IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No. 5209 of 2021 Date of Decision: 02.06.2025 _______________________________________________________ Prem Lal Thakur …….Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & another … Respondents ______________________________________________________ Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the Petitioner: Mr. Onkar Jairath, Advocate with Mr. Anshul Jairath and Mr. Piyush Mehta, Advocates. For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol, Mr. Vishal Panwar and Mr. B.C.Verma, Additional Advocate Generals, with Mr. Ravi Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General, Advocate ,for the respondent/State. Mr. Sarthak Mehta, Advocate, for respondent No.2. _______________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral): By way of instant petition, petitioner has prayed for following main reliefs:- “i) That a writ in the nature of mandamus of any other appropriate writ, order of direction may kindly be issued to the respondents directing them to count the services rendered by the petitioner w.e.f.14.07.2012 to 26.12.2016 as adhoc services in the regular pay scale plus all admissible allowances and grant all the consequential benefits including arrears etc. alongwith interest @ 9% per annum; 1Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 ii) That the respondents may be directed to release all consequential benefits such as arrears etc. in favour of the petitioner in a time bound manner.” 2. Precisely, the relevant facts as emerge from the pleadings adduced on record by the respective are that petitioner herein was initially appointed against the post of Assistant Architect on 11.10.1997 in the respondent-Department on a fixed monthly salary of Rs.3200/-. Before services of the petitioner could be regularized and brought on adhoc basis, FIR under Section 120-B of IPC and sections 7, 8 and 13(i)(d) read with Section 13(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act came to be lodged against him on 01.09.2006. Vide judgment dated 30.11.2009, petitioner herein came to be convicted by learned Special Judge (Forests)Shimla for his having committed offence punishable under Section 120-B of IPC and Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and accordingly, he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for six months with a fine of Rs. 2000/- alongwith one Sh. Parveen Zinta. 3. After pronouncement of aforesaid judgment, a show cause notice dated 09.03.2010 came to be served upon the petitioner stating therein that why on account of judgment of conviction rendered against him, he be not terminated. Though, petitioner by way of reply denied the allegation against him and claimed that he has filed appeal against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by 3 the trial Court in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh and as such, issue with regard to termination may be deferred. However, fact remains that vide order dated 6.4.2010(Annexure P-4), services of the petitioner were terminated on the ground that reply submitted by him cannot be accepted as Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 14.12.2009 has only suspended the sentence imposed by the trial Court, but not the conviction. Vide judgment dated 19.10.2011 appeal filed by the petitioner against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by Court below came to be allowed, as a result thereof, he came to be acquitted of the charges framed against him under the relevant provision of law, as detailed hereinabove. After passing of aforesaid judgment, petitioner made a representation stating therein that since his conviction has been set-aside, he may be reinstated alongwith consequential benefits. However, fact remains that no action was taken upon his representation and as such, he was again compelled to approach this Court by way of CWP No. 248 of 2012, titled Prem Lal Thakur vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and another, which came to be disposed of, with a direction to the respondent/competent authority to consider and decide the representation of the petitioner within a period of six weeks. 4. Though, pursuant to representation filed by the petitioner, respondents vide order dated 24.07.2012 re-engaged him, but on 4 contract basis afresh as Architect Assistant on the terms and conditions contained therein. Petitioner being not satisfied with aforesaid fresh appointment on contract basis, filed representation (Annexure P-11) to respondent No.2-Council, but no response was ever received and as such, petitioner again approached erstwhile H.P. Administrative tribunal by way of T.A. No.5606 of 2015. During the pendency of aforesaid case, respondent No.2 issued letter dated 27.10.2016 (Annexure P-12) stating therein that petitioner shall be given appointment on adhoc basis, if the case filed by him before the erstwhile Tribunal is withdrawn. In the aforesaid background, petitioner withdrew his transfer application on17.11.2016 with liberty to approach this Court on the same cause of action, if need so arises. On 13.09.2018, respondent-Council issued a letter dated 13.09.2018 stating therein that the petitioner has been given adhoc appointment to the post of Architect Assistant w.e.f.09.12.2016, whereas the petitioner was claiming the same w.e.f.24.07.2012 i.e. the day he was reengaged pursuant to his conviction being set aside by this Court. 5. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Onkar Jairath, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that since petitioner was exonerated vide order dated 19.10.2011 passed by this Court, he should have been offered adhoc appointment w.e.f. 24.07.2012 on a 5 day he was reengaged pursuant to judgment of acquittal recorded by this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that though respondent-Council vide communication dated 8.9.2018 ordered reengagement of the petitioner on adhoc basis w.e.f.9.12.2016 alongwith consequential benefits, but fact remains that till date, no consequential benefits have been released. 6. While placing reliance upon the judgment rendered by Division Bench of this Court in LPA No.699 of 2011, titled Manjit Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, learned counsel for the petitioner states that by now it is well settled that once incumbent is honourably acquitted by competent court of law, he is entitled to be reinstated from the date, he was terminated that too alongwith consequential benefits. 7. Mr. Sarthak Mehta, learned counsel representing respondent No.2-Council, while referring to the reply filed by the respondent-Council states that Council had recommended the case of the petitioner to the Government of Himachal Pradesh for adhoc appointment against the post of Architect Assistant w.e.f.14.07.2012, on which date, he was reengaged pursuant to his acquittal by this Court, but since such proposal was rejected, there was no occasion for the Council to grant the relief, as prayed for. He further submitted that as per advise of Department of Personnel, there is no provision of 6 rule/instruction etc. in the department of Personnel to convert a contractual appointee after completing a prescribed length of service as such into an adhoc appointee, rather as per prevailing policy of the Government the contractual appointees are regularized after rendering a particular length of service as on specific cutoff date subject to fulfillment of other terms and condition laid down. However, learned counsel representing respondent No.2 was unable to dispute that similar situate persons, who were initially appointed alongwith the petitioner against the post of Architect Assistant were also working on adhoc basis prior to their regularization. In the instant case, petitioner after his having completed requisite years of service was also regularized and now he stands retired. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 9. It is not in dispute that petitioner, who was initially charge sheeted under Section 120-B of IPC and Sections 7, 8 and 13(i)(d) read with Section 13(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was firstly convicted and sentenced by the learned Special Judge (Forests) Shimla vide judgment dated 30.11.2009, but subsequently aforesaid judgment of conviction was set aside by this Court vide judgment dated 19.10.2011. Taking note of aforesaid acquittal of the petitioner, though respondent No.2-Council, while considering the representation 7 filed by the petitioner, recommended his case to the government for his reinstatement as Architect Assistant on adhoc basis w.e.f. 26.7.2012, on which date, he was reengaged pursuant to his acquittal, but interestingly petitioner was reinstated to the post of Architect Assistant on adhoc basis w.e.f. 9.12.2016 that too without grant of any consequential benefits w.e.f.26.7.2012. 10. By now it is well settled that an employee after his/her being acquitted in a criminal case is entitled to be reinstated in service from the date, he was terminated that too alongwith consequential benefits. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgment dated 31.08.2023 passed by Division Bench of this Court in Manjit Singh case(supra), wherein Division Bench of this Court having taken note of various judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court held that dismissal of the petitioner was only on the ground of his conviction by the Criminal Court, and once the said conviction was set aside by the judgment of the High Court, judgment of trial Court convicting him would merge in the judgment of the High Court and appellant has to be taken as innocent all through and once Department itself drops disciplinary proceedings pursuant to acquittal of employee, he/she cannot denied salary allowances for the period, he was compelled to remain out of the job on account his suspension and termination. 8 11. At this stage, it would be profitable to reproduce paras No.2 to 17 of aforesaid judgment herein below:- “2. The appellant was involved in a criminal case, and on 04.06.1995, consequent upon registration of F.I.R. against him under Sections 302/392, 120-B of Indian Penal Code read with Sections 25/54/59 of the Arms Act, he was immediately placed under suspension. 3. In the Sessions Court he was initially convicted. 4. On the basis of the said conviction, he was dismissed from service on 26.11.1997. 5. He challenged this conviction in the High Court, which acquitted him on 14.05.1999. 6. Thereafter, he was reinstated into service on 04.05.2000. The disciplinary proceedings were also dropped. 7. The learned Single Judge has granted him full salary for the period 04.06.1995, when he was placed under suspension, till 26.11.1997, when he was dismissed from service, but denied him full salary for the period from 26.11.1997 to 04.05.2000, i.e. the date of his dismissal from the date of his reinstatement, probably on the view that since he had not worked, he is not entitled to the same. 8. Though the Three Judge Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Brahma Chandra Gupta vs. Union of India (1984)2 SCC 433 was cited and referred to by the learned Single Judge, in which it was held that on acquittal an employee is entitled to be reinstated and he ought to get full salary, still the learned Single Judge did not grant the same. 9. Counsel for the appellant seeks to contend that apart from the said judgment, the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Others vs. Shambhu Nath Singla and Others (1996)1 SCC 296, has also granted full salary and allowances for the period during which the employee was kept under suspension. 9 10. Counsel for the respondents, however, placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore vs. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and Another (1996)11SCC 603 , to contend that the appellant is not entitled to back wages for the entire period from 26.11.1997 up to 04.05.2005. 11. No doubt, in the said judgment back wages were denied, but it was observed that each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop, and the judgment in Brahma Chandra Gupta’s case (supra-1), was not taken note of though the said judgment is rendered by Three Judge Bench. 12. The fact remains that the dismissal of the petitioner was only on the ground of his conviction by the Criminal Court, and once the said conviction was set-aside by the judgment of the High Court rendered on 14.05.1999, the judgment of the trial Court convicting him would merge in the judgment of the High Court and the appellant has to be taken as innocent all through. Once the Department had itself dropped the disciplinary proceedings post his acquittal, he cannot be denied salary and allowances for the period 26.11.1997 to 04.05.2000. 13. Therefore, even if the appellant had not worked for the period 26.11.1997 to 04.05.2000, it has to be taken that he was innocent and he was prevented from working for this period and, therefore, he would be entitled to full salary and allowances for the said period as well. 14. Our view is fortified by not only the judgment of the Supreme Court in Brahma Chandra Gupta’s case ( supra) wherein, the Supreme Court held that full amount of salary should be paid to the employee who had been dismissed from service on the ground that he was convicted by the trial Court, when he is subsequently reinstated when he was acquitted by the appellate Court in the criminal court. 15. Similar view is also taken in Shambhu Nath Singla and Others ( Supra). 10 16. In Raj Narain v. Union of India and others (2019)5 SCC 809 , the Supreme Court held:- “7. The point that remains to be considered is whether the Appellant is entitled to payment of full wages between 1979 and 1987. The Appellant was placed under suspension on 23.10.1979 and his suspension was revoked on 21.10.1987. An interesting development took place during the interregnum by which the disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21.03.1983. It is clear from the record that the Appellant was the one who was seeking postponement of the departmental inquiry in view of the pendency of criminal case. The order of suspension was in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the Appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental inquiry. Thereafter, the Respondents took four years to reinstate him by revoking his suspension. The order of suspension dated 23.10.1979 came to an end on 21.03.1983 which is the date on which disciplinary proceedings were dropped. The Appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial which did not happen. Ultimately, the Appellant was reinstated by an order dated 21.10.1987 by revocation of the order of suspension. Though, technically, the learned Additional Solicitor General is right in submitting that the impugned judgment does not even refer to the I.A., we are not inclined to remit the matter to the High Court at this stage for fresh consideration of this point. We hold that the Appellant is entitled for full wages from 23.10.1979 to 21.10.1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance.” 17. No doubt, in the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Jaipal Singh5 and in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore ( Supra) cited by the Additional Advocate General, back wages were denied, but from the said decisions, it is clear that the earlier judgments in Brahma Chandra Gupta’s case ( 1 supra) and Shambhu Nath Singla and Others( supra), were not noticed. 11 18. In this view of the matter, the appeal is allowed following the decisions in Brahma Chandra Gupta’s case (supra) and Shambhu Nath Singla and Others( supra) and Raj Narain ( Supra); the order of the learned Single Judge in so far as he denied full salary and allowances to the petitioner for the period 26.11.1997 to 04.05.2000, is set aside; and it is held that the appellant is entitled to full salary and allowances for the said period as well, which shall be paid to him within three months. If not, the appellant shall be paid interest @ 9% per annum. 12. Since it is not in dispute that after having taken note of factual aspect of the matter and law on point, that respondent- Council itself recommended to State of Himachal Pradesh for appointment of the petitioner on adhoc basis w.e.f. 26.07.2012, on which date he was reinstated, prayer made on behalf of the petitioner for grant of relief, as prayed for in the instant petition, deserves to be allowed. 13. Consequently, in view of the above, the present petition is allowed with a direction to the respondents to count the services rendered by the petitioner w.e.f.14.07.2012 to 26.12.2016 as adhoc services in the regular pay scale plus all admissible allowances and grant all the consequential benefits including arrears alongwith interest at the rate of 6% per annum within a period of four months, failing which, petitioner shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% per annum instead of 6%. Pending applications, if any, also stands disposed of. (Sandeep Sharma), Judge June 02, 2025 12 (shankar)