( 2025:HHC:24049 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA LPA No: 335 of 2024 Reserved on: 28.05.2025 Announced: 24.07.2025 _______________________________________________________________________ Khubwati Appellant Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & others ...Respondents Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge 1Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the appellant: Mr. Hirdaya Ram, Advocate. For the respondents: Ms. Priyanka Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General. Ranjan Sharma, Judge Appellant-writ petitioner, Khubwati, has come up before this Court in instant appeal, assailing the judgment dated 21.11.2023, [referred to as Impugned judgment] passed by the Learned Single Judge in CWP No.7850 of 2022, In re: Khubwati versus the State of Himachal Pradesh and others, whereby, the claim of appellant-writ petitioner for compassionate appointment was dismissed, by recording a finding that the claim was time barred and, therefore, the rejection orders dated 28.02.2014, Annexure P-8 and ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 2 - 26.08.2022, Annexure P-13, do not suffer from any perversity or illegality and did not call for any interference. FACTUAL MATRIX BEFORE WRIT COURT [CWP No 7850 OF 2022]: 2. Mother of the Appellant-writ petitioner, Late Smt. Heera Devi, was appointed as a Peon in the office of Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies at Kullu on 26.07.1973 and she died during the course of employment on 20.06.2009. After her death, the appellant applied for release of family pension and other dues on 22.12.2009 {Annexure P-4} but this prayer was declined on 01.02.2017, Annexure P-5, [in writ file] on the ground, that the appellant-writ petitioner claims herself to be a divorcee but she failed to submit any divorce-deed. CLAIM FOR COMPASSIONATE APPOINTMENT: 2(i). In addition, it is averred that appellant- writ petitioner applied for compassionate appointment to Respondent No.3 on 04.01.2010, Annexure P-7 and another application through relative on 23.03.2010 but nothing was done. It is averred that she submitted one more application for compassionate appointment ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 3 - on 20.03.2013, but the same was rejected by the Respondents on 28.02.2014, [Annexure P-8, in writ file], on the ground, that the claim was time barred as it was submitted beyond three years of death of her mother. The appellant-writ petitioner submitted another application/representation for compassionate appointment on 02.06.2015, Annexure P-9. 2(ii). It is averred that the State Government notified New Policy of Compassionate Appointment on 07.03.2019, Annexure P-11, in which, the time limit for submitting application for employment was increased from 3 years to 4 years and therefore, the appellant-writ petitioner again applied for compassionate appointment on 29.07.2019, Annexure P-12, but the same was rejected by the Respondents on 26.08.2022, [Annexure P-13 in writ file], on the ground, that the appellant was bound to make an application for compassionate appointment within three years from the date of death of her mother, [who died on 20.09.2009] whereas she submitted an application for employment beyond three years on 20.03.2013 and therefore, her claim was rejected, as being time- ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 4 - barred. 2(iii). Rejection dated 26.08.2022, Annexure P-13, was assailed by the appellant-writ petitioner in CWP No.7850 of 2022, on the ground that as per Government of India Instructions dated 16.01.2013, Annexure P-14, and based on this, her case should have been considered and also in view of the Division Bench judgement of this Court, in CWP No. 3100 of 2020, titled Mamta Devi versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors, decided on 28.10.2020, Annexure P-15, which entitles the married daughters for employment on compassionate grounds, by extending similar treatment. Other documents i.e. Annexure P-9 (colly), was placed on record to assert her claim for compassionate employment in writ petition, with the prayer for giving appointment to her on compassionate grounds. STAND OF STATE AUTHORITIES BEFORE WRIT COURT: 3. State Authorities-Respondents filed a Reply -Affidavit dated 30.05.2023 of Registrar Cooperative Societies, Himachal Pradesh, Shimla. Reply-Affidavit admits that the mother of appellant-writ petitioner ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 5 - joined service as a peon on 26.07.1993 and she died on 20.06.2009, while working as such in the office of Assistant Registrar Co-operative Societies Kullu. 3(i). Reply-Affidavit states in clear terms that the appellant-writ petitioner applied for job for the first time on 20.03.2013. However, the stand of appellant-writ petitioner that she applied for job on 04.01.2010 Annexure P-7, was denied, with averments that application dated 04.01.2010 was never received by the State Authorities. 3(ii). Reply-Affidavit further indicates that the first application dated 20.03.2013 for compassionate appointment was processed but her claim was rejected on 10.06.2013, [Annexure R-II, First Rejection Order] on the ground, that appellant-writ petitioner had applied for job beyond three years from the date of death of her mother and therefore, the same was time-barred as per Clause 8 of Compassionate Appointment Policy dated 18.01.1990. Likewise, the representation dated 28.01.2014, Annexure R-IV, was examined with reference to the application alleged to have been submitted on 04.01.2010 but after ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 6 - scrutinizing the records and the fact that no such application was never received in the department, the claim for compassionate appointment was rejected on 28.02.2014, [Annexure R-8, Second Rejection Order in writ file], on the ground that the application for employment was made beyond the period of three years in the policy. Reply further states appellant submitted another representation to the Chief Minister wherein, directions were given to examine the case and based on this, the Registrar Cooperative Societies forwarded the case to the Additional Chief Secretary (Cooperation) on 15.03.2016, Annexure R-V, stating that the appellant had applied for job beyond three years and the claim was time-barred coupled with the fact that the appellant-writ petitioner did not fulfil the educational qualification of matriculation as she was middle pass only and in this scenario, the case was sent for relaxation and after examining the matter, the Joint Secretary [Cooperation] directed Registrar Cooperative Societies on 19.03.2016, Annexure R-VI, that the time limit of three years for applying for job on compassionate grounds {Clause 8} as in ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 7 - Policy dated 18.01.1990, was reiterated as per OM dated 22.05.2015, modified on 24.02.2016 mandating that time limit of three years for applying for job on compassionate grounds cannot be relaxed. In view of this, the Assistant Registrar addressed a letter on 25.10.2016, Annexure R-VII, affirming that application dated 04.01.2010 alleged to be an application for the job was never received in this office; and in view of this, the claim of the appellant-writ petitioner was rejected again on 02.12.2016, [Annexure R-VIII, Third Rejection Order], on the ground, that once the appellant-writ petitioner had not applied for job within the time frame of three years, in terms of Clause 8 of the policy of compassionate appointment dated 18.01.1990, by reiterating the time limit on 24.02.2016, which could not be relaxed. Even after coming into force of the New Policy on 07.03.2019, Annexure P-11, she submitted a fresh application on 29.07.2019, Annexure P-12, but her case was again rejected on 26.08.2022, [Annexure P-13, Fourth Rejection Order] on the ground, that the appellant -writ petitioner applied for employment on 20.03.2013, ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 8 - i.e. beyond time limit of three years and even no relaxation in such time limit was permissible, and therefore, the case for compassionate appointment was rejected in accordance with the Policy. In this background, the State Authorities have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. REBUTTAL BEFORE THE WRIT COURT: 4. In Rejoinder, the Appellant-writ petitioner averred that once as per Clause 8 of the Policy dated 18.01.1990, Annexure P-1, the relaxation was given to those dependents, who at the time of death of deceased employee were minor to apply for job within three years of attaining majority by extending similar relaxation to the appellant-writ petitioner. The claim for job on compassionate grounds on the ground of being a married daughter was reiterated in view of the judgment in case of Mamta Devi’s (supra) [CWP No.3100 of 2020], Annexure P-15. IMPUGNED JUDGMENT DATED 21.11.2023: 5. Learned Single Judge dismissed the CWP No. 7850 of 2022, filed by appellant-writ petitioner on 11.10.2022, on the ground, that the appellants ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 9 - mother died on 20.06.2009 and she was supposed to apply for job on compassionate grounds within three years of the death of her mother but since she applied for job for first time only on 20.03.2013 therefore, the claim being time-barred was rejected in terms of Clause 8 of the Policy dated 18.01.1990, Annexure P-1 and the time limit of three years for submitting application for job was not relaxable. In these circumstances, Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, by upholding the assailed rejection orders. 6. GROUNDS OF CHALLENGE TO THE IMPUGNED JUDGEMENT IN LPA: Learned Counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner has assailed the Impugned Judgement dated 21.11.2023 dismissing her claim for compassionate appointment on the grounds, that firstly, the writ petition has been dismissed without appreciating the facts ; and secondly, the rejection of claim ignoring that the appellant had submitted an application for compassionate appointment on 4.01.2010 {Ann P-7} within three years of death of her mother; and thirdly, rejection of claim by invoking delay and ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 10 - laches when, appellant had made representation from time to time is erroneous; and fourthly, the appellant, being a married daughter is entitled for appointment in terms of the judgment in the case of Mamta Devi [supra] and fifthly, the time-limit of three years for submitting application for job was relaxed in case of minor for three years after attaining majority, then, the appellant was entitled for relaxation in time- limit ; and sixthly, the appellant was entitled for benefit of judgment in case of Surinder Kumar [CWP No. 9094 of 2013, decided on 06.10.2015 as referred to in the rejection orders dated 2.12.2016, Annexure R-VIII] ; and lastly, the time-line of three years for applying for a job under Clause 8 of 1990 policy was increased to four years under the Revised-New Policy of 2019 and therefore, the case of appellant-writ petitioner was erroneously rejected by the Learned Single Judge as time-barred. In this backdrop, the prayer was made to accept the appeal, by setting aside the judgement passed by the Learned Single Judge. 7. Heard, Mr. Hirdaya Ram, Learned Counsel ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 11 - for the appellant-writ petitioner and Ms. Priyanka Chauhan, Learned Deputy Advocate General for the State Authorities. ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 8. Based on the material on record, and after taking into account the applicable policies and the mandate of law, this Court proceeds to analyze the contentions of the Learned Counsel for the appellant- writ petitioner here-in-under:- 8(i). First contention of Learned Counsel for the appellant is that the Learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition without appreciating the facts. The above plea is misplaced, for the reason, that Learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition, after duly appreciating the factual matrix and applicable policies for compassionate appointment. Perusal of Impugned Judgement reveals that Learned Single Judge has duly considered the factual matrix that the mother of the appellant died during service on 20.6.2009 and the appellant-writ petitioner applied for job on compassionate grounds for the first time ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 12 - on 20.03.2013. Based on Clause 8 of the applicable Policy dated 18.1.1990, the Learned Single Judge held that since the application dated 20.03.2013 was submitted beyond three years of the death of her mother therefore, claim was rejected as time-barred on 10.06.2013, {Annexure R-II}. 8(ii). Learned Single Judge has recorded a finding that the first rejection order dated 10.6.2013 was not assailed by the appellant-writ petitioner and was allowed to attain finality. Learned Single Judge noted that instead of assailing this rejection, the appellant-writ petitioner made a fresh representation on 28.01.2014, {Annexure R-IV}, which was rejected on 28.02.2014 {Annexure P-8} and thereafter she submitted another representation in the year 2016, which was turned down on 02.12.2016, {Annexure R-VIII}. The Learned Single Judge also noticed that appellant-writ petitioner kept on making representation one after the other without choosing to assail the first rejection order dated 10.06.2013 {Annexure R-II}, which gave a cause of action to the appellant as her case was rejected in view of the applicable policy ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 13 - dated 18.01.1990 {Clause 8 thereof} and the inaction of not-questioning the rejection and allowing it to become stale, would neither revive the cause of action nor the state claims which suffer from the vires of delay and laches, be reopened by filing a writ petition after a long lapse in 2022, and even the subsequent representations were of no consequence as per the mandate of Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of SS Rathore vs State of Madhya Pradesh (1989) 4 SCC 582. In this backdrop, the judgement passed by Learned Single Judge, being well reasoned, and passed after appreciation of factual and legal matrix and the conduct of the appellant in placing distorted and misleading facts, refrains this Court from showing indulgence in instant proceedings. 9. Second contention of Learned Counsel for appellant is that Learned Single Judge has altogether ignored that the appellant-writ petitioner had applied for job on 04.01.2010 [Annexure P-7], within three years of date of death and therefore, her claim was held to be time-barred, erroneously. ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 14 - The above contention is contrary to records. Perusal of Reply-Affidavit reveals that the application dated 04.01.2010 was never received in the department. Perusal of remarks/endorsement made by the office in communication on 28.01.2014 Annexure R-IV, and dated 19.03.2016 Annexure R-VI, and communication dated 25.10.2025, Annexure R-VII, collectively go on to establish that the application dated 04.01.2010 and 23.03.2010 {Annexure P-7, colly} were never received in the office. Even, the appellants have not placed on record any cogent and convincing material to establish that the applications dated 04.01.2010 and 23.03.2010 were in-fact and truly submitted. In absence of any material to establish that this application was in fact submitted therefore, this Court is left with no option but to infer that the appellant -writ petitioner has placed distorted and incorrect facts, just to secure favorable orders, which is abuse of process of this Court. DISTORTED FACTS AND COMING WITH UNCLEAN HANDS DISENTILES APPELLANT FOR RELIEF: 9(i). The appellant has not come with clean hands, which is an abuse of process of law. In ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 15 - these circumstances, this Court would have imposed exemplary costs, but in the peculiar facts of this case, this Court takes a lenient view and refrains from imposing exemplary costs. A litigant, alike the appellant cannot play hide and seek with the Court. The conduct of the appellant in placing distorted facts or twisted facts and in not making full and fair, candid and clear and true disclosure of all the facts and/or in placing non-existing facts with intention to seek favorable orders or to mislead this Court, is sufficient to disentitle the appellant, for the equitable and discretionary relief in Article 226 and thereafter in the intra-court proceedings, in view of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Hari Narain vs Badri Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1558 [Para 7]; and in Prestige Lights Ltd vs State Bank of India (2007) 8 SCC 449; and in Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 1 SCC 560 ; and in K. D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited, (2008) 12 SCC 481 [Paras 34 to 39] ; and in Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 16 - (2010) 2 SCC 114, [Paras 9-24] and in Manohar Lal (Dead) by Lrs. v. Ugrasen, (2010) 11 SCC 557 [Paras 48-50]; and ; and in Abhudya Sanstha vs Union of India, (2011) 6 SCC 145; [Para 22] and the above principle was reiterated in K Jayaram & Ors vs Bangalore Development Authority (2022) 12 SCC 815 [Para 10] and in Auroville Foundation vs Natasha Storey, 2025 INSC 348 [Paras 9 &10] that an attempt to deceive the Court by placing fabricated and forged document was deprecated ; and “doctrine of clean hands and/or in placing distorted/twisted facts/non-existent facts is applicable with full force, to every proceedings before any judicial forum” and a litigant, alike the appellant-writ petitioner, who did not approach this Court with clean hands, by pleading incorrect and distorted facts, {when, the application dated 04.01.2010, and 23.03.2010, alleged to have been submitted, was inquired into and it transpired that these requests were never received by the official respondents as per the stand in the Reply Affidavit. Nothing was placed on record by appellant to establish/re-assert ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 17 - her stand and therefore, these applications appear to have been submitted as an afterthought, just to mislead this Court, which is deprecated. In these circumstances, aforesaid improper conduct of appellant-writ petitioner, is sufficient to disallow the equitable and discretionary relief to the appellants, in Article 226 proceedings and now in Intra-Court appeal. Accordingly, the plea of the appellants-writ petitioner, being misconceived was rightly disallowed by Learned Single Judge and the contention of Learned Counsel is turned down and the impugned judgment is upheld. 10. Third contention of Learned Counsel for the appellant is that the Learned Single Judge has dismissed the claim for employment on compassionate grounds by invoking the principle of delay and latches, erroneously. The above plea is misplaced, as firstly, mother of appellant-writ petitioner died on 20.06.2009 and as per Clause 8 of the Policy dated 18.01.1990 {Annexure P-1 in writ file}, appellant-writ petitioner was to required submit an application for employment ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 18 - within three years of the death of government servant (20.06.2009) and the aforesaid period of three years elapsed on 19.06.2012 whereas the appellant-writ petitioner submitted as application for employment only on 20.03.2013 beyond the time line of three years and therefore, it was rejected on 10.06.2013 {Annexure R-II}; and secondly, the rejection order dated 10.6.2013 was not assailed by the appellant and the same was allowed to attain finality ; and thirdly, the appellant-writ petitioner made a fresh representation on 28.01.2014, {Annexure R-IV}, which was rejected on 28.02.2014 {Annexure P-8} and even this rejection order was not assailed by the appellant ; and fourthly appellant submitted another representation to the Chief Minister on 15.03.2016, {Annexure R-V}, on which the concerned authorities were directed on 20.06.2015 to examine the matter and pursuant to this, Registrar Cooperation forwarded the case to Additional Chief Secretary (Cooperation) on 15.03.2016, Annexure R-V, reiterating that claim was time-barred in terms of Clause 8 of 1990 policy, which this mandatory stipulated of the time limit was reiterated ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 19 - in OM dated 24.02.2016 coupled with the fact that she did not possess the educational qualification of matriculation, whereas she was middle pass and therefore, in these circumstances, the rejection of her case on 2.12.2016 {Annexure R-VIII}, for having raised a claim beyond the time line of three years was time barred and educational ineligibility, also added to negating the claim of the appellant-writ petitioner. STALE CAUSE CANNOT BE REVIVED BY MAKING SUCCESSIVE REPRESENTATION(S) INCLUDING NON - STATUTORY REPRESENTATION: 10(i). Above narrative reveals that though the claim of the appellant-writ petitioner was rejected by State Authorities for the first time on 10.06.2013 {Annexure R-II} and she chose not to question the same. Even, second rejection order dated 28.02.2014 {Annexure P-8} was not assailed. Instead thereof, she submitted a representation to the Chief Minister, which led to passing of the third rejection order on 02.12.2016, {Annexure R-VIII}. Even after this, she submitted a fresh representation to authorities on 27.09.2019 {Annexure P-12}, which led to passing ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 20 - of fourth rejection on 26.08.2022, {Annexure P-13}. Once the cause of action accrued to the appellant on issuance of the first rejection order on 10.06.2013 {Annexure R-II} but instead of assailing the same, she chose to make representations, one after the other, which were also rejected, then, the repeated representations and the rejection thereof with same stand, will neither give rise to fresh cause nor will it revive the cause of action, which accrued in the year 2013, as per the Constitutional Bench mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of S S Rathore vs State of Madhya Pradesh (1989) 4 SCC 582. This principle has been reiterated in State of Uttar Pradesh vs Rajmati Singh (2023) 20 SCC 817 [Paras 12-20]. Appellant was supposed to be cautious and she was not to wait indefinitely for espousing her grievance from the date the cause of action or affectation of her right began on passing of first rejection orders on 10.06.2013 {Annexure R-II}. However, once the appellant had chosen not to avail legal remedy but to wait and to make repeated representations, including non-statutory representation ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 21 - dated 2.06.2015 {Annexure P-9}, which was rejected on 02.12.2016, {Annexure R-8} then, the rejection of non-statutory representation(s) will neither extend cause of action nor limitation, in the light of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chief Executive Officer & Ors vs S Lalitha, 2025 SCC Online SC 916. ACQUISCENCE BARS RIGHT AND REMEDY: 10(ii). Moreover, the material on record reveals that though the rejection order(s) were passed on 10.06.2013 {Annexure R-II} and then on 28.02.2014 {Annexure P-8} and on 02.12.2016, {Annexure R-VIII} but the appellant-writ petitioner has not questioned these orders before the appropriate judicial forums but she slept over the matter and has failed to do an act which is required by law, so as to assert her right, so as to stand in the way of the appellant for getting relief and remedy. In this view of the matter, the Learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed in the year 2022, on the ground of delay and laches. Even acquiescence of the appellants adds to negating the ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 22 - right and remedy of the appellant-writ petitioner in instant intra-court appeal, in view of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in Union of India vs N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25 {Paras 20 to 26}. In the above backdrop, the Impugned Judgement passed by the Learned Single Judge, dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches does not call for any interference. 11. Fourth contention of Learned Counsel is that Learned Single Judge has ignored the material aspect that she was a married daughter and that being so, her case ought to have been considered for appointed in terms of the judgment in case of Mamta Devi [CWP No. 3100 of 2020], Annexure P-15 which was followed in the cases of Sapna Kumari [CWP No 4521 of 2021] and in Rani Devi [CWPOA No 5378 of 2020] decided on 09.09.2024}. The above contention of Learned Counsel by placing reliance on the judgements in the cases of Mamta Devi, Sapna and Rani Devi (supra), is misplaced. Firstly, the aforesaid judgements are not applicable and the same are distinguishable on facts. ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 23 - Secondly, the factual matrix in aforesaid judgement in case of Mamta Devi (supra), reveals that her father, Late Shri Thakur Dass died on 08.05.2019 and as per Revised-New Policy in 07.03.2019 though she applied for job within four years yet her case was rejected on 22.06.2020, on the plea, that there was no provision to give employment to a married daughter, as per Clause 2 of Revised Policy and this rejection was assailed by filing the writ petition in the year 2020; and likewise, a perusal of the judgement in case of Sapna Devi (supra), indicates that her father, Late Shri Prem Lal died on 14.12.2020 and even as per the Revised-New Policy issued on 07.03.2019 though she applied for job within four years (on 20.03.2021) yet her case was rejected on 22.07.2021, on the plea that married daughter was not entitled for employment assistance and she assailed the rejection by filing writ petition in the year 2021; and similarly, a perusal of the judgement in the case of Rani Devi (supra), indicates that her father, Late Shri Jagat Ram died on 03.08.2004 and as per the Un-Revised Policy dated 18.01.1990 ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 24 - though she applied for job within three year yet her case was rejected, on the plea that the married daughter was not entitled for employment assistance and she assailed the rejection by filing OA before Administrative Tribunal in the year 2018 ; whereas in the instant case, the appellant-writ petitioner Khubwati’s mother, Late Smt. Heera Devi died on 20.06.2009 and though she was bound to apply for job within three years upto 19.06.2012 but the appellant-writ petitioner applied for job for first time on 20.03.2013 (Annexure R-1), i.e. beyond three years, which was dehors the prescription in Clause 8 of Policy dated 18.01.1990, which was reiterated in OM dated 24.02.2016 {referred in Annexures R-VI & R-VIII} coupled with the fact that out of four rejection orders, two of them were not assailed which attained finality and even the second rejection order dated 28.02.2014 {Annexure P-8} was assailed by way of a writ petition filed in the year 2022, and therefore, the writ petition was validly dismissed by Learned Single Judge and thirdly, the mandate in the aforesaid judgements will not be of any ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 25 - assistance to the appellant-writ petitioner solely on the plea of being a married daughter without having applied for job within the time line of three years; and fourthly, the appellant-writ petitioner has no vested right to claim appointment on compassionate grounds dehors the Policy/Scheme, as in this case; and fifthly, the mandate of law in the aforesaid judgments comes to the aid of those who had applied for job within three years from the date of death of deceased relative but their case was erroneously rejected by the state authorities on the plea that dependant seeking job was married daughter and was thus not covered under the Policy/Scheme, and moreover, when, as per the mandate of law in State of Maharashtra versus Madhuri Maruti, (2022) SCC Online SC 1327, {Paras 4-13 & 14} claim for compassionate appointment by a married daughter years after the death of deceased employee was not tenable, as in this case; and sixthly, the aforesaid judgements cannot be permitted to be invoked, so as to enable a dependant, who was not desirous of seeking a job and chose not to apply for the same ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 26 - within three years of the date of death of relative in terms of Clause 8 of the Policy dated 18.01.1990, which was applicable at relevant time; and seventhly, the mandate of law in the aforesaid judgements cannot be stretched to an infinite level, so as to reopen all past cases, resulting in unsettling the settled position; and eighthly, even the Policy dated 18.1.1990, Annexure P-1, besides, the prime test of indigency, the consideration, can be categorized into two broad stages, prescribing “conditions regarding eligibility” and “conditions regarding selection of eligible for appointment”. So far as the first stage is concerned, a person has to satisfy the “conditions regarding eligibility”, which are spelt out in Clause 2, defining “priority dependants” read with Clause 5 (a) to (d) laying down “other conditions”, and also by adhering to the mandatory “time-line of three years for applying for job” as per Clause 8 of the policy. So far as, the second stage is concerned, an eligible dependant is required to satisfy “conditions regarding selection of eligibles for appointment”, by adopting a selective approach on various parameters indicated ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 27 - in Clause 10, and if needed to invoke relaxation {only qua permissible four eventualities i.e. recruitment procedure, ban on recruitment, educational qualification for Class-IV & widow and age relaxation}, as per Clause 7 before making appointment. In the above backdrop, once the Policy of 18.01.1990, (supra), contemplated two stages and if a person fails to pass the first stage of eligibility, then, in that event, second stage mandating consideration by resorting to selective approach towards appointment need not be necessarily resorted to, as in this case and lastly, concession of compassionate employment cannot be extended to the appellant-writ petitioner herein, dehors the applicable Policy/Scheme, reads as under:- “BELATED REQUESTS FOR COMPASSIONATE APPOINTMENT: 8. Requests of employment assistance should be received in the Department concerned within three years of the death of the Government servant. In case where none of the sons /daughters of the deceased Government servant attain majority (Age of 18 years) at the time of the death of the government servant, the time limit for receipt of request for employment assistance in department concerned will be attainment of age of 21 years by the eldest son /unmarried daughter. No relaxation will be allowed in entertaining request beyond the ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 28 - above age except in the case of son/un- married daughter/widow of deceased Govt. servants belonging to the difficult areas as laid down the transfer policy.” In these circumstances, the reliance on the aforesaid judgements is misplaced, on facts of instant matter, as discussed above. 12. Fifth contention, of Learned Counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner is that the Learned Single Judge has ignored the fact that as per the Policy dated 18.01.1990 (Annexure P-1), once three years relaxation, has been given to the dependants who were minor at the time of death till the date of attaining age of majority, then, similar relaxation should have been given to appellant-writ petitioner which has led to an erroneous order. 12(i). The first part of the above contention of Learned Counsel for appellant is devoid of any merit, in view of the fact that firstly, the power of relaxation can be exercised by an authority only for purposes indicated in an enactment, rules or policy ; and secondly, a perusal of the policy dated 18.01.1990, Annexure P-1, provides for relaxation ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 29 - as per Clause 7 (a) to (d) only to meet out any of the three defined eventualities {i.e. relaxation in recruitment process; relaxation in ban on filling posts and relaxation in educational qualifications in genuine cases, for Class-IV posts or in case of widow}; and thirdly, even Policy dated 18.01.1990, does not contains any provision for relaxing Clause 8 of the Policy which prescribes time limit of three years from the date of death of deceased employee in applying for the job ; and fourthly, a perusal of OM dated 24.02.2016 {as in Annexure R-VI/VIII} prohibits relaxation in time limit of three years in submitting an application for job on compassionate grounds; and fifthly, even Clause 7 of Revised Policy dated 07.03.2019, Annexure P-11, {though not applicable in instant case, as discussed herein}, also prohibits relaxation in time-limit in applying for job on compassionate grounds ; and sixthly, in absence of any provision for relaxation {qua time limit in submission of application for job in Clause 8} and in case, relaxation is circumscribed by conditions, then, the aforesaid conditions have ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 30 - to be satisfied before permitting relaxation, which are absent in instant case and therefore, the plea of appellant-writ petitioner for relaxation is contrary to the mandate of law, in the cases of, Inspector General (Karmik) and others versus Prahalad Mani Tripathi, (2007) 6 SCC 162, {Para 7} ; Council of Scientific and Industrial Research and Others versus Ramesh Chandra Agrawal and another (2009) 3 SCC 35, {Para 44} ; and relaxation can neither be claimed nor granted so as to dispense with or dilute the minimum essentialities so as to throw entire policy or norms or rules overboard or to atrophied the norms is impermissible, in view of the principle outlined in Bhupendra Nath Hazarika and another versus State of Assam and others, (2013) 2 SCC 156. PARITY IMPERMISSIBLE BETWEEN DIFFERENT CLASSES OF PERSONS_DEPENDANTS {MAJOR] VIS-A-VIS DEPENDANT [MINOR]: 12(ii). Second part of the contention of Learned Counsel for appellant-writ petitioner that once Clause 8 of 1990 Policy provides for granting relaxation/ extension of three years period for applying for job to dependant who was minor, at the time of death ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 31 - of deceased-employee-relative till he attains majority {18 years}, and by enabling such a dependant to apply for job within three years therefrom {21 years} then, similar relaxation or extension in submitting application for compassionate appointment was to be given to the appellant is misconceived when, both set of dependants constitute two different classes and there cannot be any parity or equation amongst unequals. Moreover, this plea stands strength from the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh and another versus Shashi Kumar, (2019) 3 SCC 653, in the following terms:- 4. The High Court, during the course of the judgment, framed as many as nine issues which were in the following terms: “(i) Whether the amount of family pension and other retiral benefits, received by the family of the deceased-employee, can be included in the family income for denying the compassionate appointment? (ii) to (vi) … not relevant... (vii) Whether a person can claim compassionate appointment after a considerable delay? (viii) to (ix) … … not relevant... 5. Insofar as the present appeal is concerned, the State of Himachal ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 32 - Pradesh has contested the decision of the High Court on issues (i) and (vii). Hence, for the purposes of this appeal, the present judgment governs only the above aspects of the case. 36. We are not impressed with the submission that delay should not be taken into account since Paragraph 8 of the Scheme contemplates that in a situation where all the dependent children of the deceased employee have yet to attain the age of majority, the time limit for submission of an application is extended until the first of the children attains the age of twenty one years. A case where each of the children is a minor falls in a different class altogether. This cannot be equated with a situation where a dependent of a deceased employee who was a major on the date of death fails to submit an application within a reasonable period of time from the death of the employee. This aspect of delay has been dealt with in other decisions of this Court, including State of J&K Vs. Sajad Ahmed Mir (2006) 5 SCC 766 and Local Administration Department vs. M. Selvanayagam (2011) 13 SCC 42..” 12(iii). Upholding the condition of three years for submitting claim for compassionate appointment in the applicable Rule-Scheme or Policy to be justifiable and logical, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Tinku versus State of Haryana and others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3292, has held, in the following terms: ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 33 - 15. The purpose, therefore, of such policies is to give immediate succour to the family. When seen in this conspectus, three years as has been laid down from the date of death of the employee for putting forth a claim by a dependant, which, includes attainment of majority as per the 1999 policy instructions issued by the Government of Haryana cannot be said to be in any case unjustified or illogical, especially when, compassionate appointment is not a vested right. 13. Last contention of Learned Counsel for the appellant is that, the time-line of three years for applying for a job on compassionate grounds under Clause 8 of 1990 Policy was increased to four years under Revised-New Policy of compassionate grounds notified on 07.03.2019 and therefore, the appellant- writ petitioner was to be granted benefit under the Revised Policy of 2019 and this fact was ignored by Learned Single Judge erroneously. The above plea is devoid of any merit for the reason, that the appellant-writ petitioner has no right to claim benefit of the Revised-New Policy of 2019, Annexure P-11. Further, the Revised-New Policy of 2019 was to apply to those cases, which were pending on the date of issuance of the revised ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 34 - policy and such a case had not been decided earlier. Even, the Revised Policy of 2019 cannot be applied retrospectively so as cover the case of the appellant- writ petitioner, where, the death of her mother took place on 20.06.2009 and she had a right to apply for job within three years from the date of death of her mother before 19.06.2012 but since she had applied for job for first time on 20.03.2013 (Annexure R-1) therefore, her application was validly rejected for first time on 10.06.2013 (Annexure R-II) as per Clause 8 of 1990 Policy, which was reiterated to be mandatory as per the OM dated 24.02.2016. Moreover, once the case of appellant stood rejected under the Earlier Policy of 1990, on three occasions {firstly on 10.06.2013, Annexure R-II; secondly on 28.02.2014, Annexure P-8 and thirdly on 02.12.2016, Annexure R-VIII} prior to the issuance of Revised- New Policy of 2019, then, finality has to be attached even to administrative orders. Mere issuance of the Revised Policy cannot confer any right on appellant to claim reconsideration, as permitting such plea shall amount to re-opening of stale claims, as in ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 35 - this case. The appellant has neither been able to point out the infringement of any provision in 1990 Policy, and the appellant-writ petitioner cannot seek reconsideration of her case/claim dehors the 1990 Policy, which is impermissible. Thus, in view of the factual matrix and mandate of law, in cases of Prahalad Mani Tripathi, Ramesh Chandra Agrawal and Bhupendra Nath Hazarika (supra), the prescription of the time-limit of three years for submitting application for job on compassionate grounds, contained in Clause 8 of 1990 Policy is mandatory. In absence of any provision for relaxation and in absence of any guidelines for exercising relaxation of such Clause, then, in such a scenario, the time-limit could neither be tinkered with nor diluted. Even, the OM dated 24.02.2016 reiterates that the time-limit of 3 years for applying for job is mandatory. In these circumstances, once the appellant-writ petitioner had failed to submit her application for job, within mandatory time-line of three years from the date of death of her mother then, the appellant has neither any locus standii ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 36 - nor any right to seek relaxation in the prescribed time-limit. Further, the plea of the appellant that once a dependent, who was minor at the time of death of deceased employee was deferred till he attains the age of majority {18 years} and by enabling him to apply for job within three years thereafter {21 years} then, similar relaxation or extension in submitting application for compassionate appointment was to be given to the appellant also, is untenable. The reason being that appellant, being a dependent was a major on the date of death of her mother but had failed to apply for job within time-limit of three years of the death of her mother constitute a different class altogether vis-à-vis a dependent altogether who was minor on the date of death of deceased employee and in such case, the right to apply for job was deferred for three years till he attains majority {18 years}, and by enabling him to apply for job within three years therefrom {21 years}. While interpreting the provision of Clause 8 of 1990 Policy issued by the Respondent State, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has mandated in the ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 37 - case of Shashi Kumar, which was reiterated in the case of Tinku (supra), that there cannot be any parity between a dependant who was major at the time of death of deceased employee but had failed to apply for job {alike appellant} vis-a-vis another dependant who was minor at the time of death and in whose case, the right to apply was deferred/ extended as both classes of dependants are altogether different. Plea that the appellant is entitled for consideration for job on compassionate grounds, being a married daughter as per the mandate of law in case of Mamta Devi, Annexure P-15 and the judgements subsequent thereto, is of no assistance to the appellant-writ petitioner, for the reason, that solely because the appellant was married daughter will not confer an ipso facto right, when, on facts of instant case, the appellant had failed to apply for job within the time limit of three years and her inaction, lethargy and negligence cannot give a leverage to the appellant dehors the applicable policy/scheme. Even, the factual matrix in cases of Mamta Devi and other subsequent judgements, ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 38 - are altogether different, wherein, dependant(s) therein had applied for job within the time-limit of three years of the death of deceased relative-employee but their claim was rejected/denied to be not covered as per policy whereas in instant case, the claim of the appellant was rejected on the ground that it was time-barred, for want of submission of an application for job, within time frame as mandated under the policy. Besides this, once the claim of the appellant was rejected on four occasions and the appellant chose not to assail the first rejection order passed on 10.06.2013 but she proceeded to assail second rejection order dated 28.02.2014, Annexure P-8, by filing the writ petition only in the year 2022 therefore, the Learned Single Judge validly, dismissed the claim, of the appellant herein for the job, in view of delay and laches. CONTENTION OF LEARNED STATE COUNSEL: 14. Per contra, Learned State Counsel has supported the Impugned Judgment dated 21.11.2023, with submissions that the appellant has no vested right of appointment and time limit of three years ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 39 - for applying for the post from the date of death of her mother as in Clause 8 of 1990 Policy was mandatory. It is contended that the case of the appellant was rejected on four occasions but two of the rejection orders have not been assailed. It is contended that even the Second Rejection Orders passed on 28.02.2014, Annexure P-8, was assailed for the first time by filing a writ petition in 2022. It is contented that appellant cannot claim endless compassion. Learned State Counsel asserts that the appellant cannot claim a job dehors the policy. It is further contended that permitting the claim of appellant, dehors the applicable policy/scheme shall certainly amount to rewriting the terms of 1990 Policy which is impermissible; and lastly even, no mandamus can be issued when no legal right of the appellant-writ petitioner has been violated under applicable policy. TWO OF THE FOUR REJECTION ORDERS NOT ASSAILED: 14(i). Learned State Counsel contends that the appellant has not assailed two of the four rejection orders. The case of the appellant-writ petitioner ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 40 - was rejected for the first time on 10.06.2013, Annexure R-II and secondly on 28.02.2014, Annexure P-8 and thirdly on 2.12.2016, Annexure R-VIII and lastly on 26.08.2022, Annexure P-13 in the writ records. Appellant-writ petitioner has assailed rejection orders dated 28.02.2014, Annexure P-8, and rejection orders dated 26.08.2022, Annexure P-13. Perusal of the writ records reveals that since the two other rejection orders dated 10.06.2013, Annexure R-II and rejection orders dated 2.12.2016, Annexure R-VIII have not been assailed and therefore, they are inferred to have had attained finality. Not laying a challenge to the two rejection orders, shall definitely stand in the way of the appellant, which in itself disentitles the appellant to lay a challenge to the impugned judgment and the same is enough to disallow the claim of the appellant-writ petitioner in instant appeal also. COMPASSIONATE APPOINTMENT NOT A SOURCE OF RECRUITMENT - THERE CANNOT BE ENDLESS COMPASSION: 14(ii). Second contention of Learned State Counsel is that the mother of the appellant-writ petitioner ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 41 - died on 20.06.2009 while serving as Peon in office of Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Kullu, but appellant-writ petitioner slept over her rights and she did not apply for compassionate appointment, within the time limit of three years as per Clause 8 of the Policy dated 18.01.1990, (Annexure P-1). She applied for job for the first time on 20.03.2013 (Annexure R-1). Since application for compassionate appointment was time barred therefore, the same was rightly rejected on 10.06.2013 (Annexure R-II) and same rejection orders were reiterated on 28.02.2014 (Annexure P-8), then on 2.12.2016, Annexure R-VIII and lastly on 26.08.2022 (Annexure P-13). The mother of the appellant died about 15 years ago in the year 2009 in accordance with the applicable norms/rules/policy and her case was rejected on four occasions and the first rejection was passed way back in the year 2013 but the writ petition was filed belatedly only in the year 2022. Now she has come up in instant appeal, and that too without pointing out any indigency. Further, once appellant, being a married daughter, ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 42 - had eked out a living for the last 15 years, then, she has neither any vested right nor any valid claim for appointment on compassionate grounds which is not a regular source of recruitment coupled with the fact that due to elapse of 15 years, the need for immediacy stood lost and when, nothing is on record to show that “indigency” still exists, as per the mandate of law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the cases of Madhuri Maruti and in Debabrata Tiwari (supra) In these circumstances, contention of Learned State Counsel has merit, in view of the judgements passed in case of National Hydroelectric Power Corporation and another versus Nanak Chand and another, (2004) 12 SCC 487, that compassionate appointment is not a source of recruitment, in the following terms:- 5. It is to be seen that the appointment on compassionate ground is not a source of recruitment but merely an exception to the requirement regarding appointments being made on open invitation of application on merits. Basic intention is that on the death of the employee concerned his family is not deprived of the means of livelihood. The object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crises. ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 43 - THERE CANNOT BE ENDLESS COMPASSION: CLAIM IMPERMISSIBLE AFTER CRISES OVER: 14(iii). As a sequel to above, once the appellant being a daughter had eked out of living since the death of her mother in 2009 till 2022 then, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed at any time in future and that too after a long lapse of time and the crisis is over, in view of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Eastern Coalfields Limited versus Anil Badyakar and others (2009) 13 SCC 112, in the following terms:- 20. The principles indicated above would give a clear indication that the compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over. NO CLAIM PERMISSIBLE DEHORS SCHEME POLICY : 14(iv). Third contention of Learned State Counsel is that the appellant-writ petitioner has no right for compassionate appointment, dehors the Rules/Policy dated 18.01.1990. The above contention of Learned State ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 44 - Counsel has merit, in view of the fact that Clause 8 of the 1990 Policy, Annexure P-1, mandates an dependent of a deceased Government servant to apply for compassionate appointment within three years of the death of the Government servant but the appellant-writ petitioner has failed to submit the necessary application within three years of death of Government servant, therefore, Clause 8 certainly stands in the way of appellant-writ petitioner by treating her to be ineligible for further consideration. Moreover, the claim for compassionate appointment is to be tested in the background of the applicable Rules/Scheme /Policy. No person has a right to seek appointment on compassionate grounds dehors the Policy /Scheme, as is being sought for by appellant- writ petitioner in the instant case. Claim dehors the Rules/Scheme cannot be granted, in terms of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Limited versus Madhusudan Das and others (2008) 15 SCC 560, in the following terms:- “15. This Court in a large number of ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 45 - decisions has held that the appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It must be provided for in the rules. The criteria laid down therefor, viz., that the death of the sole bread earner of the family, must be established. It is meant to provide for a minimum relief. When such contentions are raised, the constitutional philosophy of equality behind making such a scheme be taken into consideration. Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India mandate that all eligible candidates should be considered for appointment in the posts which have fallen vacant. Appointment on compassionate ground offered to a dependent of a deceased employee is an exception to the said rule. It is a concession, not a right.” CLAIM FOR APPOINTMENT REGARDLESS OF RULE RULES /SCHEME IMPERMISSIBLE: 14(v). The Hon’ble Supreme Court has outlined that the claim for compassionate appointment should be in consonance with the Rules/Scheme and such appointment cannot be made regardless of applicable Rules/Policy, in State of Rajasthan versus Chandra Narain Verma, (1994) 2 SCC 752, in the following terms: 3. We have heard counsel on both sides. It is one thing to say that a family member of the deceased is entitled to appointment on compassionate ground, but it is altogether a different thing ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 46 - to say that his appointment should be made regardless of the rules. Since he had crossed the maximum age prescribed for the post of Sub- Inspector of Police, the authorities were fully justified in offering him the post of Lower Division Clerk, which he should have accepted. We fail to see how the High Court could in the face of the rules direct the authorities to make his appointment as Sub-Inspector of Police. We, therefore, cannot allow the orders to stand. We set-aside the order of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench and direct that the respondent may join as Lower Division Clerk, if he so desires, within four weeks from today. Any appointment made on pain of contempt proceedings pursuant to the impugned judgement may be cancelled….” COURTS CANNOT REWRITE OR DILUTE TERMS OF POLICY BY ACTING DEHORS NORMS: 14(vi). The provision of Clause 8 of 1990 Policy, which was reiterated on 24.02.2016 provides time limit of 3 years for applying for the job, from the date of death of the deceased employee. After the death of her mother on 20.06.2009, the appellant failed to apply for job within the mandatory period of three years. Failure to adhere to this norm, due to her inactions, lethargy and negligence had resulting in rejection of her claim by treating it to be time-barred. Accepting the prayer of appellant- ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 47 - writ petitioner for re-consideration cannot be acceded to, for the reason, that the appellant has no vested right for compassionate employment and such claim cannot be permitted dehors the Scheme-Policy. The claimed prayer shall result in re-writing the policy- scheme is impermissible. The Hon’ble Supreme Cout has deprecated that Courts cannot rewrite the terms of policy and compassionate appointment must be granted by the terms of the State Policy and cannot be in derogation thereof or dehors thereto in the State of Himachal Pradesh versus Parkash Chand, (2019) 4 SCC 285, in the following terms: 10. In the exercise of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, it was not open to the High Court to rewrite the terms of the Policy. It is well settled that compassionate appointment is not a matter of right, but must be governed by the terms on which the State lays down the policy of offering employment assistance to a member of the family of a deceased government employee. 11. For the above reasons, we are of the view that the judgement of the High Court is unsustainable. The High Court has virtually rewritten the terms of the Policy and has issued a direction to the State to consider ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 48 - applications which do not fulfil the terms of the Policy. This is impermissible. FINALITY ATTACHED TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS UNLESS INFRACTION OF SCHEME- POLICY ESTABLISHED: 14(vii). While supporting the Impugned Judgement, Learned State Counsel contends that case of appellant -writ petitioner was rejected on four occasions on 10.06.2013, Annexure R-II, on 28.02.2014, Annexure P-8, on 02.12.2016 Annexure R-VIII and on 26.08.2022, Annexure P-13 and finality has to be attached to such rejection orders. Above contention of Learned State Counsel carries weight, since, finality has to be attached to administrative orders/ action unless such an order is dehors or in derogation of the applicable Rules/ Scheme /Policy notified by the State Authorities. The appellants own inaction, lethargy or negligence cannot be the permitted to be a valid basis for reopening the matter after 15 years now. Nothing has been placed on record by the appellant -writ petitioner that State Authorities-Respondents herein have violated or acted in contravention of the applicable Rules/Policy/Scheme {1990 Policy} in ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 49 - instant case. Accordingly, the Impugned Judgment, negating the claim of the appellant-writ petitioner for compassionate appointment in accordance with applicable Policy {including Clause 8} is upheld. MANDAMUS CANNOT BE ISSUED WHEN NO LEGAL RIGHT OF APPELLANT IS VIOLATED: 15. Claim of the appellant-writ petitioner seeking quashing of the rejection orders dated 28.02.2014, Annexure P-8 and 26.08.2022, Annexure P-13, is untenable, for the reason, when, the appellant has not been able to point out infraction of or violation of any of the applicable norm/scheme/ policy. In absence of any violation or infringement the appellant has no right to seek issuance of mandamus. A writ of mandamus can only be claimed when, a legal right vests in a person and a corresponding legal obligation on the State, in terms of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa and Others versus Prasana Kumar Sahoo (2007) 15 SCC 129, reads as under:- “20. It may be that some other persons similarly situated have been appointed. But Article 14 as is well known ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 50 - contains a positive concept. A writ of mandamus can be issued by the High Court when there exists a legal right in the writ petitioner and corresponding legal obligation in the State. Only because an illegality has been committed, the same cannot be directed to be perpetuated by a court of law.” In terms of the mandate of law in case of Prasana Kumar Sahoo, once no legal right of appellant-writ petitioner has been infringed by the State Authorities whereas the rejection was based on the applicable norms/policy of 1990, Annexure P-1 therefore, mandamus cannot be issued. Accordingly, rejection orders passed by the State Authorities in accordance with the applicable norms/policy, which were upheld by the Learned Single Judge, does not suffer from any infirmity. CONCLUSION: 16. As per Clause 8 of the 1990 Policy, the appellant-writ petitioner was required to apply for job, within the time limit of three years from the date of death of her mother. She failed to do so. The first application for job, submitted beyond the time line was validly rejected on 10.6.2013. ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 51 - The time line of three years in clause 8 of 1990 Policy, which was reiterated on 24.02.2016 was mandatory and the appellant cannot seek or raise a claim for appointment dehors the policy/scheme, in view of the factual matrix and mandate of law, in cases of Prahalad Mani Tripathi, Ramesh Chandra Agrawal and Bhupendra Nath Hazarika (supra), the prescription of the time-limit of three years for submitting an application for job on compassionate grounds, as per Clause 8 of the Policy of 1990, does not contain any provision for relaxing {Clause 8 of the said Policy}. In absence of any provision for relaxing Clause 8 and absence of guidelines for exercising such power of relaxation, the time-limit for submitting application for job could neither be sought to be relaxed or tinkered with nor diluted. Even, the OM dated 24.02.2016 reiterates that time-limit of 3 years for applying for job is mandatory. In these circumstances, once the appellant-writ petitioner had failed to submit her application for job, within mandatory time-line of three years from the date of death of her mother ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 52 - then, the appellant has neither any locus nor any right to seek relaxation in the prescribed time- limit. Further, the plea of the appellant that once a dependent, who was minor at the time of death of deceased employee was deferred till he attains the age of majority {18 years} and by enabling him to apply for job within three years thereafter {21 years} then, plea of appellant for similar relaxation /extension in submitting application for compassionate appointment as given to minor(s) untenable. Moreover, once the appellant was a major on the date of death of her mother cannot claim equation or parity with a dependant who was minor on the date of death of deceased employee and for whom, the right to apply for job accrued for three years after attaining majority. While interpreting Clause 8 of 1990 Policy issued by Respondent State, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has mandated in the case of Shashi Kumar, which stands reiterated in case of Tinku (supra), that a dependant who was major at the time of death of deceased can neither claim ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 53 - equation nor parity vis-a-vis another dependant who was minor at the time of death, as both classes of dependants are altogether different and therefore this contention is turned down. Further, the plea of appellant that she is entitled for job on compassionate grounds, being a married daughter as per the mandate of law in the case of Mamta Devi, Annexure P-15 and the related judgements in the case of Sapna Devi and Rani Devi (supra) as referred to above, is also of no assistance to the appellant-writ petitioner. Merely because the appellant was married daughter will not confer an ipso facto right, when, the appellant had failed to apply for job within the time limit of three years as required under the policy and her inaction, lethargy and negligence cannot give any leverage to the appellant dehors the applicable policy/scheme. Even, the benefit of the judgement in the cases of Mamta Devi and related judgements wherein, a dependant(s) had applied for job within time-limit of three years of the death of deceased relative-employee and the claim was rejected, with ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 54 - the plea that “married daughters were not covered /were ineligible” for job on compassionate grounds. In instant case, the claim of appellant was rejected, as time-barred, for not applying for job, within the time frame of 3 years from the date of death of her mother, as required under Clause 8 of the Policy of 1990, which provision was reiterated as per the OM dated 24.02.2016. Though the State Authorities rejected the claim of the appellant on four occasions but she did not assail the first rejection order dated 10.06.2013 which attained finality. Even, the second rejection order dated 28.02.2014, Annexure P-8, was assailed after about 8 years by filing the writ petition only in the year 2022 and Learned Single Judge validly, dismissed her claim for job, in view of delay and laches. Material on record reveals that Revised- New Policy of 2019, Annexure P-11, was applicable to new and to all pending cases, which had not been decided earlier. Claim of the appellant which stood rejected under the extant Policy of 1990, on ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 55 - four occasions {i.e. for the first time firstly on 10.6.2013, then on 28.02.2014, Annexure P-8 and thereafter} cannot be permitted to be reopened, so as unsettle the settled matters and/or to reopen those cases which already stood decided. Further, the appellant has not been able to place on record any material to assert/establish that the rejection orders, passed on four occasions by State Authorities, were in any manner contrary or dehors the 1990 Policy/Scheme of Compassionate Appointment. Prayer of the appellant-writ petitioner in seeking a direction to the State Authorities to consider her claim under the Revised Policy of 2019, shall certainly disturb the finality attached to the earlier rejection orders passed under the Earlier-Applicable Policy of 1990, in accordance with law. Acceding to the plea of appellant shall amount to rewriting the terms of Policy is impermissible. The appellant- writ petitioner has no vested right for compassionate appointment. Moreover, nothing has been placed on record to establish “indigency” [as per certificate ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 56 - issued by competent authority], as on the date of passing of the first rejection order on 10.06.2013 and again at the time of filing of writ petition in the year 2022 and thereafter in the present intra court appeal. Compassionate employment is not a source of recruitment. Appellant cannot claim endless compassion, dehors scheme-policy and that too when, 15 years have elapsed since the death of her mother in 2009, which goes on to infer sense of immediacy has effaced. In such eventuality, the claim for appointment on compassionate grounds is untenable, in the teeth the mandate of Law in State of Maharashtra versus Madhuri Maruti, (2022) SCC Online SC 1327, {Paras 4-13 & 14} and in State of West Bengal versus Debabrata Tiwari & others, (2025) 5 SCC 712 {Para 32 & 32.1 to 32.5}. IMPUGNED JUDGEMENT PASSED BY LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE UPHELD: 17. In the instant case, the appellant has failed to establish the infraction of any Rules, Policy or Scheme, which entitles the appellant for considering her claim for compassionate employment, ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 57 - despite having chosen, not to apply for the job within the stipulated period of three years, in terms of the applicable norms. Even, a claim, on ground of being a married daughter cannot accrue to her without having applied for job, within the stipulated period of three years in Clause 8 of Policy of 1990, reiterated on 24.06.2016, which was mandatory. The non challenge to two of the earlier rejection orders also disentitles her for any relief. The lapse of 15 years now, from the date of death of her mother reveals that the sense of “immediacy” has been lost. Even, nothing has been placed on record or established {by way of an Indigency Certificate, issued by competent authority} before the writ court and even in this appeal that the appellant is still in “indigency”. A claim decided thrice, under the Earlier Policy of 1990 cannot be permitted to be reopened on coming into force of the Revised-New Policy of 2019, when, finality has to be attached to administrative orders, unless the earlier orders were established to be passed in violation of the applicable norms or scheme or policy, which factors ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 58 - are missing in instant case. In these circumstances, the rejection orders passed in accordance with the applicable scheme-policy and the Impugned judgment dated 21.11.2023, dismissing the writ petition, does not suffer from any perversity, infirmity or illegality and the same is upheld; and the contentions raised in instant appeal, being devoid of any merit are negated, in facts of instant matter. 18. No other issue was raised/argued. DIRECTIONS: 19. In view of the above discussion, and for reasons recorded hereinabove, the instant appeal is dismissed, in the following terms: (i) Instant LPA i.e. LPA no 335 of 2025 is dismissed; (ii) The Impugned Judgment dated 21.11.2023, passed by the Learned Single Judge in CWP No. 7850 of 2022, titled Khubwati versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others is upheld; (iii) Rejection order(s) dated 28.02.2014 Annexure P-8, and dated 26.08.2022 Annexure P-13 are upheld; (iv) Parties to bear respective costs. ( 2025:HHC:24049 ) - 59 - In the aforesaid terms, the instant appeal and all pending applications, if any shall also stands disposed of, accordingly. (G.S. Sandhawalia) (Ranjan Sharma) Chief Justice Judge July 24, 2025 (tm)