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2025 DAILYLAW 67786 (PNJ)

PROMILA AND OTHERS v. TARSEM AND OTHERS

FAO/3855/2025 · 2025-09-01

Amarinder Singh Grewal

Public Interest Litigationbody2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

FAO-3855-2025 (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT 120 Promila and oth Tarsem and others CORAM : Present: AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL, J. (ORAL) 1. against the impugned award dated 15.02.2016 passed by the Accident Claims Tribunal, Kaithal (for short ‘the learned Tribunal’) seeking enhancement of compensation, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 2673 days in filing the appeal. 2. (since deceased) along with Surinder Singh @ Raju was travelling from Kaithal to their village Sambhal Wali on a Hero motorcycle. Jainender was driving the motorcycle at a moderate speed on the road, while Surinder Singh was riding pillion. At about 8:00 p.m., when they reached near Rajbaha in the area of village Peonda on the Jind car bearing registration No. HR offending vehicle), being driven by respondent No.1 in a rash and negligent manner, at a high speed, without blowing horn and coming on the wrong side of the road from Jind side, struck the front right side of their motorcycle. Due 2025 (O&M) -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Promila and others Versus Tarsem and others HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL Mr. Pankaj Bali, Advocate for the appellants. *** AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL, J. (ORAL) The present appeal has been preferred by the appellants against the impugned award dated 15.02.2016 passed by the Accident Claims Tribunal, Kaithal (for short ‘the learned Tribunal’) seeking enhancement of compensation, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 2673 days in filing the Succinctly, the facts are that on 31.03.2015, Jainender @ Bhullar (since deceased) along with Surinder Singh @ Raju was travelling from Kaithal to their village Sambhal Wali on a Hero motorcycle. Jainender was driving the motorcycle at a moderate speed on the road, while Surinder Singh was riding pillion. At about 8:00 p.m., when they reached near Rajbaha in the area of village Peonda on the Jind car bearing registration No. HR-06R-6883(hereinafter referred to as the fending vehicle), being driven by respondent No.1 in a rash and negligent manner, at a high speed, without blowing horn and coming on the wrong side of the road from Jind side, struck the front right side of their motorcycle. Due IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH FAO-3855-2025 (O&M) Date of Decision:01.09.2025 ...Appellants ... Respondents JUSTICE AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL, J. (ORAL) The present appeal has been preferred by the appellants-claimant against the impugned award dated 15.02.2016 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kaithal (for short ‘the learned Tribunal’) seeking enhancement of compensation, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 2673 days in filing the cinctly, the facts are that on 31.03.2015, Jainender @ Bhullar (since deceased) along with Surinder Singh @ Raju was travelling from Kaithal to their village Sambhal Wali on a Hero motorcycle. Jainender was driving the motorcycle at a moderate speed on the extreme left side of the road, while Surinder Singh was riding pillion. At about 8:00 p.m., when they reached near Rajbaha in the area of village Peonda on the Jind–Kaithal road, a 6883(hereinafter referred to as the fending vehicle), being driven by respondent No.1 in a rash and negligent manner, at a high speed, without blowing horn and coming on the wrong side of the road from Jind side, struck the front right side of their motorcycle. Due ...Appellants JUSTICE AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL claimant learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kaithal (for short ‘the learned Tribunal’) seeking enhancement of compensation, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 2673 days in filing the cinctly, the facts are that on 31.03.2015, Jainender @ Bhullar (since deceased) along with Surinder Singh @ Raju was travelling from Kaithal to their village Sambhal Wali on a Hero motorcycle. Jainender was extreme left side of the road, while Surinder Singh was riding pillion. At about 8:00 p.m., when they Kaithal road, a 6883(hereinafter referred to as the fending vehicle), being driven by respondent No.1 in a rash and negligent manner, at a high speed, without blowing horn and coming on the wrong side of the road from Jind side, struck the front right side of their motorcycle. Due PANKAJ KUMAR 2025.09.08 18:51 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab and Haryana High Court Chandigarh FAO-3855-2025 (O&M) to the impact, both occupa multiple grievous injuries. Jainender succumbed to the injuries on the spot. The respondent No.1, driver of the offending vehicle stopped momentarily and then fled. Consequently, FIR No.26 dated 01.04.20 337 and 304 the same, claim petition was preferred by legal representatives of the deceased where the learned Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.26,43,000/ claimants being widow, minor son and mother of the deceased. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant seeking enhancement of compensation. 3. The present appeal is accompanied by an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay of 2673 days in filing the same on the ground that appellant No.1, being a village household lady, reposed complete faith in her e Advocate, under the impression that the appeal against the award dated 15.02.2016 had been duly filed. For about nine years, the said counsel repeatedly assured her that the appeal was pending before this Hon’ble Court and would be listed in due course. However, in February 2025, upon enquiry made through her relative, it came to light that no such appeal had ever been filed. When confronted, the said counsel not only failed to disclose any appeal number but also threatened receiving filing expenses, vakalatnama, blank papers, and even 10% fee on the award, the counsel had deliberately misled the appellants. Consequently, a complaint dated 23.04.2025 was lodged before the Bar C Haryana, duly acknowledged on 02.05.2025. Thereafter, the appellants reconstructed the brief, arranged resources, and engaged the present counsel 2025 (O&M) -2- to the impact, both occupants of the motorcycle fell on the road and sustained multiple grievous injuries. Jainender succumbed to the injuries on the spot. The respondent No.1, driver of the offending vehicle stopped momentarily and then fled. Consequently, FIR No.26 dated 01.04.20 337 and 304-A IPC was registered at Police Station Titram the same, claim petition was preferred by legal representatives of the deceased where the learned Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.26,43,000/ nts being widow, minor son and mother of the deceased. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant seeking enhancement of compensation. The present appeal is accompanied by an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay of 2673 days in filing the same on the ground that appellant No.1, being a village household lady, reposed complete faith in her earlier counsel, Sh. Mehar Singh, Advocate, under the impression that the appeal against the award dated 15.02.2016 had been duly filed. For about nine years, the said counsel repeatedly assured her that the appeal was pending before this Hon’ble Court would be listed in due course. However, in February 2025, upon enquiry made through her relative, it came to light that no such appeal had ever been filed. When confronted, the said counsel not only failed to disclose any appeal number but also threatened the appellant. It was further revealed that despite filing expenses, vakalatnama, blank papers, and even 10% fee on the award, the counsel had deliberately misled the appellants. Consequently, a complaint dated 23.04.2025 was lodged before the Bar C Haryana, duly acknowledged on 02.05.2025. Thereafter, the appellants reconstructed the brief, arranged resources, and engaged the present counsel nts of the motorcycle fell on the road and sustained multiple grievous injuries. Jainender succumbed to the injuries on the spot. The respondent No.1, driver of the offending vehicle stopped momentarily and then fled. Consequently, FIR No.26 dated 01.04.2015 under Sections 279, A IPC was registered at Police Station Titram. Occasioned by the same, claim petition was preferred by legal representatives of the deceased where the learned Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.26,43,000/- to the nts being widow, minor son and mother of the deceased. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant seeking The present appeal is accompanied by an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay of 2673 days in filing the same on the ground that appellant No.1, being a village household arlier counsel, Sh. Mehar Singh, Advocate, under the impression that the appeal against the award dated 15.02.2016 had been duly filed. For about nine years, the said counsel repeatedly assured her that the appeal was pending before this Hon’ble Court would be listed in due course. However, in February 2025, upon enquiry made through her relative, it came to light that no such appeal had ever been filed. When confronted, the said counsel not only failed to disclose any appeal the appellant. It was further revealed that despite filing expenses, vakalatnama, blank papers, and even 10% fee on the award, the counsel had deliberately misled the appellants. Consequently, a complaint dated 23.04.2025 was lodged before the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana, duly acknowledged on 02.05.2025. Thereafter, the appellants reconstructed the brief, arranged resources, and engaged the present counsel nts of the motorcycle fell on the road and sustained multiple grievous injuries. Jainender succumbed to the injuries on the spot. The respondent No.1, driver of the offending vehicle stopped momentarily 15 under Sections 279, Occasioned by the same, claim petition was preferred by legal representatives of the deceased to the nts being widow, minor son and mother of the deceased. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant seeking The present appeal is accompanied by an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay of 2673 days in filing the same on the ground that appellant No.1, being a village household arlier counsel, Sh. Mehar Singh, Advocate, under the impression that the appeal against the award dated 15.02.2016 had been duly filed. For about nine years, the said counsel repeatedly assured her that the appeal was pending before this Hon’ble Court would be listed in due course. However, in February 2025, upon enquiry made through her relative, it came to light that no such appeal had ever been filed. When confronted, the said counsel not only failed to disclose any appeal the appellant. It was further revealed that despite filing expenses, vakalatnama, blank papers, and even 10% fee on the award, the counsel had deliberately misled the appellants. Consequently, a ouncil of Punjab and Haryana, duly acknowledged on 02.05.2025. Thereafter, the appellants reconstructed the brief, arranged resources, and engaged the present counsel PANKAJ KUMAR 2025.09.08 18:51 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab and Haryana High Court Chandigarh FAO-3855-2025 (O&M) on 27.05.2025, who promptly filed the appeal on 29.05.2025. Therefore, delay of 2673 day such, prayer is made to condone the same. 4. It is apparent that the appellant way of appeal within the period prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1988). The provisions of Section 173 of the Act of 1988 deals with appeals, which are reproduced as under: pay any amount in terms of such award shall be enter preferring the appeal in time. 5. A perusal of the proviso to it crystal clear that the High Court may entertain the appeal after expiry of the period of 90 days, if it is satisfied that the appellant 'sufficient cause' from preferring the appeal in time. Thus, the appellant required to satisfy that there was sufficient cause for the delay. 6. The phrase 'sufficient cause' as use pari materia interpreted in the same way. 7. The plea that informed of the dates by her counsel cannot furnish a valid ground to condone 2025 (O&M) -3- on 27.05.2025, who promptly filed the appeal on 29.05.2025. Therefore, delay of 2673 days in filing the appeal is neither intentional nor willful and as such, prayer is made to condone the same. It is apparent that the appellant way of appeal within the period prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1988). The provisions of Section 173 of the Act of 1988 deals with appeals, which are reproduced as under: “173. Appeals:(1) Subject to the provisions of sub any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court: Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be enter High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court: Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the a lakh] rupees.” A perusal of the proviso to Section 173 it crystal clear that the High Court may entertain the appeal after expiry of the f 90 days, if it is satisfied that the appellant 'sufficient cause' from preferring the appeal in time. Thus, the appellant required to satisfy that there was sufficient cause for the delay. The phrase 'sufficient cause' as use pari materia to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and should, therefore, be interpreted in the same way. The plea that appellant No.1 is a household lady and informed of the dates by her counsel cannot furnish a valid ground to condone on 27.05.2025, who promptly filed the appeal on 29.05.2025. Therefore, s in filing the appeal is neither intentional nor willful and as It is apparent that the appellants did not approach this Court by way of appeal within the period prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1988). The provisions of Section 173 of the Act of 1988 deals with appeals, which are reproduced as under:- :(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2 any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court: Provided further that the High Court may entertain the ter the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than [one Section 173 of the Act of 1988 makes it crystal clear that the High Court may entertain the appeal after expiry of the f 90 days, if it is satisfied that the appellants were prevented by 'sufficient cause' from preferring the appeal in time. Thus, the appellants are required to satisfy that there was sufficient cause for the delay. The phrase 'sufficient cause' as used in 173 of the Act of 1998 is in of the Limitation Act, 1963 and should, therefore, be is a household lady and was not duly informed of the dates by her counsel cannot furnish a valid ground to condone on 27.05.2025, who promptly filed the appeal on 29.05.2025. Therefore, s in filing the appeal is neither intentional nor willful and as did not approach this Court by way of appeal within the period prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1988). The provisions of Section section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to tained by the five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is Provided further that the High Court may entertain the ter the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims [one of the Act of 1988 makes it crystal clear that the High Court may entertain the appeal after expiry of the prevented by are of the Act of 1998 is in of the Limitation Act, 1963 and should, therefore, be was not duly informed of the dates by her counsel cannot furnish a valid ground to condone PANKAJ KUMAR 2025.09.08 18:51 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab and Haryana High Court Chandigarh FAO-3855-2025 (O&M) the delay. A bare perusal of the application seeking condonation of delay shows that the appellant being bothere whether the matter came up hearing or not his/her brief and lament later on to blame others. It is a maxim in latin vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subve and not those who sleep over their rights’. establish 'sufficient cause' that prevented the statutory limitation period. 8. The obj span of a legal remedy so as to put an end to every legal remedy as it is futile to keep any litigation or dispute pending indefinitely. Furthermore, it is also settled proposition of law tha explained, which is lacking in the case at hand. When mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to be condoned on sympathetic grounds statutory provision of law of limitation may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment passed in Basawraj and an 81 has observed that it is a settled legal proposition that law for limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The limitation on equitable grounds. A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. 2025 (O&M) -4- A bare perusal of the application seeking condonation of delay shows that the appellants have made only general and basic statement, without being bothered to inquire for 9 years about the date of hearing of the matter or whether the matter came up hearing or not his/her brief and lament later on to blame others. It is a maxim in latin igilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt’ and not those who sleep over their rights’. establish 'sufficient cause' that prevented them the statutory limitation period. The object and purpose of the statutes of limitation span of a legal remedy so as to put an end to every legal remedy as it is futile to keep any litigation or dispute pending indefinitely. Furthermore, it is also settled proposition of law that delay of each and every day has to be explained, which is lacking in the case at hand. When mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to be condoned on sympathetic grounds statutory provision of law of limitation may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment passed in Basawraj and another Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC has observed that it is a settled legal proposition that law for limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. A bare perusal of the application seeking condonation of delay made only general and basic statement, without about the date of hearing of the matter or whether the matter came up hearing or not. A litigant cannot sleep over his/her brief and lament later on to blame others. It is a maxim in latin niunt’ that says ‘law aids the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights’. The appellants have failed them from filing the appeal within ect and purpose of the statutes of limitation is to fix the life span of a legal remedy so as to put an end to every legal remedy as it is futile to keep any litigation or dispute pending indefinitely. Furthermore, it is also t delay of each and every day has to be explained, which is lacking in the case at hand. When mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to be condoned on sympathetic grounds alone. The statutory provision of law of limitation may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment passed in other Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC has observed that it is a settled legal proposition that law for limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. The statutory provision may A bare perusal of the application seeking condonation of delay made only general and basic statement, without about the date of hearing of the matter or A litigant cannot sleep over his/her brief and lament later on to blame others. It is a maxim in latin that says ‘law aids the vigilant to from filing the appeal within is to fix the life span of a legal remedy so as to put an end to every legal remedy as it is futile to keep any litigation or dispute pending indefinitely. Furthermore, it is also t delay of each and every day has to be explained, which is lacking in the case at hand. When mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly alone. The statutory provision of law of limitation may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment passed in other Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC has observed that it is a settled legal proposition that law for limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it The statutory provision may PANKAJ KUMAR 2025.09.08 18:51 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab and Haryana High Court Chandigarh FAO-3855-2025 (O&M) cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim lex sed lex, such a situation. 9. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance, the explanation given by the appellant appeal within the period of limitation is neither plausible nor convincing and thus, does not inspire the confidence of this Court to condone the delay of 2673 days. 10. Consequently, the instant appeal stands dismissed on the ground of delay . September 0 Pankaj* 2025 (O&M) -5- cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim lex sed lex, which means “the law is hard but it is the law” stands attra such a situation. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance, the explanation given by the appellants for not approaching this Court by way of instant appeal within the period of limitation is neither plausible nor convincing and s not inspire the confidence of this Court to condone the delay of Consequently, the instant appeal stands dismissed on the ground (AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL September 01, 2025 Whether speaking/reasoned Whether reportable cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura which means “the law is hard but it is the law” stands attracted in In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance, the explanation for not approaching this Court by way of instant appeal within the period of limitation is neither plausible nor convincing and s not inspire the confidence of this Court to condone the delay of Consequently, the instant appeal stands dismissed on the ground AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL) JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No : Yes/No cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no dura cted in In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance, the explanation for not approaching this Court by way of instant appeal within the period of limitation is neither plausible nor convincing and s not inspire the confidence of this Court to condone the delay of Consequently, the instant appeal stands dismissed on the ground ) PANKAJ KUMAR 2025.09.08 18:51 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab and Haryana High Court Chandigarh