1 2025:CGHC:20152-DB AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 242 of 2017 State Of Chhattisgarh Through: Police Station Bamnidih, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus Guljar Singh, S/o Late Bakth Singh Aged About 47 Years, R/o Village Bamnidih, Police Station Bamnidih, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh. ---- Respondent For Appellant/State : Shri Deepak Kumar Singh and Shri Sachhidanand Yadav, Panel Lawyers For Respondent : Ms. Apoorva Nigam, Advocate appears on bahalf of Shri K.K. Patel, Advocate Division Bench Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal & Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board. 02.05.2025 Per Sanjay S. Agrawal, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Cr.P.C.’), questioning the legality and propriety of the judgment SUNITA GOSWAMI Digitally signed by SUNITA GOSWAMI Date: 2025.05.05 16:57:17 +0530 2 dated 10.04.2017 passed by the Sessions Judge, Janjgir-Champa (CG) in Criminal Appeal No.146/2016, whereby, the appellate Court while reversing the finding recorded by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Champa, District Janjgir-Chama vide judgment dated 25.10.2016 passed in Criminal Case No.461/2012, has acquitted the respondent- Guljar Singh from the offence punishable under Sections 420/34, 467/34, 468/34, 471/34 and 466 of IPC. 2. Briefly stated, the case of the prosecution is, that on 05.11.2011, the complainant- Banshidas filed an application enumerated under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. against the respondent- Guljar Singh and one Amit Saraf before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Champa, alleging inter alia, that he is the owner of the land bearing Khasra No.289 admeasuring 0.90 acre, situated at village Bargadi, Patwari Halka No.18, Tehsil Champa and was in possession thereof and, the alleged land was also recorded in his name in the revenue papers. It is alleged further that for his livelihood, he was out of the said village and when he returned and approached the concerned Patwari in order to get the copy of the revenue records, then only it was revealed to him that the respondent in connivance with the co-accused, namely, Amit Saraf, got his land registered in the name of said Amit Saraf, who threatened him when he went to take the possession of his said land. Further of his allegation is that the respondent with an intention to grab the land of him, made the tampering in the revenue records, though, he has never sold the alleged land to said Amit Saraf and while taking advantage of his absence, the respondent has misused his power of his post in order 3 to provide undue benefit to said Amit Saraf. 3. After receiving the aforesaid complaint (Ex.P-9), the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Champa has directed the Station House Officer, Bamnidih to investigate the matter and submit its report and the matter was taken into consideration for investigation and Crime No.03/2012 was registered and during the course of investigation, it was found that the co-accused, namely, Amit Saraf has purchased the paddy from Krishak Seva Sahakari Samiti Maryadit, Bamnidih on the basis of the ‘Rin- Pustika’ pertaining to the land bearing Khasra No. 289 admeasuring 0.90 acre and, after completion of the investigation, the respondent and the said co-accused, Amit Saraf were arrested by the Police and the charge-sheet was submitted before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Champa, where the charges have been framed with regard to the offence mentioned herein-above. 4. After considering the evidence led by the prosecution, the trial Court vide its judgment dated 25.10.2016 in Criminal Case No.461/2012, has convicted the respondent and the said co-accused, namely, Amit Saraf with regard to the alleged offence by observing that the revenue papers, like ‘Khasra Panchashala’ for the year 2001-02 to 2004-05 and B-1 for the year 2004-05, was tampered by the respondent, while deleting the name of complainant - Banshidas and instead mentioning therein the name of co-accused Amit Saraf and, that by placing reliance upon the opinion given by the Handwriting Expert, namely, Manisha Dubey (PW-19), held that the alleged tampering was made by the respondent- Guljar Singh and, accordingly, he and said co-accused 4 Amit Saraf were held guilty for the offence mentioned herein-above. 5. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment, the appeals being Criminal Appeal No.146/2016 and Criminal Appeal No.152/2016 were preferred by the respondent- Guljar Singh and said Amit Saraf, respectively and, vide judgment impugned dated 10.04.2017, the learned appellate Court, while reversing the said finding recorded by the trial Court, acquitted the respondent- Guljar Singh and said Amit Saraf and, the instant appeal has been preferred only against the judgment impugned passed in Criminal Appeal No.146/2016, whereby, the respondent- Guljar Singh has been acquitted with regard to the offence punishable under Sections 420/34, 467/34, 468/34, 471/34 and 466 of IPC. 6. Shri Deepak Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/State submits that the finding of the appellate Court reversing the finding of the trial Court, is apparently contrary to the materials available on record. While referring to the revenue papers for the year 2001-02 to 2004-05 and B-1 for the year 2004-05 and by referring further to the opinion given by the Handwriting Expert (PW- 19), it is contended that alleged materials were not taken into consideration in its proper manner by the lower appellate court, while acquitting the respondent, which however, amply establishes the alleged forgery committed by him, the Patwari of the concerned village in alleged revenue papers. 7. Ms. Apoorva Nigam, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on 5 the other hand, while referring to the statement of complainant- Banshidas (PW-9) and his son- Rajudas (PW-8), submits that the complainant himself has failed to establish the fact that the alleged land was purchased by him from Dwarika Gupta, as alleged by him in the complaint (Ex.P-9) made on 05.11.2011. It is contended further that the specimen signatures of respondent- Guljar Singh, marked as S-1 to S-42 and the “Casual Leave Application” made by him to the concerned Tahsildar, were not placed before the Handwriting Expert as neither the specimen signatures were sent, as revealed from the statement of Investigating Officer, nor the alleged seized article, i.e. “Casual Leave Application”, as the same was not found to be established by its attesting witnesses, therefore, the opinion given by the Handwriting Expert (PW-19) which was even not found to be corroborated by other evidence would, of no use. She placed her reliance to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Murari Lal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (1980) 1 SCC 704 and contended that the appellate court while disbelieving the opinion given by the Handwriting Expert, has not committed any illegality in acquitting the respondent from the commission of the alleged crime. 8. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the entire record carefully. 9. Before proceeding with the matter, it is to be noted that in a case of an order of acquittal, the normal presumption of innocence would get reinforced as held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Atley V. State 6 of U.P., reported in AIR 1955 SC, 807 and, if two views are possible from the evidence on record then the appeal court must be slow in interfering with the appeal preferred against the order of acquittal as held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sambasivan and others vs. State of Kerala, reported in (1998) 5 SCC 412 and, what would be the approach while dealing with the acquittal appeal was laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Ramesh Babulal Doshi Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (1996) 9 SCC 225, wherein, it has been held at para 7 as under :- “7. Before proceeding further it will be pertinent to mention that the entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal was patently wrong for it did not at all address itself to the question as to whether the reasons which weighed with the trial Court for recording the order of acquittal were proper or not. Instead thereof the High Court made an independent reappraisal of the entire evidence to arrive at the above quoted conclusions. This Court has repeatedly laid down that the mere fact that a view other than the one taken by the trial Court can be legitimately arrived at by the appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence cannot constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere with an order of acquittal unless it comes to the conclusion that the entire approach of the trial Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate Court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate Court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate Court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then - and then only - reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own 7 conclusions. In keeping with the above principles we have therefore to first ascertain whether the findings of the trial Court are sustainable or not”. 10. While keeping in mind the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred matters, it is necessary to examine the facts and the evidence as led by the prosecution in order to ascertain as to whether the findings recorded by the appeal Court acquitting the respondent from the commission of the alleged crime are perverse or would deserves to be upheld. 11. Perusal of the application (Ex.P-9) made by the complainant under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Champa, would show that he was the owner of the land bearing Khasra No.289 admeasuring 0.90 acre and the revenue papers were recorded in his name and, it was alleged by him that when he was out of the said village, the respondent has tampered the revenue papers while deleting the name of him and by mentioning the name of said co- accused, namely, Amit Saraf in his place. 12. In order to establish the alleged allegations, it is to be established by cogent and reliable evidence that he is the owner of the alleged land and his name is deleted from the alleged revenue papers by the respondent while committing manipulatiion and/or forgery upon it. But, a bare perusal of his (PW-9) statement would reveal the fact that although, it was stated by him that he had purchased the alleged land, i.e. Khasra No. 289 admeasuring 0.90 acre from one Dwarika Gupta for a consideration of Rs.13,000/-, however, neither a registered deed of sale to this effect was placed on record, nor the ‘Namantaran Panji’ 8 showing the name of him was placed. Further of his testimony would show that he acquired the alleged land by virtue of ‘Chakbandi’ and also by virtue of deed of ‘Exchagement’, but none of those documents have, however, been placed on record in order to show that he acquired any right, title or interest upon the alleged land. His son, namely, Rajudas (PW-8) was, however, unable to state how the name of his father was recorded in the revenue papers with regard to the alleged land. 13. It is to be seen further, as reflected from the seizure memo, marked as Ex.P-3, that a deed of sale was recovered in presence of two witnesses, namely, Madhav Dadsena (PW-3) and Jaishankar (PW-4). But, a bare perusal of the alleged seizure memo would reveal the fact that the alleged deed of sale, seized therein, was pertaining to the land bearing Khasra No. 418 admeasuring 0.87 hectare for a consideration of Rs.9,000/-, which is distinct from the land in question, i.e. Khasra No.289 admeasuring 0.90 acre. 14. In view of the aforesaid analysis, it is, thus, evident that although, the complainant has alleged in his application (Ex.P-9) that he had purchased the alleged land from Dwarika Gupta, but has failed to establish the same. Therefore, it cannot be said that he had acquired any interest over the land in question bearing Khasra No.289 admeasuring 0.90 acre from said Dwarika Gupta. 15. Insofar as the revenue papers, like ‘Khasra Panchashala’ for the year 2001-02 upto 2004-05 and B-1 for the year 2004-05 seized vide Ex.P-4 in presence of two witnesses, namely, Laldas Manikpuri (PW-5) and 9 Manaram Pandey (PW-6) are concerned, it, however, appears from a bare perusal of the said revenue papers that although the name of Banshidas, the complainant, was shown to be deleted and the name of co-accused Amit Saraf was recorded in his place, but whether this entry, alleged to have been made by the respondent- Guljar Singh or not, is now to be examined and/or, whether it was duly proved by the complainant or not. 16. In order to establish the aforesaid fact, the specimen signatures of respondent- Guljar Singh (S-1 to S-42) and the “Casual Leave Application”, seized vide Ex.P-6, were sent for examination to the Handwriting Expert, namely, Manisha Dubey (PW-19), who vide her report (Ex.P-31-C) opined that the alleged signature made in the alleged revenue papers is of the same person, i.e. the respondent- Guljar Singh. Although, it was opined as such, but a bare perusal of the statement of Investigating Officer, namely, Vivek Kumar Pandey (PW-18), it appears that the alleged specimen signatures alleged to have been recovered in presence of Gajraj Singh and one Jadgish Sharma, were, however, not found to be established as both have not been examined for proving the same. It is to be seen further that the alleged “Casual Leave Application”, alleged to have been recovered vide seizure memo Ex.P-6 in presence of two witnesses, namely, D.C. Koshle (PW-11) and Manaram Pandey (PW-6), was also, not found to be established by them that it was recovered in their presence from Alimma Bargiss (PW-12), the employee of the concerned Tahsil Office. In view thereof, it cannot be said that the alleged application and the 10 specimen signatures of the respondent – Guljar Singh were sent for its examination to the said Handwriting Expert. 17. It is true that the Expert’s testimony is made relevant by virtue of Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act and, the corroboration of his/her testimony may not be insisted upon before acting on his/her opinion. But, in the instant matter, as observed herein-above, the specimen signatures of the respondent and the alleged “Casual Leave Application” made by him before the concerned Tahsildar, were not found to be sent for examination; therefore, under such circumstances, before acting upon her testimony, it is to be seen whether her statement is corroborated by other evidence led by the prosecution or not, as the Supreme Court in the matter of Murari Lal (supra), held that on the facts of a particular case, a Court may require corroboration before acting upon it. The relevant observations made at paragraphs 4, 6 and 11 read as under:- "4. We will first consider the argument, a stale argument often heard, particularly in criminal courts, that the opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert should not be acted upon without substantial corroboration. We shall presently point out how the argument cannot be justified on principle or precedent. We begin with the observation that the expert is no accomplice. There is no justification for condemning his opinion-evidence to the same class of evidence as that of an accomplice and insist upon corroboration. True, it has occasionally been said on very high authority that it would be hazardous to base a conviction solely on the opinion of a handwriting expert. But, the hazard in accepting the opinion of any expert, handwriting expert or any other kind of expert, is not because experts, 11 in general, are unreliable witnesses- the quality of credibility or incredibility being one which an expert shares with all other witnesses-, but because all human judgment is fallible and an expert may go wrong because of some defect of observation, some error of premises or honest mistake of conclusion. The more developed and the more perfect a science, the less the chance of an incorrect opinion and the converse if the science is less developed and imperfect. The science of identification of finger-prints has attained near perfection and the risk of an incorrect opinion is practically non-existent. On the other hand, the science of identification of handwriting is not nearly so perfect and the risk is, therefore, higher. But that is a far cry from doubting the opinion of a handwriting expert as an invariable rule and insisting upon substantial corroboration in every case, howsoever the opinion may be backed by the soundest of reasons. It is hardly fair to an expert to view his opinion with an initial suspicion and to treat him as an inferior sort of witness. His opinion has to be tested by the acceptability of the reasons given by him. An expert deposes and not decides. His duty ‘is to furnish the judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of his conclusion, so as to enable the judge to form his own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence’. 6. Expert testimony is made relevant by Section 45 of the Evidence Act and where the Court has to form an opinion upon a point as to identity of handwriting, the opinion of a person ‘specially skilled’ ‘in questions as to identity of handwriting' is expressly made a relevant fact…. So, corroboration may not invariably be insisted upon before acting on the opinion of an handwriting expert and there need be no initial suspicion. But, on the facts of a particular case, a court may require corroboration of a varying degree. There can be no hard and fast rule, but nothing will justify the rejection of the opinion of an expert 12 supported by unchallenged reasons on the sole ground that it is not corroborated. The approach of a court while dealing with the opinion of a handwriting expert should be to proceed cautiously, probe the reasons for the opinion, consider all other relevant evidence and decide finally to accept or reject it. 11. We are firmly of the opinion that there is no rule of law, nor any rule of prudence which has crystallized into a rule of law, that opinion- evidence of a handwriting expert must never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated. But, having due regard to the imperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting, the approach, as we indicated earlier, should be one of caution. Reasons for the opinion must be carefully probed and examined. All other relevant evidence must be considered. In appropriate cases, corroboration may be sought. In cases where the reasons for the opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing a doubt, the uncorroborated testimony of an handwriting expert may be accepted. There cannot be any inflexible rule on a matter which, in the ultimate analysis, is no more than a question of testimonial weight. We have said so much because this is an argument frequently met with in subordinate courts and sentences torn out of context from the judgments of this Court are often flaunted." 18. In the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred matter, we, examined the testimony of the Handwriting Expert, namely, Manisha Dubey (PW-19) whether her testimony was corroborated by other evidence led by the prosecution, but, we do not find that her statement based upon the opinion (Ex.P-31-C) given by her, was, corroborated. No reliance, therefore, could be placed upon it for attributing the respondent for the commission of the alleged crime. 13 19. Consequently, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment acquitting the respondent for the commission of the alleged crime, so as to call for any interference in this appeal. 20. The appeal being devoid of merit is, accordingly, dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge sunita