JUDGMENT : PARTH PRATEEM SAHU, J. 1. Heard on admission. 2. Appellant/defendant No.1 has preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity “CPC”) against the judgment and decree dated 9.8.2017 passed by the learned District Judge, Bemetara in Civil Appeal No. 9A/2017 thereby dismissing the appeal filed against the judgment and decree dated 1.4.2017 passed in Civil Suit No.22-A/2014 by which learned Civil Judge Class-I Bemetara (CG) has decreed the suit of respondent No.1/ plaintiff for declaration of title and separate possession after partition. 3. Facts of the case, in brief, are that plaintiff filed a civil suit seeking declaration of title; share to the extent of one-fourth in suit properties described in Schedule ‘A’, ‘B’ & ‘C’ to plaint and possession. It was pleaded that plaintiff and defendants are children born out of wedlock of Firtu and Brijbai. Land of Schedule-A admeasuring 7.63 hectare of 15 different khasra numbers, situated at PH No.38 Village Ghursena, Tahsil Nawagarh, District Bemetaera, was recorded in name of Firtu. This is ancestral land of the parties. From the income of land of Schedule-A, Firtu had purchased land of Schedule-B bearing Khasra No.578 area 0.30 hectare situated in PH No.38, Village Ghursena, Tahsil Nawagarh, District Bemetara, in the name of plaintiff and Brijbai (mother of plaintiff). Similarly, land bearing Khasra No.684 area 1.09 hectare situated in PH No.34, Village Bhopsara, Tahsil Nawagarh, District Bemetara, as described in Schedule-C, was purchased in the name of defendant No.1. After death of Firtu, plaintiff being one of legal heirs demanded her share in ancestral property, which was denied by defendant No.1. Upon inquiry, plaintiff came to know that ancestral land of Schedule ‘A’ is recorded in the name of defendant No.1 only and therefore, she filed an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer (R) Bemetara. It was further pleaded that plaintiff being legal heir of Firtu is entitled for equal share in the ancestral property of Schedule ‘A’ and ‘C’, partition among the family members had not taken place, plaintiff never consented for not recording her name in Patwari record nor had she relinquished her share in ancestral property or put her thumb impression on any such document. 4. 4. Defendant No.1 filed written statement contending that the land of Schedule-A is recorded in his name since long, plaintiff failed to give description of land which she is claiming to be ancestral property. It was denied that from the income of ancestral land, any land was purchased in the name of plaintiff or their mother Brijbai. Firtu had purchased the land in name of defendant No.1 from his own income. After the death of Firtu, plaintiff had relinquished her share in ancestral property in favour of defendant No.1 as a result the entire property came to be recorded in name of defendant No.1. Plaintiff has no right, title over the property left behind by Firtu. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Judge framed as many as five issues; given opportunity to respective parties to adduce evidence, both oral and documentary, and after a full fledged trial, decreed suit of plaintiff taking note of admission of defendant No.1 that the suit property is ancestral property, any registered document showing relinquishment of share by plaintiff in ancestral property is not produced by plaintiff, Firtu died intestate, therefore, as per provisions of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, plaintiff is having right, title in the ancestral property and as such, she is entitled for one-fourth share in suit property and possession thereof after partition. 6. Against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court the defendant No.1/appellant herein preferred first appeal before the first appellate Court and the same came to be dismissed by impugned judgment and decree herein affirming the findings of the trial Court. 7. This second appeal against concurrent findings has been filed by defendant No.1/appellant proposing following substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether the court belows concurrent findings in regard to entitlement of plaintiff 1/4th share over the suit property as per pleading i.e. para 6, 7 & 8 of plaintiff are sustainable in eyes of law in view of benami transaction act? 2.Whether plaintiff being married daughter entitled for partition against the schedule property as already partitioned among the heirs during lifetime of late Firtu? 3. Whether concurrent findings of courts below are perverse in view of evidence and documents available on records thus liable to be interfered?” 8. 2.Whether plaintiff being married daughter entitled for partition against the schedule property as already partitioned among the heirs during lifetime of late Firtu? 3. Whether concurrent findings of courts below are perverse in view of evidence and documents available on records thus liable to be interfered?” 8. Learned counsel for appellant would argue that learned trial Court, without appreciating the evidence available in record, in its proper perspective decreed the suit in favour of plaintiff/ respondent No.1. He submits that in a suit for partition, burden of proof remains on the plaintiff to prove whether there exists joint family nucleus. Defendant No.1 had not admitted that the plaintiff had a share in the suit property and denied specifically that the plaintiff had no right and interest in the suit property. Since the plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence that the suit property was ancestral property, merely because the plaintiff and defendant No.1 are children of Late Firtu, plaintiff is not entitled to share in suit properties as claimed by her in the suit. He further argued that after death of Firtu, plaintiff had relinquished her rights in suit property and therefore her name was not mutated in revenue records. He next contended that Firtu died first and thereafter plaintiff’s mother died and therefore, she cannot claim share in terms of amendment in the Hindu Succession Act in the year 2005. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for plaintiff/respondent No.1 herein opposing submissions of learned counsel for defendant No.1/appellant herein, would submit that suit property of Schedule ‘A’ is ancestral property, which is clear from categoric admission of defendant No.1 in his written statement as also evidence that it was previously recorded in the name of Late Firtu, father of plaintiff and defendant No.1, and thus, plaintiff being daughter of late Firtu is entitled for equal share in it. He next contended that defendant No.1 failed to prove by producing cogent evidence that defendant No.1 was having independent source of income to purchase the land described in Schedule ‘C’. Thus, it is clear that lands in question had been purchased out of income from ancestral property, therefore, the finding recorded by both the Courts that suit properties were purchased from the income of ancestral property and the plaintiff is entitled to have 1/4th share in the entire suit property, does not call for any interference. Thus, it is clear that lands in question had been purchased out of income from ancestral property, therefore, the finding recorded by both the Courts that suit properties were purchased from the income of ancestral property and the plaintiff is entitled to have 1/4th share in the entire suit property, does not call for any interference. He next contended that defendant No.1 has not filed any relinquishment deed or any other document which could show that plaintiff had relinquished her right or share in the entire suit property in favour of her brother/defendant No.1. He lastly argued that the plaintiff, being daughter of Late Firtu, is entitled to equal share in the ancestral properties as per the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, particularly in light of amendment to Section 6 of the Act in 2005. Under these circumstances, the concurrent findings of fact of both courts below that plaintiff is entitled for 1/4th share in the suit property is justified and does not call for any interference. 10. Heard counsel for the respective parties on admission and perused the record of both the Courts. 11. Admitted facts of present case are that the parties to the suit are children of Late Firtu and Brijbai. Land described in Schedule ‘A’ to plaint was recorded in the name of Late Firtu and after his death, it was succeeded by defendant No.1; land described in Schedule ‘B’ was purchased by late Firtu in the name of plaintiff and her mother Brijbai. Firtu died intestate. 12. Plaintiff filed civil suit with specific plea that after death of her father Firtu, she is entitled for one-fourth share in the suit schedule properties. 13. Defendant No.1 admitted in written statement as well in his evidence that Late Firtu was his father; land described in Schedule ‘A’ is ancestral land, which was earlier recorded in name of Firtu, but since last so many years, it is in his name. Partition has not taken place between legal heirs of late Firtu. In cross-examination, defendant No.1 admitted that land purchased in the name of plaintiff and their mother Brijbai, was purchased by Late Firtu out of income from ancestral property. 14. In Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna Prasad & Ors. (2018) 7 SCC 646 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that : “12. In cross-examination, defendant No.1 admitted that land purchased in the name of plaintiff and their mother Brijbai, was purchased by Late Firtu out of income from ancestral property. 14. In Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna Prasad & Ors. (2018) 7 SCC 646 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that : “12. It is settled that the property inherited by a male Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s father is an ancestral property. The essential feature of ancestral property, according to Mitakshara Law, is that the sons, grandsons, and great grandsons of the person who inherits it, acquire an interest and the rights attached to such property at the moment of their birth….” 15. Thus, it is clear that a property inherited by a Hindu male from his father, father's father & father's father's father would remain ancestral. Hence, in view of categoric admission on the part of defendant No.1 himself that he inherited the suit property of Schedule-A from his father Firtu, it is clear that the land of Schedule ‘A’ was ancestral property and land of Schedule ‘B’ was purchased by Late Firtu out of income from ancestral property of Schedule ‘A’. 16. Defendant No.1 in his evidence claimed that he purchased 'C' schedule property from his individual income. It is well settled that property purchased in the name of one of members in joint family, cannot become his individual property unless such person proves from cogent evidence as to his independent source of income to purchase the same. In case of Adiveppa and others v. Bhimappa & another, (2017) 9 SCC 586 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus:- "19. It is a settled principle of Hindu law that there lies a legal presumption that every Hindu family is joint in food, worship and estate and in the absence of any proof of division, such legal presumption continues to operate in the family. The burden, therefore, lies upon the member who after admitting the existence of jointness in the family properties asserts his claim that some properties out of entire lot of ancestral properties are his self-acquired property.” 17. From perusal of pleadings in written statement and evidence of defendant No.1 it is appearing that he failed to plead and prove that he had individual capacity to purchase 'C' schedule property or wherefrom he got income to buy 'C' schedule property. From perusal of pleadings in written statement and evidence of defendant No.1 it is appearing that he failed to plead and prove that he had individual capacity to purchase 'C' schedule property or wherefrom he got income to buy 'C' schedule property. On the contrary, statement of defendant No.1 in Para-10 of his cross-examination in respect of land of Schedule ‘C’, is in contradiction to what he had pleaded in written statement. In written statement, he has pleaded that land of Schedule ‘C’ was purchased by Late Firtu out of his own income, whereas in evidence he stated that land of Schedule ‘C’ was purchased by him from his own income. Thus, by his own say defendant No.1 has falsified his plea in evidence and thereby ruling out possibility of purchasing land of Schedule ‘C’ by him out of his own income. Even, it is settled law that oral evidence cannot be taken into consideration without there being a proper pleading. Hence, oral evidence of defendant No.1 that he had purchased the land of Schedule ‘C’ from his own income cannot be countenanced for believing case of defendant No.1 as he cannot be allowed to improve his case through oral evidence without there being a specific plea in written statement. 18. In case of P.N. Venkatasubramania Iyer and Ors. vs. P.N. Easwara Iyer & Ors . AIR 1966 Madras 266 , it was observed thus:- 82. A member of an undivided family can certainly have separate acquisition of property for his own benefit from his personal resources, and keep it impartible between himself and his children. But, when it is established that substantial family funds were available to the member to make purchases or that he blended his earnings with the joint family assets, then the onus would be on the member to prove that the acquisition in question was made wholly out of his own earnings. The law as to blending is summarised in Hindu law….” 19. In case of D.S. Lakshmaih vs L. Balasubramanyam , (2003) 10 SCC 310 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus:- “14. We may now refer to three decisions whereupon reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents. The law as to blending is summarised in Hindu law….” 19. In case of D.S. Lakshmaih vs L. Balasubramanyam , (2003) 10 SCC 310 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus:- “14. We may now refer to three decisions whereupon reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents. In Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai v. Desai Mallappa this Court held that where a manager claims that any immovable property has been acquired by him with his own separate funds and not with the help of the joint family funds of which he was in possession and charge, it is for him to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence his plea that the purchase money proceeded from his separate fund. The onus of proof in such a case has to be placed on the manager and not on his co-parceners. It is difficult to comprehend how this decision lends any support to the contention of the respondents that in absence of leading any evidence, the claim of Appellant 1 of the property being self-acquired has to fail. In the cited decision, the manager was found to be in possession and in charge of the joint family funds and, therefore, it was for him to prove that despite it he purchased the property from his separate funds. In the present case, admittedly, no evidence has been led by the respondents that the first appellant was in possession of any such joint family funds or as to value or income, if any, of Item 2 property." 20. In view of above decisions, land of Schedule ‘C’ which stood in the name of defendant No.2 blends with ancestral properties mentioned in Schedule ‘A’ & ‘B’ and the same is also amenable for partition among the plaintiff, defendant No.1 because appellant miserably failed to prove his source of individual income to buy 'C' schedule property. 21. Defendant No.1 has stated in his examination-in-chief that plaintiff has relinquished her share in suit property, whereas in cross-examination, admitted that plaintiff has not executed any document in favour of defendant No.1 relinquishing her right. It is well settled in law that relinquishment of interest with joint family properties can only be made by a registered deed, if the interest to be relinquished is worth more than Rs.100/-, it requires compulsory registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act. It is well settled in law that relinquishment of interest with joint family properties can only be made by a registered deed, if the interest to be relinquished is worth more than Rs.100/-, it requires compulsory registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act. In absence of registered instruments, relinquishment or release deed cannot be accepted by the revenue officers for effecting mutation in the revenue records. In the instant case, the suit properties are worth more than Rs.100/- and there is no registered relinquishment deed. Admittedly, defendant No.1 except oral testimony has not produced any documentary evidence to demonstrate that the plaintiff had relinquished her right in suit schedule properties. Thus, defendant No.1 failed to prove that plaintiff gave up her interest in the suit properties. Hence, learned trial Court below rightly held that in absence of any relinquishment of share by plaintiff, she is entitled for 1/4th share in the suit properties and possession after partition. 22. So far as submission of learned counsel for appellant that name of defendant No.1 has been mutated in land records is concerned, plaintiff has challenged the mutation in favour of defendant No.1 by filing an appeal before the Sub Divisional Officer (R), Bemetara on the ground that procedure prescribed under Sections 109 & 110 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 has not been followed in mutation proceeding. The Sub Divisional Officer upon appreciation of record found that while passing the mutation order, the Tahsildar has not conducted any inquiry or scrutiny regarding claim made by defendant No.1 and even written intimation of the mutation proceeding and reasonable opportunity of hearing was not given to all persons interested in mutation. Therefore, vide order dated 14.1.2015 allowed the appeal and set aside the mutation order dated 22.2.2003. Even otherwise, Hon’ble Supreme Court in its various decisions including in order dated 06.09.2021 passed in SLP (civil) No.13146/2021 (Jitendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, held as under: "6. Right from 1997, the law is very clear. In the case of Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (D) By Lrs., reported in (1997) 7 SCC 137 , this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of mutation and it is observed and held that mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title to the property nor has it any presumptive value on title. In the case of Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (D) By Lrs., reported in (1997) 7 SCC 137 , this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of mutation and it is observed and held that mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title to the property nor has it any presumptive value on title. Such entries are relevant only for the purpose of collecting land revenue.” 23. In case of H. Lakshmaiah Reddy v. L. Venkatesh Reddy , (2015) 14 SCC 784 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : "8. As rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, the first defendant did not relinquish or release his right in respect of the half-share in the suit property at any point of time and that is also not the case pleaded by the plaintiff. The assumption on the part of the High Court that as a result of the mutation, the first defendant divested himself of the title and possession of half-share in suit property is wrong. The mutation entries do not convey or extinguish any title and those entries are relevant only for the purpose of collection of land revenue...” 24. In light of above discussed proved facts, perusal of impugned judgments shows that after due appreciation of evidence, oral and documentary, adduced by the parties the trial Court has recorded the findings in favour of plaintiff which have subsequently been affirmed by the first appellate Court as well. Concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts being based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record does not suffer from any perversity or material irregularity warranting interference by this Court. Hence, in the considered opinion of this Court, no substantial question of law, nonetheless those proposed by appellants in memo of appeal, arises in present appeal and therefore, there is no merit in appeal. 25. In second appeal the High Court can interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below only on a question of law much less substantial question of law. The findings of fact recorded by the Courts below are not liable to be interfered with unless the same are perverse. In the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar , (1999) 3 SCC 722 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “5. The findings of fact recorded by the Courts below are not liable to be interfered with unless the same are perverse. In the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar , (1999) 3 SCC 722 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. 26. In the matter of Vishwanath Agrawal S/o Sitaram Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal , (2012) 7 SCC 288 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the concurrent findings recorded by Courts below cannot be disturbed until and unless they are perverse or contrary to law. Relevant portion of the said judicial pronouncement reads as under:- “37.... High Court in a second appeal should not disturb the concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the findings recorded by the Courts below are perverse being based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record no reasonable person could have come to that conclusion. We may note here that solely because another view is possible on the basis of the evidence, the High Court would not be entitled to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 27. In case of Adiveppa & Ors. vs. Bhimappa & Ors . We may note here that solely because another view is possible on the basis of the evidence, the High Court would not be entitled to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 27. In case of Adiveppa & Ors. vs. Bhimappa & Ors . (2017) 9 SCC 586 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed and held as under: "17. Here is a case where two Courts below, on appreciating the entire evidence, have come to a conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to prove their case in relation to both the suit properties. The concurrent findings of facts recorded by the two Courts, which do not involve any question of law much less substantial question of law, are binding on this Court. 18. It is more so when these findings are neither against the pleadings nor against the evidence and nor contrary to any provision of law. They are also not perverse to the extent that no such findings could ever be recorded by any judicial person. In other words, unless the findings of facts, though concurrent, are found to be extremely perverse so as to affect the judicial conscious of a judge, they would be binding on the Appellate Court." 28. In the result, this second appeal being devoid of any substance is liable to be and is hereby dismissed as such at the admission stage itself. No order as to costs. 29. Decree be drawn accordingly.