ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD v. N PURNACHANDRA RAO
MACMA/134/2019 · 2025-08-21
T C D Sekhar
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 6825 (AP) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 6825 (AP) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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APHC010065542019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3505] FRIDAY,THE TWENTY SECOND DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T.C.D.SEKHAR MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 134/2019 Between:
1. ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD, PRIVATE LIMITED, REP. BY ITS DIVISIONAL MANAGER, KRISHNA DISTRICT
...APPELLANT AND
1. N PURNACHANDRA RAO, 2/62, KALAKARULA COLONY, BILLAPADU VILLAGE, GUDIVADA MANDAL, KRISHNA DISTRICT
2. M ARJUNA RAO, R/O. KODURU, MUDINEPALLI MANDALM, KRISHNA DIST
3. SMT LINGAMANENI JOHNSI RANI, R/O. SHAMNAGAR TIKKLE ROAD, VIJAYAWADA
...RESPONDENT(S): Appeal filed under Order 41 of CPC praying thet the Highcourt may be pleased toaggieved by the judgment and decree in MVOP. 230/2010 dated 17.12.2015 on the file of the
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chairman, motor accidents claims cum XI Additional District judge, Gudivada IA NO: 1 OF 2019 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased Pleased to condone the delay of 1070 days in filing the appeal which is neither willful nor deliberate IA NO: 2 OF 2019 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased Pleased to suspend the operation of the order and decree in MVOp. 230/2010 dated 17.12.2015 on the file of the chairman, Motor accidents claims cum XI Addl. district judge, Gudivada IA NO: 3 OF 2019 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to pass an order to modify the order dated 15.3.2019 by not giving liberty to withdraw the amount in IA.No. 2 of 2019 in MACMA.No. 134 of 2019 and to pass IA NO: 4 OF 2019 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to Enlarge the time in IA.No. 2 of 2019 in MACMA No. 134 of 2019 dt. 15.3.2019 to deposit the money with the condition that the respondent No.1 not to withdraw the amount and to pass Counsel for the Appellant:
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1. KRISHNANAND VADAKATTU Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1.
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The Court made the following judgment:
The present appeal is filed aggrieved by order dated 17.12.2015, passed in MVOP No.230 of 2010, on the file of the learned Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims-cum-XI Additional District Judge, Gudivada, along with an application vide IA No.1 of 2019, seeking to condone the delay of 1070 days. 2. For proper appreciation of the case of the appellant, the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the present application are as follows:
“I submit that the order was pronounced on 17.12.2015 which fact was not known to the petitioners inasmuch as the copy of the award was not received by its office. Recently, the Third Party Hub dealing with the matters of Third Party claims is shifted from Visakhapatnam to Vijayawada. At that time, it is noticed that the case is pending in MVOP No.230 of 2010 and when enquired it came to the knowledge that the OP was
decreed on 17.12.2015. Immediately, certified copies were applied on 16.10.2018 and the same was delivered on
31.10.2018. On further verification, it is found that no such Policy was issued in respect of the crime vehicle and decision was taken to file the instant Appeal. In the process there is a delay of 1070 days in filing the appeal, which is neither willful nor deliberate due to the inadvertent circumstances mentioned above. I submit that I have a strong case to succeed.”
3. During the course of hearing, the counsel for the appellant submits that the appeal could not be filed in time in view of the
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administrative contingencies as stated in the affidavit filed in support of the said application. The impugned order was passed on 17.12.2015, by the tribunal and the copy of the application was filed on 16.10.2018, to obtain certified copy of the impugned
order. On perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the delay application, except stating that the appellant insurance company was not aware of the fact that an award was passed in the matter and copy of the same was not received by its office, nothing is stated explaining the delay in filing the copy application. Further, it is stated that, the Third Party Hub dealing with the matters was shifted from Visakhapatnam to Vijayawada during the said period, and it came to the knowledge of the appellant that the OP was
decreed on 17.12.2015. Thereafter, the appellant filed application on 16.10.2018 to get certified copy of the order impugned and the same was delivered on 31.10.2018. Further, on perusal of the record it is clear that, the appeal was filed on 06.03.2019. It is needless to mention that the period of limitation for filing the appeal is 90 days, and the appeal ought to have been filed before the said period is exhausted. However, absolutely no explanation is forthcoming from the affidavit filed in support of the application seeking to condone the delay. 6
4. As already noted supra, though the certified copy was received on 31.10.2018, the appeal was filed only on 06.03.2019, and no explanation is forthcoming as to why the appeal could not be filed immediately thereafter. Apart from the same, the appellant has miserably failed to explain the delay in filing the present appeal. 5. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with the aspect of condoning delay, recently in the judgment of Pathapati Subba Reddy and Others v. Special Deputy Collector and Others1 held as follows at paragraph No. 26:
“26.
On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
1 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513
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construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”
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6. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary 2 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows at paragraph Nos. 6 and 7:
“6.
At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal/Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction
2 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612
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will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal.
But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the
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expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495: AIR 1981 SC 733).”
7. In Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran and another3, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows at paragraph Nos.31 and 32:
“31. It is a well-stated law that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasized in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/defendants have
3 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1093
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failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet.”
8.
In the absence of any such explanation, this Court is not inclined to exercise its discretionary power to condone the inordinate delay of 1070 days in preferring the present appeal. In view of the above referred judgments, the appellant miserably failed to make out a case for condoning the inordinate delay. 9. In view of the same, there is no merit in the present application to condone the inordinate delay of 1070 days in preferring the present appeal and accordingly IA No.1 of 2019 is dismissed. Consequently, the MACMA No.134 of 2019 is also dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs. As a sequel, all pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. _____________________ JUSTICE T.C.D. SEKHAR Dt.22.08.2025 DSB
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200 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T.C.D. SEKHAR
MACMA No.134 of 2019 Date 22.08.2025
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DSB