Order : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The applicant has preferred the present revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, feeling aggrieved by the order dated 05.04.2024 passed in Civil Suit No. 27A/2016 by the Second Civil Judge, Class – I, Bastar at Jagdalpur, (C.G.) whereby the plaintiff/non-applicant No.1 filed a suit for declaration of title, possession, and injunction. The defendants/applicants moved an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, contending that an earlier suit (C.S. No. 2A/2013) on the same cause of action was dismissed for want of prosecution, thereby attracting the bar under Order IX Rule 9 CPC. The trial Court, vide order dated 05.04.2024 in Civil Suit No. 27A/2016, rejected the application holding that the issue involved mixed questions of law and fact. The Trial Court erred in not considering that the earlier suit was dismissed without liberty to file afresh, rendering the present suit not maintainable. Being aggrieved, the applicants have preferred this revision. 2. Facts of the case, as canvased by the applicant, are that the plaintiff/non-applicant No.1 instituted a civil suit seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of certain immovable properties situated at Jagdalpur, Village Bade Marenga, Village Palli, and Village Chhote Devda, which were originally owned by late Govind Rath. It was the specific case of the plaintiff that he, along with the defendants, are the legal heirs of late Govind Rath, who passed away on 07.05.1976, leaving behind the aforementioned properties. After his demise, both parties continued to enjoy the usufruct and benefits arising from the said properties jointly. Subsequently, defendant No.7 / applicant No.2 instituted a separate civil suit bearing Civil Suit No. 3A/2013 before the competent Court at Jagdalpur, seeking declaration of title, possession, and permanent injunction against the present plaintiff and defendant No.1 / applicant No.1. During the pendency of that suit, on 20.12.2013, a compromise application was filed between the parties, and the matter was amicably settled in respect of the suit properties situated in Village Palli and Village Bade Marenga. The said suit was accordingly disposed of in terms of the compromise. Thereafter, the present plaintiff, along with defendant No.1 / petitioner No.1, filed another suit bearing Civil Suit No. 2A/2013 for declaration of title and for setting aside the order dated 23.02.1999 passed by the Assistant Superintendent of Land Records, Jagdalpur. The said suit was accordingly disposed of in terms of the compromise. Thereafter, the present plaintiff, along with defendant No.1 / petitioner No.1, filed another suit bearing Civil Suit No. 2A/2013 for declaration of title and for setting aside the order dated 23.02.1999 passed by the Assistant Superintendent of Land Records, Jagdalpur. However, during the pendency of that suit, defendant No.1, acting in collusion with defendants No.2 to 7, failed to pursue the matter diligently. In view of the earlier compromise entered into in Civil Suit No.3A/2013, it was agreed that Civil Suit No.2A/2013 would also be withdrawn. Consequently, due to the non-appearance of the plaintiff on 15.01.2014, Civil Suit No.2A/2013 was dismissed for want of prosecution. As the defendants failed to honour the terms of the compromise arrived at in Civil Suit No.3A/2013 and further started raising construction and creating third-party rights over the suit properties, the plaintiff was constrained to file the present suit (Civil Suit No.27A/2016) seeking appropriate reliefs. 3. On 28.01.2020, the defendants/applicants filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC read with Order IX Rule 9 CPC, contending that since the earlier suit (Civil Suit No.2A/2013) involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action had already been dismissed for want of prosecution, the present suit was barred under Order IX Rule 9 CPC and, therefore, not maintainable. The plaintiff filed his reply on 01.02.2020, denying the averments and asserting that Civil Suit No.2A/2013 had not been dismissed for want of prosecution. It was further pleaded that a similar application had earlier been filed by the defendants on 17.08.2016, which was allowed by the Trial Court on 12.10.2017. Against that order, the plaintiff preferred an appeal, and the learned Appellate Court, by its order dated 30.10.2019, set aside the order dated 12.10.2017 and remanded the matter for decision on merits. Pursuant to the said directions, the learned Trial Court, vide order dated 22.06.2021, dismissed the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, holding that in view of the remand order passed by Appellate Court, the suit was required to be adjudicated on merits. 4. Aggrieved by the order dated 22.06.2021, the applicant preferred a Civil Revision No.24/2022 before this Court. 4. Aggrieved by the order dated 22.06.2021, the applicant preferred a Civil Revision No.24/2022 before this Court. Vide order dated 28.08.2023, this Court disposed of the revision petition, directing the parties to appear before the Trial Court in Civil Suit No.2A/2013, and further directed the Trial Court to pass appropriate orders after hearing both parties. In compliance with the said order, both parties appeared before the Trial Court in Civil Suit No.2A/2013. On 30.10.2023, the plaintiff therein submitted an application stating that he had earlier, on 20.12.2013, expressed his unwillingness to pursue the said suit and had also remained absent on 15.01.2014, thereby warranting dismissal of the suit. Accepting this submission, the learned Trial Court observed that the plaintiff had, in fact, failed to appear on 15.01.2014, and accordingly, the suit stood dismissed for want of prosecution. Thereafter, in Civil Suit No.27A/2016, the defendants/applicants filed a fresh application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Order IX Rule 9 CPC on 26.02.2024, contending that since Civil Suit No.2A/2013 between the same parties involving the same cause of action had been dismissed for want of prosecution on 30.10.2023, the present suit was barred and not maintainable. The plaintiff opposed the said application, asserting that the earlier dismissal had occurred on his own application, and further that the same issue had already been decided earlier. After hearing both sides, the learned Trial Court, vide its impugned order dated 05.04.2024, dismissed the defendants’ application, holding that the earlier Civil Suit No.2A/2013 had already been decided, the present suit was at the stage of evidence, and that the proceedings were being continued in accordance with the directions issued by the High Court. Aggrieved by the said order dated 05.04.2024, the present revision has been preferred by the applicants, being advised that the impugned order is illegal, arbitrary, and contrary to the provisions of law, as the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that once the earlier suit had been dismissed for want of prosecution without any liberty to institute a fresh suit, the present proceedings were clearly barred under Order IX Rule 9 CPC. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant would submit that the impugned order dated 05.04.2024 passed by the learned II nd Civil Judge Class-I, Bastar at Jagdalpur in Civil Suit No.27A/2016 suffers from serious legal infirmities and material irregularities apparent on the face of the record. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant would submit that the impugned order dated 05.04.2024 passed by the learned II nd Civil Judge Class-I, Bastar at Jagdalpur in Civil Suit No.27A/2016 suffers from serious legal infirmities and material irregularities apparent on the face of the record. The Court below has failed to appreciate the matter in its correct legal perspective and has misdirected itself both on facts and in law while rejecting the applicants’ application filed under Order VII Rule 11 read with Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). It is submitted that Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC mandates that where the suit appears from the statements made in the plaint to be barred by any law, the same is liable to be rejected at the threshold. The provision is couched in mandatory terms, and once the existence of a statutory bar is apparent from the pleadings, the Court has no discretion but to reject the plaint. The learned Trial Court, however, has completely overlooked this settled principle and has erroneously deferred the issue for consideration at a later stage, despite the bar being ex facie evident from the record. The earlier suit, Civil Suit No.2A/2013, was filed between the same parties, involving the same subject matter and identical cause of action. It is an admitted position that the said suit was dismissed for want of prosecution, vide order dated 30.10.2023, operative with effect from 15.01.2014. Once the earlier suit stood dismissed for non-prosecution, without any liberty being granted to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action, the present proceedings are clearly barred by the express language of Order IX Rule 9 CPC. The learned Trial Court, while dismissing the application, failed to give due weight to this fundamental legal bar. It is further contended that the present suit, Civil Suit No.27A/2016, has been instituted on the same facts, same cause of action, and in respect of the same properties that were the subject matter of the earlier suit, C.S. No.2A/2013. The mere change in form or wording of the relief claimed cannot alter the true nature of the cause of action. The principle that no party can be permitted to re-agitate the same claim which has already been abandoned or dismissed for non- prosecution, without liberty to refile, is well settled. The mere change in form or wording of the relief claimed cannot alter the true nature of the cause of action. The principle that no party can be permitted to re-agitate the same claim which has already been abandoned or dismissed for non- prosecution, without liberty to refile, is well settled. The learned Trial Court, therefore, ought to have held that the present suit was not maintainable in view of the express statutory bar under Order IX Rule 9 CPC. The counsel for the applicants submits that the learned Trial Court has also committed a material irregularity in not considering the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC in its true scope and import. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that frivolous, vexatious, or barred suits do not proceed to trial unnecessarily, thereby saving judicial time and preventing harassment to the opposite party. The Trial Court, by holding that the issue involves a “mixed question of law and fact,” has misconstrued the legal position, since the bar under Order IX Rule 9 CPC is apparent from the record itself and does not require any evidentiary determination. 6. The learned counsel for the applicants further submit that the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the clear distinction between Order IX Rule 4 and Order IX Rule 8 of the CPC. Whereas Order IX Rule 4 permits the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit where the earlier one was dismissed under Order IX Rule 2 or Rule 3 (for non-service of summons or default of appearance before service), the provision under Order IX Rule 9 expressly prohibits the institution of a fresh suit where the earlier suit was dismissed under Rule 8, i.e., after the appearance of defendant but due to the default of plaintiff. In the present case, since the earlier suit (C.S. No.2A/2013) was dismissed after the defendants had entered appearance, the bar under Order IX Rule 9 CPC squarely applies. The failure of learned Trial Court to appreciate this legal distinction has led to a manifest miscarriage of justice. It is also submitted that the learned Trial Court has exercised jurisdiction with material illegality and procedural impropriety. The failure of learned Trial Court to appreciate this legal distinction has led to a manifest miscarriage of justice. It is also submitted that the learned Trial Court has exercised jurisdiction with material illegality and procedural impropriety. The Court below has not only misinterpreted the statutory provisions but has also ignored binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and various High Courts, which have consistently held that when a suit is barred by law, the same must be rejected at the inception under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. By allowing the suit to proceed despite the evident bar, the Court below has caused undue hardship and prejudice to the applicants, compelling them to undergo unnecessary litigation contrary to the settled principles of law. The learned counsel for applicants further submit that allowing the impugned order to stand would result in grave miscarriage of justice, as it would permit the plaintiff to circumvent the clear statutory bar and re-litigate an issue that has already attained finality upon dismissal of the earlier suit. Such a course would defeat the very object of procedural law, which is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and ensure finality of litigation. In view of the foregoing submissions, it is contended that the impugned order dated 05.04.2024 is illegal, arbitrary, and unsustainable in law. The same deserves to be quashed and set aside by this Court, and the application filed by the applicants under Order VII Rule 11 read with Order IX Rule 9 CPC deserves to be allowed in the interest of justice. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 would submit that the present revision petition preferred by the applicants/defendants is misconceived, devoid of substance, and liable to be dismissed in limine. The impugned order dated 05.04.2024 passed by the learned II Civil Judge, Class-I, Jagdalpur in Civil Suit No.27A/2016 has been passed after due appreciation of facts and law, and the same suffers from no perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference under the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. It is submitted that the defendants had moved an application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Order IX Rule 9 CPC, contending that the present suit was barred by law in view of the dismissal of an earlier suit, Civil Suit No.2A/2013, allegedly filed on the same cause of action. It is submitted that the defendants had moved an application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Order IX Rule 9 CPC, contending that the present suit was barred by law in view of the dismissal of an earlier suit, Civil Suit No.2A/2013, allegedly filed on the same cause of action. The learned Trial Court, after considering the submissions of both sides, rejected the said application on the ground that Civil Suit No.2A/2013 had already stood dismissed, the present suit (filed on 13.03.2016) was being prosecuted in accordance with the directions of this Court and the objections raised by the defendants involved mixed questions of fact and law which could be determined only upon trial. This finding is entirely justified in law and does not call for interference. At the outset, it is emphasized that the entire foundation of the defendants’ case rests upon an erroneous assumption that both the suits, C.S. No.2A/2013 and C.S. No.27A/2016, arise from the same cause of action and concern the same property. However, the applicants have failed to substantiate this crucial assertion by producing before this Court a copy of the plaint of Civil Suit No.27A/2016. In the absence of such material, no legitimate comparison can be drawn between the two suits, and the plea of statutory bar under Order IX Rule 9 CPC must necessarily fail. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 submits that the reliefs claimed in the two suits are distinct. In Civil Suit No.2A/2013, the plaintiff sought a declaration of co-ownership in respect of two-thirds share of the residential property situated at Sheet No.90, Plot No.36, Jagdalpur, jointly with his brothers, and the said suit was filed primarily challenging an order dated 23.02.1999 passed by the Assistant Superintendent, Land Records, Jagdalpur. The cause of action therein thus arose from the alleged illegality in the mutation proceedings and the attempted construction by certain defendants over the said land. In contrast, the present Civil Suit No.27A/2016 has been filed on an entirely different factual basis and in respect of a different share of the same ancestral property. The plaintiff in the present suit seeks a declaration of ownership over the one-third share of the same property which, under a registered Will executed by late Govind Rath, devolved upon the mother of plaintiff, Smt. Gauribai. The plaintiff in the present suit seeks a declaration of ownership over the one-third share of the same property which, under a registered Will executed by late Govind Rath, devolved upon the mother of plaintiff, Smt. Gauribai. The cause of action, therefore, arose only when the defendants, brothers of the plaintiff, refused to acknowledge the co-ownership rights of plaintiff over this one-third portion derived through the Will. The parties to the two suits are also not identical: while Civil Suit No.2A/2013 involved 21 defendants, the present Civil Suit No.27A/2016 involves only seven defendants, making it evident that both the composition of parties and the factual basis differ materially. Hence, the alleged similarity of cause of action and identity of parties, as asserted by the applicants, is wholly misconceived. The bar under Order IX Rule 9 CPC applies only when a subsequent suit is filed on the same cause of action between the same parties and in respect of the same subject matter. Since none of these essential elements are satisfied in the present case, the learned Trial Court rightly held that the question raised by the applicants cannot be decided as a pure question of law and would necessarily require a detailed factual examination at trial. 8. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 that the applicants have suppressed material facts from this Court. It is pertinent to note that the issue of res judicata and maintainability had already been raised by the defendants at an earlier stage in the same proceedings. On that occasion, the learned Trial Court had dismissed the suit under Order VII Rule 11 CPC vide order dated 12.10.2017 on the same grounds. The plaintiff preferred Civil Appeal No.10/2017, which was allowed by the learned 3 rd Additional District Judge, Jagdalpur vide judgment dated 30.10.2019, setting aside the order passed by Trial Court and directing that an issue be framed to determine the question of res judicata in due course of trial. The present application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Order IX Rule 9 CPC, therefore, amounts to a re-litigation of an already decided issue and is an abuse of the process of Court. The defendants have conveniently failed to disclose this vital fact while filing the present revision. The present application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Order IX Rule 9 CPC, therefore, amounts to a re-litigation of an already decided issue and is an abuse of the process of Court. The defendants have conveniently failed to disclose this vital fact while filing the present revision. The learned Trial Court has rightly observed that the objections raised by the applicants relate to a mixed question of fact and law, which cannot be conclusively determined without examining evidence. The law is well settled that a plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC unless the bar of law is evident on the face of the plaint itself. Where, as in the present case, the question involves examination of facts, such as comparison of properties, causes of action, and identity of parties, the plaint cannot be summarily rejected. Further, it is well established that dismissal of an earlier suit for want of prosecution does not constitute a decision on merits and therefore does not operate as res judicata nor does it attract the bar under Order IX Rule 9 CPC unless all pre-conditions of identity of cause and parties are met. Reliance in this regard is placed on the decision of this Court in Dharmendra Jain v. Madhu Nahata (Jain) , reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 13916 , wherein the Division Bench, relying on the Constitution Bench judgment in Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar ( AIR 1966 SC 1332 ) , held that dismissal of a former suit for default of appearance or want of prosecution does not amount to a final adjudication on merits and, therefore, cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. National Construction Co. , reported in (1996) 1 SCC 735 , and this Court in Rajesh v. Goparam , reported in 2010 SCC OnLine Chh 153 , have reiterated that dismissal of a suit on technical grounds does not preclude institution of a fresh suit based on a distinct or continuing cause of action. , reported in (1996) 1 SCC 735 , and this Court in Rajesh v. Goparam , reported in 2010 SCC OnLine Chh 153 , have reiterated that dismissal of a suit on technical grounds does not preclude institution of a fresh suit based on a distinct or continuing cause of action. Furthermore, in Prem Kishor v. Brahm Prakash , reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 356 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that an order merely closing or striking off proceedings does not amount to dismissal for default under Order IX Rule 8 or a decision on merits under Order XVII Rule 3, and therefore does not create a legal bar to a fresh action. In addition, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharampal v. Punjab Wakf Board , reported in (2018) 11 SCC 449 , has categorically held that where the parties in the subsequent suit are not the same as those in the earlier one, the bar under Order IX Rule 9 CPC cannot apply. The same principle directly applies in the instant case, since the parties, causes of action, and nature of reliefs are distinct in both suits. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the contention of the applicants that the present suit is barred under Order IX Rule 9 CPC is wholly untenable. The learned Trial Court has committed no error of jurisdiction in rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Rather, the Trial Court has rightly exercised its discretion to allow the matter to proceed to trial so that the real issues between the parties may be adjudicated on evidence. The impugned order, therefore, subserves the ends of justice and does not warrant any interference by this Court. Hence, the present revision petition is a frivolous attempt to delay the proceedings in the main suit and to deprive the plaintiff of his lawful rights over the ancestral property devolved upon him by virtue of a valid testamentary instrument. The revision lacks any merit either on facts or on law, and if entertained, would only result in prolonging the litigation unnecessarily. Accordingly, the respondent prays that this Court may be pleased to uphold the impugned order dated 05.04.2024, dismiss the present revision petition with exemplary costs, and permit the civil suit to proceed to its logical conclusion in the interest of justice, equity, and fair play. 9. Accordingly, the respondent prays that this Court may be pleased to uphold the impugned order dated 05.04.2024, dismiss the present revision petition with exemplary costs, and permit the civil suit to proceed to its logical conclusion in the interest of justice, equity, and fair play. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the documents annexed along with the revision. 10. The relevant facts, as emerge from the pleadings, are that the respondent/plaintiff instituted Civil Suit No.27A/2016 seeking declaration of title, possession, and permanent injunction in respect of certain immovable properties situated at Jagdalpur, Village Bade Marenga, Village Palli, and Village Chhote Devda. It was pleaded that the properties originally belonged to late Govind Rath, who passed away on 07.05.1976, leaving behind his legal heirs, including the present plaintiff and the defendants. It is not in dispute that defendant No. 7 had earlier filed Civil Suit No.3A/2013 seeking similar reliefs against the present plaintiff and defendant No.1, which was amicably settled through compromise on 20.12.2013. Thereafter, the present plaintiff and defendant No.1 jointly filed another suit, Civil Suit No.2A/2013, seeking declaration of title and for setting aside the mutation order dated 23.02.1999 passed by the Assistant Superintendent, Land Records, Jagdalpur. However, owing to non- appearance of the plaintiff on 15.01.2014, the said suit came to be dismissed for want of prosecution. According to the applicants, the dismissal of the earlier suit, being without liberty to file afresh, bars the present suit under Order IX Rule 9 CPC. Conversely, the plaintiff asserts that the cause of action in both suits is distinct and that the earlier dismissal does not preclude institution of the present proceedings. 11. During the pendency of Civil Suit No.27A/2016, the defendants filed successive applications under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, contending that the plaint was barred under Order IX Rule 9 CPC in view of the dismissal of the earlier suit. The first such application was allowed by the Trial Court on 12.10.2017; however, the plaintiff preferred Civil Appeal No.10/2017, which was allowed by the 3 rd Additional District Judge, Jagdalpur, vide judgment dated 30.10.2019, setting aside the order and directing that the issue of maintainability be decided at trial. Subsequently, the Trial Court again dismissed the defendants’ second application under Order VII Rule 11 on 22.06.2021, holding that the matter required adjudication on evidence. Subsequently, the Trial Court again dismissed the defendants’ second application under Order VII Rule 11 on 22.06.2021, holding that the matter required adjudication on evidence. Against this, the defendants preferred Civil Revision No.24/2022 before this Court, which was disposed of on 28.08.2023, directing the parties to appear before the Trial Court in the earlier Civil Suit No.2A/2013, and further directing that the Trial Court pass appropriate orders after hearing both sides. Thereafter, on 30.10.2023, the earlier suit (C.S. No.2A/2013) was formally recorded as dismissed for want of prosecution. Armed with this order, the defendants filed a fresh application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Order IX Rule 9 CPC in the present suit, which came to be rejected by the Trial Court on 05.04.2024. 12. Upon hearing both sides and perusing the record, the questions arise for consideration are whether the subsequent suit (C.S. No.27A/2016) is barred under Order IX Rule 9 CPC in view of the dismissal of the earlier suit (C.S. No.2A/2013) and whether the learned Trial Court committed any jurisdictional error or material irregularity in rejecting the defendants’ application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC? 13. At the outset, this Court deems it appropriate to delineate the legal ambit of Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which operates as a statutory bar against the institution of a fresh suit where a former suit between the same parties has been dismissed under Rule 8 of Order IX, that is, when the plaintiff fails to appear on the date fixed for hearing after the defendant has entered appearance. For this bar to operate, three essential conditions must co-exist: (i) the parties to the subsequent suit must be the same as those in the earlier one, or at least claim under the same title; (ii) the earlier suit must have been dismissed for default after appearance of the defendant, i.e., under Rule 8 and not under Rules 2 or 3 of Order IX; and (iii) the subsequent suit must be based upon the same cause of action and relate to the same subject-matter. 14. Unless these foundational conditions are fulfilled, the prohibition under Rule 9 does not become operative. In the present case, the record reveals that the former suit, Civil Suit No. 2A/2013, was dismissed for want of prosecution owing to the non-appearance of the plaintiff on 15.01.2014. 14. Unless these foundational conditions are fulfilled, the prohibition under Rule 9 does not become operative. In the present case, the record reveals that the former suit, Civil Suit No. 2A/2013, was dismissed for want of prosecution owing to the non-appearance of the plaintiff on 15.01.2014. The order of dismissal itself does not record that the defendants were present or that the dismissal occurred after contest under Rule 8. Furthermore, the composition of the parties, the nature of relief claimed, and the underlying cause of action in the present Civil Suit No. 27A/2016 appear to differ materially. Hence, the bar contemplated under Order IX Rule 9 CPC cannot be invoked merely on the ground that both suits involve certain overlapping properties descended from a common ancestor. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Amruddin Ansari (Dead) through LRs v. Afajal Ali & Ors ., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 912 , has recently reaffirmed that “an order of dismissal of a suit or application in default under Order IX Rules 2 or 3 of CPC is neither an adjudication nor a decree; such an order does not terminate the rights of the parties on merits and cannot, therefore, operate as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. The Court further held that the bar under Rule 9 is strictly confined to dismissals under Rule 8 and cannot be extended by analogy to dismissals for non-prosecution or procedural defaults unaccompanied by contest. This authoritative pronouncement settles the legal position beyond cavil that every dismissal for default does not attract the embargo of Rule 9. Relevant paragraphs are quoted below : “ 17 . This authoritative pronouncement settles the legal position beyond cavil that every dismissal for default does not attract the embargo of Rule 9. Relevant paragraphs are quoted below : “ 17 . From bare reading of the aforesaid two provisions i.e. Rule 4 and Rule 9 of Order IX of the CPC, it is manifestly clear that under Rule 4 of Order IX of the CPC, the legislature in express term has not precluded the plaintiff from filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action in the event suit is dismissed under Rule 2 or Rule 3 of Order IX of the CPC, whereas Rule 9 of Order IX debars the plaintiff from filing a fresh suit in a case where the suit is dismissed under Rule 8 of Order IX of the CPC The only remedy provided for such dismissal is to file an application under Rule 9 of Order IX of the CPC for restoration of suit. xxx xxx xxx 26. From a plain reading of the term “decree”, it is manifestly clear that to constitute a decree, there must be a formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the right of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit, but the decree shall not include any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order or any order of dismissal for default. It is, therefore, evidently clear that a dismissal of a suit or application for default particularly under Rule 2 or Rule 3 of Order IX of the CPC is not the formal expression of an adjudication upon any right claimed or the defence set up in a suit. An order of dismissal of a suit or application in default is also not appealable order as provided under Order XLIII of the CPC If we read Order XLIII CPC, we will find that orders passed under Order IX, Rule 9 of the CPC or Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC are made appealable, but order passed under Order IX Rule 4 of the CPC is not appealable. It is, therefore, clear that an order of dismissal of a suit or application in default under Rule 2 or Rule 3 of Order IX of the CPC is neither an adjudication or a decree nor it is an appealable order. It is, therefore, clear that an order of dismissal of a suit or application in default under Rule 2 or Rule 3 of Order IX of the CPC is neither an adjudication or a decree nor it is an appealable order. If that is so, such order of dismissal of a suit under Rule 2 or Rule 3 of Order IX of the CPC does not fulfill the requirement of the term “judgment” or “decree”, inasmuch as there is no adjudication. In our considered opinion, therefore, if a fresh suit is filed, then such an order of dismissal cannot and shall not operate a res judicata. 16. The same principle was echoed earlier in Dharampal v. Punjab Wakf Board , reported in (2018) 11 SCC 449 , where the Supreme Court held that where the parties or the subject matter in the two suits are not identical, the bar under Order IX Rule 9 has no application. Relevant paragraph is quoted below : “ 26 . Apart from what is held above, even otherwise, in our opinion, the present suit could be filed notwithstanding dismissal of the earlier suit because the earlier suit was filed only against one defendant i.e. father of Defendant 1 on a cause of action which accrued against one defendant at that time whereas the present suit was filed against three defendants out of which two defendants were not parties to the earlier suit. So the parties and even part of the cause of action qua defendants were different in both the suits. It is for all these reasons, so far as the first submission of the learned counsel is concerned, it has no merit and hence rejected.” 17. Similarly, in the matter of Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar , reported in AIR 1966 SC 1332 , the Constitution Bench observed that only a decision which finally adjudicates upon the rights of parties can operate as res judicata or create a legal bar to subsequent litigation. Relevant paragraph is quoted below : “14. …... Similarly, in the matter of Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar , reported in AIR 1966 SC 1332 , the Constitution Bench observed that only a decision which finally adjudicates upon the rights of parties can operate as res judicata or create a legal bar to subsequent litigation. Relevant paragraph is quoted below : “14. …... Where, for example, the former suit was dismissed by the trial court for want of jurisdiction, or for default of plaintiff's appearance, or on the ground of non-joinder of parties or misjoinder of parties or multifariousness, or on the ground that the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the plaintiff to produce probate or letters of administration or succession certificate when the same is required by law to entitle the plaintiff to a decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or on the ground of improper valuation or for failure to pay additional court fee on a plaint which was undervalued or for want of cause of action or on the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any), the decision not being on the merits would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit. ……...” 18. Applying these principles to the case at hand, this Court finds that the earlier dismissal of Civil Suit No. 2A/2013 did not amount to a final adjudication of rights, nor were all preconditions of identity of parties and cause of action fulfilled; consequently, the statutory bar pleaded by the applicants cannot be sustained. It is a settled proposition of law that a dismissal of a suit for default of appearance or for want of prosecution does not constitute an adjudication on merits of the dispute between the parties. Such an order is merely procedural and cannot extinguish substantive rights of the plaintiff unless accompanied by a judicial determination of the issues. 19. The Supreme Court in Amruddin Ansari (supra) lucidly explained the legal nature of such an order as an order of dismissal of a suit in default of appearance of the plaintiff does not amount to a ‘decree’ within the meaning of Section 2(2) CPC, for there is no adjudication of the rights of parties. 19. The Supreme Court in Amruddin Ansari (supra) lucidly explained the legal nature of such an order as an order of dismissal of a suit in default of appearance of the plaintiff does not amount to a ‘decree’ within the meaning of Section 2(2) CPC, for there is no adjudication of the rights of parties. Consequently, such dismissal cannot operate as res judicata, nor can it preclude the plaintiff from seeking redress in a subsequent proceeding founded on the same or a continuing cause of action. This exposition was reiterated by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. National Construction Co. , reported in (1996) 1 SCC 735 , where it was held that a technical dismissal, whether for want of prosecution or procedural lapse, cannot be construed as a decision on merits and therefore does not prevent a party from instituting a fresh suit, provided the cause of action continues to subsist. Relevant paragraph is quoted below : “ 17 . In Sidramappa v. Rajashetty [ (1970) 1 SCC 186 : AIR 1970 SC 1089 ] (SCC at p. 189 : AIR at pp. 1060-61) this Court held that where the cause of action on the basis of which the previous suit was brought, does not form the foundation of the subsequent suit, and in the earlier suit, the plaintiff could not have claimed the relief which he sought in the subsequent suit, the plaintiff's subsequent suit is not barred by Order 2 Rule 2. Applying this ruling to the facts of the present case, it is clear that, in the first suit, the appellants could only claim reliefs in respect of Rs 14,12,836 which was the maximum amount stipulated in the performance guarantee. They could not have claimed reliefs of Rs 1,13,27,298.16 which they did in the second suit on the basis of the contract relating to the work to be performed by the contractor.” 20. Likewise, in Prem Kishor v. Brahm Prakash , reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 356 , the Supreme Court clarified that an order “striking off” or “closing” a matter does not partake the character of a decree under Section 2(2) CPC and therefore cannot bar subsequent proceedings. It was held as under : “55. Likewise, in Prem Kishor v. Brahm Prakash , reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 356 , the Supreme Court clarified that an order “striking off” or “closing” a matter does not partake the character of a decree under Section 2(2) CPC and therefore cannot bar subsequent proceedings. It was held as under : “55. The moot question is whether the eviction petition was dismissed for default which dismissal would certainly bar a fresh suit if instituted on the same cause of action [Ed. : as per Order 9 Rule 9CPC.] . The words, which we have quoted above, certainly do not mean dismissal either on merits or on default. It was argued before us that the order should only be taken to mean what an order under Order 17 can possibly be and nothing else. We are not impressed by such submission. The order did not purport to be one of dismissal for default or on merits and it cannot be taken to mean other than what it purported to be. It is in ordinary phraseology; not legal phraseology and it cannot be divested of its ordinary meaning. Its ordinary meaning is that the proceeding was closed and the suit would not count as a pending one. The later description would be redundant if the order was one of final disposal of the suit. The order did not purport to be a final disposal of the suit. It merely stopped the proceedings. It did nothing more. This is not final decision of the suit within the meaning of Order 9 Rule 8 and Order 17 Rule 3, respectively, of the CPC.” 21. In the present case, the dismissal of the earlier suit, Civil Suit No. 2A/2013, was admittedly not on merits but on account of the non- appearance of plaintiff. The said order does not record any adjudication of title, possession, or injunction, nor was any issue framed or evidence led. The absence of adjudication, coupled with the fact that the present suit arises out of alleged subsequent acts of interference and fresh violations by the defendants, clearly distinguishes it from the earlier proceeding. Therefore, the learned Trial Court rightly concluded that the bar under Order IX Rule 9 cannot be mechanically applied in the absence of a final determination of rights. 22. Therefore, the learned Trial Court rightly concluded that the bar under Order IX Rule 9 cannot be mechanically applied in the absence of a final determination of rights. 22. It is pertinent to emphasise that the Code itself makes a clear distinction between dismissals falling under Rules 2 or 3 of Order IX and those under Rule 8. While Rule 4 permits a plaintiff, whose suit has been dismissed under Rules 2 or 3 (for non-service of summons or failure to pay process fee), to either apply for restoration or to institute a fresh suit, Rule 9 expressly prohibits a fresh suit when the earlier dismissal occurs under Rule 8 after the defendant has appeared. 23. The Supreme Court in Amruddin Ansari (supra) has drawn attention to this distinction, observing that the scheme of Order IX contemplates varying consequences depending on the stage and reason for dismissal; hence, the bar under Rule 9 cannot be invoked for every procedural default. 24. In the present matter, there exists ambiguity as to whether the dismissal of Civil Suit No. 2A/2013 was indeed under Rule 8 or whether it was merely a mechanical order of closure for non-appearance under Rules 2 or 3. Such a determination requires a factual inquiry into the circumstances leading to the dismissal, whether the defendants were on record, whether any effective hearing took place, and whether the dismissal was voluntary or due to a mutual understanding between the parties following the earlier compromise in Civil Suit No. 3A/2013. These issues cannot be conclusively resolved at the threshold without evidence. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the power under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC to reject a plaint on the ground of statutory bar must be exercised only when the bar is apparent on the face of the plaint and not where it depends upon disputed facts or requires extrinsic evidence. 25. In Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association , reported in (2005) 7 SCC 510 , the Supreme Court categorically held that for the purpose of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11, the averments in the plaint alone are to be looked into; the defence or other external material cannot be imported to defeat the claim at the inception.” “ 19 . There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction of words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities. xxx xxx xxx 22. [Ed. : Para 22 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./92/2005 dated 22-9-2005.] . There is distinction between “material facts” and “particulars”. The words “material facts” show that the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action must be stated. Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement or plaint becomes bad. The distinction which has been made between “material facts” and “particulars” was brought by Scott, L.J. in Bruce v. Odhams Press Ltd. [(1936) 1 KB 697 : (1936) 1 All ER 287 (CA)].” 26. This principle has been reiterated in Kamala v. K.T. Eshwara Sa reported in (2008) 12 SCC 66 1, where it was observed that when mixed questions of law and fact arise, rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC is impermissible. “21. Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code has limited application. It must be shown that the suit is barred under any law. Such a conclusion must be drawn from the averments made in the plaint. Different clauses in Order 7 Rule 11, in our opinion, should not be mixed up. Whereas in a given case, an application for rejection of the plaint may be filed on more than one ground specified in various sub-clauses thereof, a clear finding to that effect must be arrived at. Different clauses in Order 7 Rule 11, in our opinion, should not be mixed up. Whereas in a given case, an application for rejection of the plaint may be filed on more than one ground specified in various sub-clauses thereof, a clear finding to that effect must be arrived at. What would be relevant for invoking clause (d) of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code are the averments made in the plaint. For that purpose, there cannot be any addition or subtraction. Absence of jurisdiction on the part of a court can be invoked at different stages and under different provisions of the Code. Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is one, Order 14 Rule 2 is another. 22. For the purpose of invoking Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code, no amount of evidence can be looked into. The issues on merit of the matter which may arise between the parties would not be within the realm of the court at that stage. All issues shall not be the subject-matter of an order under the said provision. 23. The principles of res judicata, when attracted, would bar another suit in view of Section 12 of the Code. The question involving a mixed question of law and fact which may require not only examination of the plaint but also other evidence and the order passed in the earlier suit may be taken up either as a preliminary issue or at the final hearing, but, the said question cannot be determined at that stage.” 27. Applying the same reasoning, this Court finds that the Trial Court was justified in treating the issue raised by the applicants as involving a mixed question of fact and law and declining to summarily reject the plaint. The question whether the present suit is based on an identical cause of action and whether the earlier dismissal attracts the bar of Rule 9 can only be answered after examining the pleadings and evidence at trial. Therefore, the impugned order suffers from no illegality or perversity warranting interference in revision. The Trial Court has rightly allowed the matter to proceed so that the substantive rights of the parties can be determined upon full consideration of evidence rather than being stifled at a preliminary stage. 28. Accordingly, this Civil Revision is dismissed.