IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. CMPMO No.112 of 2025 Decided on: 02.09.2025 ____________________________________________________ Rakesh Khanna ……….. petitioner Versus Vijaya Shakti Gupta ……….respondent ____________________________________________________ Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the petitioner : Mr. R.K. Gautam, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Jai Ram Sharma, Advocate. For the respondent : Ms. Devyani Sharma, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Sanjeev Sood and Vivek Thakur, Advocate. ____________________________________________________ Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral) The present petition has been preferred against the impugned order dated 13.11.2024 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Dharamshala in case No. 24/2015 titled as Vijay Shakti vs. Rakesh Khanna, whereby an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC by the present petitioner (defendant) has been rejected. 2. Heard counsel for the petitioner. Perused the impugned order and the documents appended alongwith the present petition. 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 3. Brief facts giving rise to the case at hand are that the present respondent (plaintiff) had filed a suit for possession on termination of tenancy by issuance of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the same has been done as the suit property was located within the territorial jurisdiction of Gram Panchayat Khanyara. During the pendency of the aforesaid suit in the year 2015, Gram Panchayat Khanyara came within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Corporation, Dharamshala. In view of the aforesaid, the premises came within the purview of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1997 (for purpose of brevity referred to as the Act). 4. Hence, in the aforesaid backdrop, an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was preferred by the present petitioner (defendant). The aforesaid application so filed was vehemently contested by the present respondent (plaintiff). The trial Court was of the view that rights inter se the parties stood crystallized on the date of filing of the suit. Therefore, according to the trial Court, the mere fact that during the pendency of the pending lis inter se the parties, the area of the Gram Panchayat Khanyara came within the purview of the Municipal Corporation, Dharamshala would be of no consequence. The jurisdiction of the trial Court to decide the Civil Suit as per the Trial Court on account of the aforesaid development was not affected. 3 5. At the very outset, it would be appropriate to refer to certain provisions of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act (for purpose of brevity referred to as the Act). The expression tenant has been defined in the Act in Section 2(j). Relevant extract whereof reads as follows:- 2(j) “tenant” means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a residential or non-residential building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after termination of tenancy--------------- 6. Other than the aforesaid, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant extract of Section 14 of the Act which reads as follow:- Eviction of Tenants-(1)” A tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise, whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 7. The issue qua Civil Court ceasing to have jurisdiction to try a suit for possession, if the property came under the purview of the Rent Act was considered in 2017 (4) SCC 202 titled as Rajender Bansal and others vs. Bhuru (dead) through legal representatives and others. The following principles, were culled out therein:- 18.1 Rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the law applicable on the date of filing of the suit will continue to apply until the suit is disposed of or adjudicated. 4 18.2. If during the pendency of the suit, the Rent Act becomes applicable to the premises in question, that would be of no consequence and it would not take away the jurisdiction of the civil Court to dispose of a suit validly instituted. 18.3. In order to oust the jurisdiction of the civil court, there must be a specific provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of those cases also which were validly instituted before the date when protection of the Rent Act became available in respect of the said area/premises/ tenancy. 18.4. In case the aforesaid position is not accepted and the protection of the Rent Act is extended even in respect of suit validly instituted prior in point of time when there was no such protection under the Act, it will have the consequence of making the decree, that is obtained prior to the Rent Act becoming applicable to the said area/premises, un-executable after the application of these acts in respect of such premises. This would not be in consonance with the legislative intent. 8. An exception to the aforesaid principles culled out was enunciated in para 22 thereof, the same reads as follows:- “22. A significant questing would be as to how we need to read judgments in Mani Subrat and Laxmi Narayan Guin cases, the outcome whereof went in other direction. However, when we understand the ratio of the aforesaid two cases appropriately, we find no contradiction between these two cases and other line of cases like Atma Ram Mittal, etc. discussed above. Insofar as the judgments in Mani Subrat Jain and Laxmi Narayan Guin are concerned, these were rendered keeping in view the definition of “tenant” appearing in the rent legislations therein, namely, the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. What was found is that definition of “tenant” in those enactments included even an ex-tenant. This coupled with the fact that there was specific provision laying down that a tenant will not evicted even in execution of a decree passed either before or after the commencement of the enactment, except in accordance with the provisions contained in the Rent Act, impelled the Court to take the view that the moment the Rent Act became applicable to the area in question, the tenant or even ex tenant stood protected and could be evicted only under the said Rent Acts. Therefore, the principles which we have culled out above 5 in para 18 would be subject to one exception. In case definition of “tenant” and provisions pertaining to eviction of tenants contained in the Rent Acts cover even those cases where the tenancy has been terminated (or depending upon the provisos of the Rent Act, even when the civil court has passed the decree) the protection provided under such provision would come to the rescue of the tenant even in respect of pending cases. It is because of the reason that such a Rent Act specifically provides for protection of this nature and bars the jurisdiction of the civil Court even in respect of pending cases. On the other hand, where there is no such specific protection given under the provisions of the said Rent Act, the principle as laid down in Mansoor Khan will be applicable”. 9. The exception culled out in Rajender Bansal’s case (supra) was based on a judgment passed by the Apex Court in case reported as (1980) 1 SCC 1 titled as Mani Subrat Jain vs. Raja Ram Vohra. The provisions being considered in Mani Subrat Jain’s case i.e. the definition of tenant and provisions pertaining to eviction of tenants were para materia as in the case at hand. Hence, in view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement delivered by the Apex Court, I am of the considered view that the case at hand is squarely covered by the exception carved out in Rajender Bansal’s case. In other words, despite bringing the disputed premises within the purview of the Rent Act during the pendency of the civil suit inter se the parties, the civil proceedings can continue and can be taken to their logical conclusion but the decree so passed would not be executable to the extent the Rent Act gives protection. 6 10. Meaning thereby that if the Civil Court passes a decree for payment of rent/mesne profits/damages and also a decree for possession, it is only the decree for possession which is un-executable but the decree for payment of rent/mesne profits/damages is executable in accordance with law (See 2009 (2) SLC 448 (DB) titled as Sunit Kumar vs. Laxmi Chand. 11. In view thereof, the present petition is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any also stand disposed of. Parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 17th September, 2025. (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge September 02, 2025 tarun