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2025 DAILYLAW 75785 (KAR)

SMT. TARA DEVI v. SMT. CHAYA. V

WP/12389/2020 · 2025-07-23

Vijaykumar A Patil

Original Suitbody2025

Judgment text

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- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF JULY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL WRIT PETITION NO.12389/2020 (GM-CPC) BETWEEN: SMT. TARA DEVI W/O C. BHARATH KUMAR AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS R/AT NO.13, 4TH CROSS SHANKARPURAM BANGALURU-560004 REP. BY HER GPA HOLDER SRI. C. BHARATH KUMAR S/O CHANDMUL AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS R/AT. NO.13, 4TH CROSS SHANKARPURAM BANGALURU-560004 …PETITIONER (BY SRI. B.V. GANESH NAG, ADV., FOR SRI. SAPPANNAVAR BASAVARAJ SHIVAPPA, ADV.,) AND: 1. SMT. CHAYA .V W/O T. NATARAJ AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS R/AT NO.421, RMV II STAGE BANGALURU-560094. 2. INDRA BHOOMI BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS PVT LTD REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR SRI. T.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO S/O LATE K. SRINIVASA RAO AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS R/AT. NO.77/8, 2ND MAIN ROAD Digitally signed by RUPA V Location: High Court of karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 VYALIKAVAL BANGALURU-560003. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. M.S. MOHAN, ADV., FOR R2 [ABSENT] R1 SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED) THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 08.09.2020, I.A.NO.II, PASSED BY THE XXIX ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU (CCH-30) IN O.S.NO.4871/2018 AT ANNEXURE- A & ETC. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 'B' GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL ORAL ORDER This petition is filed challenging the order dated 08.09.2020 passed on I.A.No.2 by the XXIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, in O.S.No.4871/2018. 2. Heard. 3. Sri.B.V.Ganesh Nag, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has filed a suit against the respondent No.1 for the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 22.07.2016. The respondent No.1 opposed the suit by filing a written statement. The respondent No.2 filed an application for impleadment on the ground that - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 the respondent No.1 executed an agreement of sale dated 02.07.2016 in its favour. The Trial Court, ignoring the law on the point, allowed the application under the impugned order solely on the ground that the agreement of sale in favour of the respondent No.2 is prior in point of time and to avoid ambiguity and conflicting orders, respondent No.2 has been permitted to come on record. It is submitted that in a suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale, a third party cannot be allowed to be impleaded which has been held by this Court in the case of CHINNASWAMY GOWDA Vs. SHIVARAMU C.M. AND ORS.1 It is also submitted that this Court in the aforesaid case allowed the impleading application only because the proposed defendants were the title holders and in possession of the suit schedule property and the said order was passed with a condition that the proposed defendants shall put up their defence only to the extent of the prayer sought in the suit and they are not allowed to enlarge the scope of the specific performance to a suit for title or possession. Hence, he seeks to allow the petition. 1 2023 SCC OnLine Kar 1378 - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 4. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material available on record. I have given my anxious consideration to the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. The pleading and material on record indicate that the petitioner filed a suit in O.S.No.4871/2018 for the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 22.07.2016 against the respondent No.1. The respondent No.1 has taken a stand in the said suit by filing a written statement. The respondent No.2 filed an application under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking for impleadment in the said suit. The affidavit accompanying the said application indicates that the respondent No.1 executed the agreement of sale in favour of the respondent No.2 on 02.07.2016 and the said agreement entered in favour of the respondent No.2 is prior to the agreement of sale in question. It is also averred that the respondent No.1 did not disclose with regard to the execution of the agreement of sale in favour of the petitioner, to the respondent No.2. Considering the averments and the contentions, the Trial Court allowed the - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 application on the ground that the agreement referred in the plaint is a later agreement than the agreement of the proposed defendant No.2 and to avoid ambiguity in conflict of orders, the respondent No.2 was allowed to come on record. 6. It is trite law that in a suit for specific performance of the contract, the Court is required to consider, firstly, whether there exists a right to some relief against such a party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceeding and secondly whether an effective decree can be passed in the absence of such a party. In the case on hand, the agreement claimed by the respondent No.2 is a different agreement entered into between the respondent No.1 and the respondent No.2 and the subject matter of the suit is the agreement of sale entered into between the petitioner and the respondent No.1 and in the absence of the respondent No.2, a decree can be passed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of KASTURI Vs. IYYAMPERUMAL AND OTHERS2 at paragraphs 14 to 18 and 22 held as under: 2 (2005) 6 SCC 733 - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 "14. Keeping the principles as stated above in mind, let us now, on the admitted facts of this case, first consider whether Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are necessary parties or not. In our opinion, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are not necessary parties as an effective decree could be passed in their absence as they had not purchased the contracted property from the vendor after the contract was entered into. They were also not necessary parties as they would not be affected by the contract entered into between the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3. In the case of Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra [(1995) 3 SCC 147] , it has been held that since the applicant who sought for his addition is not a party to the agreement for sale, it cannot be said that in his absence, the dispute as to specific performance cannot be decided. In this case at para 9, the Supreme Court while deciding whether a person is a necessary party or not in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale made the following observation: (SCC p. 150) “Since the respondent is not a party to the agreement of sale, it cannot be said that without his presence the dispute as to specific performance cannot be determined. Therefore, he is not a necessary party.” (emphasis supplied) 15. As discussed hereinearlier, whether Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 were proper parties or not, the governing principle for deciding the question would be that the presence of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 before the court would be necessary to enable it effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. As noted hereinearlier, in a suit for - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 specific performance of a contract for sale, the issue to be decided is the enforceability of the contract entered into between the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 and whether contract was executed by the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 for sale of the contracted property, whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and whether the appellant is entitled to a decree for specific performance of a contract for sale against Respondents 2 and 3. It is an admitted position that Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 did not seek their addition in the suit on the strength of the contract in respect of which the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale has been filed. Admittedly, they based their claim on independent title and possession of the contracted property. It is, therefore, obvious as noted hereinearlier that in the event, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are added or impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale shall be enlarged from the suit for specific performance to a suit for title and possession which is not permissible in law. In the case of Vijay Pratap v. Sambhu Saran Sinha [(1996) 10 SCC 53] this Court had taken the same view which is being taken by us in this judgment as discussed above. This Court in that decision clearly held that to decide the right, title and interest in the suit property of the stranger to the contract is beyond the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract and the same cannot be turned into a regular title suit. Therefore, in our view, a third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 different character. As discussed above, in the event any decree is passed against Respondents 2 and 3 and in favour of the appellant for specific performance of the contract for sale in respect of the contracted property, the decree that would be passed in the said suit, obviously, cannot bind Respondents 1 and 4 to 11. It may also be observed that in the event, the appellant obtains a decree for specific performance of the contracted property against Respondents 2 and 3, then, the Court shall direct execution of deed of sale in favour of the appellant in the event Respondents 2 and 3 refusing to execute the deed of sale and to obtain possession of the contracted property he has to put the decree in execution. As noted hereinearlier, since Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 were not parties in the suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of the contracted property, a decree passed in such a suit shall not bind them and in that case, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would be at liberty either to obstruct execution in order to protect their possession by taking recourse to the relevant provisions of CPC, if they are available to them, or to file an independent suit for declaration of title and possession against the appellant or Respondent 3. On the other hand, if the decree is passed in favour of the appellant and sale deed is executed, the stranger to the contract being Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 have to be sued for taking possession if they are in possession of the decreetal property. 16. That apart, from a plain reading of the expression used in sub-rule (2) Order 1 Rule 10 CPC “all - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 the questions involved in the suit” it is abundantly clear that the legislature clearly meant that the controversies raised as between the parties to the litigation must be gone into only, that is to say, controversies with regard to the right which is set up and the relief claimed on one side and denied on the other and not the controversies which may arise between the plaintiff-appellant and the defendants inter se or questions between the parties to the suit and a third party. In our view, therefore, the court cannot allow adjudication of collateral matters so as to convert a suit for specific performance of contract for sale into a complicated suit for title between the plaintiff- appellant on one hand and Respondents 2 and 3 and Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 on the other. This addition, if allowed, would lead to a complicated litigation by which the trial and decision of serious questions which are totally outside the scope of the suit would have to be gone into. As the decree of a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, if passed, cannot, at all, affect the right, title and interest of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 in respect of the contracted property and in view of the detailed discussion made hereinearlier, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would not, at all, be necessary to be added in the instant suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. 17. It is difficult to conceive that while deciding the question as to who is in possession of the contracted property, it would be open to the court to decide the question of possession of a third party or a stranger as - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 first the lis to be decided is the enforceability of the contract entered into between the appellant and Respondent 3 and whether contract was executed by the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 for sale of the contracted property, whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and whether the appellant is entitled to a decree for specific performance of a contract for sale against Respondents 2 and 3. Secondly in that case, whoever asserts his independent possession of the contracted property has to be added in the suit, then this process may continue without a final decision of the suit. Apart from that, the intervener must be directly and legally interested in the answers to the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. In Amon v. Raphael Tuck and Sons Ltd. [(1956) 1 All ER 273 : (1956) 1 QB 357 : (1956) 2 WLR 372] it has been held that a person is legally interested in the answers to the controversies only if he can satisfy the court that it may lead to a result that will affect him legally. 18. That apart, there is another principle which cannot also be forgotten. The appellant, who has filed the instant suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is dominus litis and cannot be forced to add parties against whom he does not want to fight unless it is a compulsion of the rule of law, as already discussed above. For the reasons aforesaid, we are, therefore, of the view that Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are neither necessary parties nor proper parties and therefore they are not - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 entitled to be added as party-defendants in the pending suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. 22. For the reasons aforesaid, in our view, the stranger to the contract, namely, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 making claim independent and adverse to the title of Respondents 2 and 3 are neither necessary nor proper parties, and therefore, not entitled to join as party- defendants in the suit for specific performance of contract for sale." 7. This Court in the case of CHINNASWAMY GOWDA referred supra, considering the law on the point held as under: "a. If the proposed respondents are not allowed to participate in the suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance and if the said suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff it would affect the independent right claimed/asserted by the contesting respondents based on their registered sale deed which is prior to the agreement of sale would lead to multiplicity of proceedings. b. If the application for impleadment is rejected, no effective decree can be passed in favour of the plaintiff in the absence of such party as the proposed defendants are claiming that they are registered sale deed holders in possession. c. There is no dispute with regard to preposition of law that if the third party is impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance would be enlarged to - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 a suit for title and possession. It is specifically contended by the proposed defendants that the present suit is filed in collusion with an intention to deprive the rights of the title holder without making them as parties to the suit and it is further contended that on the date of execution of the agreement of sale said Sri.Mariyappa was not having any right to enter into agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff as he has sold the entire extent of the suit schedule property by forming the sites in favour of the proposed defendants. In a suit for specific performance, it is essential that there is a valid and binding contract between the parties, and the proposed defendants have specifically contended that the subject agreement of sale is invalid document entered into between the plaintiff and Sri.Mariyappa fraudulently. The prior purchasers of the property are necessary parties only to the extent of ascertaining the validity of the agreement of sale. Hence, question of enlarging the scope of suit for specific performance would not arise. d. By referring to the various proceedings that have taken place between the parties referred supra and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the contesting respondents are proper and necessary parties in a suit. e. A necessary party is a person who ought to have been made a party to the suit or proceedings and in his absence no effective decree would have been passed and if necessary party is not impleaded in the suit, the suit itself is liable to be rejected. However, a proper party is a - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 party though not a necessary party, however, his presence would enable the Court to completely and effectively adjudicate upon the lis pending before it, though he need not be a person against whom the decree is made. In the instant case, the contesting respondents may not be necessary parties but proper parties to the suit. The presence of proposed defendants would enable the Court to adjudicate the lis pending before it completely and will have complete facts and evidence before it, to arrive at a just and proper conclusion with regard to grant of relief sought by the plaintiff. The relief sought by the plaintiff is being a discretionary relief, the trial Court is required to consider the various factors before passing appropriate orders in the suit. f. On perusal of the various Sections under Chapter III of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, it emerges that prayer for specific performance is discretionary one. The Court granting decree is required to look into various aspects as to whether Sri.Mariyappa was competent to execute the agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff, and the agreement of sale dated 10.06.2016 is a valid agreement as contend by the proposed defendants, hence the proposed defendants are proper parties to the suit. The party who seeks specific performance of the contract is required to satisfy all the requirements essential for seeking the relief in equity. Hence, the proposed defendants who have purchased the suit schedule property prior to the subject sale agreement are necessary parties to the suit. - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 g. There cannot be any straight jacket formula for impleadment of the parties in the suit, it always depends on the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. This Court is conscious that the scope of suit for specific performance is very limited and it cannot be enlarged by allowing third party in to the suit proceedings. However, under the peculiar facts and circumstances and that too when a specific assertion is made by the proposed defendants that the agreement of sale is set up by the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 8 only with an intention to overcome the registered sale deeds of the proposed defendants, the proposed defendants have specifically contended that the defendant Nos.1 to 8 are not contesting the suit by filing the written statement, the said aspect requires to be taken note of appropriately. The peculiar facts and circumstances of the case leads to an inference that the defence of the proposed defendants are necessary in the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff and for complete adjudication of lis. h. The impleadment of the proposed defendants in the suit would help/aid the trial Court as to whether it should exercise and grant discretionary relief in favour of the plaintiff or not. The plaintiff being the dominus litus is required to prove his case based on the pleading and evidence. Mere allowing the proposed defendants to come on record would not enlarge the scope of the suit. The proposed defendants would be allowed to come on record upon specific terms that the proposed defendants shall putforth their defence only to the extent of prayer sought - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 in the suit and are not allowed to set up new prayer in the suit filed by the plaintiff. Hence, on the above terms the proposed defendants are permitted to come on record in the suit as defendant Nos.9 to 53. i. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kasturi supra and in the case of Gurmit Singh Bhatia referred supra, the said decisions has no application to the case on hand. In the case of Kasturi as well as in the case of Gurmit Singh Bhatia the proposed parties were the subsequent purchasers of the property in question, however, in the instant case the proposed defendants are prior purchasers of the property. The proposed defendants are allowed to come on record upon specific terms that they shall put up their defence only to the extent of prayer sought in the suit and they are not allowed to enlarge the scope of specific performance to a suit for title or possession. It is always open for the proposed defendants to work out their remedies available in law if the subject suit is decreed against them." 8. In the aforesaid observation of this Court in the aforesaid decision, it was noted that the proposed defendants in the aforesaid case were the title holders and in possession of the suit schedule property, the application for impleadment was allowed on specific terms that the proposed defendants shall put up their defence only to the extent of prayer sought in the - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 suit and they are not allowed to enlarge the scope of the specific performance to a suit for title or possession. Considering the decision of the Supreme Court and this Court, I am of the considered view that allowing the respondent No.2 to come on record would amount to enlarging the scope of the suit as the plaintiff as well as the respondent No.2 are claiming right independently on separate agreements. Hence, it is open for the respondent No.2 to independently agitate the right available under the agreement by filing a separate suit and not by impleadment. In my considered view, the Trial Court lost sight of the law on the point and allowed the application which requires interference of this Court in this petition. 9. For the aforementioned reasons, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER (i) The writ petition is allowed. (ii) The impugned order dated 08.09.2020 passed on I.A.No.2 filed under Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC by the XXIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, in - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27949 W.P. No.12389/2020 O.S.No.4871/2018 is set aside. Consequently, I.A.No.2 filed under Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC is rejected. No order as to costs. Sd/- (VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL) JUDGE RV List No.: 1 Sl No.: 41