- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34485-DB WP No. 9154 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 1ST DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND WRIT PETITION No. 9154 OF 2025 (S-KSAT) BETWEEN: 1. THE REGISTRAR, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA, M.S. BUILDING, BANGALORE-560 001 2. THE ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR OF ENQUIRIES -11, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA, M.S.BUILDING, BANGALORE - 560 001. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI MADHU KIRAN JAGGA, ADVOCATE FOR SRI JOSEPH ANTHONY, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY REVENUE DEPARTMENT, M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU-560 001. 2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, HARAPANAHALLI SUB DIVISION, HARAPANAHALLI, DAVANAGERE DISTRICT-583 131. Digitally signed by VALLI MARIMUTHU Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34485-DB WP No. 9154 of 2025 3. MR. M.R. NAGARAJU, S/O. LATE RAMANNA, AGED 50 YEARS, WORKING AS TAHSILDAR GRADE-1 AT BHADRAVATHI, R/AT BHADRAVATHI, SHIVAMOGGA-577 301. 4. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER DAVANAGERE - 577 001 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI V. SHIVAREDDY, AGA FOR R1, R2 & R4) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 11TH 2020 BY THE HON'BLE KSAT IN APPLICATION No.315/2018, ANNEXURE-A. THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND ORAL ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V. ARAVIND) Heard Sri Madhu Kiran Jagga, learned counsel for Joseph Anthony; learned counsel for the petitioners – Karnataka Lokayukta; and Sri V. Shivareddy, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondents 1, 2 and 4. - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34485-DB WP No. 9154 of 2025 2. The Registrar, Karnataka Lokayukta, is before this Court assailing the order dated 11.09.2020 passed in Application No.315/2018 by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, Bengaluru (for short, ‘the Tribunal’). 3. Respondent No.3 filed an application before the Tribunal challenging the order dated 04.09.2017, whereby the State, in exercise of its power under Rule 14-A of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 (for short, ‘the KCS (CCA) Rules, 1957’), entrusted the investigation to the petitioner–Lokayukta, as also the order appointing the Enquiry Officer and the Articles of Charge. 4. One Sri Karadi Sannabadakappa, S/o Karadi Nanjappa, resident of Yellapura Village, Gourihalli Post, Harapanahalli Taluk, Davanagere District, filed a complaint against respondent No.3 alleging irregularities in passing orders relating to revenue entries. The petitioner submitted a report under Section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (for short, ‘the 1984 Act’), recommending initiation of departmental enquiry against respondent No.3 and entrustment of the enquiry to the petitioner. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34485-DB WP No. 9154 of 2025 nominated an Enquiry Officer on 23.09.2017, and the Articles of Charge were issued on 27.12.2017. 5. Respondent No.3, in the application before the Tribunal, contended that no misconduct had been committed and that the enquiry was without any basis. The Tribunal, under the impugned order dated 11.09.2020, held that the Lokayukta and the Government had initiated the enquiry without proper application of mind to the provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of entrustment, the appointment of the Enquiry Officer, and the Articles of Charge. 6. Sri Madhu Kiran Jagga, learned counsel for Sri Joseph Anthony, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the preliminary enquiry culminating in a report under Section 12(3) of the 1984 Act disclosed prima facie material against respondent No.3. Based on the said report, the State Government entrusted the enquiry to the petitioner–Institution, pursuant to which Articles of Charge were issued. It is contended that the interjection by the Tribunal at this stage is - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34485-DB WP No. 9154 of 2025 premature, as respondent No.3 would have full opportunity to put forth his defence in the course of the enquiry. 7. Sri V. Shivareddy, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4, submits that the State Government, upon examining the report of the petitioner under Section 12(3) of the 1984 Act, entrusted the investigation under Rule 14-A of the KCS (CCA) Rules, 1957 after due application of mind. 8. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Additional Government Advocate, it is noticeable that the complaint was filed alleging irregularities in effecting change of names in the Katha certificate by respondent No.3 without notice to the complainant. Respondent No.3 submitted a detailed reply. However, the petitioner proceeded to recommend initiation of departmental enquiry, pursuant to which the State Government entrusted the enquiry to the petitioner. The Tribunal thereafter recorded a finding that neither the Lokayukta nor the Government had applied their mind to the issue with reference - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34485-DB WP No. 9154 of 2025 to the provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, and consequently set aside the enquiry proceedings. 9. Be that as it may, the order of the Tribunal is dated 11.09.2020, whereas the present writ petition came to be filed on 24.03.2025, nearly after a lapse of 4½ years. No explanation is offered in the pleadings for the delay in approaching this Court. Though there is no prescribed period of limitation for filing a writ petition, the remedy is required to be invoked within a reasonable time. A delay of 4½ years is too long to be construed as a reasonable period. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others [2024 SCC OnLine SC 551], while examining the question of what constitutes a reasonable period for invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, has, at paragraphs 9 to 13, held as follows: “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34485-DB WP No. 9154 of 2025 considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34485-DB WP No. 9154 of 2025 invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34485-DB WP No. 9154 of 2025 Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34485-DB WP No. 9154 of 2025 or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34485-DB WP No. 9154 of 2025 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution- makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34485-DB WP No. 9154 of 2025 13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 11. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, and in the absence of any explanation for the delay, the present writ petition is clearly barred by delay and laches. To a specific query of the Court, learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to offer any satisfactory explanation for the delay. - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34485-DB WP No. 9154 of 2025 12. One more added reason for not to entertain this petition is, the entrustment order by the State is set aside now by Tribunal. The State has chosen not to contest the setting aside of the entrustment order. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, we are not inclined to entertain this petition on the ground of delay and laches. As the petition is being rejected on the ground of delay, we have not gone into the merits of the matter. Accordingly, the writ petition stands rejected. Sd/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (K. V. ARAVIND) JUDGE MV List No.: 1 Sl No.: 18