JUDGMENT : RAVINDRA KUMAR AGRAWAL, J. 1. This Second Appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed by the plaintiffs against the impugned judgment and decree dated 20.07.2010 passed by IIIrd Additional District Judge (FTC) Ambikapur, District Surguja, in Civil Appeal No.57-A/2008 whereby the First Appeal filed by the appellants/plaintiffs against the judgment and decree dated 25.04.2008 passed by Civil Judge Class-II Ambikapur, in Civil Suit No.88-A/2005 has been dismissed and the judgment and decree of the trial court has been affirmed. 2. For the sake of convenience, the status of parties shown in the Civil Suit are being taken in the present Second Appeal. 3. On 24.01.2012, the appeal was admitted by the court for hearing on the following substantial question of law: “Whether both the courts below were not justified in holding Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is not applicable in the case, ignoring material admissions leading to inference that the parties, after being Hinduised, changed their customs to that what is followed by Hindus?” 4. The plaintiff filed a civil suit for declaration of title, permanent injunction and partition of the suit property admeasuring 8.341 Hect. of village Ranta, Tehsil Lundra, District Surguja shown in Schedule-A, 1.562 Hect. of land of village Kardoni, Tehsil Lundra, District Surguja shown in Schedule-B and 0.632 Hect. of land situated at village Dakai, Tehsil Lundra, District Surguja shown in Schedule-C of the plaint. It is pleaded in the plaint that the suit property was originally held by one Chamra Uraon, who is an aboriginal Tribe, but they have adopted the Hindu customs and governed by the Hindu Law. Late Chamra Uraon was maternal grandfather of plaintiffs who performed marriage of his four daughters including the mother of plaintiffs late Kundal. She was married at village Ranta itself. Since late Chamra Uraon was not having any male member in his family, all the four daughters were taken care of Chamra Uraon and his lands were cultivated by all of them. After death of Chamra Uraon, the names of all four daughters came on revenue record as his LRs and all of them were cultivating the suit property. Since 6-7 years back, the mother of plaintiffs Kundal also died and names of plaintiff were also recorded in the revenue records as her legal heirs. After death of Chamra Uraon, the names of all four daughters came on revenue record as his LRs and all of them were cultivating the suit property. Since 6-7 years back, the mother of plaintiffs Kundal also died and names of plaintiff were also recorded in the revenue records as her legal heirs. The defendant No.2 filed an application for partition of the suit land and then the Naib Tehsildar Lundra passed an order on 09.03.2004 for partition of the suit property and in execution thereof, the defendant No.2 raised an objection in which the claim of defendant No.2 was denied vide order dated 03.11.2004. The plaintiff also filed an application under Section 32 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 and then the Naib Tehsildar vide its order dated 30.07.2005 directed the parties to get their right and title decided by the competent civil court and then the present civil suit has been filed. The plaintiff pleaded that they have 1/4th share over the suit property as the legal heir of late Chamra Uraon through their mother Kundal. Therefore, a decree may be passed in their favour that they are entitled for 1/4th share over the suit property and also for permanent injunction over their share of the property from interference of the other members of the family. 5. The defendants jointly filed their written statement, denied the plaint averment and pleaded that the suit property are self acquired property of late Chamra Uraon. They denied that parties are governed by Hindu Law and they have been sufficiently Hinduised. They further pleaded that the parties are governed by their own custom and as per custom of Uraon caste and community, the daughters who have married and her husband was residing in her matrimonial house as Gharjiha Damad, she would only get the share over the property of his father in law. It was also pleaded that three daughters of late Chamra Uraon were married and their husbands were kept as Gharjiha Damad in the house of late Chamra Uraon. The marriage of mother of plaintiffs was performed and she was sent to her matrimonial house where she was residing in her matrimonial house along with her husband. It was also pleaded that three daughters of late Chamra Uraon were married and their husbands were kept as Gharjiha Damad in the house of late Chamra Uraon. The marriage of mother of plaintiffs was performed and she was sent to her matrimonial house where she was residing in her matrimonial house along with her husband. The female members who got married and left her parents house would not get any property from her father, but only those female members who resides at parents house and her husbands are also residing as Gharjiha Damad, they would only get the share over the property of her father. After death of Chamra Uraon, the defendants are cultivating the suit property and taken care of their land as per their entitlement. Since the marriage of mother of plaintiff was performed at village Ranta, but due to ignorance of revenue authority, the name of Kundal Bai was also mutated in the revenue records along with names of defendants, however, she has not right or title over the suit property. By taking advantage of mutation of her name, the plaintiffs have filed the suit claiming partition over the suit property that her mother was also having equal share along with other three sisters. When the objection was raised before the Naib Tehsildar Lundra, he stopped partition proceeding and directed the parties to get their right and title decided by the competent civil court. They would also submit that the parties are not governed by the Hindu Law and as per their own custom and customary law, the plaintiffs are not entitled for any share over the property and they have no right, title or possession over the suit and their suit is liable to be dismissed. 6. The trial court after appreciating the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues : 7. The trial court after appreciating the evidence available on record comes into conclusion that plaintiffs have failed to prove that parties are governed by Hindu Law and Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (in short, the Act, 1956) would be applicable for their succession and entitled for 1/4th share of the suit property. The trial court after appreciating the evidence available on record comes into conclusion that plaintiffs have failed to prove that parties are governed by Hindu Law and Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (in short, the Act, 1956) would be applicable for their succession and entitled for 1/4th share of the suit property. The trial court also found that in Uron community there is customary law prevailing that the daughter who are residing at parents house and her husband is also residing as Gharjiha Damad, would only get share on the property of her father and Mangti Bai, Sonkalya Bai and Karmanya Bai were also the daughters who resided at her parents house and their respective husbands were Gharjiha Damad and thereby denied the claim of the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit. The first appellate court also, in consonance with the findings recorded by the trial court, dismissed the first appeal preferred by the plaintiffs which gives rise to present second appeal in which the substantial question of law has been framed by this court as set out in the opening paragraph of this judgment. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants/plaintiffs would submit that both the courts below were absolutely unjustified in holding that parties are not governed by the Hindu Law and they have not sufficiently Hinduised for their succession. The courts below have also erred in considering that parties are governed by their own customary law in which only daughters who have Gharjiha Damad will get share over the property of her father. From the evidence available on record and the admissions made by the witnesses, the plaintiffs have sufficiently proved for their succession that the parties are governed by Hindu Succession Act and Hindu Law. Even as per their customary law, only one daughter can be kept as Gharjiha Damad, however, in the present case, except the husband of plaintiff’s mother, the husband of other three daughters of late Chamra Uraon were kept as Gharjiha Damad. She would further submit that under the principles of equity and good conscience, out of four daughters of late Chamra Uraon, only one daughter i.e. the mother of plaintiffs have been deprived and thus such an arbitrary act cannot be considered to be the custom of family and all the daughters of late Chamra Uraon are entitled for equal share over the property. Along with the sisters, the name of mother of plaintiffs have been recorded in the revenue records, however, they denied to give partition to the plaintiff despite having equal right and title over the suit property. In support of her claim, she would rely upon judgment passed by Supreme Court in " Ram Charan and Others Vs. Sukhram and Others ", 2024 SCC Online SC 3810 , judgment dated 06.02.2019 passed by coordinate Bench of this court in Daduram & Others Vs. Bhuri Bai (Dead) through LRs. (Second Appeal No.270 of 2003) and judgment dated 02.08.2011 passed in Second Appeal No. 421 of 1991, Mst. Phulbasia & Another Vs. Ramsingh (since dead) through LRs. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents supported the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court as well as first appellate court and would submit that the plaintiff has failed to prove customary law by proper pleading and evidence that they are not governed by their own customary law but governed by Hindu Succession Act. Even though some admissions have been made by the parties in the evidence that they performed Puja of Hindu Gods and Goddess and celebrate Hindu festivals but that itself is not sufficient to hold that parties are sufficiently Hinduised. Although the mother of plaintiff was married in the same village as per their own customary law, but her husband was not Gharjiha Damad and therefore she could not get any share over the property as per their customary law. The other three sisters had Gharjiha Damad and as such they will get their share over the suit property and therefore the appeal filed by the plaintiff does not have any merit and is liable to be dismissed. 10. I have heard the counsel for the parties, considering their rival submissions and perused the record of the trial court. 11. Section 2(2) of the Act 1956 provides applicability of Act, 1956 to the aboriginal Tribes which reads as under: “ 2. Application of Act. —(1) xxx xxx xxx (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution unless the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs.” 12. Application of Act. —(1) xxx xxx xxx (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution unless the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs.” 12. List of Scheduled Tribes is contained in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 amended with effect from 1-11-2000 by virtue of Section 20 of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000, which provides that on and from the appointed day, the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950, shall stand amended as directed in the Fourth Schedule. Uraon to which the parties herein belong is in Entry 33 in relation to Chhattisgarh in the above order. As such, Uraon is a Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of the Constitution of India notified by the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 by the President of India and it is a Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of Article 366(25) of the Constitution. Thus, the provisions of the Act of 1956 do not pro-tanto apply to the members of Scheduled Tribe as per Section 2(2) of the Act of 1956, because of non obstante clause in Section 2(2) of the Act of 1956, as the customary law of the Scheduled Tribe has been preserved by the legislature. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Madhu Kishwar and others v. State of Bihar and others , (1996) 5 SCC 125 after noticing sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act of 1956, held as under:- “4….. Thus neither the Hindu Succession Act, nor the Indian Succession Act, nor even the Shariat law is applicable to the custom-governed tribals. And custom, as is well recognized, varies from people to people and region to region.” 14. Thus, it is held that the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 will not apply to the parties, as they are Uraon scheduled tribes, which is Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of Article 366(25) of the Constitution of India and the Central Government has not issued any notification directing otherwise and applying the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act to them. 15. 15. The further question to be considered is whether the parties have become “Hindus out-and-out” or have become “sufficiently Hinduised” so as to be governed in the matter of succession and inheritance by the principles of Hindu Law or still they are governed by their tribal customary law? 16. When this court examines the evidence of the parties, it transpires that PW-1, Dilip in his cross examination has admitted that they are performing their marriages, birth and death rituals as per their own customs. He also admits that his maternal uncle kept Somaru, Ranglal and Gohandur as Gharjiha Damad. PW-2, Kalpu Ram has also admitted that all the rituals in their community are to be performed as per their own customary law. PW-3, Devsai also stated about his own customary law prevailing in Uraon community. He also stated about Gharjiha Damad. The defendant No.1 Mangti Bai in her cross examination admits that marriage of three sisters were performed by her mother and their respective husbands are Gharjiha Damad. She also admits that only one daughter in the family can be Gharjiha Damad. In paragraph 6 of cross examination she admits that they accepted Hindu religion. The Tehsildar Lundra had passed an order of partition between her, Sonkaliya, Karmaniya, Dilip and Manjhi. DW-2, Lala Ram, have also admitted in his cross examination that only one daughter in the family could have the Gharjiha Damad, however, the family of defendants get 3 daughters with Gharjiha Damad. They admits celebration of Holi, Deewali, Chherka and Karma festivals. They performed Laxmi Puja in Deewali. They also performed 6 th day, 12 th day and 27 th day function as also 13 th day function in death. In marriage ceremony they also fixed Mandap and use Haldi and Sindoor. 17. PW-4, Sonkaliya, have also admitted in her cross examination that they celebrate Holi and Deewali festivals, performs Laxmi Puja in Deewali as other Hindus perform. In their marriage function, they use Mandap, Sindoor and Churi as per the customs of Hindu. There is no difference in the rituals of Hindus and their own family. 18. The D.W. 1 Mangti Bai stated in her evidence that only one daughter could be kept in the family, as Gharjiha, and only she would get the property of her father. She admitted that she also governed by the Hindu religion. There is no difference in the rituals of Hindus and their own family. 18. The D.W. 1 Mangti Bai stated in her evidence that only one daughter could be kept in the family, as Gharjiha, and only she would get the property of her father. She admitted that she also governed by the Hindu religion. D.W.2 Lalaram stated in his evidence that they are governed by their own rituals, but in cross-examination, he stated that, against the custom of only a daughter being Gharjiha, the mother of Mangti has kept three daughters as Gharjiha. He further admitted in his evidence about the celebration of Holi, Diwali, Karma, Chherta festival and performing pooja of Goddess Laxmi in the Diwali festival. He also stated about the rituals of the marriage ceremony in their community, which are almost similar to the Hindu community. P.W. 4 Sonkaliya also admitted in her evidence that they are celebrating Diwali, Holi festival and performing Laxmi Pooja in Diwali. They also used Choodi, Sindur, and Mandap in the marriage ceremony, as the customs of Hindus. There is no difference in the rituals of their own community and Hindus. 19. Mere pleading as vague as it can be would not amount to pleading and establishing that they have given up their customary succession, and to establish further that they become Hindus out-and-out or sufficiently Hinduised, and in the matter of succession, they are governed by any particular school of Hindu law. The evidence in this respect is not clear from either party. 20. In the matter of " Ram charan and Others v. Sukhram and Others ", AIR 2025 SC 3356 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the situation where either party could not establish the particular law of a community or custom, and then the principle of justice, equity and good conscience would be applicable. In paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of its judgment, it has been held that:- “15. Given the above situation that neither any particular law of a community nor custom could be brought into application by either side, we now proceed to examine the argument advanced before the High Court that is the principle of justice, equity, and good conscience. These principles find statutory recognition in the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, Section 6 whereof is extracted herein below: "6. These principles find statutory recognition in the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, Section 6 whereof is extracted herein below: "6. In cases not provided for by section five, or by Rule in cases any other law for the time being in force, the Courts shall act according to justice, equity and good conscience." 16. At the outset, it is observed that regarding the 1875 law, the impugned judgment notes that the same has been repealed as of March 2018 and, therefore, cannot be applied. We find this position to be mistaken. The Repeal Act No.4 of 2018 provides for a saving clause, which reads as under: "4. Savings. The repeal by this Act of any enactment shall not affect any other enactment in which the repealed enactment has been applied, incorporated or referred to; and this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity. effect or consequences of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred, or any remedy or proceeding in respect thereof, or any release or discharge of or from any debt, penalty, obligation. liability, claim or demand, or any indemnity already. granted, or the proof of any past act or thing: nor shall this Act affect any principle or rule of law, or established jurisdiction, form or course of pleading, practice or procedure, or existing usage, custom, privilege, restriction, exemption, office appointment, notwithstanding that the respectively may have been in any manner affirmed or recognised or derived by, in or from any enactment hereby repealed; same nor shall the repeal by this Act of any enactment revive or restore any jurisdiction, office, custom, liability, right, title, privilege, restriction, exemption, usage, practice, procedure or other matter or thing not now existing or in force." (Emphasis supplied) 17. The effect of Section 4 is clear that no right having been accrued prior to the repeal of the Act shall be affected thereby. As we have already observed, the parties to the instant lis are neither governed by Hindu nor Muslim laws and, therefore, would be covered by Section 6 of the 1875 Act. The effect of Section 4 is clear that no right having been accrued prior to the repeal of the Act shall be affected thereby. As we have already observed, the parties to the instant lis are neither governed by Hindu nor Muslim laws and, therefore, would be covered by Section 6 of the 1875 Act. So, the right having been accrued in favour of the appellant-plaintiffs' mother upon the death of her father, which was approximately 30 years before the filing of the plaint became crystallized and would not be affected by the fact that the Act was no longer in the statute book. This Act, therefore, necessarily had to be applied by the High Court. At this juncture, it is pertinent to consider the meaning of 'justice, equity and good conscience.” 21. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also in the matter of M.V. Elisabeth and others v. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd., Hanoekar House, Swatontapeth, Vasco-De-Gama, Goa , 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433 held that where statute is silent and judicial intervention is required, Courts strive to redress grievances according to what is perceived to be principles of justice, equity and good conscience. It was observed as under: - “86. The judicial power of this country, which is an aspect of national sovereignty, is vested in the people and is articulated in the provisions of the Constitution and the laws and is exercised by courts empowered to exercise it. It is absurd to confine that power to the provisions of imperial statutes of a bygone age. Access to court which is an important right vested in every citizen implies the existence of the power of the Court to render justice according to law. Where statute is silent and judicial intervention is required, Courts strive to redress grievances according to what is perceived to be principles of justice, equity and good conscience.” 22. The meaning and significance of "justice, equity and good conscience" has been dealt with by the coordinate bench of this court in the case of "Daduram v. Bhuri Bai (Dead) Th. LRs. Tirith Kumar and Others", S.A. No. 270/2003, decided on 06-02-2019 , and held that:- “19. Now, the question is what is meaning and significance of the expression “justice, equity and good conscience”. LRs. Tirith Kumar and Others", S.A. No. 270/2003, decided on 06-02-2019 , and held that:- “19. Now, the question is what is meaning and significance of the expression “justice, equity and good conscience”. The Formula "Justice, Equity and Good Conscience"—The origin of the formula lie in the Romeo canonical sources, way back in the 16th Century. Late the formula was applied in Italy, Germany and France. It appealed the English legal system which modified and incorporated it in their own system. The preamble to the Act of Succession enacted in 1536 used the expressions "Equity, reason and good conscience". The East India Company carried the principle to India. In 1688, the Judges appointed in Bombay under the Company's Law were "to behave themselves according to good conscience". The Royal Charters of 1683, 1687, 1726 and 1753 also used the expressions "Equity and Good Conscience" and "Justice and Right". The Regulation of 1781 enjoined that in all cases for which no directions were given the respective Judge "do act according to justice, equity and good conscience". The principles were to be applied where positive law or custom did not assist the Court to dispense judicial Justice. Indeed, the term "Justice'' eludes a precise definition. It means the constant and perpetual disposition to render to every man his due. The Courts are to administer "commutative justice" and "distributive justice" as well. The expression "commutative justice" means that virtue whose object is to render to every one what belongs to him, as nearly as may be, or that which governs contracts. To render commutative justice, the judge must make an equality between the parties, so that no one may be gainer by another's loss. The expressions "distributive justice" means that virtue whose object is to distribute rewards and punishments to each one according to his merits, observing a just proportion by comparing one person or fact with another, so that neither equal persons have unequal things nor unequal persons things equal. "Equity' is a system of law or rules more consonant than the ordinary law which opinions current for the time being as to a just regulation of the mutual rights and duties of men living in a civilized society, vide Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn,, Vol. 14, p. 464. "Equity' is a system of law or rules more consonant than the ordinary law which opinions current for the time being as to a just regulation of the mutual rights and duties of men living in a civilized society, vide Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn,, Vol. 14, p. 464. "Equity' according to Blackstone means "that portion of remedial justice which was formerly exclusively administered by a court of Equity as contra- distinguished from that portion which was formerly exclusively administered by a court of common law” - vide Blackstone's Commentaries, 429-437. The meaning of the expressions "Justice, equity and good conscience” was summed up by Lord Hobhouse in Waghela Rajsanji v. Shekh Masludin (1887) 13 Ind. Appl. 89(96). "Justice, equity and good conscience" could be interpreted to mean the rules of English Law and found applicable to Indian society and circumstances". (See U. Bransly Nongaiang v. U. Drolishon Syiemiong and others, (1986) 2 Gauhati Law Reports 487. ) 23. In the matter of Chuiyya s/o Jhadi and another v. Mangari Bai and another , 2000(2) M.P.L.J. 441 the M.P. High Court while dealing with the issue of inheritance of property of father by daughter belonging to “Oraon tribe” held as under: - “It is true that the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 do not apply to the members of the Scheduled Tribe as per section 2(2) of this Act. It is also true that parties are Scheduled Tribes. In the absence of son the daughter was entitled to inheritance and she used to get “limited Estate” and on her death it used to pass on to the reversioners of her father. That rule has been abrogated. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confers full heritable capacity on a female heir. There is no definite evidence that amongst the Oraons a daughter is excluded from inheriting the property of her father. There should be no disparity in the rights of man and woman in matters of succession and inheritance. This is recognized in all the systems. It is for the person setting up the plea of exclusion of daughter from inheritance to prove and establish that there is such a caste custom. A custom is a rule which has by long usage obtained the force of law. It must be ancient, certain and reasonable. The daughter is entitled to the share in the lands in dispute.” 24. A custom is a rule which has by long usage obtained the force of law. It must be ancient, certain and reasonable. The daughter is entitled to the share in the lands in dispute.” 24. Similarly, in the matter of Sukhmani and others v. Jagarnath , 2000 RN 301 the M.P. High Court applying the principles of equity, justice and good conscience, finding no provision of law governing right to succession among Gond-caste held as under: - “10. The trial Court had rightly held that the daughters are entitled to a share in the property of father in the Gond community and they along with Sonamati and the respondent succeeded to the property of Jatu. After the death of Sonamati half share of Sonamati was also transmitted to the appellants as there was no prohibition in law to succeed the property of their step-mother. In fact, sections 5 and 6 of the Central Provinces Law read together would show that in absence of any law governing the right to succession, the principles of equity, justice and good conscience shall apply. 11. For all these reasons, this Court comes to the conclusion that the appellants and the respondent are entitled to 1/6th share each in the suit property.” 25. This Court also in the matter of Mst. Sarwango and others v. Mst. Urchamahin and others , AIR 2013 Chhattisgarh 98 applying Section 6 of the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, held that in absence of any law of inheritance or custom prevailing in Gond-caste, Courts are required to decide right according to justice, equity and good conscience and allotted ½ share to daughters on the property left by their father. It was observed as under: - “10. In the present case, both the parties have failed to prove any law of inheritance or custom prevailing in their Gond caste i.e. member of Scheduled Caste whom Hindu Law or other law governing inheritance is not applicable. In absence of any law of inheritance or custom prevailing in their caste governing the inheritance the Courts are required to decide the rights according to justice, equity and good conscience in term of Section 6 of the Act. Plaintiffs Sawango and Jaituniya are daughters of Jhangal, nearest relative rather the respondents, who were daughter-in-law of brother of Jhangal and legitimate or illegitimate son of Balam Singh, son of Dakhal. 11. Plaintiffs Sawango and Jaituniya are daughters of Jhangal, nearest relative rather the respondents, who were daughter-in-law of brother of Jhangal and legitimate or illegitimate son of Balam Singh, son of Dakhal. 11. In these circumstances, plaintiffs Sawango and Jaituniya would be the persons' best entitlement to inherit the property left by their father. The Courts below ought to have decreed the suit for partition to the extent of share of Jhangal, but the Court below i.e. the lower appellate Court has allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit in absence of any law or custom for inheritance for a member of Schedule Tribe. The Courts below are required to decide their rights of inheritance in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act applicable to the State of Chhattisgarh and undivided State of Madhya Pradesh.“ 26. In Ram Charan (Supra) the Supreme Court has held in paragraph 28 & 29 as under : “28. Granted that no such custom of female succession could be established by the appellant-plaintiffs, but nonetheless it is also equally true that a custom to the contrary also could not be shown in the slightest, much less proved. That being the case, denying Dhaiya her share in her father’s property, when the custom is silent, would violate her right to equality vis-à-vis her brothers or those of her legal heirs vis-à-vis their cousin. 29. In view of the above discussion, we are of the firm view that in keeping with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, read along with the overarching effect of Article 14 of the Constitution, the appellant-plaintiffs, being Dhaiya’s legal heirs, are entitled to their equal share in the property. The judgments of the Courts below are accordingly set aside to that extent. The civil appeal is allowed accordingly.” 27. All these evidences would clearly demonstrate that although Hindu Succession Act would not applicable to Uraon community, however by their rituals and adopting Hindu culture, they are sufficiently Hinduised. Thus, under the equity and good conscience, the plaintiff cannot be deprived from property of late Chamra Uraon through their mother. Even otherwise, there is no justification with respect to non granting property to the plaintiff when three other daughters of late Chamra Uraon got their share over the property and only one daughter i.e. the mother of plaintiff deprived from her share. Even otherwise, there is no justification with respect to non granting property to the plaintiff when three other daughters of late Chamra Uraon got their share over the property and only one daughter i.e. the mother of plaintiff deprived from her share. Even on the point of Gharjiha Damad the evidence comes that only one daughter can be kept as Gharjiha Damad, however, in the present case three daughters of Chamru were kept as Gharjiha Damad which itself is against the alleged applicable custom of the family which goes against the defendants that if the customs are not prevailing in the family, the property could be divided into all the daughters of late Chamru including the mother of plaintiff. 28. In view of above consideration as well as the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, this court is of the considered opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled for their share over the suit property equally to other daughters of late Chamru. Accordingly, the substantial question of law is answered in favour of plaintiff and it is held that both the courts below were not justified in holding that the plaintiff is not entitled for any relief in the suit. 29. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellants/plaintiffs is allowed and judgment and decree passed by both the courts below are side aside. The plaintiffs are title holder of 1/4th share of the suit property shown in Schedule-A,B & C of the plaint and they are entitled for partition and separate possession of the suit property according to their 1/4th share and defendants are restrained from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs over the property which they will get in partition. Parties shall bear their own costs. 30. An appellate decree be drawn accordingly.