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2025 DAILYLAW 69596 (KAR)

SRI THOMAS v. FRANCIS PRAKASH

CRP/276/2016 · 2025-10-23

V Srishananda

body2025

Judgment text

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- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V SRISHANANDA CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.276 OF 2016 (RES) BETWEEN: 1. SRI THOMAS S/O LATE G PRAKASH AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.973 MAIN ROAD, VIVEKANANDA CIRCLE MYSORE-570023 2. MARIA SCHOLASTICAL W/O JOSEPH CHARLES AGED 57 YEARS, RESIDING AT 64, 18TH CROSS, JAYANAGAR MYSORE-570014 …PETITIONERS (BY SRI OJASWI FOR SRI K V DHANANJAY, ADVOCATES) AND: FRANCIS PRAKASH S/O LATE G PRAKASH SINCE DEAD REPRESENTED BY LRS 1. RITA MARGRET W/O LATE FRANCIS G PRAKASH AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS, RESIDING AT # 37 H BLOCK, RAMAKRISHNA NAGAR MYSORE-570022 Digitally signed by MALATESH K C Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 2. CELINE MARY W/O SOMAN AGED 68 YEARS, R/A 25/2, LINGAMBUDHI TANK SRIRAMPURA MYSORE-570001 3. JOSEPH CHARLES S/O LATE ANTHONY AGED 65 YEARS, 4. ARUN ANTHONY AGED 30 YEARS, S/O JOSEPH CHARLES 5. SARA AGED 32 YEARS, D/O JOSEPH CHARLES RESPONDENT NOS.3 TO 5 ARE RESIDING AT 64, 18TH CROSS, JAYANAGAR, MYSORE-570014 6. ROOPASHRI W/O SHESHADRI AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, R/A 19, ARAVINDNAGAR II STAGE, KUVEMPU NAGAR, MYSORE-570023 7. YASHODAMMA W/O MALLIAH, AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS, R/A 78, II CROSS, ARAVINDANAGAR, MYSORE-570023 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI H. MUJTABA, ADVOCATE FOR R1; SRI SUMANTH.K, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1; SRI S.PRASAD, ADVOCATE FOR R2; SRI PAVAN SHYAM, ADVOCATE FOR R3, R5 AND R7; SRI SAINATH.D.M, ADVOCATE FOR R4 AND R6) - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 115 OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 19.02.2016 PASSED IN O.S No.579/2009 ON THE FILE OF THE ADDL. II CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC., MYSURU, PARTLY DECREEING THE SUIT FOR POSSESSION. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V SRISHANANDA ORAL ORDER Heard Sri Ojaswi for Sri K.V.Dhananjay, learned counsel for the revision petitioners and Sri H.Mujtaba, learned counsel for the respondent No.1. 2. Present revision petition is filed challenging the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.579/2009 decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. 3. Operative portion of the judgment reads as under: “The suit of the plaintiffs is hereby partly decreed with costs. The plaintiffs are entitled for restoration of possession of the suit schedule properties in their favour. The defendants are directed to hand over the possession of the suit schedule properties in favour - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 of the plaintiffs within period of one month from the date of this order. The plaintiffs are entitled for damages to be determined by way of separate enquiry. Draw decree accordingly.” 4. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 in O.S.No.579/2009 being aggrieved by the same have preferred the present revision petition on the following grounds:  “The plaintiffs had offered 54 Exhibits while the defendants had offered 170 Exhibits. The Trial Court has devoted several pages and numerous paragraphs to discuss in detail, the Exhibits submitted by the plaintiffs. Mysteriously, there is simply no discussion anywhere in the judgment about the Exhibits filed by the defendants. Such an uneven judicial treatment by itself amounts to a grave failure of justice and in fact, there has been a severe failure of justice in this case, for that reason.  The Court below could not even detect the fundamental falsity in the allegation of the plaintiffs - that a 70-year-old defendant had physically and forcibly dispossessed the plaintiffs, children of plaintiffs' school and staff therein from the plaintiffs' TGP School at the suit property on - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 13-Aug-2009. It was improbable that a 70 year old man could have done so even while physically acting in concert with other defendants defendant No.2 Maria Scholastical is a woman who was 50 years old, 3rd defendant Joseph Charles was 58 years old, 4th defendant Arun Anthony was 23 years old, 5th defendant Sara, a girl, was 25 years old, 6th defendant Roopashri was a woman who was 48 years old and Yashodamma, the 7th defendant was a woman who was 51 years old. The plaint itself had not alleged that the defendants had brought anybody else with them to evict the plaintiffs from the school forcibly. As such, the Court below has failed to exercise even ordinary care and caution while evaluating the grossly fraudulent case of the plaintiffs. Hence, there has been a serious miscarriage of justice and deserves to be corrected in this Revision.  The Court below did not even notice that the fact of the filing of the suit was simply inconsistent with the plaintiff's primary allegation - that they were dispossessed on 13-Aug-2009 when in fact, they did not think of filing a case to the Court for a full 73 days thereafter; the suit was filed in the Court below only on 26-Oct-2009. Nor had the plaintiffs filed any police complaint at all -another compelling reason to doubt their allegation. It is - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 unthinkable that the jurisdictional police would have simply ignored an allegation as serious as put forth by the plaintiffs; the intervention of the police alone could have secured complete relief to the plaintiffs as the police would have necessarily arrested the troublemakers and removed them from the suit property if only the plaintiffs' version was true. However, had the plaintiffs' police complaint been false, the police would have easily detected the same and the plaintiffs' would have been hauled up for making a false complaint. In other words, the Trial Court did not notice that the allegation levelled by the plaintiff in his suit was essentially one of a serious criminal nature. Yet, the Trial Court did not ask itself about why the plaintiff did not proceed to give a police complaint at all. After all, if only the defendants had encroached into the suit property and took over some one's building to run their school, it would have been a very simple case for the police to address and solve. Why the plaintiff did not even elect this remedy which could have led the police to arrest and remove the wrongdoers is a question that has missed the attention of the Trial Court. The plaintiff's choice to not proceed to the police for an immediate redressal should have alerted the Trial Court to the falsity of the plaintiffs' version. Thereby, the Trial Court did not accord due care - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 and attention to its whole chain of reasoning- occasioning failure of justice.  Equally, the Court below did not even see that the plaintiffs were not even keen to invoke the process of the Court until February 2010. The first hearing in the Court below took place only 175 days -on 8- Feb-2010. The Trial Court could not even notice these primary infirmities in the case of the plaintiffs to doubt their main allegation of dispossession. Still, it has chosen altogether to discard each and every Exhibit and defence of the defendants. Thereby, a grave failure of justice has been occasioned.  The Trial Court did not notice at all that neither plaintiff had offered any evidence to reiterate their essential allegation - that they were dispossessed. The first plaintiff, as he had expired midway, was represented by his wife and she plainly said during the cross-examination that she was simply not aware at all about who had come to dispossess her husband. She put forth a mutually contradictory stand by saying two different things for the same date and time - that she was at home and away from the suit property at one breath and in another breath that she was with her husband at the suit property. The second plaintiff did not even - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 take the witness stand. As such, the whole case of the plaintiffs was that of being forcibly dispossessed and yet, nobody came forward to say as much during evidence. This failure alone should have been enough to throw out the case of the plaintiff. Hence, there has been a grave failure of justice.  The defendants had produced dozens of Government records, the plaintiffs' correspondence to the Government and other documents to prove the existence and functioning of 'Mary's High School in the suit property. The plaintiffs could not impeach any of these Government records or letters addressed to the Government and neither could the Trial Court find any fault therein. These documents were D42, D43, D44, D45, D46, D47, D48, D49, D53, D54, D55, D56, D57, D58, D59, D60, D63, D65, D66, D67, D69, D70, D71, D72, D73, D74, D75, D76. D77. D78, D82, D83, D84, D86, D164, D165 and others. Still, the Trial Court has perversely said that the defendants had forcibly evicted the plaintiffs from the suit property, occupied the plaintiffs' school and passed off as if they were running their own school, 'Mary's High School' at the suit property. The Trial Court did not even ask if it was possible for any person at all to claim simply that he was running a - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 school in a given land without producing Government records to prove it. Of course, the Trial Court had to assume in its reasoning that whether a school was situated in a place or not had to be decided wholly on the basis of private documents and testimony of private parties - a fundamentally flawed assumption in light of the fact that the educational sector is very tightly regulated in the State and India and a plethora of Government records would simply prove or disprove the existence or absence of a school on a given land. As such, since the Trial Court made an unlawful assumption in the face of voluminous Government records produced by the defendants to prove the existence of their Mary's High School at the suit property, the impugned Order is not merely deeply flawed but demonstrates grave perversion of the course of justice.  The plaintiffs' evidence during cross-examination rebuts their own averment in the plaint, yet the trial court has wholly missed it. The plaint essentially started with an averment that the first plaintiff, Francis Prakash bought the suit property out of his earnings from 'Mary Brick Industries' whereas during the evidence, his wife admitted that she could not think of any person who had seen her husband's independent business earning. - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 She even admitted that there was simply no document to show that her husband had an independent source of income; he had come to Mysore only after 'Mary Brick Industries' had begun. In fact, to disprove these averments, the defendants had produced voluminous documents to show that the first defendant, Thomas was the one to establish and run 'Mary Brick Industries' and that the earnings therefrom went into purchase of the suit property. Yet, the Trial Court has unjustifiably seen it unnecessary to delve into the defendant's evidence simply because it thought that all of those documents had to do with 'Mary Brick Industries'.  The Trial Court set itself for a perverse outcome when it simply turned a blind eye to the plaintiffs' own evidence during cross-examination: The plaintiff herself admitted that the suit property was converted for a non-agricultural purpose only for setting up a school in 1997 itself; she did not know, however, that all of these Orders were in fact, issued in the name of 'St. Mary's Educational Association'. Yet, the Trial Court has misdirected itself in not paying due attention to the plaintiffs' own admission during cross-examination. - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016  Further, the Trial Court did not even pay bare attention to the fact that the first plaintiffs' foundational averment in this 2009 suit at the Court below was wholly opposed to what he himself had submitted to this Hon'ble Court in 2001. Justice T.S.Thakur (as his Lordship then was) of this Hon'ble Court had passed on Order on 19 Nov 2001 in a writ petition that had been filed by this very plaintiff, Francis Prakash as President of Mary's Educational Society [Writ Petition No. 20640 of 2001]. A copy of the said judgment had been furnished as Exhibit D168. It began with these lines: "Land measuring 3 acres and 10 1/2 guntas situate in Lingambudi Village of Mysore Taluk is owned by the Petitioner..."  The aforesaid description is of the suit property. As to what the first plaintiff/petitioner to this Hon'ble Court then had submitted in 2001 as his activity was on the suit property, this Hon'ble Court has stated in the aforesaid Order that: "...He urged that the Petitioner had established an educational Institution, to which nearly 650 students were admitted, whose interest was likely to suffer in case - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 the proposed acquisition was allowed to go on..." "...The fact that the Petitioner is making use of the land for running an institution also does not render the acquisition proceedings illegal or justify interference with the same..."  A mere glance at the Order above would have conclusively established that the whole case of the plaintiff in this suit was one of rank fraud and deception. Their case in the plaint is that only in 2009 did they commence a school known as TGP school and never before it; that the defendants who were running 'Mary's' High School' under Mary's Educational Association at some other place had encroached upon the suit property on 13-Aug- 2009, evicted the plaintiffs and started running this alleged "TGP School' as 'Mary's High School' in the suit property only from that date 13-Aug-2009. The aforesaid Order passed by Hon'ble Justice T.S.Thakur (as his Lordship then was) on 19-Nov- 2001 says a very different thing instead - that, as on 19-Nov-2001 itself, the plaintiff himself had submitted to this Hon'ble Court that a school (and which was none but Mary's High School) was being run in the suit property with him as the President of the society running that school (Mary's - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 Educational Association). A gross failure of the Trial Court to locate this basic deception in the plaint has led to a grave failure and perversion of justice.  The Court below failed to see that the plaintiffs themselves had voluntarily sworn upon and executed Affidavits in favour of the educational activity of 'St.Mary's Educational Association' in respect of the suit property and thereby, conferred a valid licence to the said 'St.Mary's Educational Association' to perform its educational activity at the suit property. In other words, the Trial Court just did not pay any attention to the fact that both the plaintiffs themselves had executed duly sworn Affidavits twelve years before the institution of the suit for the purpose of allowing the suit property to be used for running the school by the 'St. Mary's Educational Association'. It is a standard practice within the Department of Education to insist in cases where the school building sits on land to which other people have title that Affidavits from such persons towards security of tenure be furnished to it. Such an Affidavit was in fact, tendered in this case by none other than the plaintiffs themselves. Exhibit D63 could not have been more clinching of the case of the defendants. - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 It is an Affidavit executed before a Notary in Mysore on 12-Jan-1997. It says: "I, Francis G Prakash S/o. Gnanaprakasom (52 years) solemnly declare that I contribute 3 acres 10 ffl guntas of land at Sy.No.25/4 of Lingambudi Village, Mysore Taluk to St.Mary's Educational Association towards, an encouragement for their free education programme to the economically poor students of all community. I donate my land with my full will without any pressure or compulsion from outside and I will not take back my land at any cost".  A similar declaration by the 2nd plaintiff Celine Mary on the same day, 12-Jan-1997 through an affidavit duly executed before a Notary says the exact thing as the first plaintiff: "I Celine Mary W/o. Soman (50 years) solemnly declare that I contribute 37 guntas of land at Sy.No.25/2 of Lingambudi village, Mysore Taluk to St. Mary's Educational Association as encouragement for their free education programme to the economically poor students of all community. - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 "I donate my land with my full will without any pressure or compulsion from outside, and I will not take back my land at any cost."  The Affidavits above were marked as Exhibits D63. There is simply no whisper about it anywhere in the judgment of the Trial Court. Naturally, the plaintiff's counsel sought to get over these two documents by suggesting to the defendants that these two documents were 'forged.' Expectedly, the defendant reiterated on the witness stand that these two documents were genuine. These two documents, therefore, touched upon the core question before the Trial Court over whether there was any dispossession at all as alleged. The Trial Court had a plain duty to rule upon the scope of these two documents in its judgement. In other words, that the Trial Court simply ignored the contention of the plaintiffs' counsel that these two documents were 'forged' as it said nothing at all about these aspects, it also had a commensurate duty to make sense of these two documents. The only implication that these two documents could provide was that the whole case of the plaintiffs was based on fraud and deception. The Trial Court did not notice as much and there has resulted a massive failure of justice thereby. - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016  The Trial Court did not even appreciate the fact that the plaintiff's wife herself admitted during cross-examination that a video that purported to show forcible eviction did not even show Thomas in it and that she could not say when that video was even shot. The Trial Court has accorded great weight to such testimony that is lacking in its most basic requirement of credibility. Hence, there has been a grave failure of justice.  The Trial Court, it is respectfully submitted, has also failed to exercise ordinary care in its own reasoning. At paragraph 27 of its judgment, it says that it is proved that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit property even before their dispossession on 13-Aug-2009 because of the defendants' own admission that the school in the suit property was being run by the plaintiff from 2002 itself up to 2009. Thereby, the Trial Court has itself said that there was in fact, a school in the suit property from 2002 itself. Still, the Trial Court does not ask itself - 'which school was it that ran from 2002 in the suit property as the plaintiffs' TGP School came into existence in the suit property only in May 2009?" The Trial Court should have known that it has itself entered a finding that the TGP School in the suit property came into existence only in May 2009. Apparently, the Trial - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 Court did not even ask about how one could say that the school in the suit property was being managed by the plaintiffs from 2002 itself when its own finding was that a school came into existence there only in May 2009. These fundamental infirmities have led to a grave miscarriage of justice.  The Trial Court has been, it is respectfully submitted, carried away by the fact the defendants filed two suits in 2009 itself and the Trial Court has reasoned that thereby, by obtaining an ex-parte Order of injunction on 13-Aug-2009 in the latter suit, the defendants forcibly evicted the plaintiffs from the school. The Trial Court did not probe this issue with greater scrutiny. The Trial Court did not take note of the averments or the defence in these two cases. About the latter suit, O.S. No.1279 of 2009, the Trial Court says that the defendants 'managed to secure an exparte temporary injunction. The Trial Court continues then to say that "on strength of the same the defendants came to the suit property on 13-Aug-2009 and illegally dispossessed her husband from eight class rooms of plaint A schedule property. And broke open the lock and are illegally running Mary's Educational Association school in the plaint A schedule property without obtaining any necessary permission from - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 the competent authorities. Likewise the defendants have also occupied the plaint B schedule property on the strength of the same temporary injunction Order."  The Trial Court did not take a closer look at the plaint or the written statement in O.S.No.1279 of 2009. In fact, the prayer in the said case simply goes to show that the defendants who were the plaintiffs in that other case (O.S.No.1279 of 2009) had apprehended that: i. the plaintiffs (defendants in O.S.No.1279 of 2009) would interfere with the running of Mary's High School at the suit property and that they ii. would also try to put up a sham school only to undercut the reputation of Mary's High School at the suit property.  Such apprehension is entirely consistent with the stand taken by the defendants in this very case. Without the Trial Court entering into the averments or the defence in the previous case, O.S.No.1279 of 2009, it could not have discredited the case of the defendants at all. Further, though true that the defendants did not explain why they had filed two separate suits at that time, the relief sought for in those cases was not even examined - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 carefully by the Trial Court. The relief sought in it had said: Prays for (A) Permanent Injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property by running the institution in the plaint schedule property except evict in due process of law. (B) Grant permanent injunction restraining the defendants from canvassing or defame the institution with pseudo advertisements or placards'  The ex-parte interim injunction was sought in these terms: Prays to grant an ad-interim temporary injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, workmen or anybody acting on behalf of them from interfering with running of the institution in the application schedule property till the disposal of the suit as such an order is necessary for the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit.  The Trial Court did not state anywhere and the plaintiffs themselves did not state anywhere that the prayer sought in the suit above (O.S.No.1279 - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 of 2009) was in any manner contrary to the defence put up by the defendants in the Court below. As such, in the absence of a finding that these defendants had previously sought a relief that was inconsistent with their defence in this case, the Trial Court made a giant leap in reasoning to hold that 'because the Court would think that the defendants had acted dishonestly once before, they acted dishonestly once again by making use of the ex-parte temporary injunction Order'. Such a surmise could not amount to a judicial reasoning and the elevation of that surmise to a judicial finding in this case has led to a grave perversion of justice.  If only the Trial Court had felt that the defendants had not satisfactorily explained the reason for filing two separate but similar suits for injunction one after the other, the fact that an anxious and worried litigant who was already old and infirm would do so could have been noted by the Trial Court to express strong disapproval of it in the instant case. Also, as this defendant had denied authorising his lawyer to file those cases during his cross-examination, the Trial Court could have taken a keener interest in what really had transpired at the relevant time. If only the Trial Court had felt it necessary to punish this defendant - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 for his indiscretion of filing two cases, in view of the fact that this defendant had denied having authorised the same during his cross-examination, the Trial Court could have summoned the lawyer concerned and allowed the lawyer to confront this defendant and to then, even warn this defendant against lying. Even better, the Trial Court could have taken steps to initiate prosecution of this defendant if it felt that he was lying to the Court on a matter of substance and relevance to this case. The Trial Court did none of those things - thereby, implying that its own perception of dishonesty on the part of the defendants was not even carefully realized by it. It could not have chosen to disbelieve the case of the defendant in this case simply because of what it felt was a lack of satisfactory explanation from him on this count. In doing so, the Trial Court forgot the basic rule of our civil trials that records of the Government produced over a long duration rarely lie. To determine whether Mary's High School was situated in the suit property, the Trial Court was not expected to treat the conduct of the defendant as determinative. It was not so determinative, either in fact or in law. The determinative factors were the records of the Government and all of those records simply spoke in favour of there being Mary's High School at the suit property. The Trial - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 Court simply ignored every Government record in this case. Such dismissal is nothing but a gross perversion of justice.  Further, a careful thinker would always ask if the Trial Court was unhappy with the defendant's lack of explanation for filing two previous suits - one after another and would therefore, find against him in this suit, what has been the Trial Court's approach to greater fraud and deception by the plaintiff, however? That the plaintiff simply instituted his suit by saying that Mary's High School was situated somewhere else and not in the suit property whereas previous judgments of higher courts had recorded his own claim that Mary's High School was situated in the suit property and record after record maintained by the Government too had said that Mary's High School was situated in the suit property, how has the Trial Court dealt with the plaintiff's deception at all? Apparently, the Trial Court has not even cared to notice the plaintiff's fraud and the fact that it did not notice it would render its punishment of the defendants for what it thought as their dishonesty is highly suspect and lacks basic fairness or justice. If a plaintiff's blatant fraud and deception would be ignored and the defendant's perceived dishonesty is taken by a Court to pass judgment against the - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 defendant and in favour of the fraudulent and deceiving plaintiff, the law would have incurred gross perversion of justice, and that is the situation in this case. As the Trial Court did not see the need to weigh the evidence carefully before it simply because of its perceived dishonesty in the defendant, it fell into even more perversion.  Further, the Trial Court has grossly misconstrued the defendants' own deposition during cross- examination. The defendant had said: 'It is true to suggest that the gate door lock and class rooms were broke opened in presence of DDPI. It is false to suggest that all other Defendants and myself colluded with each other and misrepresented with the authorities and got the door lock opened. Thereafter it was not locked even till today. The witness voluntarily states that initially with the presence of DDPI, I broke open the gate lock and next the parents rushed inside the school and broke open the classroom's lock". This admission, according to the Trial Court was all it took to tilt the trial against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiffs para 28 of the judgment says "28. The fact that the plaintiffs were dispossessed on basis of ex-parte temporary injunction sought by the f defendant in O.S.1279/2009 is evident on the - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 basis of admission of DW1 himself in his cross- examination that...".  However, the Trial Court did not even pay close attention to the deposition above. The only thing that the admission above of the defendant indicates is that a lock was put on his school in the suit property and that he broke open that lock in the presence of the DDPI. This was a perfectly legitimate activity for him to do. If one's school building doors are found to be suddenly locked on a given morning by trouble-makers, the school management would necessarily break open the doors and in this case, they were lawful enough even to call the Deputy Director of Public Instruction (DDPI) to the spot and to do so in his presence. The Trial Court had simply no basis whatsoever to take the aforesaid admission to even remotely come to the misguided conclusion that: i. the defendants' were not running any school in the suit property; ii. the plaintiffs were running their school in the suit property; iii. the defendants went to the suit property on 13-Aug-2009 armed with an ex-parte temporary injunction Order and - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 iv. the defendants dispossessed the plaintiffs on that very day.  The conclusion above of the Trial Court is grossly perverse as it simply rests on the admission of the defendant that he removed the locks put on his school by troublemakers in the presence of the DDPI.  Further, the Trial Court fell into significant error when it did not itself ask about the date on which this lock-breaking took place. The counsel for the plaintiffs did not elicit, and the defendant did not say during the deposition on when this lock breaking took place a fundamental omission that goes against the plaintiff assuming that the whole event should carry the meaning favoured by the Trial Court. Also, the Trial Court does not ask about why the plaintiff's school that was alleged to be running at that time in the suit property was even locked at all - it should have been open and running. Certainly, the plaintiff's version being that his school was running at that time, why then was his school building closed with locks put on school doors is a crucial question that the Trial Court did not even raise. As the deposition says that parents and children were all there at that time, it was school hour time. This has led to a gross failure of justice in this case. - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016  Moreover, the Trial Court also fell into grave error when it did not notice that the DDPI or the Deputy Director of Public Instruction who is a senior education officer for a district in the Department of Education under the State Government would not leave all of his official duties to visit the suit property to encourage the defendants to break open the doors of somebody else's school. The DDPI was there simply because the Government would be interested in ensuring that school children are not turned away from a school only because trouble makers have locked the doors of that school. In his presence, the defendant breaking open the door of a school that he has consistently stated to be his and none else's is a legitimate and protective activity for the defendant. A fundamentally flawed reasoning by the Trial Court in this case has led to an unprecedented miscarriage of justice in this case. In the process, the Trial Court has unjustifiably created an impression that a senior officer of the Department of Education has illegally allowed the defendants to defraud and wrong the plaintiffs by allowing one school to be illegally transported into the building of another school and to run there. A judicial officer is not at liberty to make these many unfounded impressions about a senior officer of the - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 Department of Education. For these additional reasons, the Trial Court has erred gravely.  Also, a case of this nature is one that should have led to the passage of an interim Order but the Trial Court says nothing about passage of any interim Order in this case and the record itself says nothing about the giving or declining of an interim Order in this case. If an interim Order was declined by the Trial Court, the plaintiff could have approached this Hon'ble Court in Revision and critical guidance in this case could have been easily provided by this Hon'ble Court in view of this Hon'ble Court's familiarity with the law governing educational institutions; this Hon'ble Court could have even provided directions to the Trial Court to summon the records and officers of the Department of Education to resolve the plain dispute between the parties. The Trial Court did not ask about why the plaintiffs did not insist, obtain or appeal grant or denial of an interim Order that was so essential to cases of this nature. Thereby, there has been an uncritical acceptance of the deeply suspicious version of the plaintiff- leading to a failure of justice.  Equally, the Trial Court did not even notice that this Hon'ble Court too already formed an - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 impression that the defendants were running their school in the suit property in its judgment in CRP No.45 of 2013 on 10-Oct-2013. The said CRP had been filed by Thomas, the Revisional Petitioner herein and this Hon'ble Court had, on preponderance of probabilities, observed that: “...It also appears, by way of conduct, petitioner herein is in possession and has established a school in the suit property. Might be the property was standing in the name of the respondent's predecessor viz., the husband of the 1st respondent. The very fact is, petitioner herein was in possession and running a school in the portion of the property. It also appears, as a matter of preponderance of probability, petitioner's contribution would be there when the property was purchased in the name of his brother..." Thereby, the Trial Court committed a serious error of fact and law.  Further, the Trial Court did not even ask about when the building that was housing the plaintiffs' alleged TGP School was even constructed. If only the Trial Court had begun to ask this critical question, it would have noticed that the said - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 building had been constructed pursuant to permissions obtained in 1997 and that the conversion Order issued then had strictly stipulated that the school building proposed on the suit property was to be constructed in the next two years and that no other use was permissible for the suit property. Thereby, the Trial Court would have been put on alert that the suit property had witnessed the completion of a school building as early as 1999. Thus, the Trial Court could not have missed the fact that it was Mary's High School that was being run in the said building in the suit property from 1999 itself. These fundamental omissions have led to a grave miscarriage of justice.  The Court below has in fact, reached the exact same conclusion that it had reached earlier without receiving the defendants' Written Statement or evidence. That Order had been set aside by this Hon'ble Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 45 of 2013 and the Court below had been mandated to accord full opportunity to the defendants. Yet, the impugned Order is simply no different from what had been passed earlier and had been set aside by this Hon'ble Court. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside at the very threshold. - 30 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016  For all of the reasons above, the whole case of the plaintiffs that was based on fraud and deception has been rewarded by the Trial Court by decreeing the suit in their favour and against the defendants. The Trial Court did not even confer ordinary care and attention to this case though the case did touch upon the provision of education to the poor and underprivileged sections of the society. For all these reasons, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside in its entirety as a gross failure, miscarriage, and perversion of justice. 5. Facts of the case which are utmost necessary for disposal of the present revision petition are as under: 6. Plaintiffs filed a suit in respect of the following immovable properties for possession on the ground that under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, plaintiffs were dispossessed from the suit property by virtue of an interim order passed in O.S No.1279/2009. DESCRIPTION OF SUIT PROPERTY SCHEDULE-A Only 8 Rooms in the Ground Floor of the alienated landed property with building in Sy. No.25/4, Janjar - 31 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 No.347, measuring 3 Acres 10½ Guntas situated in Lingambudhi Tank, Srirampuram, III Stage, Kasaba Hobli, Mysore Taluk, Mysore and bounded on:- East by Road West by Lingambudi Tank North by Celine Mary's land i.e., 'B' Schedule property South by Church and land of Helavanna SCHEDULE-B Alienated landed property with Sy No. 25/2, measuring 37 Guntas comprising of 5 class rooms in Ground Floor and Two Houses, situated at Lingambhudi Tank, Srirampura 3rd Stage, Kasaba Hobli, Mysore Taluk, Mysore and bounded on the:- East by Entrance and Dallalanna's land West by Lingambudi Tank North by Private Property South by Land and Building of 1st Plaintiff 7. Suit on due contest came to be decreed by the Trial Court. 8. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner re-iterating the grounds urged in the revision petition vehemently contented that, there is no dispute that plaintiffs are the owners of the - 32 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 suit property, but school was run by the revision petitioners which has been suppressed by the plaintiffs. 9. When there was an interim order of injunction in favour of the petitioners herein, they went and took possession of the property which was illegally taken away by the plaintiffs. 10. It is also contended that, parents of the students also gave a helping hand for the revision petitioners to run the school properly which has been ignored by the learned Trial Judge while decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs resulting in miscarriage of justice. Therefore, sought for allowing the revision petition. 11. Per contra, Sri H.Mujtaba, learned counsel for the contesting respondent No.1 supports the impugned judgment. 12. Having heard the arguments of both sides, this Court perused the material on record meticulously. 13. A memo came to be filed by the counsel for plaintiffs who are the respondents in this case, on 05.07.2018 which reads as under: - 33 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 “The respondents have taken possession of the suit schedule properties. The second relief granted by the Court below does not survive. The respondents state that the Execution Petition in No.27 of 2016 filed by them was dismissed as fully satisfied on 16.07.2016. The above petition has, therefore, become infructuous. WHEREFORE, the respondents pray that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to dismiss the above petition as having become infructuous to meet the ends of justice.” 14. Admittedly the plaintiffs being the owners of the suit property, they have been successful in establishing the fact that they have been dispossessed by the defendants illegally by taking advantage of an ex-parte order of injunction passed in O.S No.1279/2009. A suit in O.S.No.579/2009 under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act was thus maintainable. 15. It is also borne out from the records that the said interim order of injunction was subsequently vacated. Therefore, decreeing of the suit is thus justified. - 34 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:42110 CRP No. 276 of 2016 16. Even though the revision petitioners have contended that they were running the School for the orphans, since the owners of the property are the plaintiffs, the contrary allegations which were found in the written statement and the evidence of the defendants are of no avail in maintaining either the possession of the suit property or on any other account. 17. There is also serious dispute as to who was running the school and management thereof in the suit property. 18. Since the plaintiffs are the owners of the property, they are entitled for the possession of the suit property. 19. In view of the memo filed by the plaintiffs stating that their possession has been restored through the process known to law, nothing survives in this revision petition to be decided. 20. Accordingly, the following: ORDER Revision petition is dismissed. Sd/- (V SRISHANANDA) JUDGE kcm List No.: 1 Sl No.: 59