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2025 DAILYLAW 6917 (RAJ)

PROGRAMME OFFICER (NAREGA ) AND BLOCK DEVELOPMENT OFFICER v. SHRI PADMARAM

CRES/61/2025 · 2025-07-04

Maneesh Sharma

Transfer Petitionbody2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

[2025:RJ-JP:24683] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Restoration Application No. 61/2025 IN S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No.2881/2017 1. Programme Officer (Narega ) And Block Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti Revadar, District Sirohi Rajasthan. 2. District Programme Officer (Narega) and District Collector Sirohi Collectorate, District Sirohi Rajasthan. ----Petitioners Versus 1. Shri Panna ram S/o Late Shri Dalaram, Aged About 42 Years, 2. Smt. Samda Devi W/o Shri Panna Ram, Aged About 39 Years, R/o Village Jalampur, Tehsil And Pachayat Samiti Revdar, District Sirohi, Presently R/o Near Anaj Mandi Dudu, Tehsil Dudu, District Jaipur (Raj.) ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sanjay Bharati For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA Order 04/07/2025 1. The present restoration application is barred by a delay of 1980 days. 2. Upon due consideration of the application for condonation of delay, this court finds no sufficient ground to condone the delay and explanation so put forth by the appellant cannot be said to be sufficient explanation for condonation of delay as the same appears to be a lame excuse without any supportive record. 3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Esha Bhattacharjee v. Committee of Raghunatpur Nafar Academy and others" reported in [(2013) 12 SCC 649] held as under: "21.8 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration of a few days, for the former doctrine of prejudice is [2025:RJ-JP:24683] (2 of 3) [CRES-61/2025] attracted, whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants a strict approach, whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9 (ix) The conduct, behaviour, and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties, and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of a liberal approach" 4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, reported in (1971) 2 SCC 860", has held as under: "That law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims." 5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Rajneesh Kumar & Anr. vs. Ved Prakash" reported in 2024 0 Supreme (SC) 1101, has held as under: It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to [2025:RJ-JP:24683] (3 of 3) [CRES-61/2025] blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief. 6. In view of the above legal proposition of law and facts stated above, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is hereby dismissed for want of any sufficient cause mentioned in the application. 7. Accordingly, the Civil Misc. Application bearing No. 376/2025 filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is hereby dismissed as being devoid of merits. 8. In view of above, the present restoration application is dismissed. 9. Any other pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (MANEESH SHARMA),J SOURAV /38