- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39172-DB WP No. 27386 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND WRIT PETITION NO. 27386 OF 2024 (S-KSAT) BETWEEN: 1. SRI DASAPPA AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, S/O. LATE NARAYANASWAMY, WORKING AS SDA, HIGH SCHOOL SECTION GOVERNMENT P.U. COLLEGE, SARAGUR, H.D. KOTE TALUK MYSORE DISTRICT - 571 121, R/AT NO.250, 2ND CROSS, UDBOOR, JAYAPURA HOBLI, MYSORE TALUK AND DISTRICT - 571 127. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. BASAVARAJA PATEL G.K., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY THE SECRETARY, (EDUCATION DEPT.) M.S. BUILDING BENGALURU - 560 001. Digitally signed by VALLI MARIMUTHU Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39172-DB WP No. 27386 of 2024 2. THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS, NEW PUBLIC OFFICE, NRUPATUNGA ROAD, BENGALURU - 560 001. 3. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS, MYSORE DISTRICT, MYSORE - 570 001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. V. SHIVAREDDY, ADVOCATE) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE RECORDS RELATING TO THE IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED BY THE KSAT AT BENGALURU DATED 16.12.2020 MADE IN APPLN. No.731/2017 VIDE ANNEXURE-A PERUSE AND QUASH THE SAID ORDER AS ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND ALLOW THE APPLN. No.731/2017 THEREIN AND ISSUE WRIT IN THE NATURE OF MANDAMUS, MANDAMUS DIRECTING THE RESPONDENTS TO PROMOTE THE PETITIONER TO THE NEXT HIGHER CADRE OF SDA w.e.f THE DATE ON WHICH THE PETITIONER COMPLETES 7 YEARS OF SERVICE AS GROUP D EMPLOYEE, ON PAR WITH THAT OF HIS JUNIORS IN THE OTHER DISTRICT WITH ALL CONSEQUENTIAL MONETARY BENEFITS AND ETC,. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39172-DB WP No. 27386 of 2024 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND ORAL ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND) Heard Sri Basavaraja Patel G.K., learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri V. Shivareddy, learned Additional Government Advocate for the respondent-State. 2. The applicant in Application No.731 of 2017 is before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order dated 16.12.2020 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal at Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’). 3. The petitioner was initially appointed to the Group- D post on 28.05.1999 and subsequently became eligible for promotion to the next higher cadre of SDA. Upon completion of the requisite number of years in Group-D, the petitioner submitted a representation seeking promotion to the post of SDA. In 2009, the petitioner, along with other similarly placed employees, filed an application before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by its order dated 07.07.2009, directed the concerned - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39172-DB WP No. 27386 of 2024 authority to consider the representation. The petitioner was promoted to the post of SDA on 14.03.2011. Respondent No.2 thereafter published the date-wise seniority list of SDAs. 3.1 The petitioner submitted a representation seeking retrospective promotion immediately upon completion of seven years in Group-D. By an endorsement dated 12.10.2012, respondent No.2 rejected the representation. Challenging the said endorsement, the petitioner, along with similarly situated persons, approached the Tribunal in Application Nos.7516-7527 of 2012, which were dismissed. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.58341 of 2016 before this Court, which was disposed of on 28.11.2016, with a direction to respondent No.3 to consider the representation afresh. 3.2 In compliance with the directions of this Court, and upon consideration of the representation, an endorsement was issued on 02.01.2017 rejecting the request. Aggrieved by the endorsement, the petitioner filed Application No.731 of 2017 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by the impugned order dated 16.12.2020, dismissed the application. - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39172-DB WP No. 27386 of 2024 4. Sri Basavaraj Patel G.K., learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner, being eligible for promotion to the post of SDA, should have been promoted on the date of his eligibility, as vacancies existed. He further submits that where the delay in promotion is not attributable to the petitioner, such delay should not deprive him of his right to promotion from the date of eligibility. The Tribunal, without taking note of the fact that juniors to the petitioner in the Group-D cadre have been promoted, committed an error in rejecting the application. 5. Sri V. Shivareddy, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondents, submits that the petitioner does not have a vested right to promotion, he only has a right to be considered for promotion, and such right does not survive in view of the promotion granted with effect from 17.03.2011. He further submits that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 6. On consideration of the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present petition on the ground of delay and laches without - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39172-DB WP No. 27386 of 2024 further examination of the merits of the case. The order of the Tribunal is dated 16.12.2020, whereas the writ petition was filed on 28.09.2024, nearly three years and nine months thereafter. The pleadings in the writ petition do not offer any explanation for the delay, and learned counsel for the petitioner has not furnished any acceptable justification. Although there is no prescribed limitation for filing a writ petition, the exercise of such right cannot be indefinite. The right must be exercised within a reasonable time, and a period exceeding three and a half years cannot be regarded as reasonable. 6.1 The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others (2024 SCC OnLine SC 551), has considered the question of delay in approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Paragraphs 9 to 13 of the judgment are extracted as follows: “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39172-DB WP No. 27386 of 2024 period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39172-DB WP No. 27386 of 2024 such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39172-DB WP No. 27386 of 2024 [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39172-DB WP No. 27386 of 2024 the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39172-DB WP No. 27386 of 2024 injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39172-DB WP No. 27386 of 2024 effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third- party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39172-DB WP No. 27386 of 2024 Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 7. In the light of the above factual aspects and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mrinmoy Maity (supra), we find no justification to entertain this petition after an inordinate delay of more than three and a half years. 8. There is no error or illegality found in the order of the Tribunal. No demonstrable ground is made out to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. 9. The petition is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. Sd/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (K. V. ARAVIND) JUDGE DDU List No.: 1 Sl No.: 19