- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36863-DB WP No. 2688 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND WRIT PETITION NO. 2688 OF 2024 (S-KSAT) BETWEEN: 1. KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA REP. BY ITS REGISTRAR M. S. BUILDING BENGALURU - 560 001. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY REVENUE DEPARTMENT VIDHANA SOUDHA BENGALURU - 560 001. 2. THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL KARNATAKA STATE, RESIDENCY PARK ROAD BENGALURU - 560 001. 3. SMT. B. A. BHUVANESHWARI AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS W/O. K. V. SRINIVASAMURTHY RETIRED DEPUTY TAHSILDAR RESIDING AT A-1/201, II FLOOR, GANGA BLOCK, NGV, Digitally signed by VALLI MARIMUTHU Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36863-DB WP No. 2688 of 2024 KORMANGALA, BENGALURU - 560 047. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. V.SHIVAREDDY, AGA) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE AN ORDER/DIRECTION CALLING FOR RECORDS FROM THE RESPONDENTS NO.1 AND THE HONBLE TRIBUNAL WHICH ULTIMATELY RESULTED IN THE PASSING OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER ANNEXURE-A I.E., APPLICATION NO.1063/2017 PASSED BY HONBLE KSAT BANGALORE AND ETC,. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND ORAL ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND) Heard Sri Venkatesh S. Arbatti, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri V. Shivareddy, learned Additional Government Advocate, for respondent Nos. 1 and 2-State. 2. The Karnataka Lokayukta, assailing the order in Application No.1063/2017 dated 05.08.2019, passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, Bengaluru (for short, - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36863-DB WP No. 2688 of 2024 ‘the Tribunal’), is before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. While respondent No.3 was working as Manager, Karnataka Housing Board, a complaint was filed by Sri K. Siddappa alleging payment of compensation to ineligible persons in respect of lands bearing Survey No.35/3 measuring 2 Acres 12 Guntas, Survey No.36 measuring 1 Acre 34 Guntas, and Survey No.108/3 measuring 38 Guntas of Banahalli Village, Anekal Taluk. The petitioner, after considering the reply of respondent No.3, submitted a report under Section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, dated 29.10.2011, recommending departmental enquiry. Thereafter, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against respondent No.3, and the enquiry was entrusted to the petitioner, who nominated an enquiry officer. 3.1 The enquiry report was submitted on 21.05.2015, holding the charges to be proved. Subsequently, on 05.06.2015, the petitioner recommended imposition of the penalty of compulsory retirement from service, which was later modified on 13.07.2016 to the penalty of permanent withholding of 50% of pension. A show-cause notice was issued - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36863-DB WP No. 2688 of 2024 to respondent No.3, to which a reply was filed. Respondent No.1, by order dated 22.12.2016, imposed the penalty of permanent withholding of 50% of pension. This order of penalty became the subject matter of the application before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, in the impugned order, having noted that the disciplinary proceedings were concluded after a period of ten years without any reasonable explanation, set aside the order dated 22.12.2016 imposing the penalty. Consequently, the Lokayukta is before this Court. 4. Sri Venkatesh Arbatti, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-Lokayukta, submits that disciplinary proceedings can be continued against a retired Government servant. He further submits that respondent No.3 faced a serious charge of payment of compensation in respect of acquisition of lands in favour of a person not entitled to receive the same. Learned counsel contends that the enquiry was completed within a reasonable time and that the penalty imposed is proportionate to the alleged misconduct. - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36863-DB WP No. 2688 of 2024 5. Sri V. Shivareddy, learned Additional Government Advocate, appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2, supports the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties, we are not inclined to entertain this writ petition for the reasons stated hereunder. 7. The complaint was registered on 08.11.2002 in respect of an incident that occurred on 04.02.1994. Respondent No.3 filed a reply on 09.05.2003, whereas the Articles of Charge were issued on 02/30.05.2012. The Tribunal set aside the penalty on the ground of delay in the conclusion of the enquiry. The necessity for the early conclusion of departmental enquiries has been enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and Others v. Chaman Lal Goyal [(1995) 2 SCC 570], which reads as follows: "9. ....It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36863-DB WP No. 2688 of 2024 too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing." 8. If the facts of the present case are examined in the light of the principle enunciated above, it is seen that the complaint dated 08.11.2002 relates to an incident on 04.02.1994. Respondent No.3 filed a reply on 09.05.2003, whereas the Articles of Charge were issued on 02/30.05.2012. Respondent No.3 retired on superannuation on 31.08.2012. These dates indicate that the Articles of Charge were issued shortly before his retirement, nearly ten years after the complaint was lodged. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, such a delay is not fair to the delinquent officer and renders the task of proving the charges difficult. Where the delay is too long and unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. In the present case, the delay of ten years is considerable and cannot be ignored, as it would cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself. - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36863-DB WP No. 2688 of 2024 9. In the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chaman Lal Goyal (supra), the order of the Tribunal, allowing the application and quashing the order of penalty on the ground of delay in the conclusion of the enquiry, is justified. 10. We are not inclined to entertain this writ petition for another reason. The order of the Tribunal is dated 05.08.2019, whereas the present petition was filed on 23.01.2024, nearly four and a half years later. The petition does not offer any explanation for the delay in filing. When queried by the Court, learned counsel for the petitioner had no explanation to offer. Although no specific limitation is prescribed for filing a writ petition, the right must be exercised within a reasonable time. A delay of four and a half years cannot be regarded as reasonable, and, in the circumstances, the petition is liable to be dismissed on account of delay and laches. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others (2024 SCC OnLine SC 551), has considered the question of delay in approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36863-DB WP No. 2688 of 2024 Constitution of India and, at paragraphs 9 to 13, has held as follows: “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36863-DB WP No. 2688 of 2024 submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36863-DB WP No. 2688 of 2024 [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36863-DB WP No. 2688 of 2024 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36863-DB WP No. 2688 of 2024 apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held: - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36863-DB WP No. 2688 of 2024 “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 12. In the light of the above judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the delay of four and a half years cannot be considered reasonable for entertaining this petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 13. In the light of the aforesaid reasons, while upholding the order of the Tribunal, the present writ petition is dismissed on account of delay in the conclusion of the - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36863-DB WP No. 2688 of 2024 disciplinary enquiry as well as delay in filing the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. Pending I.A.s, if any, stand disposed of. Sd/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (K. V. ARAVIND) JUDGE DDU List No.: 1 Sl No.: 10