( 2025:HHC:27640 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 180 of 2012. Reserved on: 06.08.2025. Date of Decision: 13.08.2025. State of H.P. ...Appellant. Versus Sucha Singh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant/State : Mr. Jatinder K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr. Ajay Kumar Dhiman, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 01.02.2012, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. I, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of Indian Penal Code (in short “IPC”) and Section 184 of Motor Vehicles Act (in short 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2( 2025:HHC:27640 ) “MV Act”). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC & 184 of the MV Act. It was asserted that the informant, Pankaj (PW1), was riding a motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-36- A-3232 on 27.12.2009. His aunt, Vijay Lakshmi (PW2), was sitting as a pillion rider. When the motorcycle reached Khabli Dosarka at 02:15 pm, an HRTC bus bearing registration No. HP- 68-1958 hit the motorcycle at a high speed. The informant and Vijay Lakshmi fell and sustained injuries. The accident was caused by the negligence of the bus driver. The injured were taken to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police. An entry (Ex-PW7/A) was recorded in the police station, and ASI Kuldeep Kumar (PW7) was directed to verify the correctness of the information. He went to the hospital and recorded the statement of the informant (Ex-PW1/A), which was sent to the police station where FIR (Ex-PW7/B) was registered. ASI Kuleep 3( 2025:HHC:27640 ) Kumar (PW7) filed an application (Ex-PW7/D) for conducting the medical examination of Vijay Lakshmi (PW2). MLC of Vijay Lakshmi (Ex-PW7/E) and treatment summary (Ex-PW7/K) were obtains. ASI Kuldeep Kumar (PW7) went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex-PW7/F). The photographs of the spot (Ex-PW1 to Ex-PW4) were taken. The bus was seized vide seizure memo (Ex-PW7/G), and the motorcycle was seized vide seizure memo (Ex-PW1/B). The documents of the bus were seized vide memo (Ex-PW4/A). The mechanical examination of the vehicles was conducted by HC Rajender Kumar (PW5), who found that there was no mechanical defect in the bus which could have led to the accident. Statements of remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version and after the completion of the investigation. The challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and Section 184 of the MV Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4( 2025:HHC:27640 ) 4. The prosecution examined 07 witnesses to prove its case. Pankaj (PW1) is the informant. Vijay Lakshmi (PW2) is the pillion rider who sustained injuries in the accident. Dharam Pal (PW3) took the photographs. Harnam Singh (PW4) and Shakti Chand (PW6) are the witnesses to the recovery. HC Rajender Kumar (PW5) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. ASI Kuldeep Kumar (PW7) conducted the investigation. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.PC admitted that he was driving the bus bearing registration No. HP-68-1958 on 27.12.2009 at 02:15 pm. He admitted that the bus was taken into possession by the police. He claimed that the motorcycle had skidded on the gravel which were lying on the roadside. The pillion rider sustained injuries. He did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the pillion rider Vijay Lakshmi (PW2) and Dharam Pal (PW3) admitted that the gravels were lying at the place of the accident. There were contradictions in the statements of the informant and Vijay Lakshmi (PW2) regarding the manner of hitting the motorcycle. HC Rajender Kumar (PW5) stated that no dent was found on the 5( 2025:HHC:27640 ) motorcycle, which made the prosecution’s case suspect that the bus had hit the motorcycle. The Investigating Officer did not record the statements of the passengers travelling in the bus, and an adverse inference was to be drawn against the prosecution. Consequently, the complaint was dismissed and the accused was acquitted by the learned Trial Court. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material placed before it. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses were discarded without any cogent reason. The informant stated that the bus hit the motorcycle, and his statement was corroborated by Vijay Lakshmi (PW2). The witness denied the suggestion that the motorcycle skidded on the road. There is no evidence to suggest that the motorcycle was being driven towards the wrong side of the road. The evidence was not properly appreciated. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 6( 2025:HHC:27640 ) 8. I have heard Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr. Ajay Kumar Dhiman, learned counsel for the respondent. 9. Mr. Jatinder K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The informant and Vijay Lakshmi (PW2) consistently stated that the bus had hit the motorcycle from the rear. The plea taken by the accused that the motorcycle had skidded was categorically denied by them. No mechanical defect was found in both the vehicles. The accused failed to maintain the proper distance from the motorcycle as required under Rule of the Road Regulations, 1999, which was the proximate cause of the accident. Learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. Ajay Kumar Dhiman, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, supported the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. He submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view of the matter, which was possible 7( 2025:HHC:27640 ) based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and reaches a conclusion that no reasonable person would have reached based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by 8( 2025:HHC:27640 ) the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate, and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 9( 2025:HHC:27640 ) “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed, and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by 10( 2025:HHC:27640 ) the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 11( 2025:HHC:27640 ) 13. A similar view was taken in Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 523, wherein it was observed: - “6. It is true that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court has to reappreciate the evidence. After re-appreciating the evidence, the first question that needs to be answered by the Appellate Court is whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a plausible view that could have been taken based on the evidence on record. Perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court shows that this question has not been adverted to. The Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it is satisfied after reappreciating the evidence that the only possible conclusion was that the guilt of the accused had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal only on the ground that another view is possible. In other words, the judgment of acquittal must be found to be perverse. Unless the Appellate Court records such a finding, no interference can be made with the order of acquittal. The High Court has ignored the well-settled principle that an order of acquittal further strengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused. After having perused the judgment, we find that the High Court has not addressed itself to the main question.” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. HC Rajender Kumar (PW5) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles and issued reports (Ex-PW5/A and Ex-PW5/B). He stated in his cross-examination 12( 2025:HHC:27640 ) that he did not find any dent on the motorcycle. He admitted that in case the bumper of the bus hits the motorcycle, the motorcycle would suffer a dent. The bus had scratch marks, but those could be old. 16. The testimony of this witness made the prosecution’s case highly suspect that the bus had hit the motorcycle. He categorically stated that the motorcycle would have sustained a dent by the impact, and the absence of the dent makes it highly suspect that the bus had hit the motorcycle. 17. Informant Pankaj (PW1) stated in his cross- examination that the front side of the bus had hit the motorcycle. Vijay Lakshmi (PW2), on the other hand, stated in her cross-examination that the bus had crossed the motorcycle till the rear door of the conductor’s side. Her testimony contradicts the statement of the Informant Pankaj (PW1) that the front side of the bus had hit the motorcycle. This discrepancy made it highly doubtful that the bus had hit the motorcycle. 18. Vijay Lakshmi (PW2) admitted in her cross- examination that the gravel was lying on the road at the place of 13( 2025:HHC:27640 ) the accident. Dharam Pal (PW3) also admitted in his cross- examination that the gravel was visible on the road. The informant denied that any gravel was lying on the road, which shows that he is trying to conceal the facts from the Court. The existence of the gravel on the road corroborates the version of the accused that the motorcycle had skidded on the gravel. This version is also corroborated by the absence of any damage to the motorcycle. 19. There is no other evidence to show that the bus had hit the motorcycle. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view based on the material placed before it, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against the acquittal. 20. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed. 21. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like 14( 2025:HHC:27640 ) amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in an event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 22. The present appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 23. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 13th August 2025 (Shamsh Tabrez)