1 2025:CGHC:6747 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 85 of 2018  K.S.G. Rao S/o Shri K. S. Ramchandra Rao, Aged About 63 Years R/o E - 3, Vishal Nagar, Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Public Works Department Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, New Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh 2. Secretary, General Administration Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, New Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3. Secretary, Public Works Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, New Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4. Public Service Commission, Through Its Secretary, Saheed Bhagat Singh Chowk, Shankar Nagar Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 5. Shri D. K. Pradhan In - Charge, Engineer - In - Chief, Public Works Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, New Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Yogesh Netam, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Harsh Wardhan, Advocate For State : Mr. Pramod Shrivastava, Dy. Government Advocate For Respondent No. 4 : Mr. Siddhant Das, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate For Respondent No. 5 : Mr. Sajal Gupta, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Sourabh Dangi, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 06. 02.2025 2 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “10.1 That, the Hon'ble Court may be kindly pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to the grievance of the petitioner and the promotion of the respondent No.5, kept in the possession of the respondents, for kind perusal. 10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court may be kindly pleased to adjudicate and declare that the petitioner herein was entitled to be promoted on the post of Chief Engineer w.e.f. the year 2010 over and above the respondent No.5. 10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents grant notional promotion to the petitioner from the year 2010 with all consequential benefits of pay. 10.4 That, this Hon'ble Court be kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to pay retiral and other benefits to the petitioner as payable to Chief Engineer in the respondent Public Works Department w.e.f the date of retirement. 10.5 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief which the Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 10.6 That, the Hon'ble Court in the facts and circumstances of the present case may further be pleased to grant cost of the petition to the petitioner.” 2. The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Engineer (Electrical & Mechanical) in the year 1983 in Public Works Department. It is pleaded that there was a separate appointment and line of promotion for Engineers working in the Electrical & Mechanical (for short “E & M”) wing. It is also pleaded that in the year 2003, the petitioner was considered for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer (E & M) by the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC). It is further pleaded that the petitioner was eligible for promotion to the post of Superintendent Engineer and was promoted to the said post vide order dated 18.09.2007. Thereafter, the petitioner was to be promoted to the post of Chief Engineer and DPC convened in this regard in the year 2010. It is pleaded that the name of the petitioner was within the 3 zone of consideration and a DPC was convened on 20.08.2010, but the name of the petitioner was not considered. It is also pleaded that the first DPC was convened on 20.08.2010 and there were four posts of Chief Engineer and the name of the petitioner was at serial no. 7, and thereafter again, a DPC was convened on 29.09.2010 and again the name of the petitioner was not considered. Thus, the petitioner has challenged the DPC proceedings of 2010, claiming therein benefits attached to the post of Chief Engineer. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was eligible and qualified for the post of Chief Engineer. He would further submit that the petitioner had the requisite experience for promotion, but deliberately his name was not considered. He would also submit that even in the second DPC conducted on 29.09.2010, the name of the petitioner was not considered by the respondents/State authorities deliberately. He would pray to quash the DPC convened in the year 2010 for the post of Chief Engineer. 4. On the other hand, learned counsels appearing for the respondents would oppose. They would submit that the petitioner has challenged the DPC convened in the year 2010 by filing the instant petition in the year 2017. They would further submit that in para 7 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated that he came to know about illegality in promotion in the year 2013 itself, but he filed this petition in the year 2017 and there is no explanation in this regard. They would also submit that the petitioner has already got retired from the services in the year 2017 and thereafter, he filed this writ petition and thus, the instant petition deserves to be dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents 4 placed on record. 6. The petitioner has challenged the DPC convened in the year 2010 for the post of Chief Engineer, Public Works Department by filing a writ petition on 15.12.2017 and in para 7, the petitioner has stated that he came to know about illegality in promotion to the post of Chief Engineer in the year 2013, even though, he failed to file writ petition either in the year 2013 or 2014. The petitioner has already got retired from services. 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, held as under:- “17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remain unauthorizedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons -who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle” . In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 8. Recently, the Apex Court, in the matter of Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, 2022 SCC Online SC 64, held as under:- “9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary 5 opinions have been expressed (in Nav Rattanmal Vs. state of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704). The courts have expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of action (who are able to enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s Laws of England , Vol. 68 (2021) para 1005. Equally, change in de facto position or character, creation of third party rights over a period of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings, are equitable public policy considerations why period of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent oppression.(see Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association (2005) 7 SCC 510).Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. (See N. Blarkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998)7 SCC 123. Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court, way back in Moons Mils Ltd Vs. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450, had referred to the view expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company and Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, (L.R.) 5 P.C.221 in the following words: “ Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine, Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by this conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case,if an argument against 6 relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.” 9. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. Remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone this Court deems it appropriate to dismiss this petition at the very threshold. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. 10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case in light of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply (supra), Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak (supra), it is quite vivid that the petitioner has approached this Court after a delay of 7 years and in para 7 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated that he came to know about illegality in promotion to the post of Chief Engineer in the year 2013. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, this petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed on account of delay and laches. No cost(s).d Sd/- Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge $iddhant