ORDER : 1. In this batch of writ petitions, the petitioners herein have questioned the constitutional validity of notification dated 14-6-2021, whereby the Chhattisgarh Secretariat Service Recruitment Rules, 2012 (for short ‘the Rules of 2012’) have been amended inserting Bachelor’s Degree as qualification for appointment by promotion to the posts of Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary and Section Officer in serial Nos.1, 2, 3 and 7 of Schedule-IV, in addition to the requisite experience. All the posts with respect to which the challenge has been made, are 100% promotional posts. 2. Since common question of law and fact is involved in this batch of writ petitions, they have been clubbed together, heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 3. The sole petitioner in WPS No.5528/2021 namely, Hardeo Ram Sahu retired from service and similarly, petitioner No.3 Tirth Prasad Ladiya, petitioner No.4 Anwarursheed Khan, petitioner No.12 Smt. Emerensia Xess and petitioner No.13 Janak Kumar in WPS No.829/2022 retired from service, during the pendency of writ petitions. Similarly, petitioner No.9 Ravindra Kumar Barsagade and petitioner No.10 Krishna Kumar Sharma in WPS No.6913/2021 retired from service during the pendency of writ petition. Facts in Brief 4. Challenge to the amended rule has been made on the ground that amendment in the rule introducing the prescription of qualification of Bachelor’s Degree for the promotional posts is unreasonable, unfair and violative of their constitutional rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, as it is the case of the petitioners that the respondent State has not given any explanation in the counter-affidavit filed before this Court as to what is the need/requirement of adding the additional educational qualification of Bachelor’s Degree for the promotional posts of Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary and Section Officer. It is the case of the petitioners that it was the duty of the State to assign reason to bring any amendment in the rules and it must reflect reasonable, fair and not grossly unjust, however, in the present case, no such reason has been mentioned which is unreasonable and unfair on the part of the State and as such, violative of the petitioners’ rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is the further case of the petitioners that the aforesaid amendment has been made only in Schedule-IV of the Rules of 2012 and no amendment has been made in the substantive provision of Rule 14 of the Rules of 2012 which deals with Conditions of Eligibility for Promotion and introduction of educational qualification of Bachelor’s Degree is totally unnecessary, as they are working for fairly long time on the feeder post and some of them had already retired from service. 5. The State of Chhattisgarh has filed return stating inter alia that it is purely the prerogative of the State Government to amend the rules regulating promotion and rules can be altered by the State Government unilaterally, the petitioners have no vested right of promotion, mere chance of promotion is not a condition of service and the petitioners have no enforceable right to challenge the rule by which the educational qualification of Bachelor’s Degree has been prescribed for promotion to higher posts as it is full of responsibility considering the nature of work performed by the promotees. Educational qualification of Bachelor’s Degree has been added for the aforesaid posts which is the minimum qualification and which cannot be termed as arbitrary, as prescription of educational qualification to the aforesaid posts by no stretch of imagination can be termed as illegal and contrary to law. It is further submitted that in various Departments of the State of Chhattisgarh, minimum requirement to the post of Under Secretary for appointment on the post is graduation and in order to rectify the discrepancy, such an amendment has been made which is strictly in accordance with law. As such, the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. 6. Rejoinder has been filed on behalf of the petitioners controverting the allegations made in the return. Submissions on behalf of the Parties 7. Mr. Y.C. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in WPS Nos.5528/2021 & 829/2022, would submit as under:- 1. Schedule-IV of the Rules of 2012 by which the impugned amendment has been made introducing Bachelor’s Degree as educational qualification for promotion to the posts of Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary and Section Officer is unjust and improper apart from being unfair and unreasonable and is also violative of their fundamental right enshrined in Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. 2. 2. The State has failed to justify the need of adding Bachelor’s Degree to the educational qualification for the aforesaid posts, as no attempt has been made in the affidavit to show that the nature of work on the said posts was such that it would require higher qualification. 3. The aforesaid amendment has been made in the Schedule without amending the substantive provision of Rule 14 of the Rules of 2012 which deals with Conditions of Eligibility for Promotion. 4. Introduction of educational qualification i.e. Bachelor’s Degree for promotional posts was totally unnecessary, as the petitioners were efficiently performing duties on the respective posts since long. 5. Non-consideration of the claim of the petitioners for promotion violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, would rely upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of State of U.P. and another v. Ram Gopal Shukla , (1981) 3 SCC 1 , Budhan Choudhry and others v. State of Bihar , (1954) 2 SCC 791, Food Corporation of India and others v. Om Prakash Sharma and others , (1998) 7 SCC 676 , Maharashtra Forest Guards and Foresters Union v. State of Maharashtra and others , (2018) 1 SCC 149 , Major General H.M. Singh, VSM v. Union of India and another , (2014) 3 SCC 670 and that of this Court in the matter of M.P. Ade and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and another , WPS No. 4742/2019 decided on 7.4.2022 to buttress his submissions. 8. Dr. Sachin Ashok Kale, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in WPS No.6913/2021, would submit that the impugned amendment made in Schedule-IV of the Rules of 2012 adding educational qualification for promotion to higher posts is contrary to the proviso appended to Section 69(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 and, therefore, it is liable to be struck down. 9. Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh/respondents, would submit that there is presumption of law in favour of constitutionality of a legislation. Requiring higher educational qualification i.e. Bachelor’s Degree for higher post is constitutionally legal as with every promotion, the scope of work and responsibility increases. Therefore, prescribing higher educational qualification for higher post is completely just and reasonable from suitability and administrative efficiency point of view. Requiring higher educational qualification i.e. Bachelor’s Degree for higher post is constitutionally legal as with every promotion, the scope of work and responsibility increases. Therefore, prescribing higher educational qualification for higher post is completely just and reasonable from suitability and administrative efficiency point of view. He would further submit that promotion is not a vested right, but a right be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules which prevail on the date on which consideration for promotion takes place. He would also submit that prescription of educational qualification is prerogative of the employer. He would contend that the impugned notification amending the Schedule in the Rules of 2012 prescribing the educational qualification of Bachelor’s Degree for promotion on higher posts is not contrary to the proviso to Section 69(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000. Lastly, he would contend that the petitioners have failed to demonstrate as to how the impugned amendment brought in the Rules of 2012 by notification dated 14-6-2021 is violative of Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. In that view of the matter, the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. Grounds for Challenging Constitutional Validity of a Rule 11. A Statute is construed so as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim “ut res magis valeat quam pereat”. Therefore, a presumption that the Legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing that the Act is not within the competence of the Legislature, or that it has transgressed other constitutional mandates, such as those relating to fundamental rights, is always on the person who challenges its vires. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 12 th Edition, page 592.) 12. It is a settled principle of law that the Statute enacted by the Parliament or State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly. The Court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provisions under challenge cannot stand. 13. It is a settled principle of law that the Statute enacted by the Parliament or State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly. The Court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provisions under challenge cannot stand. 13. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Tamil Nadu and another v. P. Krishnamurthy and others , (2006) 4 SCC 517 recollected the following principles while adjudging the validity of subordinate legislation, including regulations: “15. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. It is also well recognised that a subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of the following grounds: (a) Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation. (b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. (c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of India. (d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act. (e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment. (f) Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules).” Rules in Question 14. The impugned Rule which is sought to be challenged as unconstitutional and violative of the petitioners’ fundamental right of being promoted on the posts of Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary and Section Officer, has been enacted by the Governor of Chhattisgarh in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 15. By the impugned notification dated 14-6-2021, amendment has been made in Schedule-IV of the Rules of 2012 by which educational qualification of Bachelor’s Degree has been added in the eligibility criteria for promotion to the posts of Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary and Section Officer. 16. The requisite eligibility qualification for the promotional posts of Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary and Section Officer pre-amendment and post-amendment, states as under:- Position Pre-amendment (Schedule IV) S. No. Present Post Promotional Post Eligibility 1. Deputy Secretary Joint Secretary 3 years of service in feeder cadre 2. Under Secretary Deputy Secretary 3 years of service in feeder cadre 3. The requisite eligibility qualification for the promotional posts of Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary and Section Officer pre-amendment and post-amendment, states as under:- Position Pre-amendment (Schedule IV) S. No. Present Post Promotional Post Eligibility 1. Deputy Secretary Joint Secretary 3 years of service in feeder cadre 2. Under Secretary Deputy Secretary 3 years of service in feeder cadre 3. Section Officer Under Secretary 5 years of service in feeder cadre 4. Assistant Grade-I Section Officer 5 years of service in feeder cadre Position Post-amendment (Schedule IV) S. No. Present Post Promotional Post Eligibility 1. Deputy Secretary Joint Secretary 3 years of service in feeder cadre and Bachelor’s Degree 2. Under Secretary Deputy Secretary 3 years of service in feeder cadre and Bachelor’s Degree 3. Section Officer Under Secretary 5 years of service in feeder cadre and Bachelor’s Degree 4. Assistant Grade-I Section Officer 5 years of service in feeder cadre and Bachelor’s Degree Chances of promotion, whether fundamental right? 17. Whether an employee has a right to be promoted or not depends on the statutory rules governing his service or the terms of the contract of service or executive instructions as the case may be. If the rules or the contract of service etc. provide or indicate that promotion is to be made on an assessment of the merits of the candidate, then the candidate has only a right to be considered for promotion as distinguished from the right to be promoted. 18. It is well settled that while promotion is a normal incidence of service and not a fundamental right, but an employee has a right to be considered for promotion. In the matter of Union of India and others v. Krishna Kumar and others , (2019) 4 SCC 319 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that there is no vested right to promotion, but a right be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules which prevail on the date on which consideration for promotion takes place, and observed in paragraphs 10, 11 & 12 as under:- “10. In considering the rival submissions, it must, at the outset, be noted that it is well settled that there is no vested right to promotion, but a right be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules which prevail on the date on which consideration for promotion takes place. In considering the rival submissions, it must, at the outset, be noted that it is well settled that there is no vested right to promotion, but a right be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules which prevail on the date on which consideration for promotion takes place. This Court has held that there is no rule of universal application to the effect that vacancies must necessarily be filled in on the basis of the law which existed on the date when they arose. The decision of this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 382 has been construed in subsequent decisions as a case where the applicable Rules required the process of promotion or selection to be completed within a stipulated time-frame. Hence, it has been held in H.S. Grewal v. Union of India, (1997) 11 SCC 758 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 420 that the creation of an intermediate post would not amount to an interference with the vested right to promotion. A two- Judge Bench of this Court held thus: (H.S. Grewal case, SCC p. 769, para 13) “13. … Such an introduction of an intermediate post does not, in our opinion, amount to interfering with any vested rights cannot be interfered with, is to be accepted as correct. What all has happened here is that an intermediate post has been created prospectively for future promotions from Group B Class II to Group A Class I. If, before these Rules of 1981 came into force, these officers were eligible to be directly promoted as Commandants under the 1974 Rules but before they got any such promotions, the 1981 Rules came in obliging them to go through an intermediate post, this does not amount to interfering with any vested rights.” 11. In Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P. (2011) 6 SCC 725 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 175 this Court observed thus: (SCC p. 735, paras 26-27) “26. It is by now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, which implies the “Rules in force” on the date the consideration took place. There is no rule of universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. There is no rule of universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. The requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old rules is interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be considered for promotion. The right to be considered for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. Unless, of course, the applicable rule, as in Y.V. Rangaiah case 9 lays down any particular time-frame, within which the selection process is to be completed. In the present case, consideration for promotion took place after the amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be accepted that any accrued or vested right of the appellants has been taken away by the amendment. 27. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellants, namely, B.L. Gupta v. MCD, (1998) 9 SCC 223 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 532, P. Ganeshwar Rao v. State of A.P. 1988 Supp SCC 740 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 123 and N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission, (1990) 3 SCC 157 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 446 are reiterations of a principle laid down in Y.V. Rangaiah case 9 .” 12. Recently, in State of Tripura v. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty, (2017) 3 SCC 646 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 718 another two-Judge Bench of this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 650-51, para 9) “9. The law is thus clear that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, namely, “rules in force on the date” the consideration takes place and that there is no rule of absolute application that vacancies must invariably be filled by the law existing on the date when they arose. As against the case of total exclusion and absolute deprivation of a chance to be considered as in Deepak Agarwal 11 , in the instant case certain additional posts have been included in the feeder cadre, thereby expanding the zone of consideration. It is not as if the writ petitioners or similarly situated candidates were totally excluded. At best, they now had to compete with some more candidates. It is not as if the writ petitioners or similarly situated candidates were totally excluded. At best, they now had to compete with some more candidates. In any case, since there was no accrued right nor was there any mandate that vacancies must be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arose, the State was well within its rights to stipulate that the vacancies be filled in accordance with the Rules as amended. Secondly, the process to amend the Rules had also begun well before the Notification dated 24-11-2011.” 19. As such, the petitioners have only a right to be considered fairly and objectively, but no right of promotion. However, in the matter of State of Maharashtra and another v. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni and others , (1981) 4 SCC 130 it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that mere chances of promotion are not conditions of service, and the fact that there was reduction in the chances of promotion did not tantamount to a change in the conditions of service. It has been further held that a right to be considered for promotion is a term of service, but mere chances of promotion are not. Furthermore, in the matter of Air Commodore Naveen Jain v. Union of India and others , (2019) 10 SCC 34 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have affirmed the view relying upon various judicial pronouncements that power of the State to fix quota for promotion cannot be said to be illegal, arbitrary or discriminatory so as to attract violation of either Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution, and it was observed in paragraphs 13 & 15 as under:- “13. In State of Mysore v. G.B. Purohit, 1967 SLR 753 (SC) this Court held that a right to be considered for promotion, is a condition of service but mere chances of promotion are not. The rule which merely affects the chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition of service. The said judgment was quoted with approval in later judgment reported as Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 1 SCC 317 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 137 wherein this Court held as under: (SCC p. 329, para 15) “15. The rule which merely affects the chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition of service. The said judgment was quoted with approval in later judgment reported as Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 1 SCC 317 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 137 wherein this Court held as under: (SCC p. 329, para 15) “15. … All that happened as a result of making promotions to the posts of Deputy Collectors division wise and limiting such promotions to 50 per cent of the total number of vacancies in the posts of Deputy Collector was to reduce the chances of promotion available to the petitioners. It is now well settled by the decision of this Court in State of Mysore v. G.B. Purohit 18 that though a right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, mere chances of promotion are not. A rule which merely affects chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition of service. In Purohit case 18 the district wise seniority of sanitary inspectors was changed to Statewise seniority, and as a result of this change the respondents went down in seniority and became very junior. This, it was urged, affected their chances of promotion which were protected under the proviso to Section 115, sub-section (7). This contention was negatived and Wanchoo, J. (as he then was), speaking on behalf of this Court observed: (SLR para 10) ‘10. … It is said on behalf of the respondents that as their chances of promotion have been affected their conditions of service have been changed to their disadvantage. We see no force in this argument because chances of promotion are not conditions of service.’ ” 15. In A. Satyanarayana v. S. Purushotham, (2008) 5 SCC 416 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 279 this Court held that the power of the State to fix quota for promotion cannot be said to be violative of the constitutional scheme of equality as contemplated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 426, paras 23 & 25-26) “23. We, however, are of the opinion that the validity or otherwise of a quota rule cannot be determined on surmises and conjectures. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 426, paras 23 & 25-26) “23. We, however, are of the opinion that the validity or otherwise of a quota rule cannot be determined on surmises and conjectures. Whereas the power of the State to fix the quota keeping in view the fact situation obtaining in a given case must be conceded, the same, however, cannot be violative of the constitutional scheme of equality as contemplated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that a policy decision and, in particular, legislative policy should not ordinarily be interfered with and the superior courts, while exercising their power of judicial review, shall not consider as to whether such policy decision has been taken mala fide or not. But where a policy decision as reflected in a statutory rule pertains to the field of subordinate legislation, indisputably, the same would be amenable to judicial review, inter alia, on the ground of being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (See Vasu Dev Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 12 SCC 753 and State of Kerala v. Unni, (2007) 2 SCC 365 ) * 25. While saying so, we are not unmindful of the legal principle that nobody has a right to be promoted; his right being confined to right to be considered therefor. 26. Similarly, the power of the State to take a policy decision as a result whereof an employee's chance of promotion is diminished cannot be a subject-matter of judicial review as no legal right is infringed thereby.” 20. As such, reduction in chances of promotion, if any, on account of change or amendment in the rules would not affect his fundamental right, as the Government servant has only a right to be considered for promotion in accordance with the relevant rules. Prescription of educational qualification – Prerogative of the employer 21. It is trite law that prescribing conditions of service and promotional avenues is the prerogative of the employer unless it suffers from patent illegality and manifest arbitrariness. (See Dwarka Prasad and others v. Union of India and others , (2003) 6 SCC 535 , Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni’s case (supra), Air Commodore Naveen Jain (supra) and P.U. Joshi and others v. Accountant General, Ahmedabad and others , (2003) 2 SCC 632 ) 22. (See Dwarka Prasad and others v. Union of India and others , (2003) 6 SCC 535 , Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni’s case (supra), Air Commodore Naveen Jain (supra) and P.U. Joshi and others v. Accountant General, Ahmedabad and others , (2003) 2 SCC 632 ) 22. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa and others , (1974) 1 SCC 19 has held that the classification on the basis of educational qualification with a view to achieve administrative efficiency is constitutionally permissible, though, facts of the case have to be looked into to judge the validity of a classification, and observed as under:- “ 32. Judicial scrutiny can therefore extend only to the consideration whether the classification rests on a reasonable basis and whether it bears nexus with the object in view. It cannot extend to embarking upon a nice or mathematical evaluation of the basis of classification, for were such an inquiry permissible it would be open to the Courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the legislature or the Rule-making authority on the need to classify or the desirability of achieving a particular object. 33. Judged from this point of view, it seems to us impossible to accept the respondents' submission that the classification of Assistant Engineers into degree-holders and diploma-holders rests on any unreal or unreasonable basis. The classification, according to the appellants, was made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency in the Engineering services. If this be the object, the classification is clearly co-related to it, for higher educational qualifications are at least presumptive evidence of a higher mental equipment. This is not to suggest that administrative efficiency can be achieved only through the medium of those possessing comparatively higher educational qualifications but that is beside the point. What is relevant is that the object to be achieved here is not a mere pretence for an indiscriminate imposition of inequalities and the classification cannot be characterized as arbitrary or absurd. That is the farthest that judicial scrutiny can extend. 34. On the fact of the case, classification on the basis of educational qualifications made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous circumstance and one has always to bear in mind the facts and circumstances of the case in order to judge the validity of a classification. 34. On the fact of the case, classification on the basis of educational qualifications made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous circumstance and one has always to bear in mind the facts and circumstances of the case in order to judge the validity of a classification. ...” 23. The principle of law laid down in Shri Triloki Nath Khosa’s case (supra) has been followed with approval in the matter of Mohammad Shujat Ali and others v. Union of India and others , (1975) 3 SCC 76 . 24. Similarly, in the matter of T.R. Kothandaraman and others v. Tamil Nadu Water Supply & Drainage BD and others, (1994) 6 SCC 282 the Supreme Court has held that higher educational qualification is a permissible basis of classification, and observed as under: - “ 16. From what has been stated above, the following legal propositions emerge regarding educational qualification being a basis of classification relating to promotion in public service: (1) Higher educational qualification is a permissible basis of classification, acceptability of which will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. (2) Higher educational qualification can be the basis not only for barring promotion, but also for restricting the scope of promotion. (3) Restriction placed cannot however go to the extent of seriously jeopardising the chances of promotion. To decide this, the extent of restriction shall have also to be looked into to ascertain whether it is reasonable. Reasons for this are being indicated later.” 25. Similarly, in the matter of K. Jagadeesan v. Union of India and others , (1990) 2 SCC 228 the Supreme Court has held that it is for the government to decide what qualification was required for the promotion to the higher post and, unless that requirement was totally irrelevant or unreasonable, it could not be said to be bad in law. 26. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of T.R. Kapur v. State of Haryana , 1986 Supp SCC 584 , 595 has held that the power to frame rules to regulate the conditions of service under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution carries with it the power to amend or alter the rules and further held that an authority competent to lay down qualifications for promotion, is also competent to change the qualifications, and observed as under:- “16. It is well settled that the power to frame rules to regulate the conditions of service under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution carries with it the power to amend or alter the rules with a retrospective effect. … It is equally well settled that any rule which affects the right of a person to be considered for promotion is a condition of service although mere chance of promotion may not be. … an authority competent to lay down qualifications for promotion, is also competent to change the qualifications. The rules defining qualifications and suitability for promotion are conditions of service and they can be changed retrospectively. ...” 27. Coming to the facts of the case in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that the petitioners have no vested right of promotion and the only right they have is the right to be considered for promotion in light of the existing rules in force on the date of consideration. Furthermore, the authority competent to lay down qualifications for promotion i.e. the State Government which has framed the Rules of 2012 is also competent to change the qualifications and it is for the State Government to decide what qualification was required for promotion to the higher post, as in the instant case, minimum educational qualification of being graduate i.e. Bachelor’s Degree has been prescribed for promotion on the posts of Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary and Section Officer, considering the scope of work and responsibility of the officers to discharge on being promoted and thus, introduction of Bachelor’s Degree as minimum educational qualification for promotion to the said posts cannot be termed as arbitrary, since even for appointment by direct recruitment to the post of AG-I under Rule 8 read with Serial No.5 of Schedule-III of the Rules of 2012, minimum educational qualification for persons having 5 years experience as AG-II in Secretariat Service is “Graduation”, meaning thereby, for further promotions to higher posts, insertion of graduation as a necessary qualification is only obvious and lower qualification for higher post will become manifestly unfair. In order to set right this discrepancy/anomaly, the impugned amendment has been made prescribing educational qualification of Bachelor’s Degree for higher post which is completely just and reasonable from suitability and administrative efficiency point of view, as those officers on being promoted are required to discharge their functions and duties as the officers of the State Government Secretariat. As such, the notification dated 14-6-2021 introducing Bachelor’s Degree as qualification for promotional posts of Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary and Section Officer in serial Nos.1, 2, 3 and 7 of Schedule-IV, in addition to the requisite experience, is constitutionally valid and at no stretch of imagination it can be termed as invalid. 28. The petitioners’ further argument is that when they have entered into service, the requisite qualification for appointment to various posts was Matriculation and now, at the fag end of their service career, introduction of amendment inserting Bachelor’s Degree in Column 5 of Schedule-IV of the Rules of 2012, will cause extreme hardship to them and stall their chances for further promotion. 29. It is well settled proposition of law that hardship of an individual cannot be a ground for invalidating a legislation. The Supreme Court in the matters of D.C. Bhatia and others v. Union of India and another , (1995) 1 SCC 104 , Sudhir Kumar Consul v. Allahabad Bank , (2011) 3 SCC 486 and State of Tamil Nadu and others v. K. Shyam Sunder and others , (2011) 8 SCC 737 had already held that hardship cannot be a ground to declare a law ultra vires. 30. The next argument of the petitioners is that amendment has been made in the Schedule without making amendment in Rule 14 of the Rules of 2012 which is the substantive provision prescribing conditions of eligibility for promotion in light of the decision rendered by this Court in M.P. Ade (supra). However, the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable from the case of M.P. Ade (supra), since in M.P. Ade (supra), the amendment in the Schedule clearly ran contrary to the substantive Rules of 2010 as also the Rules of 2003 therein, whereas, in the present case, even after amendment, entries of Serial Nos.1, 2, 3 and 7 of Schedule-IV of the Rules of 2012 do not become contrary to Rule 14 of the Rules of 2012. Therefore, the decision of this Court in M.P. Ade (supra) is of no use to the petitioners. 31. Dr. Sachin Ashok Kale, learned counsel for the petitioners in WPS No.6913/2021, has made submission that the impugned notification is contrary to the proviso appended to Section 69(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000. 32. In our considered opinion, proviso to Section 69(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000, has no application to the facts of the present case. It is not the case of the petitioners that at the time of allocation, designation, pay-scale or seniority of the petitioners was changed to their detriment. We have already held that the petitioners do not have the vested right of promotion and by the Rules of 2012 as also by the impugned amendment i.e. the notification dated 14-6-2021, no vested right of the petitioners has been taken away. As such, the proviso to Section 69(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000, has no application to the facts of the present case. 33. The decisions of the Supreme Court relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners namely, Ram Gopal Shukla’s case (supra), Budhan Choudhry (supra), Om Prakash Sharma’s case (supra), Maharashtra Forest Guards and Foresters Union (supra) and Major General H.M. Singh, VSM (supra) are clearly distinguishable on facts to the present case. 34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned amendment in Schedule-IV of the Rules of 2012 prescribing educational qualification of Bachelor’s Degree for the promotional posts of Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary and Section Officer is constitutionally valid and does not suffer any vice of arbitrariness, illegality or discriminatory. Challenge made to the said amendment is hereby rejected. Consequently, all the writ petitions deserve to be and are accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s).