- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 14TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND WRIT PETITION No. 24305 OF 2023 (S-KSAT) C/W WRIT PETITION No. 24248 OF 2023 (S-KSAT) IN WP No. 24305/2023 BETWEEN: 1. THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA, M.S. BUILDING, DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU-560 001, REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR. …PETITIONER (BY SRI VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES, VIKASA SOUDHA, BENGALURU 560 001. 2. THE DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND GEOLOGY, No.49, KHANIJA BHAVANA, Digitally signed by VALLI MARIMUTHU Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 BENGALURU 560 001. 3. SRI. N.M. UDAYASHANKAR, S/O N. MURIGENDRAPPA, AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, RETIRED DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOLOGY DEPARTMENT, R/AT No.103, SRI. JAGADGURU, GHANTAKARKARNA BHAVAN APARTMENT, CHANDRASHEKARAN ROAD, BEML 3RD STAGE, RAJARAJESHWARI NAGAR, BENGALURU 560 098. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI V. SHIVAREDDY, AGA FOR R1 & R2) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 26.11.2019 PASSED IN APPLICATION No.6359/2019 VIDE ANNEXURE-A. IN WP No. 24248/2023 BETWEEN: 1. THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA, M.S. BUILDING, DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU 560 001, REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR. ...PETITIONER (BY SRI VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES, VIKASA SOUDHA, BENGALURU 560 001. - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 2. THE DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND GEOLOGY, No.49, KHANIJA BHAVANA BENGALURU 560 001. 3. SRI. I.S. SATHISH, S/O I.P. SHANTHAMALLAPPA, AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS, RETIRED ADDL. DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOLOGY DEPARTMENT, R/AT No.1064, LAKSHMI NIVAS, NEW KANTHARAJ URS ROAD, KUVEMPU NAGAR, MYSURU 570 023. ...RESPONDENTS (BY SRI V. SHIVAREDDY, AGA FOR R1 & R2) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 26.11.2019 PASSED IN APPLICATION No.6269/2019 VIDE ANNEXURE-A. THESE PETITIONS COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND ORAL ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT) Petitioners-Karnataka Lokayukta authorities in the above two writ petitions are before this Court aggrieved by common order dated 26.11.2019 in Application - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 No.6269/2019 and Application No.6359/2019 by which the common order dated 27.06.2019 imposing penalty of withholding 5% of pension is permanently is quashed. 2. Heard Sri. Venkatesh S. Arabatti, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri. V. Shivareddy, learned AGA for respondent Nos.1 and 2. Perused the entire writ petition papers. 3. Respondents in the above writ petitions are retired Deputy Director and retired Additional Director of Mines and Geology Department. While they were in service, common articles of charge dated 10.07.2014 (Annexure-A4) was issued alleging misconduct in the matter of issuing of mining license. The enquiry was entrusted to the petitioners under Entrustment Order dated 05.06.2014. The petitioner submitted enquiry report holding that the charges are proved against the respondents. Second Show-Cause Notice dated 04.10.2017 was issued by the State Government enclosing - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 the enquiry report as well as recommendation of the petitioners. The respondents submitted their reply and the State Government under impugned order dated 27.06.2019 (Annexure-A7) imposed punishment of withholding 5% of pension, which shall not be less than the basic pension. Questioning the said order of punishment, the respondents were before the Tribunal in the above stated applications. The Tribunal under impugned order quashed the order of punishment. Questioning the same, with an additional prayer to declare Rule 214(2)(b)(ii) of KCSR has application only in respect of proceedings initiated either on the complaint given under Section 9(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 by a private individual on in respect of reference made under Section 7 (2A) by the State Government, the petitioners are before this Court. 4. However, Sri. Venkatesh S. Arabatti, learned counsel during the course of hearing would submit that the petitioners-Institution would not press prayer Nos.3 and 4 - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 made in the petitions and he seeks liberty to keep open the said prayers to be considered in an appropriate proceedings. 5. The said submission is placed on record. 6. Sri. Venkatesh S. Arabatti, learned counsel in addition to the grounds urged in the memorandum of writ petitions would contend that the allegation against the respondents is very serious and this itself would indicate that the misconduct is grave. When the nature of the charge itself is grave, there need not be any finding with regard to misconduct or grave negligence. Further, learned counsel would submit that the Tribunal without appreciating the contentions of the petitioners-Lokayukta, proceeded to allow the application on the ground that there is no finding recorded with regard to grave misconduct/negligence. Thus, learned counsel for the petitioners would pray for allowing the writ petitions. - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 7. To the Court query with regard to delay in filing the writ petitions, Sri. Venkatesh S. Arabatti, learned counsel would submit that though the impugned order of the Tribunal is dated 26.11.2019, it took sometime to take decision to file writ petitions and in entrusting the matter to its counsel. Thus, he prays for condoning the delay if any, in filing the writ petitions. 8. Having heard Sri. Venakesh S. Arabatti, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned AGA, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal for the reasons recorded below: 9. Petitioners is a statutory Institution established under the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984. The petitioner- Institution has duty and responsibility towards public. The public have trust and confidence in the petitioner- Institution. Such trust and confidence shall have to be maintained by the petitioner-Institution. In that circumstances, the petitioner-Institution cannot act - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 irresponsibly. The impugned order of the Tribunal is dated 26.11.2019 whereas, the present writ petition is filed before this Court on 30.10.2023 after nearly four years from the date of Tribunal passing the impugned order. 10. A person aggrieved by any order shall approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India within a reasonable time. Four years time in filing the writ petition against the impugned order of the Tribunal is not a reasonable time/period. There is inordinate delay by the petitioner in approaching this Court. The respondents were aged 64 years and 65 years when they approached the Tribunal and as on the date they are more than 70 years. Entertaining the writ petition at this belated stage would prejudice the cases of the respondents who have retired long back and who are in the evening of their life. 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of MRINMOY MAITY V. CHHANDA KOLEY AND OTHERS , - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 was considering the question of delay in approaching the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and held that when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. Relevant paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 read as follows: “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” In the instant case also, the petitioner has knocked the doors of the High Court after more than four years and if entertained at this length of time, it would adversely prejudice the respondent who has attained the age of superannuation and retired from service. 12. In addition to the above, we have gone through the impugned order of punishment dated 27.06.2019 and there is no finding with regard to grave misconduct or - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31525-DB WP No. 24305 of 2023 C/W WP No. 24248 of 2023 grave negligence on the part of the respondents to impose punishment of withholding pension to an extent of 5%. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of D.V.KAPOOR V/S UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in (1990) 4 SCC 314 and also in the case of H.L.GULATI VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in (2015) 12 SCC 408, has categorically held that unless finding of grave misconduct or grave negligence are recorded, based on the material on record, it is impermissible to withhold pension or part of pension. 13. Thus, we do not find any error in the order passed by the Tribunal. Accordingly, writ petitions stand rejected. Sd/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (K. V. ARAVIND) JUDGE VBS,NC List No.: 1 Sl No.: 16