Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:121314 Court No. - 33 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 24036 of 2025 Petitioner :- Hadi Hasan Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Akhilesh Pandey Counsel for Respondent :- Ashish Agrawal,C.S.C. Hon'ble Prakash Padia,J. 1. Supplementary affidavit filed today is taken on record. 2. The order dated 15.07.2023 passed by the respondent no.2 namely Additional Collector/Additional District Magistrate, Fatehpur in the proceedings initiated under Section 14 of The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 is under challenge in the present case. 3. A preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Shrey Singh, learned counsel for the respondent bank that against the aforesaid order statutory alternative remedy is available to the petitioner to file an appeal before the appellate authority as per Section 17 of the Act, 2002. In this regard he also placed reliance upon paragraphs 42 to 45 and paragraph-55 of the judgement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tandon reported in 2010 (8) SCC 110, which reads as follows :- "42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No.1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression `any person' used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self- imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. ....... 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection." 4. From perusal of the record it is clear that against the order impugned statutory alternative remedy is available to the petitioner. 5. In this view of the matter, present writ petition is dismissed on the ground of statutory alternative remedy is available to the petitioner under Section 17 of the Act, 2002. Order Date :- 24.7.2025 Pramod Tripathi Digitally signed by :- PRAMOD TRIPATHI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Digitally signed by :- PRAMOD TRIPATHI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad