1 Reserved on : 10.07.2025 Pronounced on : 30.07.2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF JULY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION No.18101 OF 2025 (GM - CPC) BETWEEN: M/S. SOMS REALTORS AND DEVELOPERS REGISTERED UNDER INDIAN PARTNERSHIP ACT, 1932 NO.569, 11TH MAIN, IV BLOCK, JAYANAGAR, BENGALURU – 560 011, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER MR. J. SOMASHEKAR, S/O JAYRAJ C., AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI RAJESWARA P.N., ADVOCATE) AND: 1 . MR. ROBERT ZOMAWIA STREET S/O LATE E. STREET, AGED 88 YEARS, RESIDING AT WHITE HALL, ST. JOHN SCHOOL, R 2 SHILLONG, MEGHALAYA STATE. 2 . MS. JEANNETTE RALTE STREET, D/O. ROBERT ZOMAWIA STREET, AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS, RESIDING AT WHITE HALL, ST. JOHN SCHOOL, SHILLONG, MEGHALAYA STATE. 3 . MR. DAVID RALTE STREET, S/O. ROBERT ZOMAWIA STREET, AGED 50 YEARS, RESIDING AT WHITE HALL, ST. JOHN SCHOOL, SHILLONG, MEGHALAYA STATE. ALSO AT ST. DOMINIC SCHOOL, JIGALA ROAD, ATTIBELE VILLAGE, ANEKAL TALUK, BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI PRAKASH B.N., ADVOCATE FOR R1 AND R2; NOTICE TO R3 IS DISPENSED WITH VIDE ORDER DATED 26.06.2025,) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO CALL FOR RECORDS IN OS NO. 563/2008 ON THE FILE OF HON’BLE II ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, ANEKAL; SET ASIDE ORDER DTD 09.06.2025 (ANNEXURE-A) PASSED BY THE HON’BLE II ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, ANEKAL IN OS NO. 563/2008 ON IA NO. 17 AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE APPLICATION IA NO. 3 17 (ANNDXURE-H) FILED UNDER ORDER XII RULE 6 OF THE CPC, 1908 AS PRAYED FOR BY THE PETITIONER IN IA NO. 17. THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 10.07.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:- CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CAV ORDER The petitioner/plaintiff is before this Court calling in question an order dated 9-06-2025 passed by the II Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Anekal in O.S.No.563 of 2008 declining to accede to I.A.No.17 filed for drawing up a partial decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. 2. Heard Sri P.N.Rajeswara, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri B.N. Prakash, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2. 3. The essential factual tapestry is as follows: The 1st respondent is said to be the absolute owner of 36 acres of land in Indlabele Village, Attibele Hobli, Anekal Taluk 4 having purchased the same in his name and in the names of his wife and children, who are other defendants in the suit. On 26-10-2007 the 1st respondent and the petitioner enter into two agreements of sale in respect of the aforementioned 36 acres of land in two parcels, at the rate of ₹50/- lakhs per acre. A subsequent agreement is also entered into between the parties in furtherance of agreements of sale. A registered General Power of Attorney (‘GPA’) is executed by the 1st respondent in favour of the petitioner on 03-12-2007. It appears that the 1st respondent did not come forward to get the sale deed registered and began to demand ₹1.25 crores per acre towards the sale consideration. Therefore, the plaintiff institutes a suit in O.S.No.563 of 2008 seeking specific performance of the agreement so entered into between the parties. The said suit is pending adjudication. 3.1. In the said suit, the petitioner files an application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC seeking the Court to draw up a decree on the alleged admission of 40% share in the property in favour of the petitioner/plaintiff. The concerned Court, by the order impugned, rejects the said application holding that the said 5 application cannot be considered at this stage. It is this that has driven the plaintiff/petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that defendant No.1/1st respondent who had entered into the agreements of sale has admitted that 40% of the property would undoubtedly be transferred in favour of the petitioner and, therefore, partial decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC ought to have been drawn by the concerned Court. He would contend that the order of the concerned Court is in ignorance of the well settled principles of law as afore-submitted. He would seek the Court to allow the petition and direct the concerned Court to draw up partial decree in terms of the admission of the 1st respondent. 5. Conversely, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that for the last 17 years the suit is pending. At no point in time the plaintiff has projected readiness and willingness to come forward to get the sale deed registered. Without demonstration of readiness and willingness in a suit for specific performance, let alone a decree, even a partial decree 6 cannot be drawn is the statement of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. He would, however, seek dismissal of the petition, with a direction to the concerned Court to conclude the suit within the time fixed by this Court, as it is 17 years old and it is a suit for specific performance. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 7. The afore-narrated facts are a matter of record. The plaintiff enters into two agreements of sale with the 1st defendant on 26-10-2007. They are registered agreements of sale. In terms of the said agreements ₹50/- lakhs per acre was the sale consideration. Another unregistered agreement for sale consideration of ₹1.25 crores per acre was also entered into between the parties. These are two agreements one registered and the other unregistered. Pursuant to the sale agreement, a GPA is also executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property. The 1st defendant is said to have declined to come forward for registration on the score that the 7 subsequent agreement which was entered into between the parties was for ₹1.25/- crores per acre as against ₹50/- lakhs per acre in terms of an earlier agreement. When the defendants did not come forward to execute the sale deed for the agreed amount i.e., ₹50/- lakhs per acre, legal notice is caused upon the defendants by the plaintiff on 14-02-2008 in which the plaintiff agrees to increase the sale consideration by ₹5/- lakhs per acre. The notice did not fructify to any agreement between the parties. 8. The plaintiff then institutes the suit in O.S.No.563 of 2008 seeking relief of specific performance of registered agreements entered into between the parties. The respondents/defendants entered appearance and filed their written statement. Issues are framed by the concerned Court on 04-01-2013. During the subsistence of proceedings, an application comes to be filed by the plaintiff in I.A.No.17 under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC praying the concerned Court to draw up a partial decree for 40% of the share of the 1st defendant in the suit schedule properties in favour of the petitioner/plaintiff. The defendants filed their objections and written arguments are also filed on the application. The concerned 8 Court rejects the application, on the score that it is not a stage at which a partial decree can be drawn. It is this that has driven the plaintiff to this Court. Since the impugned order rejects the claim of the petitioner, I deem it appropriate to notice the same. I.A.No.17 comes to be rejected by the following order: ”Orders on IA No.17 IA No.17 filed by plaintiff U/o 12 Rule 6 r/w Section 151 of CPC, praying to decree the suit in part, i.e., with respect to 40% share of defendant No.1. 2. In support of application managing partner of plaintiffs swear to an affidavit and submitted that they filed suit for relief of specific performance of contract dated 26.10.2007, executed by GPA holder of the plaintiff, as per agreement of sale and GPA they paid ₹50,00,000/- as advance consideration. Defendant No.1 in his written statement clearly submitted that he is owner of 40% of the share in schedule properties and he also admitted that he agreed to sell his share in the suit schedule properties. Defendant No.1 in his written statement admitted the execution of agreement with respect to 40% of his share and also admitted that additional 5 lakhs per acre was demanded in written statement defendant No.1 admitted the sale agreement and its execution towards 40% of his share. The admitted fact need not be proved. The admissions made by defendant No.1 are sufficient to decree the suit by invoking 12 Rule 6 of CPC with respect to 40% share of the 1st defendant. 3. Application resisted by filing written objection and by contending that application filed only to drag and protract the proceedings. There is no admission in the written statement to decree the suit as prayed by the plaintiff. Even though issues framed on 14-10-2008 without adducing evidence plaintiff filed false application to drag and protect the proceedings. Plaintiff filed suit by contending that defendant No.1 being a absolute owner of the schedule property by agreeing to sell the schedule 9 properties for consideration of ₹50/- lakhs per acre executed sale deed dated 26-08-2007 and prayed to direct the defendants to execute sale deed, but in instant application plaintiff pleaded against to the pleadings of the plaint. Application is not maintainable, hence prayed to dismiss the application. 4. Heard both side, perused materials placed before the court. 5. Suit filed for relief of specific performance of contract on the basis of agreement dated 26-10-2007 and to direct the defendants to execute sale deed in favour of the schedule properties and to declare defendant No.1 is the sole and absolute owner of the schedule properties. Instant application filed praying to decree the suit with respect 40% share of the defendant No.1. Plaintiff in the plaint stated that defendant No.1 is the sole owner and prayed to declare defendant No.1 as a sole owner of the property, but in instant application plaintiff himself admitting that defendant No.1 is the owner of 40% share, this is against to pleadings. On perusal of written statement filed by 1st defendant it can be gathered that 1st defendant admitted that he is the owner of 40% of share in the schedule properties, remaining properties were belonged to defendant No.2 to 4. Defendant No.1 also admitted that he executed sale agreements with respect to his share in the schedule properties in favour of the plaintiff. On the instigation of plaintiff and his family friend T.Sudhakar. He also stated that he terminated the sale agreement by sending letter to the plaintiff. Defendant No.1 is also stated that he requested plaintiff to pay ₹1,30,00,000/- per acre, instead of paying the amount plaintiff postponed to mobilize the funds and started to give false publication. On bare reading of written statement filed by defendant No.1 it is clear that defendant No.1 admitted execution of sale agreement, in favour of the plaintiff, with respect to 40% of his share and denied the readiness and willingness. In suit for specific performance, it is mandate duty of the plaintiff to prove readiness and willingness, without that specific performance cannot be granted in favour of the plaintiff. Defendant No.1 denied the readiness and willingness, 10 hence, it is mandatory on the part of plaintiff to prove the readiness and willingness, without establishing that suit cannot be decreed on the basis of admission by invoking Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC, with above observation I.A.No.17 filed by plaintiff U/o 12 Rule 6 r/w Section 151 of CPC, is disposed off, as it cannot be considered at this stage. For plaintiff evidence as last chance by 28-06-2025.” (Emphasis added) The concerned Court holds that the suit is filed for specific performance of contract based upon the agreement dated 26-10-2007. The application is filed seeking to decree the suit in respect of 40% of the share. Why the plaintiff seeks the same is in the agreement executed on 26-10-2007. The share of the 1st defendant is depicted in the agreement of sale as follows: “II. WHEREAS Mr. Dominic Ralte Street died on 02.08.2019 leaving the vendor as his only legal heir and in this manner, vendor become the owner of 40% share in the schedule property.” (Emphasis added) In the written statement it is reiterated that the 1st defendant became the owner of 40% share in the schedule property. It reads as follows: 11 “Whereas Mr. Dominic Ralte Street died on 02.08.1993 leaving the Vendor as his only legal heir and in this manner, the vendor become the owner of 40% share in the schedule property.” (Emphasis added) Further, at paragraph 34 of the written statement the 1st defendant admits as follows: “…. Defendant No.1 was constantly persuaded by T.Sudhakar to complete the sale deed registration, while taking the responsibility of getting a sale price of ₹1,25,00,000/- per acre for Defendant No.1’s share in the Schedule Properties. Since T.Sudhakar was a close and trusted friend of long standing, Defendant No.1 chose to once again give the Plaintiff a fair chance purely based on trust and faith, and vide letter dated 06-05-2008, conveyed though reluctantly to the Plaintiff once again his intention to register only his share of land measuring 14 acres, and in the event of failure to get the lands registered on the aforesaid date, Defendant No.1 informed that the sale agreement dated 26-10-2007 stands cancelled. It is humbly submitted that time and again it was made clear that none of the Defendants were ready to sell their share in the Schedule Properties. Defendant No.1 had in no way enhanced the sale price per acre as alleged by the plaintiff, since the agreed sale price per acre was ₹1,25,00,000/- as per the sale agreement dated 26-10-2007, and the Plaintiff himself agreed to enhance the sale price by ₹5,00,000/- which if added to the existing sale price then the same amounts to ₹1,30,00,000/- per acre. Thus the Plaintiff has falsely submitted to this Hon’ble Court that Defendant No.1 stealthily offered to sell his share in the Schedule properties for an enhanced sale price.” 12 Based upon this, the petitioner files the aforesaid application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. It, therefore becomes necessary to notice Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. It reads as follows: “ORDER XII – ADMISSION: RULE 6. Judgment on admissions.—(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub- rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.” (Emphasis supplied) Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC deals with judgment on admission. Where admissions of fact have been made in the pleadings or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on an application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make its judgment, having regard to such admission. 13 JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE: 9 In the light of the partial decree/judgment sought on admission, it becomes necessary to notice the interpretation of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC by the Apex Court. 10. The Apex Court in the case of HARI STEEL AND GENERAL INDUSTRIES v. DALJIT SINGH1 has held as follows: “…. …. …. 25. In the judgment in Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd. [Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd., (2011) 15 SCC 273: (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 376], nature and scope of Order 12 Rule 6 has been considered by this Court. In the aforesaid judgment this Court has held that the discretion conferred under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is to be exercised judiciously, keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant. Para 11 of the judgment read as under: (SCC pp. 276-77) “11. It is true that a judgment can be given on an “admission” contained in the minutes of a meeting. But the admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling provision, it is neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. The court, on examination of the facts and circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a 1 (2019) 20 SCC 425 14 judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. In short the discretion should be used only when there is a clear “admission” which can be acted upon. (See also Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India [Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120], Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust [Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust, (2010) 4 SCC 753: (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 262] and Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh Chadha [Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh Chadha, (2010) 6 SCC 601: (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 745].) There is no such admission in this case.” 26. In the judgment in S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj [S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj, (2015) 9 SCC 287: (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 589], this Court has held that the power under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a right. It is further held in the aforesaid case that where the defendants have raised objections, which go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise discretion under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. Para 8 of the judgment read as under: (SCC p. 291) “8. The words in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC “may” and “make such order …” show that the power under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the court. Where the defendants have raised objections which go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The said rule is an enabling provision which confers discretion on the court in delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent of the claim admitted by one of the parties of his opponent's claim.” 27. In the judgment in Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan [Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396] , while considering the scope of Order 8 Rule 10 and Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, this Court has held that the court is not to act blindly upon the admission of a fact made by the defendant in 15 the written statement nor should the court proceed to pass judgment blindly merely because a written statement has not been filed by the defendant traversing the facts set out by the plaintiff in the plaint filed in the court. 28. In the aforesaid judgment, while considering the scope of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, post amendment by amending Act, 1976 this Court has held as under: (Balraj Taneja [Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396] , SCC p. 408, paras 21-23) “21. There is yet another provision under which it is possible for the court to pronounce judgment on admission. This is contained in Rule 6 of Order 12 which provides as under: ‘6. Judgment on admissions.—(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub- rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.’ 22. This rule was substituted in place of the old rule by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. The Objects and Reasons for this amendment are given below: ‘Under Rule 6, where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on the admitted claim. The object of the rule is to enable a party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which, according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The rule is wide enough to cover oral admissions. The rule is being amended to clarify that oral admissions are also covered by the rule.’ 23. Under this rule, the court can, at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings, pass a judgment on the basis of 16 admissions made by the defendant. But before the court can act upon the admission, it has to be shown that the admission is unequivocal, clear and positive. This rule empowers the court to pass judgment and decree in respect of admitted claims pending adjudication of the disputed claims in the suit.” 29. By applying the ratio laid down by this Court in the aforesaid judgments, it is to be held that there are no categorical and unconditional admissions, as claimed by the respondent-plaintiffs. In view of the stand of the appellants that, pp. 3 and 4 of the agreement dated 3-5-2005 are tampered and their signatures are fabricated, when specific issue is already framed, it cannot be said that there are categorical and unconditional admissions by the appellants. Mere admission of entering into arrangement/contract on 7-4-2005 and 3-5-2005 itself cannot be considered in isolation, without considering the further objections of the appellants that certain pages in the agreement are fabricated. In case the appellants prove that the agreement is fabricated as claimed, post-trial it goes to the root of the case on the claim of the respondent-plaintiffs. Hence, we are of the view that the aforesaid judgments fully support the case of the appellants. 30. The learned counsel for the respondent- plaintiffs Shri Shyam Divan, relying on the judgment of this Court in Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India [Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120] has submitted that in view of the balance sheets and resolutions of the company, they are to be considered as admissions otherwise it will amount to narrowing down the scope of the Rule itself. In the aforesaid judgment itself, this Court has held that when a statement of admission is brought before the Court, as long as the party making the statement is given sufficient opportunity to explain such admissions, judgment on admission can be delivered. In the case on hand it is to be noted that the relief claimed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC by filing a written application claiming admission only based on the statement made by the advocate in the bail application, and there is no other pleaded admission, in the application filed by the respondent-plaintiffs. It is a trite principle that any 17 amount of evidence is of no help, in absence of pleading and foundation in the application. It is true that when categorical and unconditional admissions are there, judgment on admission can be ordered, without narrowing down the rule but at the same time the judicious discretion conferred on the court is to be exercised within the framework of the rule but not beyond. Even on balance sheets of the company and the note of one of the Directors, it is the specific case of the appellants that the third respondent, in connivance with the respondent-plaintiffs, is also working against the appellants. In that view of the matter the claim of the respondent-plaintiffs relying on the documents relating to company is to be considered with reference to the defence of the appellants during trial in the suit. 31. In the judgment in Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust [Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust, (2010) 4 SCC 753 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 262], this Court has interpreted the expression “otherwise” as used in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and has held that the scope of the said provision of Order 12 Rule 6 is wider in comparison to provision of Order 12 Rule 1 CPC. It is true that after amendment, scope of the rule under Order 12 Rule 6 is expanded but at the same time the expression “otherwise” inserted in Order 12 Rule 6 is also to be considered within the framework of the Rule but not beyond. In any event, even in a given case, the admissions are categorical and unconditional, whether any inference can be drawn on admissions having regard to documents placed on record, is a matter to be considered having regard to facts of each case. There cannot be any straitjacket formula to extend the benefit of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court holds that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial, which permanently denies a remedy to the defendant 18 and, therefore, the power under Order XII Rule 6 CPC must be exercised with caution. It is, therefore, a judgment on admission cannot be claimed as a matter of right. 11. Later, the Apex Court in the case of KARAN KAPOOR v. MADHURI KUMAR2 has held as follows: “…. …. …. 23. Order 12 Rule 6 confers discretionary power to a court who “may” at any stage of the suit or suits on the application of any party or in its own motion and without waiting for determination of any other question between the parties makes such order or gives such judgment as it may think fit having regard to such admission. 24. Thus, legislative intent is clear by using the word “may” and “as it may think fit” to the nature of admission. The said power is discretionary which should be only exercised when specific, clear and categorical admission of facts and documents are on record, otherwise the court can refuse to invoke the power of Order 12 Rule 6. The said provision has been brought with intent that if admission of facts raised by one side is admitted by the other, and the court is satisfied to the nature of admission, then the parties are not compelled for full-fledged trial and the judgment and order can be directed without taking any evidence. Therefore, to save the time and money of the court and respective parties, the said provision has been brought in the statute. As per above discussion, it is clear that to pass a judgment on admission, the court if thinks fit may pass an order at any stage of the suit. In case the judgment is pronounced by the court a decree be drawn accordingly and parties to the case is not required to go for trial. 2 (2022) 10 SCC 496 19 25. Some special provisions have been made in Rules 7, 8 and 9 regarding affidavit of signature, notice to produce documents and also to the cost which may not have much relevance to the facts of the present case hence, not being discussed elaborately in this judgment. 26. On the issue of discretion of Court to pass judgment on admission, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj [S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj, (2015) 9 SCC 287 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 589] made the legislative intent clear to use the word “may” which clearly stipulates that the power under Order 12 Rule 6CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. In the said case, the suit for eviction was filed by the respondent landlord against the appellant tenant. The relationship of tenancy was admitted including the period of lease agreement. The plaintiffs' claim was resisted by the defendant setting up a plea that the property in question was agreed to be sold by an agreement and the advance of Rs 82,50,000 was paid. … … … 34. In our view, for the purpose of Order 12 Rule 6, the said admission is not clear and categorical, so as to exercise a discretion by the court without dealing with the defence as taken by defendant. As we are conscious that any observation made by this Court may affect the merit of either side, therefore, we are not recording any finding either on the issue of tenancy or with respect to the defence as taken by the defendant. We are only inclined to say whether the judgment and decree passed in exercise of the power under Order 12 Rule 6CPC is based on clear and categorical admission. In our view, the facts of the case in hand and the judgment in S.M. Asif [S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj, (2015) 9 SCC 287 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 589] are altogether similar, therefore, the ratio of the said judgment rightly applies to the present case.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court emphasizes that the discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC must be exercised with meticulous caution. The Rule does 20 not confer a right, but merely enables a Court to deliver expeditious justice where no factual dispute subsists. 12. The Apex Court in the case of RAJESH MITRA v. KARNANI PROPERTIES LIMITED3 has held as follows: “…. …. …. 3. At the outset, we must state that both, the learned single-judge bench and to some extent even the Division Bench of the High Court, in the present case, ought not to have decreed the suit of the landlord on the basis of alleged “admission” by the appellant no. 1 which was made in another unconnected matter, as to our mind, it does not pass muster the test of “admission” visualised in Order XII Rule 6 CPC. It is not that a court cannot pass a judgment on the basis of an admission made in some other case. All the same, what has to be kept in mind is that Order XII Rule 6 is an enabling provision conferring wide discretionary powers on the courts which cannot be claimed by any party as a matter of right. Courts can invoke Order XII Rule 6 only in cases where admissions are unconditional, unequivocal and unambiguous or when admission is based upon undisputed inferences. (See: Charanjit Lal Mehra v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan (Smt) (2005) 11 SCC 279, Raveesh Chand Jain v. Raj Rani Jain (2015) 8 SCC 428, Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India (2000) 7 SCC 120) Here, we would like to reproduce that portion of the cross-examination of appellant no. 1, as quoted by the Single Judge of the High Court, which is alleged to be an admission on part of the appellant no. 1 to deny him the right of occupying the disputed premises. It is as follows: 3 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2607 21 “33. Flat No. 208 in respect whereof you are an occupant- is it a tenancy? Yes, it is in my mother's name. 34. Your mother is Usha Mitra- am I right? Yes, Late Usha Mitra. 35. When did Usha Mitra expire? On 3rd November, 2009” This deposition is the so called ‘admission’ on which the respondent-landlord relies to claim that only the mother (Usha Mitra) of the appellants was the tenant and not the appellants. The appellant no. 1 had admitted that the tenancy was in the name of his mother. We have perused the examination-in-chief and cross- examination of appellant no. 1 made in that ‘other case’ where this statement was made. Such questions and their answers are common place in depositions before courts, but every such statement cannot be considered as an ‘admission’ to invoke Order XII Rule 6 of CPC. It is for the courts to see whether any statement in the pleadings or otherwise amounts to an admission of such a nature as to inspire the confidence of the court to pass judgment on admission under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC. It will depend upon the content and kind of statement/admission which may vary from case to case. In other words, it would depend upon the totality of facts and circumstances of a particular given case. In the present case, here, it is not a ‘clear admission’ as is being made out. Moreover, where the question and its answer are both a mixed question of fact and law, as in the present case, a so called ‘admission’ against the law can never be an “admission” as visualised under Order XII Rule 6. However, more on this later. Order XII Rule 6 is meant for speedy disposal of the suits in some cases but on the risk of repetition, we would like to caution that unless there is a clear, unambiguous, unequivocal and unconditional admission, courts should not exercise their discretion under the Rule because judgment on admissions is without a trial which may even preclude a party to challenge the matter on merits in the court of appeal. The provision of law, 22 which is meant for the expeditious disposal of appropriate cases, should therefore be cautiously exercised and it should never come in the way of any defendant denying him the valuable right of contesting the claim. (See : Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd. (2011) 15 SCC 273, Hari Steel & General Industries Ltd. v. Diljit Singh (2019) 20 SCC 425) … … … 6. The Single Judge of the High Court, however, did not accept this contention. What was relied upon were the rent receipts in the name of Smt. Usha Mitra (the mother of the present appellant), for the period between 1970 and 2009 and an affidavit attested by Smt. Usha Mitra, showing that she was the sole tenant of the premises while dismissing the claim of the defendants. Undisputedly, Smt. Usha Mitra had become a tenant under section 2(h) of the 1956 Act. However, when these facts were considered along with the deposition of appellant no. 1, it was held by the Single Judge of the High Court that after the death of Smt. Usha Mitra in 2009, the appellants would be tenants under section 2(g) of the 1997 Act only for a period of five years which would be calculated from the date of Usha Mitra's death due to the words “whichever is later” appearing in section 2(g). Five years got completed on 02.11.2014, after which the appellants had no right to remain on the premises. As we have already stated above, the learned Single Judge was not correct in decreeing the suit on this so called “admission”. Looking at the facts of the case and the position of law, it was not proper for the Court to give a judgment on admission simply because there cannot be an admission against law and in any case, it is not an unambiguous admission as is being made out. In view of the discussion above, the legal question to be determined by us is whether the appellants had also became tenants upon the death of their father, by virtue of section 2(h) of the old Act. Further, what effect would the enforcement of the new Act have on their tenancy. This goes to the root of the controversy and involves a question of law and thus, the learned single Judge erred in passing the judgment under Order XII Rule 6. What has been given to the appellants under law 23 cannot be taken away on the basis of an unclear deposition. In short, there cannot be an admission against law. Whether a particular statement amounts to an “admission” will depend on the fact of each case. In the case at hand, we are of the opinion that it is not an admission as visualised under Order XII Rule 6.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court reiterates that a suit cannot be decreed based on conditional admission or any admission made in collateral proceedings. 13. The Apex Court, yet again, in the case of RAJIV GHOSH v. SATYA NARYAN JAISWAL4 has held as follows: “…. …. …. OBJECT OF AMENDMENTS 21. Rule 6, as originally enacted, enabled a court to pronounce judgment or admission “either in pleading or otherwise”. It read thus: “6. Judgment on admissions.— Any party may, at any stage of a suit. where admissions of facts have been made, either on pleadings or otherwise, apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties and the Court may upon such application make such order or give such judgment, as the Court may think just.” 22. The Law Commission considered the provision. With a view to clarify the position as to admission and also to empower the court to pronounce a judgment: suomotu and to draw a 4 2025 SCC OnLine SC 751 24 decree on such judgment, recommended to modify the rule. It stated: “Where a claim is admitted, a court has jurisdiction under Order XII Rule 6 to enter a judgment for the plaintiff, and to pass a decree on the admitted claim (with liberty to the plaintiff to proceed with the suit in the ordinary way as to the remainder of the claim). The object of the rule is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment, at least to the extent of the relief to which, according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The rule has been held to be wide enough to cover oral admissions. The use of the words ‘or otherwise’ in Rule 6, without the words ‘in writing’ which are used in Rule 1 of Order XII, shows that a judgment may be given even on an oral admission. It is desirable to codify this interpretation. It may be noted that under the present rule, a judgment on admission can be passed only on an application. According to a local amendment. the Court may, on the application of any party or of its own motion, make such order or give such judgment. This is a useful amendment, and should be adopted. In our view, it is also desirable to provide that a decree shall follow or judgment on admissions.” (See: Law Commission's Fifty-fourth Report, p. 145) 23. In Statement of Objects and Reasons, it had been stated: “Clause 65, sub-clause (ii)- Under Rule 6, where a claim is admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on the admitted claim. The object of the rule is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment at least to the extent of relief to which, according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The rule is wide enough to cover oral admissions. The rule is being amended to clarify that oral admissions are also covered by the rule” (See : Notes on Clauses, Gazette of India, dt. 08-04-1974, Pt. II, S. 2, Extra., p. 316) 25 24. Rule 6(1) empowers the court to pronounce a judgment upon admissions made by parties without waiting for the determination of other questions. 25. Rule 6(2) states that a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment. 26. The primary object underlying Rule 6 is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment at least to the extent of admission. Where a plaintiff claims a particular relief or reliefs against a defendant and the defendant makes a plain admission, the former is entitled to the relief or reliefs admitted by the latter. [See : Uttam Singh v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120] 27. As observed in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for amending Rule 6, “where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled.” 28. The provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary and permissive. They are not mandatory, obligatory or peremptory. This is also clear from the use of the word “may” in the rule. 29. The powers conferred on the court by this rule are untrammeled and cannot be crystallized into any rigid rule of universal application. They can be exercised keeping in view and having regard to the facts and varying circumstances of each case. 30. If the court is of the opinion that it is not safe to pass a judgment on admissions, or that a case involves questions which cannot be appropriately dealt with and decided on the basis of admission, it may, in exercise of its discretion, refuse to pass a judgment and may insist upon clear proof of even admitted facts. 31. To make order or to pronounce judgment on admission is at the discretion of the court. First, the word 26 “may” is used in Rule 6 and not the word “shall” which prima facie shows that the provision is an enabling one. Rule 6 of Order 12 must be read with Rule 5 of Order 8 which is identical to the Proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act. Reading all the relevant provisions together, it is manifest that the court is not bound to grant relief to the plaintiff only on the basis of admission of the defendant. (See : Sher Bahadur v. Mohd. Amin, AIR 1929 Lah 569) 32. In the leading decision of Throp v. Holdsworth, Jessel, [L.R.] 3 Ch. 637 (640) M.R. said:“This rule enables the plaintiff or the defendant to get rid of so much of the action, as to which there is no controversy.” 33. In Uttam Singh (Supra) the plaintiff bank filed a suit for recovery of a large sum of money against the defendant. It also filed an application under Order 12, Rule 6 for judgment upon admission in respect of part of claim. The application was allowed and a decree was passed. An appeal against the decree was also dismissed by the High Court. The defendant approached this Court. It was contended before this Court by the defendant that (i) Rule 6 of Order 12 covers only those admissions made in pleadings; (ii) the effect of the admissions can only be considered at the trial of the suit; and (iii) the provision of Order 12, Rule 6 must be read along with the provisions of Order 8 and the court should call upon the plaintiff to prove its case independent of so called admissions. 34. Negativing the contentions and referring to the object of Order 12, Rule 6, the Court observed that “where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The scope of Rule 6 should not be narrowed down where a party applying for judgment is entitled to succeed on a plain admission of the opposite party. The admission by the defendant was clear, unambiguous, unequivocal and unconditional. The courts below were, therefore, right in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff.” 35. The words “or otherwise” are wide enough to include all cases of admissions made in the pleadings or de hors the pleadings. Under Rule 6, as originally enacted, it was held that the words “or otherwise” without the words “in writing” used in 27 Rule 1 showed that a judgment could be given upon oral or verbal admission also. [See :Beeny, re, (1894) 1 Ch D 499] The Amendment Act of 1976, however, made the position clear stating that such admissions may be “in the pleading or otherwise” and “whether orally or in writing”. Thus, after the amendment in Rule 6, the admissions are not confined to Rule 1 or Rule 4 of Order 6, but are of general application. Such admissions may be express or implied (constructive); may be in writing or oral; or may be before the institution of the suit, after the suit is brought or during the pendency of proceedings. 36. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court very correctly laid down the following interpretation of the provision of O. 12, R. 6, CPC, in the decision of ITDC Limited v. Chander Pal Sood and Son, (2000) 84 DLT 337 (DB) : (2000 AIHC 1990): “Order 12, R. 6 of Code gives a very wide discretion to the Court. Under this rule the Court may at any stage of the suit either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without determination of any other question between the parties can make such order giving such judgment as it may think fit on the basis of admission of a fact made in the pleadings or otherwise whether orally or in writing.” 37. The use of the expression ‘otherwise’ in the aforesaid context came to be interpreted by the High Court. Considering the expression the Court interpreted the said word by stating that it permits the Court to pass judgment on the basis of the statement made by the parties not only on the pleadings but also dehors the pleadings i.e. either in any document or even in the statement recorded in the Court. If one of the parties' statement is recorded under O. 10, Rr. 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same is also a statement which elucidates matters in controversy. Any admission in such statement is relevant not only for the purpose of finding out the real dispute between the parties but also to ascertain as to whether or not any dispute or controversy exists between the parties. Admission if any is made by a party in the statement recorded, would be 28 conclusive against him and the Court can proceed to pass judgment on the basis of the admission made therein. 38. Rule 6 of Order XII, before the amendment, allowed judgment on admission only on an application by a party. The Law Commission, however, suggested that a judgment may be pronounced either on an application by a party or even suomotu [See : Throp (supra)] 39. This rule authorizes the court to enter a judgment where a claim is admitted and to pass a decree on such admitted claim. This can be done at any stage. [See : Uttam Singh (supra)]. Thus, a plaintiff may move for judgment upon admission by the defendant in his written statement at any stage of the suit although he has joined issue on the defence.” [See : Brown v. Pearson, [L.R.] 21 Ch. 716]. Likewise, a defendant may apply for dismissal of the suit on the basis of admission by the plaintiff in rejoinder. 40. The court may, in an appropriate case, give a judgment at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings on admission by a party. [See : Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396]. But if the case involves questions which cannot conveniently be disposed of at a motion stage, the court may not give judgment at that stage. [See : Simla Wholesale Mart (Supra)] 41. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 as inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 requires the court to draw up a decree in accordance with the judgment on admission. Sub-rule (2) is thus consequential and logical sequence to sub-rule (1). 42. Since the object of sub-rule (1) is to enable the plaintiff to get judgment on admission of the defendant to the extent of such admission, he must get the benefit thereof immediately without waiting for the determination of “non-admitted claim”. Sub-rule (2) makes it imperative for the court to draw up a decree in terms of judgment on admission which can be executed by the plaintiff.” [See : Uttam Singh (supra)]. In such cases, there may be two decrees; (i) in respect of 29 admitted claim; and (ii) in respect of “non-admitted” or contested claim. [See : Bai Chanchal v. United Bank of India, (1970) 3 SCC 124 : AIR 1971 SC 1081]. 43. A decree under Rule 6 may be either preliminary or final. [See : Sivalinga v. Narayani, AIR 1946 Mad 151] 44. We are of the view having regard to the clear and unequivocal admission made by the defendant in his written statement, the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in decreeing the suit applying Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court now holds that Order XII Rule 6 CPC is enabling, discretionary and permissive. Therefore, the judgment can be passed as per pleadings based on admission, which is not in controversy between the parties. 14. On a blend of the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court what would unmistakably emerge is, that a judgment can be passed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC only in a case where the admission is unambiguous and unconditional. Therefore, the admission should be unequivocal and power must be used sparingly, as it is a decree where the defence of the defendant is washed off. On the elucidation of law by the Apex Court if the facts as narrated 30 hereinabove are noticed, there is no unequivocal admission on the part of defendant No.1. The controversy revolves round whether it is ₹50/- lakhs per acre or ₹1.25 crores per acre, as the legal notice increases the value by ₹5/- lakhs per acre. Whether it is ₹50/- lakhs agreement or ₹1.25 crore agreement is still in controversy. Therefore, there is no unequivocal admission by defendant No.1 with regard to the price. It may be that he has admitted 40% share of the property being his. But, that would not mean that there is an admission on sale consideration. The dispute, as afore-noted, is central to the suit and cannot be glossed over. The admission, therefore, fails to meet the benchmark of clarity required to warrant a judgment on admission under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, as the dispute strikes at the heart of the contract sought to be specifically enforced. SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT: 15. As observed hereinabove, the suit is for specific performance. In a suit for specific performance, readiness and willingness of parties is imperative. Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, pre-amendment, reads as follows: 31 “16. Personal bars to relief.—Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person— (a) who would not be entitled to recover compensation for its breach; or (b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential term of, the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract; or (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms of the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (c)— (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court; (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.” (Emphasis supplied) Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract. The explanation to Section 16 clearly indicates that there 32 must be an averment of readiness or willingness to perform. Whether the acts of the plaintiff have been in consonance with Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act is necessary to be noticed. 16. The sale transaction i.e., agreement is of the year 2007. If it is prior to amendment, the plaintiff will have to satisfy twin conditions under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, which would be to prove readiness and willingness to perform the contract. It becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of PYDI RAMANA v. DAVARASETY MANMADHA RAO5, wherein it is held as follows: “…. …. …. Readiness and willingness not proved 13. In order to obtain a decree for specific performance, the plaintiff must aver and prove that he has performed his part of the contract and has always been ready and willing to perform the terms of the contract which are to be performed by him. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act mandates “readiness and willingness” of the plaintiff to be averred and proved and it is a condition precedent to obtain the relief of specific performance.” (Emphasis supplied) 5 (2024) 7 SCC 515 33 The Apex Court holds the twin conditions must be satisfied by the plaintiff if he is wanting a decree of specific performance. 17. The Apex Court, further amplifying the concept of readiness and willingness, in the case of SANGITA SINHA v. BHAWANA BHARDWAJ6 holds as follows: “…. …. …. 16. It is settled law that under the Act, 1963, prior to the 2018 Amendment, specific performance was a discretionary and equitable relief. In Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi, (2019) 3 SCC 704, which has been followed in P. Daivasigamani v. S. Sambandan, (2022) 14 SCC 793, this Court framed material questions which require consideration prior to grant of relief of specific performance. The relevant portion of the judgment in Kamal Kumar (supra) is reproduced hereinbelow: “7. It is a settled principle of law that the grant of relief of specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief. The material questions, which are required to be gone into for grant of the relief of specific performance, are: 7.1. First, whether there exists a valid and concluded contract between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property. 7.2. Second, whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract and whether he is still ready and willing to perform his part as mentioned in the contract. 7.3. Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his part of the contract and, if so, how and to 6 2025 SCC OnLine SC 723 34 what extent and in what manner he has performed and whether such performance was in conformity with the terms of the contract; 7.4. Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff against the defendant in relation to suit property or it will cause any kind of hardship to the defendant and, if so, how and in what manner and the extent if such relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff; 7.5. Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any other alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest money, etc. and, if so, on what grounds. 8. In our opinion, the aforementioned questions are part of the statutory requirements [See Sections 16(c), 20, 21, 22, 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Forms 47/48 of Appendices A to C of the Code of Civil Procedure]. These requirements have to be properly pleaded by the parties in their respective pleadings and proved with the aid of evidence in accordance with law. It is only then the Court is entitled to exercise its discretion and accordingly grant or refuse the relief of specific performance depending upon the case made out by the parties on facts.” 17. It is trite law that ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ are not one but two separate elements. ‘Readiness’ means the capacity of the Respondent No. 1-buyer to perform the contract, which would include the financial position to pay the sale consideration. ‘Willingness’ refers to the intention of the Respondent No. 1-buyer as a purchaser to perform his part of the contract, which is inferred by scrutinising the conduct of the Respondent No. 1-buyer/purchaser, including attending circumstances. 18. Continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the Respondent No. 1-buyer/purchaser from the date of execution of Agreement to Sell till the date of the decree, is a condition precedent for grant of relief of specific performance. This Court in various judicial pronouncements has held that it is not enough to show the readiness and willingness up to the date of the plaint as the conduct must be such as to disclose readiness and willingness at all times from the date of the 35 contract and throughout the pendency of the suit up to the decree. A few of the said judgments are reproduced hereinbelow:— A. In Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, (1967) 1 SCR 227, it has been held as under:— “6. But the respondent has claimed a decree for specific performance and it is for him to establish that he was, since the date of the contract, continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, his claim for specific performance must fail. As observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 43: “In a suit for specific performance, on the other hand, he treated and was required by the Court to treat the contract as still subsisting. He had in that suit to allege, and if the fact was traversed, he was required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness, from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of his suit.” The respondent must in a suit for specific performance of an agreement plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract continuously between the date of the contract and the date of hearing of the suit….” (emphasis supplied) B. In Vijay Kumar v. Om Parkash, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1913, it has been held as under:— “6. In order to obtain a decree for specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and the readiness and willingness has to be shown throughout and has to be established by the plaintiff….” (emphasis supplied) C. In J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, (2011) 1 SCC 429, it has been held as under:— 36 “27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is non-compliance with this statutory mandate, the court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. “Readiness and willingness” to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties.” (emphasis supplied) D. In Umabai v. NilkanthDhondiba Chavan (Dead) By LRs., (2005) 6 SCC 243, it has been held as under:— “30. It is now well settled that the conduct of the parties, with a view to arrive at a finding as to whether the plaintiff-respondents were all along and still are ready and willing to perform their part of contract as is mandatorily required under Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act must be determined having regard to the entire attending circumstances. A bare averment in the plaint or a statement made in the examination-in- chief would not suffice. The conduct of the plaintiff- respondents must be judged having regard to the entirety of the pleadings as also the evidence brought on records.” (emphasis supplied) E. In Mehboob-Ur-Rehman (Dead) through Legal Representatives v. Ahsanul Ghani (supra), it has been held as under:— “16. Such a requirement, of necessary averment in the plaint, that he has already performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him being on the plaintiff, mere want of objection by the defendant in the written statement is hardly of any effect or consequence. The essential question to be addressed to by the Court in such a matter has always been as to whether, by taking the pleading and the evidence on record as a whole, the plaintiff has established that he has performed his part of the contract or has always been ready and willing to do so…” 37 (emphasis supplied) F. In C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy (Dead) by Legal Representatives (supra), it has been held as under:— “16. The words “ready and willing” imply that the plaintiff was prepared to carry out those parts of the contract to their logical end so far as they depend upon his performance. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount which he has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the date of decree, he must prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready to perform his contract. 17. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao [N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115], it was held that continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant of the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must necessarily be proved to be available. 18. In Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James [Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James, (2002) 9 SCC 582], this Court has held that inference of readiness and willingness could be drawn from the conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of circumstances in a particular case. It was held thus : (SCC p. 584, para 5) 38 “5. … So far these being a plea that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract is there in the pleading, we have no hesitation to conclude, that this by itself is not sufficient to hold that the appellants were ready and willing in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. This requires not only such plea but also proof of the same. Now examining the first of the two circumstances, how could mere filing of this suit, after exemption was granted be a circumstance about willingness or readiness of the plaintiff. This at the most could be the desire of the plaintiff to have this property. It may be for such a desire this suit was filed raising such a plea. But Section 16(c) of the said Act makes it clear that mere plea is not sufficient, it has to be proved.” (emphasis supplied) 19. Consequently, the readiness and willingness of the buyer to go ahead with the sale of the property at the time of the institution of the suit loses its relevance, if the Respondent No. 1-buyer is unable to establish that the readiness and willingness has continued throughout the pendency of the suit. 20. After examination of the pleadings and evidence in the present suit as well as the conduct of the Respondent No. 1-buyer, this Court is unable to agree with Respondent No. 1-buyer that she was willing to perform the Agreement to Sell dated 25th January, 2008 and go ahead with the purchase of the property. This Court says so because admittedly, as noted above, the five demand drafts dated 7th February 2008 for Rs. 2,11,000/- (Rupees Two Lakh Eleven Thousand) were encashed by the Respondent No. 1-buyer in July, 2008. The conduct of the Respondent No. 1-buyer in encashing the demand drafts establishes beyond doubt that the Respondent No. 1-buyer was not willing to perform her part of the Agreement to Sell and proceed with execution of the sale deed; for the Respondent No. 1-buyer would not have encashed the demand drafts if she was indeed willing to perform the contract and have a sale deed executed. Consequently, once it is established that the Respondent No. 1-buyer is not willing to perform the contract, the fact that the entire advance 39 consideration/earnest money had not been returned to Respondent No. 1-buyer is irrelevant and immaterial.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. Again, the Apex Court in the case of R. KANDASAMY V. T.R.K. SARAWATHY7 has held as follows: “…. …. …. 21. Requisite pleadings and proof that are required of a plaintiff to succeed in a suit for specific performance are succinctly captured in this Court's decision of recent origin in U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy [U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, (2023) 11 SCC 775: (2024) 3 SCC (Civ) 570]. The relevant passage reads: (SCC p. 783, para 24) “24. To aver and prove readiness and willingness to perform an obligation to pay money, in terms of a contract, the plaintiff would have to make specific statements in the plaint and adduce evidence to show availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time. In other words, the plaintiff would have to plead that the plaintiff had sufficient funds or was in a position to raise funds in time to discharge his obligation under the contract. If the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds with him to discharge his obligations in terms of a contract, which requires payment of money, the plaintiff would have to specifically plead how the funds would be available to him. To cite an example, the plaintiff may aver and prove, by adducing evidence, an arrangement with a financier for disbursement of adequate funds for timely compliance with the terms and conditions of a contract involving payment of money.” (Emphasis supplied) 7 (2025) 3 SCC 513 40 Both the judgments of the Apex Court separately define what is readiness and willingness. The Apex Court holds that readiness and willingness is not a static concept which would get arrested on the date of institution of the suit. Readiness and willingness is a continuing process. The Apex Court underscores that such readiness and willingness must not only be averred, but demonstrated, continuously, from the date of agreement till the date of decree. 19. Alas, in the instant case, the plaintiff having commenced litigation in the year 2008, has neither adduced evidence nor exhibited requisite alacrity to proceed with the matter, thereby, failing to satisfy the statutory imperative under Section 16(c) of the Act. The pursuit of partial decree, absent of unequivocal admission and bereft of any semblance of sustained readiness and willingness is but, a legal mirage, a claim incapable of surviving judicial scrutiny. Such a plea, if entertained would undermine the settled principles of law. 41 20. In the case at hand the suit was instituted in the year 2008 and is languishing for over 17 years. There is no convincing material to show that the plaintiff was at any stage, prepared to perform his contractual obligations, much less, continuously so. The application for a partial decree appears to be a strategic detour, rather than a genuine assertion of contractual rights. The long silence and procedural delays do not inspire confidence in the petitioner’s bonafides. While partial decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC is permissible, it is to be on undisputed facts and unequivocal admission by the defendant which is conspicuously absent in the case at hand. The plaintiff, no where in the suit, has led his evidence or taken a step to demonstrate readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. In that light, the petitioner cannot demand a partial decree to be drawn in his favour. 21. For the foregoing reasons and in deference to the settled legal position and the factual matrix, this Court finds no merit in the 42 petition. The impugned order is both legally sound and judicially reasoned. Therefore, the petition must fail. 22. Therefore, the following: O R D E R (i) Writ Petition lacking in merits stands rejected. (ii) Interim order, if any operating, shall stand dissolved. (iii) Since the suit is of the year 2008 and 17 years have passed by, I deem it appropriate to infuse finality into these proceedings and direct the concerned Court to conclude the proceedings, within an outer limit of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE bkp CT:MJ