Order : AMITENDRA KISHORE PRASAD, J. 1. Heard Mr. Bidya Nand Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Varun Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. By filing the present petition, the petitioner has prayed for following relief(s) :- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the entire records relating to this case. 10.2 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the petition and set aside the impugned Order dated 06.10.2016 against the petitioner vide which the date of option of the Higher Pay Scale of SE (Civil) has been made effective from 01.04.2016 instead of making effective from 20.08.2016. 10.3 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent no.1 to issue revised order making effective the due date of Option as 20.08.2016 keeping intact the other terms and conditions same as of the impugned Order dated 23.01.2018. 10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper together with the cost of the petition.” 3. Brief facts of the case, in nutshell, are that the petitioner has challenged the impugned order dated 23.01.2018 (Annexure P/1), whereby the respondents have unreasonably altered the anniversary date for grant of increment/higher pay scale from 20.08.2016 to 01.04.2017, resulting in an undue delay of eight months and consequential financial loss to the petitioner. The petitioner was initially appointed in the erstwhile MPEB as Junior Engineer (Trainee–Civil) on 18.07.1991. Upon reorganization of the State, his services stood transferred to CSPDCL. Thereafter, CSPDCL adopted the service rules of erstwhile MPEB vide Circulars dated 14.04.2001 and 21.06.2001. 4. The respondent–CSPDCL, vide order dated 19.07.2005, circulated the provisions for grant of higher pay scales to Class–I & II employees on completion of 9/18/25/30 years of service, delinking the requirement of promotion. The circular prescribed four ‘Options’ with distinct eligibility criteria: (i) First Option upon completion of 9 years of service, effective from the day following the anniversary of initial appointment; (ii) Second Option upon completion of 18 years of service; (iii) Third Option upon completion of 25 years of service; and (iv) Fourth Option upon completing 30 years of service and 5 years after grant of the first higher pay scale, subject to exclusion of supersession period, wherever applicable. 5. The petitioner’s case pertains to Option-1, Option-2 and Option-3. 5. The petitioner’s case pertains to Option-1, Option-2 and Option-3. He was granted the first and second higher pay scales under Option-1 and Option-2 vide sanction orders dated 06.11.2009, based upon completion of 9 years (w.e.f. 19.08.2000) and 18 years (w.e.f. 20.08.2009) of service respectively, strictly in accordance with the circular dated 19.07.2005. In both instances, the respondents had rightly considered the petitioner's anniversary date of joining i.e. 19.08.1991 for reckoning completion of 9 and 18 years, thereby granting the higher pay scales from the very next day. 6. Upon completing 25 years of service, the petitioner submitted an application dated 15.07.2016 seeking grant of the Third Higher Pay Scale (Option-3) in the Pay Matrix Level-3 (? 86,600 – 1,92,300). The respondents, however, vide communication dated 03.11.2016, rejected the claim on the ground that the petitioner allegedly did not fulfil the requisite ACR criteria up to 31.03.2016, stating that his case would be reviewed after consideration of the ACR for March 2017. 7. Ultimately, the petitioner was granted the benefit of the higher pay scale of Superintending Engineer (Civil) vide order dated 23.01.2018. However, the effective date—legally accruing on 20.08.2016 was wrongly shifted to 01.04.2017 without any valid justification. The petitioner asserts that there is no adverse entry in his ACRs for the years 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16 or 2016-17. No adverse remark was ever communicated to him which could disentitle him from receiving the 3rd higher pay scale from the actual anniversary date of 20.08.2016. 8. The ground taken in letter dated 03.11.2016 that the petitioner had earned Grade “C” is wholly unfounded. Grade “C” is not a disqualification under the circular dated 19.07.2005, unless accompanied by punishment or penalty under the service rules. The circular contains no restriction barring grant of higher scales on such ground. Furthermore, the so-called adverse remarks for ACR 2015-16 were communicated to the petitioner only on 29.09.2021 after an inordinate delay of five years. Such belated communication is devoid of legal sanctity, cannot be treated as an adverse entry, and thus cannot be relied upon to deprive the petitioner of the benefit of the third higher pay scale from its due date. 9. Mr. Such belated communication is devoid of legal sanctity, cannot be treated as an adverse entry, and thus cannot be relied upon to deprive the petitioner of the benefit of the third higher pay scale from its due date. 9. Mr. Bidya Nand Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner has assailed the impugned order dated 23.01.2018, whereby the respondents have arbitrarily altered the anniversary date of increment and grant of higher pay scale from 20.08.2016 to 01.04.2017, thereby unreasonably extending the same by eight months and causing severe financial loss to the petitioner. It is submitted that the petitioner was appointed in the erstwhile MPEB as Junior Engineer (Trainee-Civil) on 18.07.1991 and upon reorganisation of the State, his services stood transferred to CSPDCL. The respondent-CSPDCL has adopted the service rules of erstwhile MPEB vide Circulars dated 14.04.2001 and 21.06.2001. 10. Learned counsel submits that vide order dated 19.07.2005, the respondent-company introduced a scheme for grant of higher pay scales to Class–I and II employees on completion of 9/18/25/30 years of service, delinking the requirement of promotion. Under this scheme, four Options were created, each prescribing specific eligibility criteria. The First Option is admissible on completion of 9 years of service, the Second Option after 18 years, the Third Option after 25 years, and the Fourth Option after 30 years of service, subject to certain conditions. It is contended that the petitioner’s case relates to Option-1, Option-2 and Option-3, and he was duly granted the first and second higher pay scales under Option-1 and Option-2 vide sanction orders dated 06.11.2009. In both these cases, the higher pay scales were granted strictly from the next day of completion of 9 and 18 years of service i.e., from 19.08.2000 and 20.08.2009 respectively, based on the anniversary of his initial appointment on 19.08.1991. 11. Learned counsel further submits that after completion of 25 years of service, the petitioner submitted his application dated 15.07.2016 seeking grant of the Third Higher Pay Scale in Pay Matrix Level-3 (?86,600 – 1,92,300). However, the respondents, vide letter dated 03.11.2016, rejected his claim on the ground that the petitioner allegedly did not fulfil the requisite ACR criteria up to 31.03.2016 and that his case would be reviewed only after considering the ACR for March 2017. However, the respondents, vide letter dated 03.11.2016, rejected his claim on the ground that the petitioner allegedly did not fulfil the requisite ACR criteria up to 31.03.2016 and that his case would be reviewed only after considering the ACR for March 2017. It is argued that despite there being no adverse entry in the ACRs of the petitioner for the years 2012-13 to 2016-17, and no adverse remark ever having been communicated, the respondents unjustifiably shifted the due date of benefit from 20.08.2016 to 01.04.2017 in the impugned order dated 23.01.2018. 12. Learned counsel submits that the reliance placed by the respondents on the petitioner having earned Grade “C” is wholly misconceived, as the circular dated 19.07.2005 nowhere stipulates that earning Grade “C”, in absence of any punishment or penalty under the service rules, amounts to a disqualification for grant of higher pay scales. It is further urged that the respondents communicated the alleged remarks of ACR for the year 2015-16 only on 29.09.2021 after a grossly belated period of five years. Such belated communication of so-called adverse remarks renders them devoid of legal sanctity and they cannot, therefore, be treated as a ground to deprive the petitioner of the benefit of the Third Higher Pay Scale from its due date of 20.08.2016. In support of his submissions, learned counsel places reliance on the following judgments: (i) Dev Dutt v. Union of India and others , (2008) 8 SCC 725 (ii) Sukhdev Singh v. Union of India and others , (2013) 9 SCC 573 (iii) Union of India v. G.R. Meghwal , 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1291 , and (iv) J.P. Agrawal v. Chhattisgarh State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. , 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 6893. 13. Relying on the above authorities, learned counsel submits that the law is now well settled that all entries in the ACR of a public servant, whether poor, fair, average, good or outstanding, must be communicated to him within a reasonable period, so that he may have an opportunity to submit a representation for upgradation. Non-communication or delayed communication of such entries vitiates any consequential action adversely affecting the employee. Lastly, it is submitted that the petitioner’s claim for grant of higher pay scale w.e.f. 20.08.2016 is fully justified, and the petition deserves to be allowed with the reliefs as prayed for. 14. On the other hand, Mr. Non-communication or delayed communication of such entries vitiates any consequential action adversely affecting the employee. Lastly, it is submitted that the petitioner’s claim for grant of higher pay scale w.e.f. 20.08.2016 is fully justified, and the petition deserves to be allowed with the reliefs as prayed for. 14. On the other hand, Mr. Varun Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, opposes the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the petitioner is not entitled to claim the benefit of the 3rd higher pay scale from 20.08.2016 as pleaded. It is contended that the grant of higher pay scales is strictly governed by the Circular dated 19.07.2005, which specifically mandates that an employee must be otherwise fit for promotion based on overall performance and must possess the requisite gradings in the ACRs for the promotional post corresponding to the opted higher pay scale. Learned counsel submits that since the petitioner’s performance for the relevant preceding years was not found satisfactory, he could not be granted the benefit from the date claimed by him and, therefore, the respondents rightly extended the benefit from 01.04.2017, i.e., the date on which he became eligible after fulfilment of the prescribed criteria. He further submits that the petitioner never challenged the validity of the Circular dated 19.07.2005, which forms the basis of the impugned action, and hence the petitioner cannot be permitted to seek relief in contravention of the said Circular. It is also urged that the petitioner failed to avail the remedy of representation within the prescribed period of three months against the order dated 23.01.2018 and instead has approached this Court after an unexplained delay of nearly five years. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu , (2014) 4 SCC 108 , learned counsel submits that the present petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of gross delay and laches alone. It is lastly submitted that the petitioner has already been granted the 3rd higher pay scale, and there is no denial of any right. Since the right to higher pay scale is not a fundamental right but is subject to fulfilment of conditions under the relevant Circular, no interference is warranted in the present writ petition. 15. It is lastly submitted that the petitioner has already been granted the 3rd higher pay scale, and there is no denial of any right. Since the right to higher pay scale is not a fundamental right but is subject to fulfilment of conditions under the relevant Circular, no interference is warranted in the present writ petition. 15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival contentions and perused the material available with the writ petition with utmost circumspection. 16. In Dev Dutt (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows :- “17. In our opinion, every entry in the A.C.R. of a public servant must be communicated to him within a reasonable period, whether it is a poor, fair, average, good or very good entry. This is because non- communication of such an entry may adversely affect the employee in two ways : (1) Had the entry been communicated to him he would know about the assessment of his work and conduct by his superiors, which would enable him to improve his work in future (2) He would have an opportunity of making a representation against the entry if he feels it is unjustified, and pray for its upgradation. Hence non-communication of an entry is arbitrary, and it has been held by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 363 that arbitrariness violates Article 14 of the Constitution.” 17. Further in Sukhdev Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “3. The question as to whether such a downgradation of Annual Confidential Report would amount to adverse remark and thus it would be required to be communicated or not fell for consideration before this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam and Ors. Vs. Prabhat Chandra Jain and Ors., (1996) 2 SCC 363 in the following terms: “We need to explain these observations of the High Court. The Nigam has rules, whereunder an adverse entry is required to be communicated to the employee concerned, but not downgrading of an entry. It has been urged on behalf of the Nigam that when the nature of the entry does not reflect any adverseness that is not required to be communicated. The Nigam has rules, whereunder an adverse entry is required to be communicated to the employee concerned, but not downgrading of an entry. It has been urged on behalf of the Nigam that when the nature of the entry does not reflect any adverseness that is not required to be communicated. As we view it the extreme illustration given by the High Court may reflect an adverse element compulsorily communicable, but if the graded entry is of going a step down like falling from 'very good' to 'good' that may not ordinarily be an adverse entry since both have a positive grading. All that is required by the authority recording confidentials in the situation is to record reasons for such downgrading on the personal file of the officer concerned and inform him of the change in the form of an advice. If the variation warranted be not permissible, then the very purpose of writing annual confidential reports would be frustrated. Having achieved an optimum level the employee on his part may slacken in his work, relaxing secure by his one-time achievement. This would be an undesirable situation. All the same the sting of adverseness must, in all events, not be reflected in such variations, as otherwise, they shall be communicated as such. It may be emphasised that even a positive confidential entry in a given case can perilously be adverse and to say that an adverse entry should always be qualitatively damaging may not be true. In the instant case we have seen the service record of the first respondent. No reason for the change is mentioned. The downgrading is reflected by comparison. This cannot sustain. Having explained in this manner the case of the first respondent and the system that should prevail in the Jal Nigam we do not find any difficulty in accepting the ultimate result arrived at by the High Court.” 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in G.R. Meghwal (supra) has held as under :- “17. Relying upon the decisions of this Court in the case of Dev Dutt (supra), Abhijit Ghosh Dastidar (supra) and Sukhdev Singh (supra), it is urged that as observed and held by this Court an opportunity to make representation against the adverse remarks/below benchmark has to be given within a reasonable time. Relying upon the decisions of this Court in the case of Dev Dutt (supra), Abhijit Ghosh Dastidar (supra) and Sukhdev Singh (supra), it is urged that as observed and held by this Court an opportunity to make representation against the adverse remarks/below benchmark has to be given within a reasonable time. That in the present case, such an opportunity was not given within a reasonable time and even otherwise on facts also when the very reporting officer/reviewing authority gave “Very Good” in the previous years and in the subsequent year all of a sudden gave below benchmark “Good”, it is rightly directed to ignore the below benchmark “Good”. 20. In the case of Dev Dutt (supra), this Court has held in paragraphs 36 and 37 as under:- “36. In the present case, we are developing the principles of natural justice by holding that fairness and transparency in public administration requires that all entries (whether poor, fair, average, good or very good) in the annual confidential report of a public servant, whether in civil, judicial, police or any other State service (except the military), must be communicated to him within a reasonable period so that he can make a representation for its upgradation. This in our opinion is the correct legal position even though there may be no rule/G.O. requiring communication of the entry, or even if there is a rule/G.O. prohibiting it, because the principle of non-arbitrariness in State action as envisaged by Article 14 of the Constitution in our opinion requires such communication. Article 14 will override all rules or government orders. 37. We further hold that when the entry is communicated to him the public servant should have a right to make a representation against the entry to the authority concerned, and the authority concerned must decide the representation in a fair manner and within a reasonable period. We also hold that the representation must be decided by an authority higher than the one who gave the entry, otherwise the likelihood is that the representation will be summarily rejected without adequate consideration as it would be an appeal from Caesar to Caesar. All this would be conducive to fairness and transparency in public administration, and would result in fairness to public servants. The State must be a model employer, and must act fairly towards its employees. Only then would good governance be possible.” 19. All this would be conducive to fairness and transparency in public administration, and would result in fairness to public servants. The State must be a model employer, and must act fairly towards its employees. Only then would good governance be possible.” 19. Very recently, in J.P. Agrawal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows :- “6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in G.R. Meghwal (supra), while dealing with a similar used that on the basis of uncommunicated ACRs, no adverse decisions affecting the rights of an employee can be taken by the department/employer. Relevant paras 13 & 17 are reproduced as under: - "13. Now, so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Dev Dutt (supra); subsequent decision in de case of Abhijit Ghosh Dastidar (supra) and in the case of Sukhdev Singh (supra) is concerned, it is submitted by Ms. Divan, learned ASG to the facts of the case on hand. It is submitted that in fact after the decision of this Court in the case of Dev Dutt (supra), the department issued two O.M.s dated 14.05.2009 and 13.04.2010 and the opportunity to the employee/officer against the below benchmark ACR was given. It is submitted that even otherwise in the aforesaid decisions, either the ACRS were not communicated at all or it was found that adverse remarks suffer from inconsistency or lack of bona fides. 17. Relying upon the decisions of this Court in the case of Dev Dutt (supra), Abhijit Ghosh Dastidar (supra) and Sukhdev Singh (supra), it is urged that as observed and held by this Court an make representation against remarks/below benchmark has to be given within a reasonable time. opportunity to the adverse That in the present case, such an opportunity was not given within a reasonable time and even otherwise on facts also when the very reporting officer/reviewing authority gave "Very Good" in the previous years and in the subsequent year all of a sudden gave below benchmark "Good", it is rightly directed to ignore the below benchmark "Good".” 20. Having given anxious consideration to the rival submissions, minutely examined the record and the applicable service rules, and having perused the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court finds that the entire controversy pivots around the question whether the petitioner, upon completion of 25 years of service on 20.08.2016, became entitled to the Third Higher Pay Scale under Option-3, and whether the respondents were justified in postponing the said benefit to 01.04.2017 on the ground of alleged deficiencies in the petitioner’s ACRs. 21. At the outset, it requires emphasis that the higher pay scale scheme introduced vide circular dated 19.07.2005 is an integral part of the service conditions of the employees of the erstwhile MPEB and now CSPDCL. The circular stipulates clear and objective eligibility criteria for each option. Crucially, it mandates that the higher pay scale becomes automatically due on completion of the prescribed period of service unless the employee suffers from a specific disqualification borne out from adverse material duly communicated to him and forming part of his service record. 22. The respondents themselves allowed the petitioner’s First and Second Higher Pay Scales with reference to the anniversary date of his initial appointment, and that too from the very next day of completion of 9 and 18 years of service. This consistent and uniform application of the circular over the years creates a legitimate expectation as well as a settled administrative practice that the petitioner’s service anniversary date of 19.08.1991 is the governing date for all higher pay scale entitlements. In such a situation, any deviation from the established standard must be based on cogent, compelling and legally sustainable reasons. Unfortunately, none exists. 23. The rejection letter dated 03.11.2016, which formed the sole basis for postponing the petitioner’s entitlement, refers vaguely to certain ACR gradings allegedly falling short of the benchmark. However, the respondents have failed to produce any adverse entry communicated contemporaneously to the petitioner. The law is no longer res integra. The judgments of Dev Dutt , Sukhdev Singh , G.R. Meghwal and J.P. Agrawal (supra) collectively establish the principle that every entry, whether poor, fair, average, good or very good, must be communicated within a reasonable time. The reason behind this principle is the preservation of transparency, fairness and natural justice in public administration. 24. The judgments of Dev Dutt , Sukhdev Singh , G.R. Meghwal and J.P. Agrawal (supra) collectively establish the principle that every entry, whether poor, fair, average, good or very good, must be communicated within a reasonable time. The reason behind this principle is the preservation of transparency, fairness and natural justice in public administration. 24. An uncommunicated entry, as repeatedly held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, is non est in the eye of law and cannot be used to the detriment of an employee. The alleged communication of remarks of the ACR for 2015-16 in the year 2021, after an inexplicable delay of five years, not only violates the very spirit of the doctrine laid down in the aforesaid judgments, but also renders such remarks worthless for the purpose of denying any service benefit. The respondents’ conduct, therefore, suffers from procedural impropriety in addition to substantive illegality. 25. It is equally significant that the circular dated 19.07.2005 does not treat “Grade C” or a below-benchmark remark, by itself, as a disqualification for grant of higher pay scale. The respondents have not pointed out any rule or clause authorising postponement of the benefit solely on the basis of such a grading without there being a punishment, penalty or established misconduct. In absence of such statutory backing, the impugned order cannot be sustained. 26. The plea of delay and laches raised by the respondents also does not impress this Court. The claim pertains to pay fixation, which is a continuing cause of action, and the petitioner continues to be deprived of monetary benefits each month. It is now well-settled that in matters relating to fixation of pay, seniority, pension and service benefits, the mere passage of time cannot extinguish the legitimate and legal entitlement of an employee, unless there is material showing that the delay has caused prejudice to the administration. No such prejudice has been demonstrated in the present case. 27. This Court, therefore, has no hesitation in holding that the shifting of the due date for the grant of the Third Higher Pay Scale from 20.08.2016 to 01.04.2017 is without authority of law, arbitrary, contrary to the governing circular, violative of the principles of natural justice and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The impugned decision not only disregards binding judicial precedents but also undermines the petitioner’s accrued right, thereby causing unwarranted financial loss. 28. The impugned decision not only disregards binding judicial precedents but also undermines the petitioner’s accrued right, thereby causing unwarranted financial loss. 28. Consequently, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 23.01.2018 to the extent it postpones the effective date of the 3rd higher pay scale from 20.08.2016 to 01.04.2017, is quashed and set aside. 29. The respondents are directed to: (i) grant the petitioner the benefit of the Third Higher Pay Scale (Option-3) with effect from 20.08.2016; (ii) refix his pay accordingly in the appropriate Pay Matrix Level; and (iii) release all consequential arrears of salary, allowances and increments flowing from such re-fixation. 30. With the aforesaid observations / directions, instant writ petition is allowed . There shall be no order as to costs.