- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36273-DB WP No. 6385 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 12TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND WRIT PETITION No. 6385 OF 2024 (S-KSAT) BETWEEN: 1. THE REGISTRAR, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA, M. S. BUILDING, DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR ROAD, BENGALURU-560001. …PETITIONER (BY SRI VENKATESH S ARBATTI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS, VIDHANA SOUDHA, BENGALURU-560001. 2. THE ACCOUNT GENERAL IN KARNATAKA, PARK HOUSE, BENGALURU-560001. 3. SRI S. SHIVANANDA SHARMA, AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS, S/O SIDDALINGAIAH RETIRED K. A. S. OFFICER, Digitally signed by VINUTHA B S Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36273-DB WP No. 6385 of 2024 CHICKMAGALURU DISTRICT, R/AT 3390-A, 2ND CROSS, VIJAYNAGAR II STAGE, BENGALURU-560040. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI B. RAVINDRANATH, AGA FOR R1 & R2) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASHING THE ORDER DATED 28/01/2019 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, BENGLAURU IN APPLICATION No.387/2008, AS PER ANNEXURE-A. THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND ORAL ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND) Heard Sri Venkatesh S. Arabatti, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri B. Ravindranath, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 2. The Karnataka Lokayukta is before this Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, assailing the order dated 28.01.2019 passed in Application No. 387/2008 by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal (for short, 'the Tribunal'). - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36273-DB WP No. 6385 of 2024 3. Respondent No. 3, while serving as Special Land Acquisition Officer in the Bengaluru Development Authority, a complaint came to be filed against him alleging that he had put up a false note recommending payment of compensation in favour of one Smt. Rajamma in respect of Sy. No. 11 of Venkojirao Khana Village, Begur Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk, measuring 7 acres 30 guntas, to the tune of Rs. 8,67,535/-. A preliminary enquiry was conducted by the petitioner, who submitted a report under Section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (for short, 'the Act'), recommending initiation of disciplinary enquiry and entrustment of the same to the petitioner. Pursuant thereto, respondent No. 1, by order dated 30.03.2001, entrusted the enquiry to the petitioner under Rule 14A of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 (for short, 'the KCS (CCA) Rules'). Thereafter, an Enquiry Officer was appointed on 20.06.2001 and Articles of Charge were issued. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 15.02.2005 holding that the charges against respondent No. 3 stood proved. - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36273-DB WP No. 6385 of 2024 3.1 A recommendation was thereafter made to the competent authority on 18.11.2005 to impose penalty of permanent withholding of the entire pension. The second show-cause notice was issued on 07.12.2005. Respondent No. 3 submitted his reply and, by order dated 04.07.2007, penalty of withholding 20% of monthly pension permanently came to be imposed, deviating from the recommendation of the petitioner. 3.2 The said order of penalty was challenged before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by its order, modified the penalty by directing withholding of 20% of monthly pension only till 31.03.2019, on the grounds that the proceedings were delayed by more than 10 years and that the reply to the show-cause notice had not been considered by the Disciplinary Authority. 4. Sri Venkatesh S. Arabatti, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the Tribunal, in exercise of its jurisdiction, cannot sit in appeal over the decision of the Disciplinary Authority and modify the penalty imposed. It is contended that if, for any reason, the penalty imposed was found unsustainable, the Tribunal ought to have remanded the matter to the Disciplinary Authority for fresh consideration. - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36273-DB WP No. 6385 of 2024 Learned counsel further submits that the enquiry proceedings were completed within a reasonable time, and that the pendency of the application before the Tribunal cannot be a ground to interfere with or modify the penalty. 5. Sri B. Ravindranath, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, supports the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the writ papers, two aspects emerge for consideration: firstly, the inordinate delay in the conclusion of the enquiry proceedings; and secondly, the delay in filing the writ petition. 7. The alleged incident pertains to the year 1990. The preliminary enquiry report was submitted on 24.08.1999. The Enquiry Officer was appointed on 20.06.2001, and the Enquiry Report came to be submitted on 15.02.2005. A recommendation to impose penalty was made on 18.11.2005. Pursuant to the issuance of the second show-cause notice on 07.12.2005, the order of penalty was passed on 04.07.2007. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36273-DB WP No. 6385 of 2024 Thus, the complaint relating to the incident of 1990 culminated only on 04.07.2007, after a lapse of 17 years. It is also noted that the enquiry itself commenced after nearly ten years. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of Punjab and Others v. Chaman Lal Goyal [(1995) 2 SCC 570], considered the consequences of delay in the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The relevant observations are as follows: "9. … It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36273-DB WP No. 6385 of 2024 circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing. …" 9. In the present case, the enquiry has been concluded after a lapse of 17 years. Such inordinate delay seriously affects the fairness of the proceedings insofar as the delinquent officer is concerned. Equally, it renders the task of proving the charges difficult and hampers the administration. It is not the case of the respondents that the delay in conclusion of the enquiry is attributable to the delinquent officer. In light of the law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are constrained to hold that the enquiry proceedings in the present case stand vitiated on account of inordinate and unexplained delay, as 17 years is far too long to be considered reasonable. 10. The order of the Tribunal is dated 28.01.2019, whereas the writ petition has been presented on 27.02.2024. The averments in the petition do not disclose any explanation for the delay. Upon a query by the Court, learned counsel for the petitioner also had no explanation to offer. A delay of four years cannot be regarded as reasonable. It is true that no period of limitation is prescribed for filing a writ petition under - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36273-DB WP No. 6385 of 2024 Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, a person invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is expected to approach within a reasonable time. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others [2024 SCC OnLine SC 551], while examining the question as to what constitutes a reasonable period for invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has, at paragraphs 9 to 13, observed as follows: “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36273-DB WP No. 6385 of 2024 appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36273-DB WP No. 6385 of 2024 is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36273-DB WP No. 6385 of 2024 exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36273-DB WP No. 6385 of 2024 done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution- makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36273-DB WP No. 6385 of 2024 which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 12. In view of the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches in concluding the disciplinary proceedings - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:36273-DB WP No. 6385 of 2024 and filing writ petition. We find no justification to overlook the delay of four years in filing the petition. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. Sd/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (K. V. ARAVIND) JUDGE MV List No.: 1 Sl No.: 18