- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF JULY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION NO. 11676 OF 2025 (GM-CPC) BETWEEN: SRI. KODANDARAM P., S/O LATE S.A.PILLAIAH AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, R/AT NO.27, 10TH MAIN SRINAGARA, BSK 1ST STAGE BENGALURU - 560 050. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. SHESHADRI H.S., ADVOCATE) AND: SMT. LATE NINGAMMA W/O LATE SRI. HONNEGOWDA DEAD BY HER LR'S 1. SMT. CHIKKATHAYAMMA D/O SRI. LATE M. HONNEGOWDA AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS 2. SMT. RATHNAMMA W/O SRI. LATE KRISHNEGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS 3. M.K. KUMAR S/O SRI. LATE KRISHNEGOWDA AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS Digitally signed by NAGAVENI Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 4. RAJESHWARI, W/O M.K. KUMAR, AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, 5. M.K. MONISHA, AGED ABOUT 17 YEARS REPRESENTED BY HER FATHER SRI. M.K. KUMAR 6. M.K. ASHOK, S/O LATE KRISHNEGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS 7. SMT. MANJULA, W/O M.K. ASHOK, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, 8. SMT. M.K. KRUPA, D/O LATE KRISHNEGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS 9. SMT. SHANTHAMMA, D/O LATE SRI. HONNEGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS, 10. M.H. RAMACHANDREGOWDA, S/O LATE SRI. HONNEGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS, 11. M.R. VINOD, S/O M.H. RAMACHANDREGOWDA AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS, - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 12. M.R. VIDHYASHREE, D/O M.H. RAMACHANDREGOWDA AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS, 13. SMT. RENUKA W/O M.H. RAMACHANDREGOWDA AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS 14. SHREYAS W/O M.H. RAMACHANDREGOWDA AGED ABOUT 19 YEARS RESPONDENTS NO.1 TO 14 ARE ALL RESIDING AT MATHIKERE VILLAGE, MALUR HOBLI, CHANNAPATNA TALUK - 562 160, RAMANAGARAM DISTRICT. …RESPONDENTS THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED ORDER DTD 22.01.2025 PASSED IN F.R NO. O.S /10/2025 BY THE PRL. CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, AT CHANNAPATNA (ANNX-A) AND CONDONE THE DELAY ON ANY TERMS THOUGHT REASONABLE BY THIS COURT AND ETC. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER Heard Sri. Sheshadri H.S., learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and have perused the material on record. 2. The petitioner is before this Court calling in question an order of the concerned Court, which declines to even register the suit and dismiss the suit at the FR stage. The reason rendered by the concerned Court is that the petitioner is wanting to register a suit for specific performance and the Agreement of Sale according to the concerned Court is of the year 2021 and therefore, it is beyond limitation of 3 years and the suit cannot be permitted to be registered. The reason so rendered by the concerned Court is as follows: "The present suit is filed on 08.01.2025, for the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale dated 04.02.2011. On perusal of the plaint averments it depicts that, the Late Ningamma was executed the registered sale deed dated 04.02.2011, for total sale consideration of Rs.3,04,000/-. The defendant Nos.1 to 14 are the legal - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 heirs of late Ningamma. The defendants have put their signature to the sale agreement dated 04.02.2011 as consenting witnesses. It is averred in the plaint that, on 30.01.2021 the defendants were issued legal notice stating that they refusing to execute the sale deed in pursuance of agreement and called the plaintiff to cancel the sale agreement. To the said notice, this plaintiff has issued reply on 09.07.2021 calling the defendants to fix the date for registration. To the said notice the defendants were not respond and therefore, the plaintiff has issued another notice dated 06.09.2021 calling the defendants to execute the regular sale deed. However, the defendants failed to comply the terms of sale agreement dated 04.02.2011. It is further averred in the plaint that there is no time limit to execute the sale deed. According to the plaintiff the cause of action arose on 04.02.2011, when the agreement was executed along with GPA, on 09.07.2021 and 06.09.2021 when the legal notice was issued by the plaintiff to the defendants. The limitation for filing a suit for specific performance, as per Article 54 of the Schedule to The Limitation Act, is 3 years 'from the date fixed for performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that the performance is refused. In this case the plaintiff has knowledge regarding refusal to execute the sale deed on 30.01.2021, when the defendants were issued legal notice stating to cancel the sale agreement. This would be the actual date to count for limitation to file this suit. This plaintiff even after issuing the notice dated 06.09.2021 to the defendants, he has not come forward to file the suit within three years ie., on or before 06.09.2024. As such this suit is barred by limitation. The plaintiff has filed the IA under Section 5 of Limitation Act, to condone the delay of 370 days in filing this suit. It is worth to note that the said provision is not applies to the - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 suit. Accordingly, the said IA itself is not maintainable. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ghewarchand vs. Mahendra Singh, (2018) 10 SCC 588, it was observed that when deciding upon the question of limitation, it is mainly required to see the plaint allegations and how the plaintiff has pleaded the accrual of cause of action for filing of the suit. Apropos limitation, this Court observed, in Basawaraj vs. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 as under: '12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated. unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. "605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.-The courts have expressed at least three differing - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence." An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property vs. SBI Staff Assn. ((2005) 7 SCC 510), Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705: AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448: (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 9071.)' In view of the above discussion I find no grounds to register this case and ordered to issue summons to the defendants. Accordingly, I decline to register this case." (emphasis supplied) 3. The reason on the face of it is untenable, as the concerned Court follows the judgment of the Apex Court, which is not even applicable to the fact situation. 4. The ground of limitation is projected by the concerned Court to reject registration of the suit. The said ground is a mixed question of law and fact albeit sometimes which can discern any other registration of suit. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 5. The Apex Court in the case of P KUMARAKURUBARAN v. P NARAYANAN1, has held as follows: "12.1. However, we are of the considered view that the issue as to whether the appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the transaction at an earlier point of time, or whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are matters that necessarily require appreciation of evidence. At this preliminary stage, the averments made in the plaint must be taken at their face value and assumed to be true. Once the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily. It becomes a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead evidence, is legally unsustainable. 12.2. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the following decisions of this Court, which have consistently held that when the question of limitation involves disputed facts or hinges on the date of knowledge, such issues cannot be decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC: (i) Daliben Valjibhai v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai “10. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the defendants made an application for correcting the revenue records only in the year 2017 and on the said application the Deputy Collector issued notice to the plaintiffs in March 2017 and that was the time when the plaintiffs came to know about the execution of the sale deed. It is under these circumstances that the suit was instituted in the year 2017. While the High Court came to the correct conclusion that under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, a suit can be instituted within 3 years of the knowledge, it proceeded to return a finding that in cases where 1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 975 - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 the document is registered, the knowledge must be presumed from the date of registration. 11. 12. Further, in Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar where again a suit for cancellation of sale deed was opposed through an application under Order 7 Rule 11, on ground of limitation, this Court specifically held that limitation in all such cases will arise from date of knowledge. The relevant portion is as follows: “15. What is relevant for answering the matter in issue in the context of the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, is to examine the averments in the plaint. The plaint is required to be read as a whole. The defence available to the defendants or the plea taken by them in the written statement or any application filed by them, cannot be the basis to decide the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d). Only the averments in the plaint are germane. It is common ground that the registered sale deed is dated 18-10-1996. The limitation to challenge the registered sale deed ordinarily would start running from the date on which the sale deed was registered. However, the specific case of the appellant-plaintiffs is that until 2013 they had no knowledge whatsoever regarding execution of such sale deed by their brothers, original Defendants 1 and 2, in favour of Jaikrishnabhai Prabhudas Thakkar or Defendants 3 to 6. They acquired that knowledge on 26-12-2012 and immediately took steps to obtain a certified copy of the registered sale deed and on receipt thereof they realised the fraud played on them by their brothers concerning the ancestral property and two days prior to the filing of the suit, had approached their brothers (original Defendants 1 and 2) calling upon them to stop interfering with their possession and to partition the property and provide exclusive possession of half (½) portion of the land so designated towards their share. However, when they realised that the original Defendants 1 and 2 would not pay any heed to their request, they had no other option but to approach the court of law and filed the subject suit within two days therefrom. According to the appellants, the suit has been filed within time after acquiring the knowledge about the execution of the registered sale deed. In this context, the trial court opined that it was a triable issue and declined to accept the application filed by Respondent 1-Defendant 5 for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). That view commends to us. … 19. In the present case, we find that the appellant-plaintiffs have asserted that the suit was filed immediately after getting knowledge about the fraudulent sale deed executed by original - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 Defendants 1 and 2 by keeping them in the dark about such execution and within two days from the refusal by the original Defendants 1 and 2 to refrain from obstructing the peaceful enjoyment of use and possession of the ancestral property of the appellants. We affirm the view taken by the trial court that the issue regarding the suit being barred by limitation in the facts of the present case, is a triable issue and for which reason the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold in exercise of the power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.” (emphasis supplied) 13. In view of the above, there was no justification for the High Court in allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 11, on issues that were not evident from the plaint averments itself. The High Court was also not justified in holding that the limitation period commences from the date of registration itself. In this view of the matter the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable.” (ii) Salim D. Agboatwala v. Shamalji Oddhavji Thakkar “11. As observed by this Court in P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy [(2015) 8 SCC 331 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 100], the rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 is a drastic power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action at the threshold. Therefore, the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power are stringent and it is especially so when rejection of plaint is sought on the ground of limitation. When a plaintiff claims that he gained knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action only at a particular point of time, the same has to be accepted at the stage of considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11. 12. Again as pointed out by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar [(2018) 6 SCC 422 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 524], the plea regarding the date on which the plaintiffs gained knowledge of the essential facts, is crucial for deciding the question whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold. 13… 14. But a defendant in a suit cannot pick up a few sentences here and there from the plaint and contend that the plaintiffs had constructive notice of the proceedings and that therefore limitation started running from the date of constructive notice. In fact, the plea of constructive notice is raised by the respondents, after asserting positively that the plaintiffs had real knowledge as well as actual notice of the proceedings. In any case, the plea of constructive notice appears to be a subsequent invention.” - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 (iii) Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India “6. The central question is : whether the plaint as filed by the appellant could have been rejected by invoking Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC? 7. Indeed, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC gives ample power to the court to reject the plaint, if from the averments in the plaint, it is evident that the suit is barred by any law including the law of limitation. This position is no more res integra. We may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta [(2007) 10 SCC 59]. In paras 13 to 20, the Court observed as follows : (SCC pp. 65-66) “13. As per Order 7 Rule 11, the plaint is liable to be rejected in the following cases: ‘(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9;’ 14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, [(2003) 1 SCC 557] it was held with reference to Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code that: ‘9. … the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power … at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage.…’ (SCC p. 560, para 9). 15. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. 16. “The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful—not formal—reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise its power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, [it has to be nipped] in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC.” (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467], SCC p. 468.) 17. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982) 3 SCC 487], only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be rejected. 18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed that the averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 was applicable. 19. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr. [(2004) 3 SCC 137] this Court held thus : (SCC pp. 146-47, para 15) ‘15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair- splitting technicalities.’ 20. For our purpose, clause (d) is relevant. It makes it clear that if the plaint does not contain necessary averments relating to limitation, the same is liable to be rejected. For the said purpose, it is the duty of the person who files such an application to satisfy the court that the plaint does not disclose how the same is in time. In order to answer the said question, it is incumbent on the part of the court to verify the entire plaint. Order 7 Rule 12 mandates where a plaint is rejected, - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 the court has to record the order to that effect with the reasons for such order.” 8. On the same lines, this Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust [(2012) 8 SCC 706 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612], observed as follows : (SCC pp. 713-15, paras 10-12) “10. … It is clear from the above that where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently stamped and not rectified within the time fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no other option except to reject the same. A reading of the above provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either before registering the plaint or after the issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial. 11. This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1 SCC 557], in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under : (SCC p. 560, para 9) ‘9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.’ It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the court to scrutinise the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co. - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express [(2006) 3 SCC 100]. 12. It is also useful to refer the judgment in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467], wherein while considering the very same provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of the trial court in considering such application, this Court has reminded the trial Judges with the following observation : (SCC p. 470, para 5) ‘5. … The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI) and must be triggered against them.’ It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and meritless and not disclosing a clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action as observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in the abovereferred decision [T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467], it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the parties under Order 10 of the Code.” 14. All these events have been reiterated in Para 28 of the plaint, dealing with the cause of action for filing of the suit. Indeed, the said para opens with the expression “the cause of action to file the suit accrued in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants when the illegal recoveries were noticed and letter dated 21-7-2000 was sent to the defendants to clarify as to how the interest was being calculated”. This averment cannot be read in isolation. …. 22. It is well-established position that the cause of action for filing a suit would consist of bundle of facts. Further, the factum of the suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed question of fact and law. Even for that reason, invoking Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is ruled out. In the present case, the assertion in the plaint is that the appellant verily believed that its claim was being processed by the regional office and the regional office would be taking appropriate decision at the earliest. That belief was shaken after receipt of letter from the - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 Senior Manager of the Bank, dated 8-5-2002 followed by another letter dated 19-9-2002 to the effect that the action taken by the Bank was in accordance with the rules and the appellant need not correspond with the Bank in that regard any further. This firm response from the respondent Bank could trigger the right of the appellant to sue the respondent Bank. Moreover, the fact that the appellant had eventually sent a legal notice on 28-11-2003 and again on 7-1-2005 and then filed the suit on 23-2-2005, is also invoked as giving rise to cause of action. Whether this plea taken by the appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law, depending on the response of the respondents.” 13. In this backdrop, the approach of the High Court in reversing the well-reasoned order of the trial Court warrants interference. The trial Court had rightly held that the issue of limitation necessitated adjudication upon evidence, particularly in view of the appellant's assertion that the Power of Attorney executed by him did not confer any authority upon his father to alienate the suit property and that the impugned transaction came to his knowledge only at a much later point in time. In such circumstances, the determination of limitation involved disputed questions of fact that could not be summarily decided without the benefit of trial. The High Court, however, proceeded to reject the plaint solely on a prima facie assumption that the suit was barred by limitation, without undertaking any examination as to whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge was demonstrably false or inherently improbable in light of the record. In the opinion of this Court, such an approach amounts to an error of law and constitutes a misapplication of the well-established principles governing the exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. For the same reasons, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents are inapplicable, being factually distinguishable. 14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has categorically averred in the plaint that he executed the registered power of attorney in favour of his father solely for the limited purpose of constructing a house and carrying out related activities. There is no express clause authorizing his father to sell the suit property to any person without the appellant's consent and knowledge. Yet, the appellant's father executed a sale deed in favour - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 of his granddaughter, going beyond the scope of the power of attorney, which raises serious doubt about misuse of authority and potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly, we are of the view that the plaint discloses a cause of action which cannot be shut out at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint and in holding that the matter ought to proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional error or perversity in the trial court's order. Rejecting the plaint where substantial factual disputes exist concerning limitation and the scope of authority under the Power of Attorney, is legally unsustainable." 6. Therefore, the issue which is a mixed question of law and fact, cannot be rejected, at the threshold. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) The petition is allowed. (ii) The order dated 22.01.2025 passed in F.R.No.O.S.No.10/2025 by the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Channapatna, stands quashed. - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27171 WP No. 11676 of 2025 (iii) The concerned Court is directed to register the suit and regulate its procedure, thereafter. Ordered accordingly. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE SJK List No.: 1 Sl No.: 10 CT: BHK