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2025 DAILYLAW 76000 (BOM)

SMT. MAYADEVI JAGATSINGH SALUJA AND ORS v. SHRI HARBHAJANSINGH JAGATSINGH SALUJA THROUGH POA SHRI DEVENDRASINGH HARBHAJANSINGH SALUJA

CRA/256/2015 · 2025-11-19

Shri Sandeep V Marne

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Judgment text

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k 1/5 904 cra 256.15 as.doc IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.256 OF 2015 Mayadevi Jagatsingh Saluja & Ors. ....Applicants V/S Harbhajansingh Jagatsingh Saluja ....Respondent _________ Mr. Ravindra S. Pachundkar for the Applicants. Mr. Murtaza Noorani with Mr. Azim Shaikh and Mr. Burhanuddin Noorani for Respondent. __________ CORAM : SANDEEP V. MARNE, J. DATE : 19 NOVEMBER 2025. P.C.: 1. The Applicants have invoked revisionary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the Code) for setting up a challenge to the order dated 12 March 2015 passed by 28th Joint Civil Judge Junior Division, Pune, rejecting the Application preferred by original Defendant No.3 under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code seeking rejection of plaint. Rejection of plaint was essentially sought on two grounds of (i) the suit being barred by provisions of Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (the Benami Act) and (ii) the suit being hopelessly barred by limitation on account of challenge to the sale deeds of 2006 and 2009. 2. I have heard Mr. Pachundkar, the learned counsel appearing for Applicants and Mr. Noorani, the learned counsel appearing for Respondent/Plaintiff. I have gone through the reasoning in the impugned order as well as records of the case filed alongwith the Application. katkam Page No. 1 of 5 k 2/5 904 cra 256.15 as.doc 3. So far as first ground of suit being barred under provisions of Section 4 of the Benami Act is concerned, the Trial Court has held that sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Benami Act provides that the provision does not apply when the person in whose name property is held is a coparcener. There are specific pleadings in the plaint that the suit property is a joint family property in which Plaintiff has a share. In that view of the matter, bar under provisions of Section 4 of the Benami Act would not be attracted in the present case. The Trial Court has rightly rejected the first ground. 4. Coming to the second ground of limitation, Plaintiff has challenged various transactions. The first sale deed in question was executed on 24 March 2006 by Defendant Nos.1 and 3 in favour of Defendant Nos.5 and 6. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Nos.1 and 3 did not have right to sell the suit property by ignoring the share of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff accordingly addressed notice dated 22 August 2006 questioning the validity of the sale transaction. It is the pleaded case of the Plaintiff that after receipt of notice dated 22 August 2006, Defendant Nos.5 and 6 promised to return the land by cancelling the sale deed of 24 March 2006. However, since Defendant Nos.5 and 6 failed to act on the promise, another notice dated 9 July 2008 was required to be addressed by the Plaintiff. 5. Plaintiffs further pleaded case in the plaint is that as promised by Defendant Nos.5 and 6 they did execute an instrument for return of land in the form of sale deed dated 15 December 2009 which Plaintiff describes as reverse sale deed (myV [kjsnh[kr). However, according to katkam Page No. 2 of 5 k 3/5 904 cra 256.15 as.doc Plaintiff, a fraud was committed in getting reverse sale deed executed in favour of Defendant Nos.2 and 3 instead of executing the same in the names of Defendant Nos.1 and 3. Thus while the mother (Defendant No.1) and sister-in-law (Defendant No.3) of the Plaintiff had sold the land on 24 March 2006 to Uday Lengade and Nilesh Lengade (Respondent Nos.5 and 6), the reverse sale deed was executed in the name of Defendant No.3 daughter and her husband Defendant No.2. Plaintiff has pleaded that the said transaction is contrary to the promise made to the Plaintiff for return of the land by Defendant Nos.5 and 6. It is Plaintiff’s further pleaded case that on the same day of execution of the so called reverse sale deed of 15 December 2009, Defendant Nos.2 and 3 executed further sale deeds bearing the same date of 15 December 2009 by which land admeasuring 20 R out of total land of 30 R was sold to Defendant Nos.7 and 8. By another sale deed executed on the same day, the remaining 10 R land was sold in the name of Defendant No.4. Defendant No.4 further went ahead and sold 10 R land in favour of Defendant Nos.7 and 8 on 20 October 2011. This is the broad trail of transactions that have occurred which is subject matter of challenge in the suit. 6. Mr. Pachundkar would lay emphasis on the act of Plaintiff issuing notice dated 22 August 2006 questioning validity of sale transaction dated 24 March 2006. He would submit that Plaintiff acquired knowledge of sale deed dated 24 March 2006 on 22 August 2006 and that therefore the suit lodged on 30 November 2013 is barred by provisions of Article 58 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. 7. However, the plaint contains specific pleadings that there was a promise by Defendant No.5 and 6 to reverse the transaction and to bring katkam Page No. 3 of 5 k 4/5 904 cra 256.15 as.doc back the land in the name of Defendant Nos.1 and 3 after receipt of notice dated 22 August 2006. This appears to be the reason why the Plaintiff had no occasion to file a Suit. The transaction of return of land is actually executed by Defendant Nos.5 and 6 as they have given up their ownership in the land by executing sale deed dated 15 December 2009. However, instead of executing the same in the name of Defendant Nos.1 and 3, the name of Defendant No.2-brother of the Plaintiff was replaced in place of the name of Defendant No.1-mother of the Plaintiff. This act is described by the Plaintiff in paragraph 8 of the plaint as misrepresentation and breach of promise. Plaintiff has pleaded that he has acquired knowledge of the subsequent transactions on 3 September 2013 in paragraph 14 of the plaint. 8. Considering the above position, it is difficult to hold at this juncture the suit is so hopelessly barred by limitation that the plaint therein must be rejected by having recourse to provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code. Since the Plaintiff has pleaded case of misrepresentation in getting the land transferred in the name of Defendant Nos.2 and 3 instead of Defendant Nos.1 and 3 as promised and thereafter Defendant Nos.2 and 3 immediately selling the land on the same day to different parties, in my view, Plaintiff must be given an opportunity to lead evidence to prove such promise and breach thereof. 9. Therefore, the issue of limitation, would be a mixed question of law and fact in the peculiar circumstances of the present case. The same can therefore be decided by the Trial Court after considering the evidence on record. katkam Page No. 4 of 5 k 5/5 904 cra 256.15 as.doc 10. Considering the overall conspectus of the case, in my view, it is difficult to conclude at this stage, in absence of any evidence on record, and by merely looking into the contents of the plaint and the documents annexed with the plaint that the suit is so hopelessly barred by limitation that the same must be nipped in the bud. In my view, the suit needs to be taken to trial. The learned Judge has rightly rejected the Application of the Defendant No.3 by impugned order dated 12 March 2015. The order is unexceptionable. The Civil Revision Application is devoid of merits. It is accordingly rejected. (SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.) katkam Page No. 5 of 5 SUDARSHAN RAJALINGAM KATKAM Digitally signed by SUDARSHAN RAJALINGAM KATKAM Date: 2025.11.20 20:16:45 +0530