-1- 2025:CGHC:2213 NAFR HIGH COURT of CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 1850 of 2018 Leena Shree Barman W/o Vidya Bhushan Barman Aged About 32 Years R/o Village Kutrabod Tahsil Pamgarh District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1- State of Chhattisgarh, Through Its Secretary, Panchayat And Rural Development Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi, Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2- Commissioner Cum Director, Directorate of Panchayat Naya Raipur, Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3- Chief Executive officer, Zila Panchayat, Janjgir Champa District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh. 4- Manjulata Maheshwari, Lecturer (Panchayat), Government Higher Secondary School, Badripat Block Malkharoda District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Ms. Zainab Vanak, Advocate, holding the brief of Mr. Mateen Siddiqui, Advocate For Respondents No.1 & 2/ State : Mr. Shubham Bajpai, Panel Lawyer For Respondent No.3 : Mr. Arpit Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent No.4 : Mr. Ankur Biswas, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 14.01.2025 1) The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE -2- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may Kindly be pleased to quash the appointment order dated 13.12.2017 (P/1) of respondent No. 4 Manjulata Maheshwari issued by the CEO, Zila Panchayat Janjgir-Champa. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authority to consider the candidature of the petitioner for appointment on the post of Lecturer (Panchayat) Biology Subject. 10.3 The Hon'ble Court may kindly grant any other writ/ writs, order/ orders, relief/ reliefs in favour of the petitioner, which the Hon'ble Court deemed fit & just in the facts and circumstances of the case, including awarding of the costs to the petitioner.” 2) Brief facts of the present case are as under:- A. An advertisement was issued for the post of Lecturer (Panchayat) by the Chief Executive Officer, Janjgir-Champa on 24.07.2017 for a total of 134 posts of various subjects including 13 posts of Lecturer (Biology) wherein, 1 post was reserved for the Scheduled Caste (Female). Last date for the submission of the application was 10.08.2017. The required qualification for the said post was Post Graduation degree and B.Ed. B. The petitioner, respondent No.4 and other eligible candidates submitted their application form for the post of Lecturer (Panchayat) under the reserved category SC (Female). C. The written examination was conducted according to the advertisement dated 27.08.2017. The result of the written examination was declared and the petitioner was placed at serial No.1 in the merit list, whereas, respondent No.4 was placed at serial No. 4. Thereafter, All the candidates were invited for document verification by respondent No.3. D. According to the advertisement, the cut off date to acquire the required eligibility qualification was 24.07.2017. The petitioner submitted her B.Ed. Mark-sheet after 24.07.2017, therefore, her name was reflected in the list of ineligible candidates in the absence of B.Ed. -3- degree/diploma/certificate. E. Annexure R/1-2/2 would reveal that the name of the petitioner was at serial No. 1, whereas, the name of respondent No.4 was at serial No.4. During the scrutiny, it was found that the petitioner acquired her B.Ed. after the cut off date i.e. 24.07.2017, therefore, her name was not considered and respondent No. 4 was selected and an appointment order was issued vide Annexure P/1 on 15.12.2017. F. The petitioner has challenged the appointment order issued in favour of respondent No.4 on the ground that the petitioner was meritorious, she was at serial No. 1 in the merit list and she has passed B.Ed. prior to 24.07.2017. 3) Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would argue that the petitioner secured 40.404 marks in the written examination of the Lecturer (Biology) and she was placed at serial No.1 of the merit list of SC (Female) but respondent No.4, who was at serial No.4 in the same merit list, was offered appointment. She would further submit that the petitioner passed her B.Ed examination in March- April-2017 prior to 24.07.2017; thus, she had the requisite qualifications of B.Ed, but the original mark-sheet was not available as it was supplied after 24.07.2017 and that cannot be a ground to reject the candidature of the petitioner. She would further argue that as per the circular/clarification issued by the Directorate of Panchayat on 20.11.2017, wherein it was stated that if a candidate has already passed B.Ed. or other required qualification prior to 24.07.2017 and submits such certificate/degree/diploma after the cut off date, the candidature would not be rejected. She would also submit that the circular dated 20.11.2017 was followed by various Zila Panchayats of the State. She would contend that -4- the respondent authorities committed an error of law in rejecting the candidature of the petitioner while not considering her name for appointment. In support thereof, she placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Charles K. Skaria and others v. Dr. C. Mathew and others and other connected matters, (1980) 2 SCC 752 and Dolly Chandra v. Chairman, JEE and others, (2005) 9 SCC 779. 4) On the other hand, learned counsels appearing for the respondents would submit that in the aforesaid advertisement dated 24.07.2017, it was specifically stated that candidates would be eligible only if they possess the required qualifications as on 24.07.2017. With regard to the circular dated 20.11.2017, it is submitted that exemptions have been granted to similarly situated candidates in different districts. As per the circular, the candidates who did not possess B.Ed. qualification would be considered at the time of submission of the application form and priority would be given to candidates who submitted their B.Ed. certificates after 24.07.2017 only after exhausting the entire list. 5) It is further contended that the name of the petitioner was rejected by the respondent authorities as prior to the cut-off date, she did not have the B.Ed. qualification and she submitted her B.Ed. mark sheet only after 24.07.2017, and this fact has not been disputed by the petitioner. It is submitted that there was only one post for SC (female), and respondent No. 4 had B.Ed. qualification on the cut-off date, therefore, there was no occasion for the respondents to issue an appointment order in favor of the petitioner. They contend that though the -5- petitioner’s name was at serial No. 1 in the merit list, but her name was not considered after scrutiny in the absence of the requisite qualification; thus, respondent No. 4 was offered the appointment. They also argue that respondent No. 4 has been working on the post of Lecturer (Panchayat) since 13.12.2017; thus, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 6) Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents. 7) Admittedly, there was a specific condition mentioned in the advertisement that candidates should meet the required qualifications as on 24.07.2017, and the required qualifications for the post of Lecturer (Panchayat) were post-graduation and B.Ed. The petitioner passed the B.Ed. examination, and the B.Ed. certificate was issued to her on 28.07.2017. However, as per the advertisement, candidates should have the required eligibility as on 24.07.2017. Meaning thereby, the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualifications on the cut-off date i.e. 24.07.2017. The petitioner participated in the written examination and was declared successful. However, during the scrutiny of the documents, it was found that the petitioner did not meet the requisite qualifications as on 24.07.2017. Therefore, while preparing the merit list, though the name of the petitioner was placed at serial No. 1, but was not offered the appointment. A circular dated 20.11.2017 was issued after the completion of the recruitment process. According to this circular, priority would be given to candidates who submitted their B.Ed. certificates after 24.07.2017 only after exhausting the entire list. 8) In the present case, there was only one post of Lecturer (Panchayat) in the SC -6- (Female) category, and respondent No. 4 was already offered the appointment and thereafter, she has joined her services too. Therefore, there was no occasion for the respondent authorities to offer the appointment to the petitioner. 9) Reliance placed by counsel for the petitioner in the matter of Charles K. Skaria (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the fact of attaining the particular qualification can be communicated to the select Committee before the selection process, the selection committee may also enquire and confirm it and on this ground, the candidature cannot be rejected. The relevant para 20 & 24 are reproduced as under:- “20. There is nothing unreasonable nor arbitrary in adding 10 marks for holders of a diploma. But to earn this extra 10 marks, the diploma must be obtained at least on or before the last date for application, not later. Proof of having obtained a diploma is different from the factum of having got it. Has the candidate, in fact, secured a diploma before the final date of application for admission to the degree course ? That is the primary question. It is prudent to produce evidence of the diploma along with the application, but that is secondary. Relaxation of the date on the first is illegal, not so on the second. Academic excellence, through a diploma for which extra mark is granted, cannot be denuded because proof is produced only later, yet before the date of actual selection. The emphasis is on the diploma, the proof thereof subserves the factum of possession of the diploma and is not an independent factor. The prospectus does say: (4)(b) : 10% to Diploma holders in the selection of candidates to M.S., and M.D., courses in the respective subjects or sub- specialities. 13. Certificates to be produced :- In all cases true copies of the following documents have to be produced:- xx xx xx (k) Any other certificates required along with the application. This composite statement cannot be read formalistic fashion. Mode of proof is geared to the goal of the qualification in question. It is subversive of sound interpretation and realistic decoding of the prescription to telescope the two and make both mandatory in -7- point of time. What is essential in the possession of a diploma before the given date; what is ancillary is the safe mode of proof of the qualification. To confuse between fact and its proof is blurred perspicacity. To make mandatory the date of acquiring the additional qualification before the last date for application makes sense. But if it is unshakeably shown that the qualification has been acquired before the relevant date, as is the case here, to invalidate this merit factor because proof, though indubitable, was adduced a few days later but before the selection or in a manner not mentioned in the prospectus, but still above board, is to make procedure not the hand made but the mistress and form not as subservient to substance but as superior to the essence. 24. It is notorious that this formalistic, ritualistic, approach is unrealistic and is unwittingly traumatic, unjust and subversive of the purpose of the exercise. This way of viewing problems dehumanises the administrative, judicial and even legislative processes in the wider perspective of law for man and not man for law. Much of hardship and harassment in Administration flows from over-emphasis on the external rather than the essential. We think the government and the selection committee rightly treated as directory (not mandatory) the mode of proving the holding of diplomas and an mandatory the actual possession of the diploma. In actual life, we know how exasperatingly dilatory it is to get copies of degrees, decrees and deeds, not to speak of other authenticated documents like mark-lists from universities, why, even bail orders from courts and government orders from public offices. This frustrating delay was by-passed by the State Government in the present case by two steps. Government informed the selection committee that even if they got proof of marks only after the last date for applications but before the date for selections they could be taken note of and secondly the Registrars of the Universities informed officially which of the candidates had passed in the diploma course. The selection committee did not violate any mandatory rule nor act arbitrarily by accepting and acting upon these steps. Had there been anything dubious, shady or unfair about the procedure or any mala fide move in the official exercises we would never have tolerated deviations. But a prospectus is not scripture and commonsense is not inimical to interpreting and applying the guidelines therein. Once this position is plain the addition of special marks was basic justice to proficiency measured by marks.” 10) The matter of Charles K. Skaria (supra), was a case pertaining to admission to a University. The candidate, though he had passed/acquired the required qualification before the last date and the same was communicated to the University, got his candidature rejected. Consequently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the application. However, in the present case, the B.Ed. mark sheet was -8- issued to the petitioner on 28.07.2017, whereas, according to the advertisement, candidates were required to acquire the necessary qualification on or before 24.07.2017. Therefore, the facts of the present case are different from those of the cited case. 11) In the matter of Dolly Chhanda (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has discussed the issue of the date on which the qualification is possessed and the last date fixed to acquire such qualification and submission of proof of the same before the authority. In para-7 & 8, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “7. The general rule is that while applying for any course of study or a post, a person must possess the eligibility qualification on the last date fixed for such purpose either in the admission brochure or in application form, as the case may be, unless there is an express provision to the contrary. There can be no relaxation in this regard i.e. in the matter of holding the requisite eligibility qualification by the date fixed. This has to be established by producing the necessary certificates, degrees or marksheets. Similarly, in order to avail of the benefit of reservation or weightage etc. necessary certificates have to be produced. These are documents in the nature of proof of holding of particular qualification or percentage of marks secured or entitlement for benefit of reservation. Depending upon the facts of a case, there can be some relaxation in the matter of submission of proof and it will not be proper to apply any rigid principle as it pertains in the domain of procedure. Every infraction of the rule relating to submission of proof need not necessarily result in rejection of candidature. 8. This principle was explained and applied in Charles K. Skaria & Ors. v. Dr. C. Mathew & Ors.1980 (2) SCC 752. The controversy here related to admission to a post graduate course in medicine. The relevant rule provided for addition of 10% marks if a candidate possessed a diploma in the relevant subject or sub-specialty and this benefit could be given only if the candidate's success in the diploma course was brought to the knowledge of the Selection Committee before completion of selection in an authentic or acceptable manner. The Prospectus provided that the attested copies of statement of marks and other documents should be attached with every application. Three such candidates were given admission who had not attached the certificate of having passed the diploma along with their applications. Their admission to post -9- graduate course was set aside by the High Court on the ground that their applications, wherein they claimed the benefit of diploma, were liable to be rejected as the requisite certificates had not been attached. This Court speaking through Krishna Iyer, J. reversed the judgment of the High Court and held that the admission to the candidates had rightly been given as they had in fact passed the diploma before the date fixed. The relevant parts of paras 20 and 24 of the judgment, where this principle was highlighted are being reproduced below : "20. There is nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in adding 10 marks for holders of a diploma. But to earn these extra 10 marks, the diploma must be obtained at least on or before the last date for application, not later. Proof of having obtained a diploma is different from the factum of having got it. Has the candidate, in fact, secured a diploma before the final date of application for admission to the degree course ? That is the primary question. It is prudent to produce evidence of the diploma along with the application, but that is secondary. Relaxation of the date on the first is illegal, not so on the second. Academic excellence, through a diploma for which extra mark is granted, cannot be denuded because proof is produced only later, yet before the date of actual selection. The emphasis is on the diploma; the proof thereof subserves the factum of possession of the diploma and is not an independent factor. … Mode of proof is geared to the goal of the qualification in question. It is subversive of sound interpretation and realistic decoding of the prescription to telescope the two and make both mandatory in point of time. What is essential is the possession of a diploma before the given date; what is ancillary is the safe mode of proof of the qualification. To confuse between a fact and its proof is blurred perspicacity. To make mandatory the date of acquiring the additional qualification before the last date for application makes sense. But if it is unshakeably shown that the qualification has been acquired before the relevant date, as is the case here, to invalidate this merit factor because proof, though indubitable, was adduced a few days later but before the selection or in a manner not mentioned in the prospectus, but still above-board, is to make procedure not the handmaid but the mistress and form not as subservient to substance but as superior to the essence. -10- * * * 24. It is notorious that this formalistic, ritualistic, approach is unrealistic and is unwittingly traumatic, unjust and subversive of the purpose of the exercise. This way of viewing problems dehumanizes the administrative, judicial and even legislative processes in the wider perspective of law for man and not man for law. Much of hardship and harassment in administration flows from over-emphasis on the external rather than the essential. We think the government and the selection committee rightly treated as directory (not mandatory) the mode of proving the holding of diplomas and as mandatory the actual possession of the diploma. In actual life, we know how exasperatingly dilatory it is to get copies of degrees, decrees and deeds, not to speak of other authenticated documents like mark-lists from universities, why, even bail orders from courts and government orders from public offices" 12) The above cited judgment was a case with regard to the admission to the JEE Course in the year 2003. 13) In the present case, there was one post reserved for SC (Female) category and the cut-off date was 24.07.2017 to acquire the required qualifications, but on the cut-off date, the petitioner did not have the requisite qualifications, therefore, her candidature was not considered. Respondent No.4 was appointed on 13.07.2017; she is still working on the same post and after long 8 years, it would be injustice and improper to cancel her appointment. 14) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Buddhi Nath Chaudhary vs. Abahi Kumar and Others, (2001) 3 SCC 328, held that if a candidate has been working on a post for more than 10 years, such a person should not be disturbed on account of some mistake. Even though the appointments were held to be improper, this Court did not disturb the appointments on the ground that the incumbents had worked for several years and had gained experience and observed as under:- “6. The selected candidates, who have been appointed, are now in employment as Motor Vehicle Inspectors for over a decade. Now that they have worked in such posts for a long time, necessarily they would have acquired the requisite experience. -11- Lack of experience, if any, at the time of recruitment is made good now. Therefore, the new exercise ordered by the High Court will only lead to anomalous results. Since we are disposing of these matters on equitable consideration, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents submitted that their cases for appointment should also be considered. It is not clear whether there is any vacancy for the post of Motor Vehicle Inspectors. If that is so, unless any one or more of the selected candidates are displaced, the cases of the contesting respondents cannot be considered. We think that such adjustment is not feasible for practical reasons. We have extended equitable considerations to such selected candidates who have worked in the post for a long period, but the contesting respondents do not come in that class. The effect of our conclusion is that appointments made long back pursuant to a selection need not be disturbed. Such a view can be derived from several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Ram Sarup vs. State of Haryana & Ors.; 1979 (1) SCC 168; District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram & Anr. vs. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, 1990 (3) SCC 655; and H.C.Puttaswamy & Ors. vs. The Honble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court, Bangalore & Ors., 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 421. Therefore, we must let the matters lie where they are.” Thus, it is clear that those who failed to fulfill the qualification at the time of their joining, now they had worked in such posts for a long time, necessarily they would have acquired the requisite experience.” 15) Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and the law, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the order of appointment issued in favor of respondent No. 4. Accordingly, the present petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost. 16) Pending IAs stand disposed of. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Nadim