62-APP-78-2010(F).DOCX Amol IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION APPEAL NO. 78 OF 2010 IN COURT RECEIVER REPORT NO. 111 OF 2009 IN SUIT NO. 2538 OF 1997 M/s Parelkar & Dallas, Architects … Appellant Versus Blossom Industries Limited And Ors. … Respondents ______________________________________________________ Ms. Kalyani Deshmukh i/b FZB & Associates, for Appellant. Mr. Ziyad Madon a/w Mr. Shehzad A.K. Najam-es-sani i/b Maneksha & Sethna Advocates, for Respondent No.1. Mr. Nitin C. Pawar, Court Receiver, High Court Bombay, is present. ______________________________________________________ CORAM : M.S. Sonak & Advait M. Sethna, JJ. DATED : 04 December 2025 ORAL ORDER:- (Per M. S. Sonak, J) 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. This Appeal the challenges order dated July 09, 2009, by which the Court Receiver’s Report No. 111 of 2009 in Suit No. 2538 of 1997 was disposed of with a direction for payment of Rs.25,000/- to the panel valuer i.e. the Appellant herein. Page 1 of 5 AMOL PREMNATH JADHAV Digitally signed by AMOL PREMNATH JADHAV Date: 2025.12.09 10:07:50 +0530 62-APP-78-2010(F).DOCX 3. The Appellant, aggrieved by the impugned order, has instituted this Appeal seeking payment of Rs. 5,21,171/- for the valuation undertaken by the Appellant and preparation of the valuation report. 4. Ms. Kalyani Deshmukh i/b FZB & Associates submitted that in this case the 1999 Guidelines ought to apply because the Court Receiver was appointed in the year 2000. Without prejudice she submitted that even under the 1999 Guidelines, there was always a discretion vested in the Court to order payments over and above those set out in the Guidelines. 5. Ms. Deshmukh further submitted that in this case there was no dispute ever raised by any of the parties regarding the valuation. She submitted that the valuation report was accepted, and based thereon, orders were also made. She submitted that the dispute was raised for the first time after the Appellant submitted its bill for Rs. 5,21,171/- for the valuation work and preparation of the valuation report. 6. Ms Deshmukh also submitted that, under the 1999 Guidelines, the fees payable to the Appellant would amount to Rs. 10,14,382.75/-. However, in deference to the 1994 Guidelines and commensurate with the work undertaken by the Appellant, the Appellant had raised a bill for only Rs. 5,21,171/-. She submitted that there was no good reason to deny this amount to the Appellant. 7. For the above two reasons, Ms Deshmukh submitted that the impugned order dated July 09, 2009, warrants 62-APP-78-2010(F).DOCX interference and the Appeal Court should issue directions for directing the payment of Rs. 5,21,171/- to the Appellant. 8. Mr Madon, the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent, defended the impugned order based on the reasoning reflected therein. He pointed out that the Receiver in this case was appointed in the year 1997. He submitted that at the time the Appellant undertook the valuation work, the Guidelines of 1994 were in force, under which a maximum of Rs. 25,000/- could be paid. He pointed out several glaring errors in the valuation report, which the learned Single Judge noted in the order dated July 25, 2008. For all these reasons, Mr Madon submitted that there was no case for allowing this Appeal for awarding the Appellant any additional charges. 9. The rival contentions now fall for our determination. 10. In the first place, the record shows that the Court Receiver was appointed in 1997 and not in 2000. Secondly, even the works carried out by the Appellant were completed before the 1999 Guidelines entered into force. Merely because the Appellant submitted their bills after the 1999 Guidelines entered into force, we cannot hold that the 1999 Guidelines should be made applicable in this matter. 11. However, we note that even under the 1994 Guidelines, though it was provided that the maximum payment that could be made to a valuer is Rs. 5,000/-, still a discretion was vested in the Court to sanction a higher amount, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 62-APP-78-2010(F).DOCX 12. In this case, the learned Single Judge, after taking cognisance of the relevant provision, has declined to exercise discretion and award a higher amount for cogent and pertinent reasons. The exercise of discretion warrants no interference in the facts and circumstances of this case. 13. The learned Single Judge noted that the Report dated February 27, 1999, prepared by the Appellant, purported to be an inventory and valuation of plant and machinery. Despite the settled position that plant and machinery embedded in the ground do not constitute movable property, the report erroneously proceeded on the basis that they constituted movable property. 14. The learned Single Judge has noted that the valuation of the individual items was carried out perfunctorily and only a consolidated valuation of Rs. 18 crores was indicated. 15. The learned Single Judge has also taken cognisance of the order made by yet another Single Judge [Vazifdar J, as his Lordship then was] in the context of the very same valuation report. In short, even this learned Single Judge found the report not up to the mark. 16. Therefore, although the learned Single Judge had the power and authority to award an amount higher than that prescribed under the 1994 Guidelines, such discretionary power was not exercised based upon cogent reasons. Such exercise of discretion calls for no interference in the Appeal. Even otherwise, the parameters of review against 62-APP-78-2010(F).DOCX discretionary orders are well settled. None of the parameters can be said to have been fulfilled in this matter. 17. Upon an independent review of the record, we also find that the Appellant’s claim was not proportionate to the efforts made. Nonetheless, the maximum sum allowable under the relevant guidelines was approved for payment. Although the Court may have discretionary power to award a higher amount in a particular case for compelling reasons, we concur with the Learned Single Judge that this was not such a case. 18. Therefore, we dismiss this Appeal without order for costs. (Advait M. Sethna, J.) (M.S. Sonak, J.)