- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF JULY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO.5680 OF 2025 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: AMAZON WEB SERVICES INDIA PVT. LTD., A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF COMPANIES ACT, 2013, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT BLOCK E, 14TH FLOOR, UNIT NOS.1401 TO 1421, INTERNATIONAL TRADE TOWER, NEHRU PLACE, NEW DELHI, DELHI, INDIA – 110 019, REP. BY ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY MR. ABHIJIT PANDEY SENIOR CORPORATE COUNSEL AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS S/O SURENDRA KUMAR PANDEY INCORRECTLY SHOWN IN THE FIR AS AMAZON WEB SERVICES (A1) N/A BENGALURU CITY KARNATAKA. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. UDAYA HOLLA, SR. COUNSEL FOR SRI. ANIND THOMAS, ADVOCATE SRI. DHARMA TEJ KONERU, ADVOCATE AND SMT. AISIRI RAJ, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY SHO CYBER CRIME POLICE STATION, RACE COURSE ROAD,GANDHI NAGAR, BANGALORE – 560 001. Digitally signed by CHANDANA B M Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 2. DR. SRIDHAR RAJENDRAN, AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS, S/O RAJENDRAN, CHIEF HUMAN RESOURCE OFFICER, ADARSH GROUP, NO.2/4, 3RD FLOOR, ADARSH HAMILTON, LANGFORD GARDENS, RICHMOND TOWN, BANGALORE – 560 062. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. SOWMYA R., HCGP FOR R1; R2 – SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED) THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA R/W SEC.528 OF BNSS, 2023 PRAYING TO QUASH FIRST INFORMATION REPORT BEARING CRIME NO. 4/2025 DATED 11.02.2025 REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 FOR ALLEGEDLY COMMITTING OFFENCES UNDER SECTIONS 65, 66 AND 66C OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000 AND SECTIONS 318(4) AND 319(2) OF BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023, AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER (AT ANNEXURE-A) DATED 11.02.2025 PENDING ON THE FILE OF 45TH ACMM, BANGALORE AND ETC. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR ORAL ORDER In this petition, petitioner – accused No.1 seeks quashing of the impugned Complaint filed by the 2nd respondent – defacto complainant and FIR in Crime No.4/2025 registered by 1st respondent – police and for other reliefs. - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 2. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the 2nd respondent, who is the Chief Human Resource Officer of M/s.Adarsh Group filed the impugned complaint against the petitioner – accused No.1 and M/s. Redington Group – accused No.2 and others for alleged offences punishable under Sections 318(4) and 319(2) BNS, 2023 and Sections 65, 66 and 66-C of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (for short, ‘the IT Act’). Aggrieved by the impugned FIR and Complaint, the petitioner – accused No.1 is before this Court by way of the present petition. 3. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and learned HCGP for respondent No.1 and perused the material on record. 2nd respondent is served with notice of the petition and has chosen to remain unrepresented and has not contested the petition. 4. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the memorandum of petition and referring to the material on record, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that there was no privity of contract between the petitioner and 2nd respondent – defacto complainant, who had allegedly entered into - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 contracts / transactions only with M/s. Redington Group – accused No.2 and M/s. Savic Technologies Pvt. Ltd., (SAVIC) and in the absence of any material to establish the commission of the alleged offences by the petitioner, the impugned proceedings deserve to be quashed especially when the 2nd respondent was trying to give a criminal colour to an alleged civil dispute / grievance / claimed by him, which is impermissible in law. It was therefore submitted that the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner – accused No.1 deserves to be quashed. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner places reliance upon the following judgments: (i) HDFC Bank Ltd., Vs. State of Bihar and others – 2024 SCC Online SC 2995; (ii) State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others – 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335; (iii) Ramesh Rajagopal Vs. Devi Polymers Private Ltd. – (2016) 6 SCC 310; (iv) International Advanced Research Centre for Powder Metallurgy and New Materials (ARCI) and others Vs. Nimra Cerglass Technics Private Limited – (2016) 1 SCC 348; (v) State of Kerala Vs. A. Pareed Pillai and another – (1972) 3 SCC 661; - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 (vi) Paramjeet Batra Vs. State of Uttarakhand and others – (2013) 11 SCC 673; (vii) Salib alias Shalu alias Salim Vs. State of UP and others – 2023 SCC Online SC 947 & (viii) B.N.John Vs. State of U.P. and another – 2025 SCC Online SC 7. 5. Per contra, learned HCGP would submit that there is no merit in the petition and that the same is liable to be dismissed. As stated earlier, the 2nd respondent having been served with notice of this petition has chosen to remain unrepresented and has not contested the petition. 6. The material on record discloses that the petitioner which is a company providing cloud computing product and services to various organizations had appointed Redington as its distributor pursuant to several documentation entered into between them; petitioner had also appointed SAVIC as its distributor pursuant to documentation. In 2023, M/s. Adarsh Developers of which the 2nd respondent is the Chief Human Resource Officer availed the cloud services of the petitioner by entering into transactions with Redington and SAVIC and not with the petitioner. In fact, the various documents pertaining to the alleged - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 transactions as alleged in the impugned complaint will indicate that all documentation, correspondence, communication, etc., was only between Adarsh Developers and Redington / SAVIC without the involvement or there being any privity of contract between the petitioner and Adarsh Developers. In fact, the petitioner was neither a party / privy to any of the transactions / communications / correspondence between Adarsh Developers, Redington / SAVIC ; on the other hand, the 2nd respondent sends an e-mail dated 09.01.2025 requesting the assistance of the petitioner to recover the data pursuant to which, the petitioner assisted the 2nd respondent in this regard. It is therefore clear that in the absence of any material to establish the role, involvement or commission of the alleged offences by the petitioner, who had absolutely no privity of contract with Adarsh Developers, the impugned complaint and FIR which completely lack necessary ingredients nor make out / disclose the commission of the alleged offences by the petitioner, I am of the view that the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner deserves to be quashed. 7. It is relevant to state that in order to attract the offences punishable under Sections 65 and 66 of the IT Act, it is - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 absolutely essential and pre-condition / pre-requisite for the accused to act with dishonest intention, which is conspicuously absent in the present case. In Ramesh Rajagopal’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under: “19. As regards the commission of offences under the Information Technology Act, 2000 the allegations are that the appellant had, with fraudulent and dishonest intention on the website of Devi Consultancy Services i.e. www.devidcs.com that the former is a sister concern of Devi Polymers. Further, that this amounts to creating false electronic record. In view of the finding above we find that no offence is made out under Section 66 of the IT Act, read with Section 43. The appellant was a Director of Devi Polymers and nothing is brought on record to show that he did not have any authority to access the computer system or the computer network of the company. That apart there is nothing on record to show the commission of offence under Section 65 of the IT Act, since the allegation is not that any computer source code has been concealed, destroyed or altered. We have already observed that the acts of the appellant did not have any dishonest intention while considering the allegations in respect of the other offences. In the circumstances, no case is made out under Sections 65 and 66 of the IT Act, 2000.” 8. In order to attract the offence punishable under Sections 318(4) BNS (Section 420 IPC), it is necessary that the accused must have had knowledge that the representation made - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 was false and the same was made with deceitful intention which are also missing from the impugned complaint and FIR; in ARCI’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under: “14. In the light of the well-settled principles, it is to be seen whether the allegations made in the complaint filed against ARCI and its officers for the alleged failure to develop extruded ceramic honeycomb as per specifications disclose offences punishable under Sections 419 and 420 IPC. It is to be seen that whether the averments in the complaint make out a case to constitute an offence of cheating. 15. The essential ingredients to attract Section 420 IPC are : (i) cheating; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being converted into a valuable security; and (iii) mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement. The making of a false representation is one of the essential ingredients to constitute the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC. In order to bring a case for the offence of cheating, it is not merely sufficient to prove that a false representation had been made, but, it is further necessary to prove that the representation was false to the knowledge of the accused and was made in order to deceive the complainant. 16. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the cheating would depend upon the intention of the accused at the time of alleged inducement. If it is established that the intention of the accused was dishonest at the very time when - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 he made a promise and entered into a transaction with the complainant to part with his property or money, then the liability is criminal and the accused is guilty of the offence of cheating. On the other hand, if all that is established is that a representation made by the accused has subsequently not been kept, criminal liability cannot be foisted on the accused and the only right which the complainant acquires is the remedy for breach of contract in a civil court. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown at the beginning of the transaction. In S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar [(2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] , this Court held as under : (SCC p. 250, para 21) “21. … In order to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was made. It is necessary to show that a person had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise, to say that he committed an act of cheating. A mere failure to keep up promise subsequently cannot be presumed as an act leading to cheating.” The above view in Palanitkar case [(2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] was referred to and followed in Rashmi Jain v. State of U.P. [(2014) 13 SCC 553 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 751]” - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 9. In Pareed Pillai’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under: “16. It would follow from the above that it was not in pursuance of any representation regarding the consignment of oil tins to the railway that the bank gave credit to the firm of the accused for the amounts of the demand drafts. On the contrary, the amounts of demand drafts were credited in the account of the firm immediately on receipt of the demand drafts even though they were not accompanied by the railway receipts. The railway receipts were, no doubt, to be sent by the accused to the bank subsequently, but there is no cogent evidence to show that at the time when the accused sent the demand drafts they did not have the intention to send subsequently railway receipts in respect of oil tins which were actually delivered to the railways. The material on record indicates that more than 5000 oil tins were despatched to various stations from Alwaye railway station on behalf of the firm of the accused-respondents during the period from February 2, 1963 to April 24, 1963. Those oil tins were appropriated by the railway authorities towards the railway receipts of earlier dates and were sent to various stations. The fact that more than 5000 oil tins were despatched on behalf of the firm of the accused to the various stations during the above period is hardly consistent with a dishonest intention on their part. It may be that the accused could not keep up the delivery of the oil tins to the railways and no tins could be despatched in respect of the said thirteen railway receipts but that fact can give rise only - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 to a civil liability of the accused. It is not sufficient to fasten a criminal liability on them. To hold a person guilty of the offence of cheating, it has to be shown that his intention was dishonest at the time of making the promise. Such a dishonest intention cannot be inferred from the mere fact that he could not subsequently fulfil the promise. 17. So far as the presence of empty tins at the railway goods shed is concerned, those tins, according to the prosecution case, were transported under the direction of Mohammed accused. Mohammed was acquitted by the trial court and his acquittal was not challenged in appeal. Pareed and Kader accused played no part in the transport of those tins to the railway goods shed. The High Court has disbelieved the evidence regarding the transport of the empty tins on behalf of the firm. We see no cogent ground to take a contrary view by reappraising that evidence. 18. We are, therefore, of the view that the material on record does not warrant interference with the finding of the High Court on the charge of cheating insofar as it related to the credit given by the bank of the amount of eleven demand drafts in question in the account of the firm. It may also be observed that the bank has got collateral security in respect of the overdraft and discounting facilities to the firm of the accused-respondents and we have not been referred to any material to show that the said security would not be sufficient to reimburse the bank for the amount due to it.” 10. It is well settled that if essentially, predominantly and overwhelmingly civil disputes and claims are sought to be given a - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 criminal colour / texture / flavour, the same deserve to be quashed as held in various judgments of the Apex Court and this Court including the case of Paramjeet Batra’s case supra, wherein it is held as under: 12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court. 11. A perusal of the Complaint and FIR will also indicate that prima-facie ingredients attracting the alleged offences had not been made out or discloses as against the petitioner especially when all transactions, correspondence, documentation, communication, etc., were only between Adarsh Developers and - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 Redington / SAVIC and not between the petitioner and Adarsh Developers between whom there was no privity of contract. In HDFC Bank’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under: “21. The appellant-bank is a juristic person and as such, a question of mens rea does not arise. However, even reading the first information report and the complaint at their face value, there is nothing to show that the appellant-bank or its staff members had dishonestly induced someone deceived to deliver any property to any person, and that the mens rea existed at the time of such inducement. As such, the ingredients to attract the offence under section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860 would not be available. 22. In so far as the provisions of section 409 of the Penal Code, 1860 is concerned, the following ingredients will have to be made out: (a) That there has been any entrustment with the property, or with any dominion over property on a person in the capacity of a public servant or banker, etc.; (b) That the said person commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property. 23. For bringing out the case under criminal breach of trust, it will have to be pointed out that a person, with whom entrustment of a property is made, has dishonestly misappropriated it, or converted it to his own use, or dishonestly used it, or disposed of that property. - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 24. In the present case, there is not even an allegation of entrustment of the property which the appellant-bank has misappropriated or converted for its own use to the detriment of respondent No. 5. As such, the provisions of sections 406 and 409 of the Penal Code, 1860 would also not be applicable. 25. As already discussed hereinabove, since there was no entrustment of any property with the appellant-bank, the ingredients of section 462 of the Penal Code, 1860 are also not applicable. 26. Likewise, since the offences under sections 206, 217 and 201 of the Penal Code, 1860 requires mens rea, the ingredients of the said sections also would not be available against the appellant-bank. 27. The first information report/complaint also does not show that the appellant-bank and its officers acted with any common intention or intentionally co-operated in the commission of any alleged offences. As such, the provisions of sections 34, 37 and 120B of the Penal Code, 1860 would also not be applicable. 28. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; 1992 SCC (Cri) 426.] : “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the first information report do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a magistrate within the purview of section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the first information report or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the first information report do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a magistrate as contemplated under section 155(2) of the Code. - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 (5) Where the allegations made in the first information report or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” 29. We find that the present case would squarely fall within categories (2) and (3) of the law laid down by this - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; 1992 SCC (Cri) 426.] . 30. We are of the considered view that the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellant-bank would cause undue hardship to the appellant-bank.” 12. In Salib’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under: “28. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.” 13. In B.N.John’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under: “24. In the present case, however, what can be seen from a perusal of the contents of the FIR, is that no such allegation of assault or use of criminal force has been made. The aforesaid FIR is based on the complaint filed by the District Probation Officer, which has already been quoted above, and the same has been reproduced verbatim in the said FIR in which only the allegation of creating disturbance has been made. 26. However, a perusal of the FIR in issue does not at all indicate the commission of any crime of use of criminal force or assault by the appellant to the public servant, except - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 for the offence of obstruction which is punishable under Section 186 of the IPC. As such the ingredients of offence under Section 353 of the IPC are clearly absent in the FIR. To that extent, we are in agreement with the appellant that since no ingredient for the offence under Section 353 of the IPC is found in the FIR, taking cognizance by the CJM of an offence that is not made out in the FIR does not appear to be correct. xxxx “34. As noted and discussed above, nothing was mentioned in the complaint/FIR of any specific acts apart from alleging that the appellant and his party were creating disturbance. Nothing has been mentioned how disturbance was created because of assault or use of criminal force. Thus, the contents of the statements recorded later under Section 161 of the CrPC clearly appears to be an afterthought and the allegation of assault/attack was introduced later on, which is inconsistent with the contents of the original FIR. 35. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that non mentioning of these vital facts in the FIR/first complaint, which would indicate assault or criminal force within the scope of Section 353 of the IPC, would vitiate the cognizance taken by the CJM. These vital facts, which constitute the ingredients for offence under Section 353 of the IPC, were not revealed in the FIR. On the other hand, the contents of the FIR would reveal the commission of only non- cognizable offence of obstructing the discharge of official duties of public servants, which would fall within the scope of - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 Section 186 of the IPC, in which event, without the order of the Judicial Magistrate, no investigation could have been launched by the police against the appellant in the said FIR. It is also to be noted that in the said FIR, Section 186 of the IPC was not even mentioned. We have already found that no complaint was lodged by a public servant against the appellant and his party before the Magistrate/court alleging commission of offence under Section 186 of the IPC as required under Section 195 (1) of the CrPC read with Section 155 of the CrPC. The written complaint filed by the District Probation Officer was not to a Judicial Magistrate but to an Executive Magistrate, hence was not valid. The police could not have investigated the said offence under Section 186 of the IPC. Thus, the very act of taking cognizance at the initial stage by the CJM, Varanasi, on the basis of the FIR under Section 353 of the IPC, which does not disclose the ingredients and commission of cognizable offence under Section 353 of the IPC, appears to be contrary to law. If the initial process is vitiated, the subsequent process would also stand vitiated. In State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 770, it was held as follows: “107. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, all subsequent and consequential proceedings would fall through for the reason that illegality strikes at the root of the order. In such a fact situation, the legal maxim sublato fundamento cadit opus meaning thereby that foundation being - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 removed, structure/work falls, comes into play and applies on all scores in the present case. 108. In Badrinath v. Govt. of T.N. [(2000) 8 SCC 395 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 13 : AIR 2000 SC 3243] and State of Kerala v. Puthenkavu N.S.S. Karayogam [(2001) 10 SCC 191] this Court observed that once the basis of a proceeding is gone, all consequential acts, actions, orders would fall to the ground automatically and this principle is applicable to judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings equally.” 14. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments, I am of the view that continuation of the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner – accused No.1 would amount abuse of process of law warranting interference by this Court in the present petition. 15. In the result, I pass the following: ORDER (i) The petition is hereby allowed. (ii) The impugned Complaint dated 11.02.2025 filed by the 2nd respondent – defacto complainant and FIR in Crime No.4/2025 dated 11.02.2025 registered by 1st respondent – police for the offences punishable under - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24928 WP No. 5680 of 2025 Sections 318(4) and 319(2) BNS, 2023 and Sections 65, 66 and 66-C of the Information Technology Act, 2000, insofar as the petitioner – accused No.1 is concerned are hereby quashed. Sd/- (S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE SD / SV List No.: 1 Sl No.: 73