- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 31ST DAY OF JULY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 12976 OF 2024 C/W CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 12612 OF 2024 CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 13002 OF 2024 IN CRL.P No. 12976/2024 BETWEEN: 1. SRI VINOD R TANTI S/O RANCHHODBHAI RAMJIBHAI TANTI, AGED 62 YEARS, RESIDING AT BUNGLOW NO. 94, FLORIDA ESTATE, KESHAV NAGAR, MUNDHWA PUNE – 411 036 …PETITIONER (BY SMT. VARSHA HITTINHALLI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF FOREST ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT, M.S. BUILDING, BANGALORE - 560 001, BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA Digitally signed by NAGAVENI Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 2. THE RANGE FOREST OFFICER TERRITORIAL RANGE CHITRADURGA, DAVANGERE – 577 501 3. DEPUTY CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS CHITRADURGA FOREST-DIVISION, CHITRADURGA - 577 501 4. THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS (HEAD OF THE FOREST FORCE) ARANYA BHAVAN, MALLESHWARAM, BANGALORE – 560 003 …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. RASHMI PATEL, HCGP) THIS CRL.P. IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C. (FILED UNDER SECTION 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR REGISTERED IN FOC NO.05/2022-23 BY RESPONDENT NO.2 DATED 13.01.2023 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM FOC NO.05/2022-23 CHITHRADURGA RANGE REGISTERED AS AGAINST PETITIONER FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 24(gg), 82A, 82B AND 114 OF THE KARNATAKA FOREST ACT, 1963 AND SECTION 2 OF THE KARNATAKA FOREST CONVERSATION ACT, 1980 IN CRL.P NO. 12612/2024 BETWEEN: 1. SRI VINOD R TANTI S/O RANCHHODBHAI RAMJIBHAI TANTI, - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 AGED 62 YEARS, RESIDING AT BUNGLOW NO.80 AND 80A, FLORIDA ESTATE, KESHAV NAGAR, MUNDHWA PUNE - 411 036. ...PETITIONER (BY SMT. VARSHA HITTINHALLI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF FOREST, ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT, M S BUILDING, BANGALORE - 560 001. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY. 2. THE RANGE FOREST OFFICER TERRITORIAL RANGE, CHITRADURGA DAVANAGERE – 577 501. 3. DEPUTY CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS CHITRADURGA FOREST DIVISION, CHITRADURGA - 577 501. 4. THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS (HEAD OF THE FOREST FORCE) ARANYA BHAVAN, MALLESHWARAM, BANGALORE – 560 003. ...RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. RASHMI PATEL, HCGP) THIS CRL.P IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 CR.P.C (UNDER SECTION 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 REGISTERED IN FOC NO.3/2022-23 BY RESPONDENT NO.2 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM FOC NO.03/2022-23 REGISTERED AT CHITRADURGA RANGE AGAINST THE PETITIONER FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 24(gg),82(A),82(B) AND 114 OF THE KARNATAKA FOREST ACT, 1963 AND SEC.2 OF THE KARNATAKA FOREST CONSERVATION ACT, 1980, PENDING ON THE FILE OF II ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, CHITRADURGA. IN CRL.P NO. 13002/2024 BETWEEN: 1. SRI VINOD R TANTI S/O RANCHHODBHAI RAMJIBHAI TANTI, AGED 62 YEARS, RESIDING AT BUNGLOW NO.80 AND 80A FLORIDA ESTATE, KESHAV NAGAR, MUNDHWA PUNE – 411 036 MAHARASTRA ...PETITIONER (BY SMT. VARSHA HITTINHALLI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF FOREST ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT, M.S. BUILDING, BANGALORE - 560 001 BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 2. THE RANGE FOREST OFFICER TERRITORIAL RANGE, CHITRADURGA DAVANGERE – 577 501 3. DEPUTY CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS CHITRADURGA FOREST DIVISION CHITRADURGA - 577 501 4. THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS (HEAD OF THE FOREST FORCE) ARANYA BHAVAN MALLESHWARAM BANGALORE – 560 003 ...RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. RASHMI PATEL, HCGP) THIS CRL.P IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 CR.P.C. (FILED UNDER SECTION 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR REGISTERED IN FOC NO.06/2022-23 BY RESPONDENT NO.2 DATED 13.01.2023 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM FOC NO.06/2022-23 CHITHRADURGA RANGE REGISTERED AS AGAINST PETITIONER FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 24(gg), 82A, 82B AND 114 OF THE KARNATAKA FOREST ACT, 1963 AND SEC. 12 OF THE KARNATAKA FOREST CONSERVATION ACT, 1980. THESE PETITIONS, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The conglomeration of these petitions call in question registration of FIRs in FOC.Nos.05/2022-23, 03/2022-23 and 06/2022-23, dated 12.01.2023 and 13.01.2023 respectively, for offences under Sections 24(gg), 82A, 82B and 114 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 and Section 2 of the Karnataka Forest Conservation Act, 1980, registered by second respondent. The petitioner and the respondents are common in all the petitions. 2. Smt. Varsha Hittinhalli, learned counsel for petitioner and Smt. Rashmi Patel, learned High Court Government Pleader for the respondents. 3. As the issue at the hand in all these petitions are common, the facts in brief as obtaining in Crl.P.No.12976/2024 are narrated: A company – Suzlon Energy Limited enters into a lease deed with Karnataka Renewable Energy Development Limited on 05.01.2007. A work order is also issued in favour of the company on the same day. The petitioner is said to be - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 appointed as the Chairman and Managing Director on 07.10.2022, of the said company which provides sustainable energy solutions and practices of utilizing renewable energy for power supply. The company then comes into legal possession of the forest land measuring 27.63 ha in Survey No.20 of Yelakurnahalli Village of Hiriyur Taluk, Chitradurga District, Jogimatti Forest Range. Pursuant to the work order, the company is said to have undertaken execution of the work. It transpires that respondent No.2 – the Range Forest Officer conducted survey of the land on which the company had put up Wind Power Project and noted that forest land of upto 2.40 ha is encroached beyond the approved forest land of 27.63 ha. by the Company. After the survey, the second respondent registers a FIR in FOC.No.05/2022-23 for the offences punishable under Sections 24(gg), 82A, 82B and 114 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 and Section 2 of the Karnataka Forest Conservation Act, 1980. The registration of the FIRs impugned in all these petitions has driven the petitioner to this Court. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner reiterating the grounds made in the petitions would submit that the FIR is registered against the petitioner, who was appointed as the Chairman and Managing Director of the Company, long after the Company was issued with the work order. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the FIR has been registered without making the company as an accused and therefore, is in violation of Section 82B of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. She further submits that although the officials of the Company have cooperated and provided all the documents for survey of the forest land to the second respondent, a series of FIRs have been registered against the petitioner when the unintentional encroachment of the forest land is sought to be regularized by the company through an application to the concerned Authority. On these grounds, she seeks to allow the petitions. To buttress her submissions, she would rely upon various judgments of the Apex Court and of this Court. 5. The Learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the respondents though refutes the submissions of the - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 learned counsel for petitioner, is not in a position to dispute the proposition of law. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused the material on record. 7. This Court on 17.12.2024 had granted an interim protection by directing the respondents not to take any coercive steps against the petitioner in all these petitions. 8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The issue lies in a narrow compass, whether the petitioner could be arraigned as an accused, without making the Company as an accused would sustain under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. 9. The issue need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter as this Court and other coordinate benches of this Court, in plethora of cases, by following the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ANEETA HADA v. GODFATHER TRAVELS AND TOURS PRIVATE LIMITED reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661, have held that a Crime / FIR - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 cannot sustain under the Act. This Court in one such case in Crl.P.Nos.101295/2019 and connected matter disposed on 23.02.2022, has held as follows: “12. The Apex Court made it clear that at no stage the measures adopted should be considered to be indicative of the fact that the prosecution shall not be initiated against those who have violated penal provisions of law and therefore, FIR that was registered was sought to be taken to its logical end by the State. While doing so, it cannot be considered that there can be proceedings initiated in violation of law. Section 82(B) of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 reads as follows: “82B. Offence by Companies etc.—(1) If the person committing an offence under this Act is a company, the company as well as every person in charge of, and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business at the time of the commission of the offence shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub- section shall render any such person liable to any punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1) where an offence under this section has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or that the commission of the offence is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the Company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section,— (a) “Company” means anybody corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) “Director” in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.” 13. Section 82B deals with offences by companies and fixes vicarious liability on the officers of the Company Board. Therefore the Company ought to have been made an accused to these proceedings. Non-arraigning of the Company as an accused is fatal to the proceedings. The law in this regard is no longer res integra as the Apex Court in the case of ANEETHA HADA v. GOT FATHER TOURS AND TRAVELS has while interpreting Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which is in pari materia with Section 82B of the Forest Act has held as follows: “53. It is to be borne in mind that Section 141 of the Act is concerned with the offences by the company. It makes the other persons vicariously liable for commission of an offence on the part of the company. As has been stated by us earlier, the vicarious liability gets attracted when the condition precedent laid down in Section 141 of the Act stands satisfied. There can be no dispute that as the liability is penal in nature, a strict construction of the provision would be necessitous and, in a way, the warrant. 56. We have referred to the aforesaid passages only to highlight that there has to be strict observance of the provisions regard being had to the legislative intendment because it deals with penal provisions and a penalty is not to be - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 imposed affecting the rights of persons whether juristic entities or individuals, unless they are arrayed as accused. It is to be kept in mind that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature and that is absolute in Section 141 of the Act which clearly speaks of commission of offence by the company. The learned counsel for the respondents have vehemently urged that the use of the term “as well as” in the Section is of immense significance and, in its tentacle, it brings in the company as well as the director and/or other officers who are responsible for the acts of the company and, therefore, a prosecution against the directors or other officers is tenable even if the company is not arraigned as an accused. The words “as well as” have to be understood in the context. Xxx 59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh (supra) which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal (supra) does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada (supra) is overruled with the qualifier as stated in paragraph 51. The decision in Modi Distilleries (supra) has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.” 14. The said judgment is followed by a Bench of three Judges of the Apex Court in Sunil Bharti Mittal (supra) where in it is held as follows: “42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through its officers, Directors, Managing Director, Chairman, etc. If - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 such a company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and action of that individual who would act on behalf of the company. It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy. However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so. 43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, along with the company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. Second situation in which he can be implicated is in those cases where the statutory regime itself attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically incorporating such a provision. 44. When the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta Hada [Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241] , the Court noted that if a group of persons that guide the business of the company have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be understood. Such a position is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction. Here also, the principle of “alter ego”, was applied only in one direction, namely, where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body corporate and not the vice versa. Otherwise, there has to be a specific act attributed to the Director or any other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the company. - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 15. In the light of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court as afore-quoted and the facts obtaining being undisputed, the Company not being made a party, the proceedings do get vitiated as it is in violation of Section 82B of the Act. The other submission that is made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that when the FIR as registered against the petitioners in the year 2017 what transpires in the interregnum assumes significance and merits consideration. While filing the charge sheet on the FIR the observation insofar as the Company is concerned reads as follows: “ªÉÄ: JAJ¸ï¦J¯ï UÀtÂUÀÄwÛUÉ ¸ÀASÉå: 2416 UÀtÂUÀÄwÛUÉzÁgÀgÀÄ PÀæªÀħzÀÝ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀıÀ® vÁAwæPÀvɬÄAzÀ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÁvÀäPÀªÁV CgÀtå ¥ÀæzÉñÀzÀ°è UÀtÂUÀÄwÛUÉAiÀÄ°è survey and demarcation £ÀPÉëAiÀÄ ¥ÀæPÁgÀ UÀtÂUÁgÀjPÉ ªÀiÁrzÁÝgÉ.” 16. The report of investigating agency filed before the Court discloses that at the time when the lease was granted the operations were carried out by the petitioners strictly in accordance with the survey and demarcation sketch. The boundaries in the forest area were changed in terms of the CEC report and the direction of the Apex Court. It is here they find that there is violation and encroachment coming within 10% and is categorized as Category-B. The final report having been filed before the Court, the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offences punishable as noted supra. The FIR which was registered on 19-11-2012 had resulted in opining that the petitioners had not committed violation of the sketch. The charge sheet is filed for offences basing the observations upon re- investigation of the CEC as there was alteration in the boundaries. The order taking cognizance by the learned Magistrate on the Forest Act reads as follows: - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 “This charge sheet is filed by the IO for the offence punishable under Section 24(a), (d), (f), (g), (gg), (h), 80, 82, 82B and 109 of the Karnataka Forest Act r/w Rules 144 and 165 and Section 4(1), 4(1A) and 21 of MMDR Act. As per the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in Crl.P.No.679 of 2017 between Vivek and another v. The State of Karnataka and another, it is held that – “when final report is filed for the offence under the MMRD Act and penal laws, the magistrate has to take cognizance of the offences under the IPC except the offence under MMRD Act and KMMC Rules.” In view of the said order, this Court can take cognizance only for the offence punishable under the Forest Act. Accordingly cognizance is taken only for the offence punishable under Section 24(a), (d),(f), (g),(gg), (h), 80, 82, 82B and 109 of the Karnataka Forest Act r/w Rules 144 and 165. Issue summons to A1 to A8 and for appearance of A9 to A11.” 17. Therefore, the trial that has to be conducted is for the offences punishable under the Forest Act. If the trial has to be conducted, the Company has to be an accused. The Company not being an accused is fatal to the proceedings is what the Apex Court in the afore-extracted judgment has held. Therefore, the offences under the Forest Act cannot be tried without the Company being made a party. There are no allegations against the directors or officers of the company individually made in the case at hand, these are offences against the company. Wherefore, the complaint, FIR or the charge sheet that is filed in the absence of the Company as a party cannot be sustained in law.” - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 10. It becomes apposite to refer to the latest judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of SANJAY DUTT V. STATE OF HARYANA, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 32, which has reiterated the proposition laid down in the case of ANEETA HADA (supra): “10. We take notice of the fact that having regard to the Scheme of the Act, 1900, there is no vicarious liability that can be attached to any of the directors or any office bearers of the company. It is the individual liability or the act that would make the person concerned liable for being prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 19 of the Act, 1900. Having regard to the nature of the allegations, it is difficult for us to take the view that the appellants herein are responsible for the alleged offence. There are no allegations worth the name in the complaint that the three appellants before us are directly responsible for uprooting of the trees with the aid of Bulldozers or JCB machines or causing damage to the environment. The persons who were actually found at the site felling the trees have not been arrayed as accused in the complaint. Although the license/necessary permission for development of the land in the specified area had been granted in favour of the company, yet for the reasons best known to the complainant the company has not been arrayed as an accused in the complaint. 11. It appears that the Courts below proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the three appellants herein being responsible officers of the company are liable for the alleged offence. While a company may be held liable for the wrongful acts of its employees, the liability of its directors is not automatic. It depends on specific circumstances, particularly the interplay between the director's personal actions and the company's responsibilities. A director may be vicariously liable - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 only if the company itself is liable in the first place and if such director personally acted in a manner that directly connects their conduct to the company's liability. Mere authorization of an act at the behest of the company or the exercise of a supervisory role over certain actions or activities of the company is not enough to render a director vicariously liable. There must exist something to show that such actions of the director stemmed from their personal involvement and arose from actions or conduct falling outside the scope of its routine corporate duties. Thus, where the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. There has to be a specific act attributed to the director or any other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the company. 12. At the same time, wherever by a legal fiction the principle of vicarious liability is attracted and a person who is otherwise not personally involved in the commission of an offence is made liable for the same, it has to be specifically provided in the statute concerned. When it comes to penal provisions, vicarious liability of the managing director and director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Even where such provision for fastening vicarious liability exists, it does not mean that any and all directors of the company would be automatically liable for any contravention of such statute. Vicarious Liability would arise only if there are specific and substantiated allegations attributing a particular role or conduct to such director, sufficient enough to attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability and by extension the offence itself. 13. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, if the statute provides for such liability and - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make specific averments as are required under the law in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening criminal liability on an officer of a company, there is no presumption that every officer of a company knows about the transaction in question. 14. The allegations which find place against the appellants herein in their personal capacity seem to be absolutely vague. When a complainant intends to rope in a Managing Director or any officer of a company, it is essential to make requisite allegations to constitute the various liability. 15. When jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the CrPC, the Court concerned should remain vigilant & apply its mind carefully before taking cognizance of a complaint of the present nature. 16. The High Court failed to pose unto itself the correct question i.e., as to whether the complaint even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety would lead to the conclusion that the appellants herein were personally liable for the offence under Section 4 of the Act, 1900 made punishable under Section 19 of the Act, 1900. 17. In Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited v. Datar Switchgear Limited, as reported in (2010) 10 SCC 479, wherein, the Chairman of the Maharashtra State Electricity Board was made an accused for the offence under Sections 192 and 199 respectively read with Section 34 of the IPC, this Court observed thus: “30. It is trite law that wherever by a legal fiction the principle of vicarious liability is attracted and a person who is otherwise not personally involved in the commission of an offence is made liable for the same, it has to be specifically provided in the statute concerned. In our opinion, neither Section 192 IPC nor Section 199 IPC incorporate the principle of vicarious liability, and therefore, it was incumbent on the complainant to specifically aver the role of each of the accused in the complaint. It would be - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 profitable to extract the following observations made in S.K. Alagh : (SCC p.667, para 19) “19. As, admittedly, drafts were drawn in the name of the company, even if the appellant was its Managing Director, he cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 406 of the Penal Code. If and when a statute contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it provides specifically therefor. In absence of any provision laid down under the statute, a Director of a company or an employee cannot be held to be vicariously liable for any offence committed by the company itself.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. In such circumstances, referred to above, no case could be said to have been made out for putting the three appellants to trial for the alleged offence. The Court concerned could not have issued process for the alleged offence.” (Emphasis supplied) In light of the afore-quoted judgments of the Apex Court and of this Court and the facts obtaining in the cases at hand, which covers the issue on all its fours, the impugned FIRs would not sustain. 11. In the light of the observations made hereinabove, the offences alleged against the petitioner would not sustain and such unsustainability would lead to quashment of the FIRs registered against the petitioner. Therefore, I deem it appropriate to quash the FIRs and pass the following: - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:29638 CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024 C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024 CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024 ORDER a. The criminal petitions are allowed. b. The FIR Nos.05/2022-23, 03/2022-23 and 06/2022- 23, registered by the second respondent, pending before the II Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Chitradurga, stand quashed. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE NVJ List No.: 1 Sl No.: 102