1 2025:CGHC:6671 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR CRMP No. 469 of 2025 Madhu S/o Kenduni Nair Aged About 38 Years R/o Plot No. 504, Near Lendra Park, Old Ramdaspeth, Distt. Nagpur, Maharashtra ... Petitioner versus M/s. Tirupati Structures India Pvt. Ltd. Through Director Anand Kumar Agrawal , Age About 67 Years, R/o 67, Behind Ralas Motors, Tatibandh, Raipur, Tehsil And District Raipur Chhattisgarh ... Respondent ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Petitioner : Mr. Pragalbha Sharma, Advocate For State : None ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge Order on Board 05.02.2025 1. Today the case was listed for admission as well as on IA No. 01/2025, an application for grant of interim relief/stay. 2. With the consent of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the matter is heard finally. 3. The present petition has been preferred by the petitioner under Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, being aggrieved by the order dated 20.11.2024 passed by learned Additional Session Judge, Raipur (C.G.) in Criminal Revision No. 441 of 2024 (Annexure P-1). By way of this petition the petitioner is also challenging the entire proceedings initiated against him in Complaint Case No. 1491 of 2018 pending before the learned 2 Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur (C.G.) (Annexure P-02). 4. Brief facts of the case is that a complaint case was filed against the present petitioner along with three other persons namely Sandeep Nair, Anil Kumar and Jitendra by the respondent on 05.01.2018 alleging therein that both the companies were in a business transaction and as such there is a credit availed by the accused company. To settle that credit so availed a cheque was issued on 25.09.2017 amounting to Rs. 12,13,511/-. The petitioner along with three accused persons duly challenged the issue of process initiated by the learned trial court before the Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur C.G. registered as Criminal Revision No. 441 of 2024 which got dismissed by the learned revision court stating that same is barred by limitation vide order dated 21.06.2024. Against which the petitioner and others duly filed a petition under Section 528 of BNSS 2023 before this Court registered as Cr.M.P. No. 1952 of 2024 which was allowed and remitted back to the learned revisional court to decide the revision in its own merits vide order dated 25.07.2024. However it was restored and the order was passed on merits wherein revision filed by the accused persons was partly allowed and set aside the order dated 04.04.2018 whereby issuance of process against the accused persons were dropped. The application filed by the present petitioner was dismissed. Hence this petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order is contrary to law as it is mentioned by the complainant in the complaint that the notice which was issued to the accused 3 persons would have served by 28.11.2017 for which no documentary evidence was adduced by the complainant in his complaint. The receipt which was filed along with the complaint to show the service of notice also discloses that the notice in fact was never served to the petitioner. It only shows the last update of track report on 25.11.2017 as “item-bagged”, which means that the item was prepared for dispatch but the report does not disclose the item was actually dispatch, delivered and received by the petitioner. That from the above it is clear that the demand notice was never received to the petitioner as such the mandatory requisition of the provision of section 138 was not complied with as such the petitioner was never served with the demand notice. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner to substantiate his ground relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the matter of Nishant Aggarwal Vs. Kailash Kumar Sharma (2013) 10 SCC 72 in para 22 as under:- “This court in Harman Electronics case considered Section 138 of the NI Act and also referred to K. Bhaskaran case and quoted the five components of offence under Section 138 which have been noted in paragraph supra. This court reiterated that the five different acts which are the components of offence under Section 138 of the NI Act were done in five different localities, any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act and the complainant would be at liberty to file a complaint at any of those places. Ultimately, tjhis court held that the Chandigarh court had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint because the parties were carryuinng on business at Chandigarh, branch office of the complainant was also in Chandigarh, the transactions were carried on only from Chandigarh and the cheque was issued and presented at Chandigarh. This court pointed out that the complaint did not show that the cheque was presented at Delhi, because it was absolutely silent in that regard and therefore, there was no option but to presume that the cheque was presented at Chandigarh. It is not in dispute that the dishonour of the cheque also took place at Chandigarh and, therefore, the only question which arose before this court for consideration was whether the sending of notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action in taking congnizance under the NI Act. In such 4 circumstances, we are of the view that Harman Electronics is only an authority on the question where a court will have jurisdiction because only notice is issued from the place which falls within its jurisdiction and it does not deviate from the other principles laid down in K. Bhaskaran. This Court has accepted that the place where the cheque was presented and dishonoured has jurisdiction to try the complaint. In this way, this court concluded that issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action but communication of the notice would. In other words, the court clarified that only on the service of such notice and failure on the part of the accused to pay the demanded amount within a period of 15 days thereafter, the commission of an offence completes.” 7. I have heard learned counsel for petitioner and perused the impugned order/s with utmost circumspection. 8. The main contention so raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is with regard to the notice. He contended that the notice which was issued to the accused persons has not been served. But Section 27 of the General Clause Act states that:- 27. (1) "Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act or any statutory instrument made thereunder authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression "serve" or either of the expression "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, and unless the contrary is proved, the service shall be deemed- (a) to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter contain ing the document, and (b) to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a letter, which the addressee has re fused to accept but in such cases it shall be open to the Court to draw or not to draw any such presumption as it may think fit to draw under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, having regard to the circumstances of the case. 9. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, documents available on record and also keeping in mind the provisions of section 27 of the General Clause Act, this court is of the considered opinion that it is crystal clear that the respondent has send the notice to the petitioner through registered mode on his correct address, therefore according to Section 27 of the said act notice has deemed to be duly served to the petitioner. Hence, 5 there seems to be no illegality or perversity in the order so passed by the concerned trial court. Therefore, the present petition being devoid of merits deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 10. No order as to cost(s). sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge alfiza