1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. G. PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V.ARAVIND WRIT PETITION NO.22849/2018 (S-KAT) BETWEEN: SRI. H.C. SOMANNA S/O LATE CHAMAIAH AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS WAS WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER (NOW UNDER AN ORDER OF COMPULSORY RETIREMENT) R/AT DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR STREET HONNURU VILLAGE, YELENDUR TALUK CHAMARAJANAGAR DISTRICT-571441. ... PETITIONER (BY MS. ARCHISHMA S. KALLUARAYA, ADV. FOR SRI M LOKESH, ADV.) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY ITS SECRETARY WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT VIKASA SOUDHA BANGALORE-560 001. 2 2. THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA REP. BY ITS REGISTRAR M.S. BUILDING BANGALORE-560 001. 3. THE CHIEF ENGINEER CAUVERY NEERAVARI NIGAM LIMITED SOUTH RANGE MYSORE- 570 001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. B SUKANYA BALIGA, AGA FOR R1 SRI VENKATESH S ARBATTI, ADV. FOR R2 SRI B.S. GAUTHAM, ADV. FOR R3) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO CALL FOR RECORDS FROM THE RESPONDENTS AND QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER OF THE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL DATED 02.02.2018 PASSED IN APPLICATION NO.2004/2017 (ANNEXURE-A) AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE SAID APPLICATION NO.2004/17 FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDER ON 03.09.2025 COMING ON THIS DAY, S.G.PANDIT J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.V. ARAVIND 3 CAV ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT) The petitioner, a compulsorily retired Junior Engineer is before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing order dated 02.02.2018 in Application No.2004/2017 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal at Bengaluru (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) rejecting petitioner’s challenge to the order of penalty of compulsory retirement dated 25.02.2017 (Annexure-A10). 2. Brief facts of the case are that, while the petitioner was working as Junior Engineer at the office of the Cauvery Neeravari Nigama Niyamith, Santhemaralli, Kollegal Taluk, Chamarajanagar District, articles of charge dated 15.03.2013 came to be issued against the petitioner alleging that he demanded and accepted bribe of Rs.10,000/- on 4 02.07.2009 from complainant Sri.D.Ningaraju, a Class-III Civil Contractor for inspecting the work done by him and for making payment of the bill amount. The Enquiry Officer nominated by the second respondent conducted a detailed enquiry and submitted a report dated 28.03.2016 holding that the charges are proved against the petitioner. Along with the recommendation of the Upa-Loykaukta dated 12.04.2016, the enquiry report was forwarded to the first respondent – State Government. The first respondent – State Government issued second show cause notice dated 23.05.2016 enclosing enquiry report providing an opportunity to the petitioner to submit his reply. The petitioner is said to have submitted his reply to the second show cause notice on 27.06.2016. Thereafter, the impugned order dated 25.02.2017 imposing penalty of compulsory retirement on petitioner is passed. 5 3. In the meanwhile, against the petitioner trial was conducted in Special Case No.35/2011 for the offence punishable under Section 7, 13(1)(b) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ‘1988 Act’) by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Chamarajanagar on the same incident of demanding and accepting bribe and was acquitted of the charges vide judgment dated 18.06.2015. 4. Questioning the penalty of compulsory retirement, the petitioner was before the Tribunal in the above stated Application and the Tribunal under impugned order dated 02.02.2018 refused to accept the petitioner’s contention by observing that the charge against the petitioner is proved on the material on record. Questioning the order of the Tribunal as 6 well as order of penalty of compulsory retirement, the petitioner is before this Court in this writ petition. 5. Heard learned counsel Ms.Archishma S. Kalluraya, learned counsel for Sri.M.Lokesh, learned counsel for petitioner, Smt.B.Sukanya Baliga, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent No.1 and Sri.Venkatesh S. Arbatti, learned counsel for respondent No.2. Perused the entire writ petition papers. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that there is no material on record to prove the charge against the petitioner and that the Disciplinary Authority without taking note of the fact that the petitioner was acquitted of the same charge before the Criminal Court, imposed penalty of compulsory retirement. Learned counsel would submit that the petitioner has been honorably acquitted in the 7 criminal case and no benefit of doubt is extended to the petitioner and that when the petitioner is acquitted of the same charges in the criminal proceedings, the first respondent ought to have closed the enquiry. It is submitted that there is no cogent evidence placed on record in the departmental proceedings to prove the charge. Learned counsel would also submit that when the judicial forum has acquitted the petitioner, the finding therein shall have to be given preference over the findings of the Enquiry Officer. 7. Learned counsel would also submit placing reliance on the decision of UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS VS. GYAN CHAND CHATTAR1 that the charge of corruption cannot be proved merely based on conjectures and probabilities. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the decision of 1 (2009) 12 SCC 78 8 the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of RAM LAL VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS2. 8. Learned counsel referring to the evidence of PW1 to PW3 before the Enquiry Officer would submit that the evidence would not support the case of the Disciplinary Authority. It is also submitted that there was no demand for bribe amount and the Disciplinary Authority has failed to prove the demand and acceptance. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Tribunal without appreciating the evidence on record has dismissed the petitioner’s application. Thus, it is prayed to allow the writ petition. 9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would vehemently submit that the petitioner was acquitted before the Sessions Court by 2 (2024) 1 SCC 175 9 extending benefit of doubt and it observed that the bribe amount is recovered from the petitioner. Learned counsel would invite attention of this Court to evidence of PW1 and submits that he has unequivocally supported the case of the Disciplinary Authority, so also PW2 – shadow witness. It is further submitted that, based on the evidence on record in the departmental proceedings, charge is held to be proved against the petitioner, wherein, the charges are to be proved on the principles of preponderance of probabilities. Further, it is submitted that evaluation of evidence in both the proceedings are different. Thus, they pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and on perusal of the entire writ petition papers, the point which falls for our consideration is as to, 10 “Whether the impugned order of the Tribunal as well as impugned order of penalty of compulsory retirement warrants interference at the hands of this Court?” 11. Answer to the above point would be in the Negative for the following reasons: The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the order of penalty in departmental proceedings is very limited. Moreover, this Court would not sit as an Appellate Authority against the order of penalty or order passed by the Tribunal. Judicial review is limited to examine as to whether there is any violation in the decision making process and it is not open to examine the decision itself. 12. The departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings are two distinct proceedings with different 11 objectives. The degree of proof required to prove the charges in both the proceedings are different. In the departmental proceedings, the charges are to be proved on the principles of preponderance of probabilities and in criminal proceedings the charges are to be proved on the principles of strict rules of evidence and beyond reasonable doubt. 13. In the case on hand, the charge against the petitioner is demanding and accepting bribe of Rs.10,000/- from the complainant, one Sri.D.Ningaraju, a Class-III Civil Contractor for inspecting the work and for making payment of the bill amount. Before the Enquiry Officer, PW1 to PW3 are examined, PW1 being the complainant, PW2 being the shadow witness and PW3 being the Investigating Officer, all of whom have supported the case of the Disciplinary Authority. PW1 – complainant has categorically stated that the DGO asked him how 12 much amount he has brought and he gave bribe amount of Rs.10,000/-. The DGO – petitioner received it from his right hand, counted it and kept it in his right side pant pocket. In the cross-examination, nothing contrary is elicited and PW1 has stood by his statement. PW2 has also supported the case of the Disciplinary Authority and he has categorically stated that upon hand wash of the DGO i.e., petitioner, his hands turned pink. It is true that the findings of the criminal proceedings will have bearing on the departmental proceedings, if the petitioner is acquitted of the charges honorably. However, upon entire reading of the judgment in the criminal proceedings i.e., Special C.No.35/2011, it cannot be said that the petitioner is honorably acquitted. The bribe amount is recovered from the DGO. The criminal Court observes that mere recovery of amount from the custody of the accused or mere possession of the 13 amount in the custody of the accused does not help much to show that illegal gratification was accepted by the accused by making demand for the same. The criminal Court mainly proceeded to acquit the petitioner solely on the ground that there is no demand. However, in the departmental enquiry, PW1 – the complainant is categorical in his statement that there was a demand and he paid bribe amount of Rs.10,000/- to the DGO who kept the said amount in his right side pant pocket. Therefore, in the instant case, the finding of the criminal Court would have no bearing on the departmental proceedings. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the case of GYAN CHAND CHATTAR (supra) to contend that where allegation of demanding and accepting bribe is involved, the degree of proof required in a departmental proceedings is much more than preponderance of probabilities. The Hon'ble Apex 14 Court in subsequent decision i.e., STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER VS. UMESH3 has observed that the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 21 of GYAN CHAND CHATTAR (supra) are not ratio decidendi of the case and those observations were made while discussing the judgment of the High Court. In UMESH (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court was considering the effect of acquittal in criminal case on departmental enquiry and at paragraphs 16, 18 and 19, it is held as follows: “16. The principles which govern a disciplinary enquiry are distinct from those which apply to a criminal trial. In a prosecution for an offence punishable under the criminal law, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to a presumption of innocence. The purpose of a disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to enquire into an allegation of misconduct by an 3 (2022) 6 SCC 563 15 employee which results in a violation of the service rules governing the relationship of employment. Unlike a criminal prosecution where the charge has to be established beyond reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding, a charge of misconduct has to be established on a preponderance of probabilities. The rules of evidence which apply to a criminal trial are distinct from those which govern a disciplinary enquiry. The acquittal of the accused in a criminal case does not debar the employer from proceeding in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction. 17. xxxxxxxxxx 18. In the course of the submissions, the respondents placed reliance on the decision in Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 129] . In that case, six charges were framed against the respondent. One of the charges was that he demanded a commission of 1% for paying the railway staff. The enquiry officer found all the six charges proved. The disciplinary authority agreed with those findings and imposed the 16 punishment of reversion to a lower rank. Allowing the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court observed that there was no evidence to hold that he was guilty of the charge of bribery since the witnesses only said that the motive/reason for not making the payment could be the expectation of a commission amount. The respondent placed reliance on the following passages from the decision : (SCC pp. 85 & 87, paras 21 & 31) “21. Such a serious charge of corruption requires to be proved to the hilt as it brings both civil and criminal consequences upon the employee concerned. He would be liable to be prosecuted and would also be liable to suffer severest penalty awardable in such cases. Therefore, such a grave charge of quasi-criminal nature was required to be proved beyond the shadow of doubt and to the hilt. It cannot be proved on mere probabilities. *** 31. … wherein it has been held that the punishment should always be proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. However, in a case of corruption, the only punishment is dismissal from service. Therefore, the charge of corruption must always be 17 dealt with keeping in mind that it has both civil and criminal consequences.” 19. The observations in para 21 of Gyan Chand Chattar case [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 129] are not the ratio decidendi of the case. These observations were made while discussing the judgment [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, 2002 SCC OnLine Guj 548] of the High Court. The ratio of the judgment emerges in the subsequent passages of the judgment, where the test of relevant material and compliance with natural justice as laid down in Rattan Singh [State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 298 : (1977) 1 SLR 750] was reiterated : (Gyan Chand Chattar case [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 129] , SCC p. 88, paras 35-36) “35. … an enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, 18 objectively and not subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or unreasonable, nor the same should be based on conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction in proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent cannot be a misconduct. The authority must record reasons for arriving at the finding of fact in the context of the statute defining the misconduct. 36. In fact, initiation of the enquiry against the respondent appears to be the outcome of anguish of superior officers as there had been an agitation by the railway staff demanding the payment of pay and allowances and they detained the train illegally and there has been too much hue and cry for several hours on the railway station. The enquiry officer has taken into consideration the non-existing material and failed to consider the relevant material and finding of all facts recorded by him cannot be sustained in the eye of the law.” (emphasis supplied) On the charge of corruption, the Court observed in the above decision that there was no relevant material to sustain the conviction of the respondent since there was only hearsay evidence where the witnesses assumed that the motive for not paying the railway staff “could be” corruption. Therefore, the standard 19 that was applied by the Court for determining the validity of the departmental proceedings was whether (i) there was relevant material for arriving at the finding; and (ii) the principles of natural justice were complied with.” 15. The judgment in the case of RAM LAL (supra) would also not aid the case of the petitioner, inasmuch as, in the said case the charge was that the delinquent therein had altered his date of birth in the marks sheet issued by the Government Secondary School. The Hon'ble Apex Court, noticing that in the criminal proceedings the Appellate Court while acquitting the delinquent had recorded that in the original marks sheet (Ex.P3) the date of birth was correctly shown, held that in view of the findings recorded in the criminal case, the findings recorded in the disciplinary proceedings cannot be allowed to stand. 20 16. The Enquiry Officer based on material and evidence, particularly PW1 has rightly concluded that the charges are proved against the petitioner. There is no reason to disagree with the finding of the Enquiry Officer. 17. There is no merit in any of the contentions raised by the petitioner and accordingly writ petition stands dismissed. Sd/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (K.V.ARAVIND) JUDGE NC CT: bms