the very same provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of the trial court in considering such application, this Court has reminded the trial Judges with the following observation : (SCC p. 470, para 5) ‘5. … The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI) and must be triggered against them.’ It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and meritless and not disclosing a clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action as observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in the abovereferred decision [T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467], it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the parties under Order 10 of the Code.” 14. All these events have been reiterated in Para 28 of the plaint, dealing with the cause of action for filing of the suit. Indeed, the said para opens with the expression “the cause of action to file the suit accrued in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants when the illegal recoveries were noticed and letter dated 21-7-2000 was sent to the defendants to clarify as to how the interest was being calculated”. This averment cannot be read in isolation. …. 22. It is well-established position that the cause of action for filing a suit would consist of bundle of facts. Further, the factum of the suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed question of fact and law. Even for that reason, invoking Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is ruled out. In the present case, the assertion in the plaint is that the appellant verily believed that its claim was being processed by the regional office and the regional office would be taking appropriate decision at the earliest. That belief was shaken after receipt of letter - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:32198 CRP No. 420 of 2025 from the Senior Manager of the Bank, dated 8-5-2002 followed by another letter dated 19-9-2002 to the effect that the action taken by the Bank was in accordance with the rules and the appellant need not correspond with the Bank in that regard any further. This firm response from the respondent Bank could trigger the right of the appellant to sue the respondent Bank. Moreover, the fact that the appellant had eventually sent a legal notice on 28-11-2003 and again on 7-1-2005 and then filed the suit on 23-2-2005, is also invoked as giving rise to cause of action. Whether this plea taken by the appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law, depending on the response of the respondents.” 13. In this backdrop, the approach of the High Court in reversing the well-reasoned order of the trial Court warrants interference. The trial Court had rightly held that the issue of limitation necessitated adjudication upon evidence, particularly in view of the appellant's assertion that the Power of Attorney executed by him did not confer any authority upon his father to alienate the suit property and that the impugned transaction came to his knowledge only at a much later point in time. In such circumstances, the determination of limitation involved disputed questions of fact that could not be summarily decided without the benefit of trial. The High Court, however, proceeded to reject the plaint solely on a prima facie assumption that the suit was barred by limitation, without undertaking any examination as to whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge was demonstrably false or inherently improbable in light of the record. In the opinion of this Court, such an approach amounts to an error of law and constitutes a misapplication of the well-established principles governing the exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. For the same reasons, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents are inapplicable, being factually distinguishable. 14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has categorically averred in the plaint that he executed the registered power of attorney in favour of his father - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:32198 CRP No. 420 of 2025 solely for the limited purpose of constructing a house and carrying out related activities. There is no express clause authorizing his father to sell the suit property to any person without the appellant's consent and knowledge. Yet, the appellant's father executed a sale deed in favour of his granddaughter, going beyond the scope of the power of attorney, which raises serious doubt about misuse of authority and potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly, we are of the view that the plaint discloses a cause of action which cannot be shut out at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint and in holding that the matter ought to proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional error or perversity in the trial court's order. Rejecting the plaint where substantial factual disputes exist concerning limitation and the scope of authority under the Power of Attorney, is legally unsustainable.” (Emphasis supplied) In the afore-quoted judgment, the Apex Court holds that when the averments in the plaint depict a cause of action, such a plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold. The issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts, which can only be determined by a trial. 5. Therefore, in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court, finding no error apparent or perversity in the - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:32198 CRP No. 420 of 2025 order dated 17.03.2025, passed by the concerned Court, the petition stands rejected. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE HNM List No.: 1 Sl No.: 218