MASHROOF @ LAL SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HIS LRS v. RAFAKAT
RSA/3146/2025 · 2026-04-17
Deepak Gupta
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 764 (PNJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 764 (PNJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH **** 106 RSA-3146-2025 (O&M) Date of Decision.: 17.04.2026 Mashroof @ Lala (since deceased) thr LRs
…..Appellant Vs. Rafakat
.….Respondent
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Present:- Mr. Naresh Kumar, Advocate, Mr. Nirbhay Garg, Advocate and Mr. Ashik Ali, Advocate for the appellant. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) CM-11224-C-2025: This is an applica#on filed under Sec#on 5 of the Limita#on Act seeking condona#on of delay of 638 days in filing the present appeal.
2.
Learned counsel for the applicants-appellants submits that the first appeal came to be dismissed by the learned Addi#onal District Judge, Yamuna Nagar, vide judgment dated 25.08.2023. It is contended that the appellants were not informed by their counsel regarding the dismissal of the appeal, allegedly on account of non-availability of contact details. According to the applicants, they came to know about the dismissal only in August, 2025, wherea3er they obtained the relevant papers from their counsel and filed the present appeal. It is thus pleaded that the delay was neither deliberate nor inten#onal and deserves to be condoned in the interest of jus#ce. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the applicants and perused the record. 4. The law rela#ng to condona#on of delay is well se5led. Though a liberal approach is ordinarily adopted so as to advance substan#al jus#ce, NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.04.18 12:15 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
RSA-3146-2025 (O&M) yet such discre#on is not unbridled. The applicant must disclose a bona fide and sufficient cause explaining the delay for the en#re period. Mere negligence, inac#on or lack of due diligence cannot furnish a ground for condona#on, par#cularly where the delay is inordinate. 5. In the present case, the delay is of as many as 638 days. The only explana#on offered is that the appellants were not informed by their counsel about dismissal of the first appeal and that contact numbers were unavailable. Such plea, by itself, cannot cons#tute sufficient cause. A li#gant who ins#tutes proceedings is expected to remain vigilant and to keep track of the ma5er. It is the bounden duty of a party to remain in touch with counsel and to make reasonable enquiries regarding the status of the case. 6. No material has been placed on record to show that the appellants made any effort whatsoever to ascertain the fate of the appeal between 25.08.2023 and August, 2025. The applica#on is conspicuously silent regarding any steps taken during this prolonged period. There is thus no sa#sfactory explana#on for the con#nued inac#on extending over nearly two years. 7. The plea that the appellants suddenly enquired in August, 2025 and therea3er obtained papers from counsel appears to be vague and wholly insufficient to explain each day’s delay in a case involving such substan#al lapse of #me. Acceptance of such casual explana#on would render the law of limita#on o#ose. 8.
Limita#on provisions are founded on public policy to ensure finality in li#ga#on and to prevent stale claims from being revived a3er long and unexplained delays. Where a party has failed to act with reasonable diligence, equitable discre#on under Sec#on 5 of the Limita#on Act ought not to be exercised in its favour. 9. In view of the above circumstances, this Court is sa#sfied that the applicants have failed to disclose any sufficient cause to jus#fy Page No. 2 of 5 Pages NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.04.18 12:15 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
RSA-3146-2025 (O&M) condona#on of delay of 638 days in filing the present appeal. 10. Consequently, the applica#on under Sec#on 5 of the Limita#on Act is dismissed. As a natural corollary, the appeal, being barred by limita#on, also stands dismissed. Main case.:
11. Though the appeal has been dismissed being barred by limita#on but even if the same is considered on merits, it is found to be without any substance. 12. The defendant has preferred the present Regular Second Appeal under Sec#on 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure assailing the
judgment & decree dated 25.08.2023 passed by the learned Addi#onal District Judge, Yamuna Nagar at Jagadhri, whereby the appeal filed by the plain#ff was partly allowed and, while declining the relief of specific performance, a decree for recovery of ₹90,000/- along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit #ll realiza#on was granted in favour of the plain#ff.
13. The plain#ff ins#tuted the suit seeking decree of possession by way of specific performance of agreement to sell dated 29.10.2012 in respect of the suit property for a total sale considera#on of 1,05,000/-. It was pleaded that a sum of 70,000/- was paid as earnest money and therea3er an addi#onal amount of ₹20,000/- was paid. The defendant denied execu#on of the agreement and alleged that signatures had been obtained on blank stamp papers and later misused.
14. The learned trial Court, a3er apprecia#ng the evidence led by the par#es, dismissed the suit in en#rety. In appeal, the learned First Appellate Court re-appraised the en#re evidence and held that execu#on of the agreement & receipts stood proved, but declined the discre#onary relief of specific performance considering the nature of the property and instead granted refund of ₹90,000/- with interest. Page No. 3 of 5 Pages NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.04.18 12:15 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
RSA-3146-2025 (O&M)
15. Aggrieved therefrom, the defendant has filed the present appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that once specific performance itself was declined, no decree for refund could have been passed; that the agreement was not proved; and that the First Appellate Court erred in reversing findings of the trial Court.
16. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and examined the record, this Court finds no merit in the appeal.
17. At the outset, it deserves no#ce that the jurisdic#on of this Court in second appeal is confined to substan#al ques#ons of law. Concurrent or even reversed findings of fact, based on apprecia#on of evidence, are not to be interfered with unless shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or resul#ng from misapplica#on of se5led legal principles.
18. The learned First Appellate Court, being the final Court on
facts, has recorded a categorical finding that the defendant admi5ed his signatures on the agreement to sell and receipts. It further no#ced that the plea of fraud or misuse of blank signed papers was unsupported by cogent evidence. The witnesses examined by the defendant did not substan#ate the plea of fraud. Such findings emerge from apprecia#on of oral and documentary evidence and cannot be reopened in second appeal merely because another view may also be possible. 19. Once the Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the agreement stood proved and money had in fact passed from the plain#ff to the defendant, it was fully competent to mould the relief and grant refund, even while refusing specific performance. 20. The relief of specific performance is discre#onary. A Court may, for valid reasons, decline enforcement of sale but s#ll restore the par#es to a just posi#on by direc#ng return of money received under the contract. To permit the defendant to retain the amount a3er denial of execu#on and failure to perform would amount to unjust enrichment. Page No. 4 of 5 Pages NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.04.18 12:15 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
RSA-3146-2025 (O&M)
21. The learned First Appellate Court found that the suit property formed part of a residen#al house occupied by the defendant and his family and that specific performance would create hardship and disturbance in privacy. On that reasoning, equitable discre#on was exercised against gran#ng specific performance but in favour of res#tu#onary refund. The approach is neither illegal nor contrary to se5led principles. 22. The defendant cannot legi#mately contend that although money was received by him, he should be permi5ed to retain the same merely because specific performance was declined. Once receipt of ₹90,000/- was accepted as proved, refund naturally followed. 23. The en#re challenge raised by the appellant is directed against apprecia#on of evidence and the discre#onary grant of alterna#ve monetary relief. No ques#on of law, much less a substan#al ques#on of law, arises for determina#on under Sec#on 100 CPC. 24. Consequently, finding no illegality, perversity or jurisdic#onal error in the impugned judgment and decree dated 25.08.2023 passed by the learned Addi#onal District Judge, Yamuna Nagar at Jagadhri, the present Regular Second Appeal is dismissed. 25. The decree for recovery of ₹90,000/- along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit #ll realiza#on shall remain intact. 26.
Pending miscellaneous applica#ons, if any, shall also stand
disposed of. April 17, 2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Nee#ka Tuteja JUDGE Whether Speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether Reportable : Yes/No Page No. 5 of 5 Pages NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.04.18 12:15 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document