IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE WRIT PETITION NO.24376 OF 2013 (L-TER) BETWEEN: M/S SASKEN COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED, (COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 1956 HAVINGITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT NO.139/25, DOMMALUR RING ROAD, BENGALURU - 560 071) REPRESENTED BY ITS RAJESH MANIAR VICE PRESIDENT-FINANCE. ...PETITIONER (BY SRI HEGDE GANAPATHY, SR. ADVOCATE A/W SRI ANIKETH B.C., ADVOCATE ) AND: SMT LAKSHMI S. KUMAR, D/O EPS KUMAR, MAJOR, R/O NO.834, 24TH CROSS, 51ST MAIN, KUMARASWAMY LAYOUT, BENGALURU-560078. ...RESPONDENT (BY SRI K.B.NARAYANASWAMY, ADVOCATE) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE AWARD DATED 14.03.2013 IN REF. NO.62/2009 PASSED BY THE II ADDITIONAL LABOUR COURT, BENGALURU VIDE ANNEXURE-A. THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 22ND JULY, 2025 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: 2 CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE CAV ORDER This petition is assailing the award dated 14.03.2013 in Reference No.62/2009 on the file of II Additional Labour Court, Bangalore. 2. In terms of the impugned award, the petitioner’s order dated 03.03.2009, terminating the respondent from employment, is set aside. The petitioner is directed to reinstate the respondent with full back wages, continuity of services and other consequential benefits. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner-Company is before this Court. 3. Heard the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 4. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, taking through the pleadings, and also the evidence placed on record, urged as under: 4.1 The respondent was employed as a Campus Recruitment Executive with effect from 21.11.2006. Respondent is a post-graduate in Business Administration 3 and was holding a managerial post, and was making decisions on behalf of the petitioner-Company, when it came to the recruitment of certain employees. 4.2 The terms of the employment between the petitioner and respondent provided for termination simpliciter, and assuming that the respondent was a workman, in such an event, the respondent-employee is entitled to benefits as provided under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short Act, 1947). The said benefit is paid to the respondent through a cheque, and said payment is admitted in respondent’s claim statement before the Labour Court. After having accepted the monetary benefits so paid, the respondent raised an Industrial Dispute, though the respondent is not a workman. 4.3 The materials placed on record, which demonstrated that the respondent-employee was working in a managerial post, have been completely overlooked by the Labour Court to record an adverse finding that the petitioner has not produced any materials to show that the respondent is not a workman. 4 4.4 The Labour Court framed the additional issue No.1 wrongly casting the burden on the Employer, though the employee invoked the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the Act, 1947. It was for the employee to make a positive statement that he/she is a workman, and no such statement is made by the employee, and the additional issue could not have been framed, casting the burden on the petitioner- Company. 4.5 Ex.M17 is the crucial document which clearly demonstrated the role played by the respondent-employee, and said document has been completely overlooked by the Labour Court. 4.6 Assuming that the petitioner - Management has the onus of establishing that the respondent was not a workman and was discharging the duty in managerial capacity, documents on record, more particularly, Ex.M17, demonstrated the role played by the respondent-employee that the respondent was discharging managerial duties, and at any stretch of imagination, respondent cannot be construed as a workman. 5 4.7 Evidence in the cross-examination by the respondent is completely overlooked. The respondent- employee has admitted that she used to conduct interviews in the selection process, and no workman will have such power to hold an interview, and the role played by the respondent cannot be construed as clerical to classify the respondent under the category of a workman. 4.8 Despite the respondent-employee making a statement that she had received a certain amount on the date of termination, the Labour Court erred in recording a finding that payment was not made to the respondent is also the submission made to emphasise the non-application of mind and perversity in the impugned award. 4.9 The fact that the respondent was working in two different Companies after the termination is admitted in the cross-examination, and this fact is overlooked by the Labour Court and resulting in an erroneous finding that the respondent was not working elsewhere or gainfully employed elsewhere and awarded back wages. 6 5. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner would also rely on the following judgments: (i) Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) and others.1 (ii) Sonepat Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited vs. Ajit Singh.2 (iii) Northoote Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd., Bombay and Another vs. Zarine H.Rahina and Another.3 (iv) Mukund Staff and Officers Association and Another vs. Mukund Ltd.4 (v) Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court Delhi and Another.5 (vi) M. Venugopal vs. Divisional Manager, LIC, Machilipatnam, A.P. and Another.6 (vii) Uptron India Ltd. vs. Shammi Bhan and Another7. (viii) Muir Mills Unit of NTC (UP) Ltd. vs. Swayam Prakash Srivastava and Another.8 1 (2013) 10 SCC 324 2 (2005) 3 SCC 232 3 2001 (3) Mh.L.J. 476 4 2008(2) Mh.L.J.416 5 ILR (1976) I Delhi 565 6 (1994) 2 SCC 323 7 (1998) 6 SCC 538 7 6. Learned counsel for respondent raised the following contentions:- 6.1 The appointment letter does not give any specific job description. It does not specify that the respondent is employed in a managerial capacity. 6.2 The respondent only coordinated the selection process and did not take part in the selection process and had no role in selecting the candidate, and has not issued any appointment letter. 6.3 The appointment letter was required to be issued by the head of the Human Resource Department, and the documents produced by the petitioner would only indicate that the respondent is communicating the decision taken by the selection committee, and the communication sent by the respondent would indicate that the appointment letter will be issued separately. 6.4 No suggestion is put to the respondent/employee in her cross-examination to say that the respondent was heading certain employees, was issuing directions to certain 8 (2007) 1 SCC 491 8 employees, or was taking managerial decisions. There was no suggestion in the cross-examination addressed to the respondent/employee that the respondent had been entrusted with the task of conducting a disciplinary enquiry or the responsibility of terminating any of the employees, and no suggestion to the effect that the respondent was doing supervisory work. 6.5 The document at Ex.M.17 is not signed, and it is only the proforma of an organizational chart said to have been sent to the respondent; the respondent has not prepared any chart. Documents at pages 87, 98 and 100 to the Writ Petition are not the documents signed by the respondent and assuming that the content of the said forms has been filled by the respondent, it would only reflect the opinion of the signing authority, and not the respondent. 6.6 The respondent was terminated, and in the place of the respondent, the person who is employed after the respondent is transferred, which amounts to a violation of Section 25G of the Act, 1947. 9 6.7 Learned counsel for the respondents relied on the following judgments: (i) S.k.Maini vs. M/s Carona Sahu Company Limited and others9 (ii) Arkal Govind Raj Rao vs. Ciba Geigy of India Ltd. Bombay10 (iii) Devinder Singh vs. Municipal Council, Sanaur11 (iv) The Commissioner of Income-Tax and Another vs. Texas Instruments India Pvt. Ltd.,12 (v) Mysore Vegetable Oil Products Ltd. and Labour Court, Madras and Another13 (vi) Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. vs. The Workmen14 (vii) S.K.Verma vs. Mahesh Chandra and Another15 (viii) Mahajan Borewell Company vs Sri Rajaram Bhat and Another16 (ix) Management, Church Of South India VS. Edith Peter17 (x) K.H.Pandhi VS. Presiding Officer, the Management of Holtecs Engineers Ltd.18 (xi) Chandrashekhar Chintaman Vaidya vs. National organic chemical industries Ltd.19 (xii) LIC of India vs. R Suresh20 9 (1994) 3 SCC 510 10 (1985) 3 SCC 371 11 (2011) 6 SCC 584 12 I.T.A. No. 141/2020 C/W I.T.A. No.151/2020 13 1961 II-LLJ-508 14 (1970) 3 SCC 248 15 (1983) 4 SCC 214 16 ILR 1998 KAR 172 17 Laws (Mad) 2000-1-11 18 Laws (Delhi) 2004-2-42 19 Laws (Bombay) 2010-2-82 10 (xiii) Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Ors., VS. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale21 (xiv) M/S Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Employers of M/S Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. and Others22 7. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner by way of reply would contend that Section 25G does not apply as no person who is employed by the petitioner, is transferred to the place of the respondent, and Section 25F would apply, and the same is complied. 8. Learned Senior counsel would also submit that the person, Ms.Shona who is said to have replaced the respondent was working through a contract labourer and was in a different department in the petitioner-Company and has not been placed to work in the place where the respondent was working, and she continued in the same place where she was working earlier as such Section 25G is not violated. 9. This Court has perused the records and has taken note of the judgment cited by both sides. In terms of 20 2008 AIR SCW-2793 21 AIR 1960 SC 137 22 (1979) 2 SCC 80 11 the impugned award, the termination order dated 03.03.2009 is set aside. 10. This Court has considered the contentions raised by both sides and considered the ratio laid down in the judgments cited by both sides. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited judgments which have laid down the law that the designation of an employee is not the criterion to determine whether an employee is a workman or not. Likewise, the nature of occasional duty or function of the employee is also not the criterion to determine whether the employee is a workman or not. The Apex Court has held that predominant duty performed by the employee is to be considered to see whether the employee is a workman or not. 12. It is also noticed that the facts obtained in the judgments cited by both sides differ from the facts obtained in the present case in so far as the nature of the work done by the employee as compared to the nature of the work done by the employee in the aforementioned judgments. 12 13. Whether the employee is a workman or not is a mixed question of fact and law and has to be ascertained from the facts of each case. Nevertheless, the general principles governing interpretation of the definition of workman as found in Section 2(s) of Act, 1947 are to be borne in mind. 14. The petitioner is assailing the award on two counts: a) The respondent was not a workman and b) Assuming that the respondent is a workman, the termination is in accordance with Section 25-F of the Act, 1947. 15. Certain facts necessary for adjudication of the petition can be summarised as under:- - Respondent was appointed as Executive - Campus Recruitment on 21.11.2006. Respondent joined services on 30.11.2006 with an annual pay of Rs.3,70,000/- per annum. Petitioner claims that on account of the global recession, the petitioner company had to downsize its workforce and on 03.03.2009 the respondent was terminated. 13 16. The respondent raised an industrial dispute before the jurisdictional Conciliation Officer, and as the conciliation failed, the Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court. Respondent filed a claim statement. The petitioner filed counter disputing the status of the respondent as a 'workman'. 17. The Labour Court, has held that the respondent is a workman and, thereafter, concluded that the termination is illegal. 18. The fact that the respondent was appointed as Executive Campus - Recruitment on an initial salary of Rs 3,70,000/- per annum is not in dispute. The designation or the salary is not the criterion to decide whether an employee is a workman or not. The salary becomes a criterion if the employee is working in a supervisory capacity. 19. Whether the employee is a workman or not has to be decided keeping in mind the definition of Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947 and the nature of the job done by the employee. 14 20. Clause No.6(a) of the appointment letter issued to the respondent reads as under:- "6. What we expect from you (a) We hope that you will devote your full time and attention in carrying out your work activities honestly, faithfully and diligently, keeping in mind at all times the Company's progress. We expect that you will not engage in or do any other business or render any professional service either on a full-time or part-time basis." 21. The aforementioned letter of employment does not throw much light on the nature of the job. 22. Ex.M7 is the letter addressed by the respondent/employee to a prospective employee, communicating the decision to select an employee. The said letter at Annexure-M7 also encloses the details relating to the employee who has been selected by the petitioner Company. Respondent, being a member of the selection panel, has assessed the candidate as under:- "Attitude - fair will be a good individual contributor." 15 23. This is the observation in the HR assessment and information sheet. 24. Ex.M8 is another letter addressed by the respondent to another employee selected by the petitioner. 25. The said letter is also accompanied by the observations made by the respondent as a member of the selection panel. 26. The observation is as under:- "Attitude - Good, can be a good team player" Communication skill - Good." 27. Ex.M9 is also a letter of appointment sent to one of the employees, signed by the respondent. However, the HR assessment and information sheet attached to it is not signed by the respondent. 28. Ex. M10 is one more appointment letter, which is accompanied by an HR assessment and an information sheet. 29. The observations made by the respondent are as under:- 16 "Attitude - positive (+ve), willing to learn; Communication skills - able to articulate, recommended for selection - yes. Reasons for selection/rejection: Fine with bond and training class." 30. There is no dispute that the respondent was in the Human Resource department and was entrusted with the responsibility of visiting campuses and coordinating with the campuses to initiate the recruitment process. 31. The respondent contends that she was only doing a clerical job, and was not involved in the decision-making process, nor did she have the authority to recruit the employees or to finalize the terms of service conditions of the newly recruited employee. 32. At this juncture, it is necessary to refer to the evidence in the cross-examination. Relevant portion of cross examination of respondent/employee reads as under:- " PÁåA¥À¸ï jPÀÄæmïªÉÄAmï §UÉÎ £ÁªÀÅ ¥ÀæwªÀµÀð K¦æ¯ï wAUÀ½£À°è ªÀiÁ»wAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ £ÀAvÀgÀ ¸ÀA§AzsÀ¥ÀlÖ ªÀĺÁ«zÁå®AiÀÄUÀ½UÉ 17 ºÉÆÃV PÀæªÀÄ dgÀÄV¸ÀÄwÛzÉÝêÀÅ. ªÀiÁ£ÀªÀ ¸ÀA¥À£ÀÆä® ªÀUÀðzÀ ¸ÀAzÀ±Àð£ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß £Á£Éà £ÀqɸÀÄwÛzÉ. " 33. In the cross-examination, the respondent has also admitted that one Syed Saleem was recruited as an HR Executive on 21.07.2008. Said appointment letter is marked at Ex.M26. Ex.M27 is the e-mail addressed by the respondent to Venkat V., and the respondent has admitted having signed the e-mail. Said e-mail reads as under:- "I had a discussion with Ashok Bhaskar and Ramaraj on this issue. I understand that this escalation was based on the talk Saleem had with Chakri during the Campus recruitment at BIT on the 23rd of July. Have assured Ashok and Ramaraj that such a thing will not be repeated. Saleem is very new to Campus recruitment, and as a corrective action, I spoke to him, briefing him on it." 34. Ex.M.27 is the e-mail addressed by the respondent in response to the e-mail sent by Venkat, another employee of the petitioner establishment. 18 35. The respondent has admitted the following relevant factors in the cross-examination: "10. It is true that, for the purpose of campus recruitment, I used to go to various colleges throughout the country. It is true that, in order to do the campus recruitment, we are required to plan in advance. 11. It is true that, as Executive, Campus Recruitment, I used to contact the placement officers of various colleges all over the country." 12. It is true that, I used to conduct pre- placement talks. It is true that, at the pre- placement talk, I used to present the history of the Company, its growth, business, strategies, opportunities and policies. Witness adds that it was a presentation made by the Company, and she used to run it. 14. It is true that, I was co-ordinating with the Placement Officer for conducting tests. It is true that, I was conducting interviews, witness adds that towards the later period. It is true that, recruitment committee consists of myself, technical persons and HR official." (Emphasis added) 19 36. Ex.M.4 is the copy of email trail between the respondent and Sridhar. On perusal of Ex.M4, it appears that the respondent has convened an interactive session of the tentative candidates. The session was convened to address the queries of selected candidates and to help them get the details relating to the petitioner-Company. 37. The document at Ex.M17, marked at Annexure-L, to the writ petition is the e-mail addressed by the respondent to Venkat V., wherein, respondent has signed the job description as an attachment. The relevant portion of the said job description attachment sent through e-mail reads as; "Position Title - Sr. Executive HR Domain - Campus Recruitment, Campus Connect, Branding and Budget Management." 38. In addition, the respondent has also signed the organizational chart, which is as under:- 20 Program Manager 39. Annexure-M (Ex.M20 in Labour Court records), is an email from the respondent sent to Rajinder Handu before conducting the recruitment process, wherein the respondent has set certain terms and conditions highlighting the policy of the petitioner-Company. 40. The learned counsel for the respondent, referring to the evidence of the witness examined on behalf of the petitioner in the cross-examination, has referred to the following statements in the cross-examination. "It is true that first party was required to fix the date, venue for campus recruitment with prior approval and consent of the concerned HR and technical panel persons." "It is true that the candidate appearing for the test are required to undergo technical and HR test conducted by Incumbent's Superior Incumbent Direct reports Direct reports Direct reports Direct reports Direct reports 21 respective panels". "The selection process involved conducting an interview by the technical panel HR and the first party." 41. In paragraph No.22 of the cross-examination of the management witness, it is stated as under:- "22. It is true that at the second party company, without the offer made by the second party company is accepted by the candidate, a final letter of appointment will be issued. It is true that the remaining package to be given to the selected candidate would be decided by the Management." 42. In paragraph No.23, it is stated as under: "23.....It is true that the 1st party was working under the supervision and guidance of the manager-recruit." 43. In paragraph No.25, it is stated as under:- "25. It is true that the decision as to the number of vacancies, the number of candidates to be interviewed and selected would be taken by the top management." 22 44. Referring to the evidence in the cross- examination of the witnesses examined on behalf of the management, learned counsel for the respondent would urge that the respondent had no decision making authority in the company and she was only acting under the supervision and control of the superior officers and she was only coordinating with the persons who are responsible for taking managerial decisions and the Labour Court is justified in passing the impugned order. 45. On overall appreciation of evidence on record the following things emerge: 1) The respondent is a member of the panel which interviewed the candidates. 2) The respondent has also participated and conducted the interview. 3) The respondent has given her opinion on the candidates who appeared in the interview and independently assessed whether the person who faced the interview is suitable for selection or not. 4) The respondent has also assigned the reasons for her decision. 23 46. Though it is elicited in the cross-examination that the respondent has no authority in finalizing the service condition package and the decision to recruit, what is required to be noticed is the respondent, had the authority to interview the candidates, coordinate the recruitment drive, coordinate and the identify the campus for holding interview, and to forward the observations relating to the eligibility or otherwise of the candidate who appeared for the interview seeking appointment. 47. It is relevant to notice from the organizational chart containing the job description which the petitioner has sent as an attachment to another employee demonstrates that she has five persons working under her. Respondent’s job description has clearly spelt out in the organizational chart and same is prepared by the respondent where she has stated that her major activity is to conduct HR interview, relationship building, employer brand building, campus connect program, designing the PPT and other brand building materials. Respondent claims to have designed the campus recruitment, internship and branding process, budgeting and 24 budget management. These aspects have been completely overlooked by the Labour Court. 48. Considering these aspects and also the documents referred to above, this Court is of the view that the nature of the job done by the respondent in the petitioner company before her termination was not clerical. The job was indeed managerial. 49. Merely becdause the decision taken by the respondent in the interview is not final and it is subject to the approval of the higher officials in the management, one cannot conclude that the nature of the job done by the respondent was only clerical or of such nature to classify the respondent as a workman. 50. It is also urged by the learned counsel for the respondent that even assuming that there was a recession in the year 2008 when the respondent was terminated from service, the petitioner has not followed the requirement under Section 25-N of the Act, 1947. Learned counsel contended that if at all there was recession and a ground for retrenchment, the respondent should have been retained and the person who was junior to the respondent in the 25 establishment should have been retrenched by following the procedure contemplated under Section 25-G on the principle the 'last come, first go'. 51. Learned Senior Counsel by way of reply urged that the contention that the 'last come first go' principle, urged by the respondent with reference to employee by name Ms.Shona, has no merit. It is submitted that Ms.Shona is working for the petitioner through an independent contractor and said employee is not the employee of the petitioner. 52. It is noticed that Ms.Shona was not working directly under the petitioner. Respondent in her cross examination admitted that Ms.Shona was recruited by independent contractor-Raj Office solutions. It is also admitted in evidence that the Ms.Shona was not working in H.R. Department and she was working in a different department under the petitioner and later she was shifted to H.R. Department. The terms and conditions relied on upon while employing the respondent is also relevant. Relevant portion of Clause No.7 of ‘Letter of Appointment’ dated 21.11.2006 reads as under: 26 "7. Termination We hope your association with us will be a very long one. However, this association may be terminated by either party by giving two month's notice. However, in the event of willful neglect of your duties, breach of trust, gross indiscipline or any other serious dereliction of duties that may be prejudicial to the interests of the company, the company has the discretion to terminate your services forthwith or with such notice as it deems fit and without any notice pay whatsoever." (Emphasis supplied) 53. From the said clause it is evident that in case either of the parties to the agreement intend to terminate the association, the party has to issue two months notice. The records would reveal that on 03.03.2009 the petitioner has terminated the employment with immediate effect. However, petitioner has paid Rs.75,000/- towards two month’s salary in lieu of two month’s notice and in addition, Rs.37,500/- is paid towards 15 days average salary for each completed years of continuous service. In all petitioner has paid Rs.1,12,500/- to the respondent. The respondent has accepted the same without any protest. In other words, the 27 parties agreed to waive two months notice. This being the position, the respondent cannot complain violation of any of the provisions of the Act, 1947. 54. It is also admitted that the respondent was working in a different establishment after being terminated from the petitioner - Company. However, the Labour Court has erroneously held that the respondent was not working after termination. In fact, in the cross-examination, the respondent admits that she was working for Robert Bosch Engineering and Business Solutions Limited and Mind Tree Limited. 55. After having gone through the impugned award passed by the Labour Court, this Court is of the view that the Labour Court erred in ignoring vital evidence placed before it, which unmistakably points to the fact that the respondent was working in a managerial capacity and not as a workman. 56. Hence, from the documents produced, it is not at all possible for the Court to hold that the first party did not have managerial powers while conducting the interviews and selecting/recommending the candidates for appointment, of course, subject to final approval of higher officials. 28 57. It is required to be noticed that it is not the case of the petitioner that the respondent alone had the power to conduct the interviews and select candidates. That is not the requirement of law to classify an employee as a workman. 58. If the employee works along with other employees and entrusted with the decision taking powers in accomplishing certain tasks entrusted, then the employee can also be termed as a person in managerial capacity, even though the employee alone did not have the power to do certain acts. 59. The analogy of the Labour Court that the documents do not reveal that 1st party was alone in charge of the campus selection and thus, the respondent is a workman is unacceptable. 60. The observation in paragraph No.20 of the impugned award that the first party was only required to identify the campus and fix the calendar for recruitment with the approval of the higher-ups in the office takes the respondent out of the ambit of a managerial post is also not sustainable. 29 61. The Labour Court again erred in holding that the absence of authority to fix the remuneration package and that the respondent was also under the supervision and guidance of the manager in the department makes her a workman is also an erroneous finding. 62. The Labour Court has also observed that the respondent had no power to sanction leave or initiate disciplinary action against the person working under her. Assuming that such power was not there, that itself is not sufficient to hold that the respondent was not working in a managerial capacity. 63. Keeping in mind the principles laid down in the decisions cited by both parties, this Court is of the view that the Labour Court erred in holding that the respondent is a workman. 64. It is also noticed that in paragraph No.38, of the impugned award the Labour Court awarded full back wages to the respondent and granted continuity of service and all consequential benefits. 30 65. In paragraph No.43 of the cross-examination, the respondent has stated that after her termination, for 1 and 1/2 years, she did not work anywhere, and when she appeared before the Court to lead evidence, she was working in "Mind Tree" and having an annual package of Rs 7,00,000/-. 66. Respondent also stated that before joining Mind Tree, she was working at Robert Bosch Engineering and Business Solutions Limited. Despite such a categorical admission, in paragraph No.38 of the impugned award, the Labour Court has held that the respondent was without any employment. 67. There is one more angle to this, even assuming that the respondent was a workman, then also the petitioner has followed the procedure contemplated under the Act, 1947 before terminating the employment and paid the retrenchment compensation. 68. Hence, the following: 31 ORDER (i) Writ Petition is allowed. (ii) Impugned award dated 14.03.2013 in Reference No.62/2009 on the file of II Additional Labour Court, Bengaluru (Annexure-A) is set aside. Consequently, the Reference is rejected. (iii) No order as to cost. Sd/- (ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE) JUDGE BRN/CHS