JUDGMENT : AMITENDRA KISHORE PRASAD, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed assailing the impugned order dated 11.09.2018 (Annexure P/1) whereby respondent No. 1 has summarily rejected the representation filed by petitioner without due application of mind, merely stating that the claim of petitioner had already been decided by a speaking order dated 28.03.2017. While doing so, respondent No. 1 has failed to consider the subsequent facts and documents submitted by the petitioner. The impugned order is non-speaking in nature and does not reflect any consideration of the grounds raised in the representation filed by petitioner, particularly with respect to the claim of petitioner for appropriate placement in the gradation list. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has been constrained to approach this Court by way of the present writ petition seeking following reliefs : “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set-aside/quash the impugned order dated 11.09.2018 and further be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to place the petitioner over and above respondent no. 3 in the gradation list, with all consequential benefits, in accordance with law. 10.2 That, any other relief/order which may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including award of the costs of the petition may be given.” 2. Facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner was duly selected through a competitive examination conducted by the Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission (MPPSC). In the result initially declared on 04.11.1993, the name of the petitioner was placed at serial number 5 in the waiting list. It is pertinent to mention that respondent No. 3 belongs to the Scheduled Tribe category and his name appeared at serial number 27 in the same list. It is significant to note that candidates up to serial number 25 in the said list belonged to the general category, while candidates from serial number 26 onwards belonged to reserved categories. Due to the non-joining of one candidate from the general category and for reasons best known to the Department, the petitioner was issued a formal order of appointment on 03.08.1995, enabling him to join the post. The petitioner subsequently became aware, upon receiving a copy of the gradation list for the period from 01.04.2009 to 31.03.2010, that his name had been placed below that of respondent No. 3. The petitioner subsequently became aware, upon receiving a copy of the gradation list for the period from 01.04.2009 to 31.03.2010, that his name had been placed below that of respondent No. 3. Being aggrieved, the petitioner promptly submitted a representation dated 08.04.2011, seeking rectification of his position in the gradation list. Upon perusal of the grievance raised by the petitioner, the concerned department, on 23.06.2011, forwarded the objection raised by the petitioner to the Government of Madhya Pradesh, specifically requesting that the seniority of the petitioner be determined in accordance with the law, particularly in light of the fact that the petitioner was selected under the general category, and as per settled law, a general category candidate with higher merit is entitled to seniority above a reserved category candidate. Despite the above, no substantive action was taken on the representation filed by the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner again submitted a fresh representation on 05.10.2011, reiterating his claim for placement above respondent No. 3. Thereafter, a formal reminder was issued to the State Government on 24.10.2011. In February 2012, the Director General of Police rejected the representation filed by petitioner on the specious ground that the merit position and score of the petitioner were not annexed with the representation, and thus no material was available to determine whether the petitioner had secured more marks than Shambhu Lal Nayak, who was placed just above respondent No. 3 in the gradation list. Consequently, the claim of petitioner for seniority above respondent No. 3 was denied. It is pertinent to state that Shambhu Lal Nayak was later subjected to a departmental inquiry, as a result of which he was awarded the punishment of demotion in rank. Thereafter, respondent No. 3 came to be placed in the position previously occupied by Shambhu Lal Nayak in the gradation list. In light of the earlier denial of his claim on the ground of lack of documentary evidence, the petitioner submitted an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005, seeking disclosure of the marks obtained by him and by other candidates in the said examination conducted in 1993. Pursuant to the RTI application, the concerned authority furnished information indicating that the petitioner had secured 1278 marks, while respondent No. 3 had obtained only 1091 marks, thus clearly establishing the superior merit position of petitioner. Pursuant to the RTI application, the concerned authority furnished information indicating that the petitioner had secured 1278 marks, while respondent No. 3 had obtained only 1091 marks, thus clearly establishing the superior merit position of petitioner. Upon receiving the aforesaid information, the petitioner once again submitted detailed representations dated 21.11.2014 and 19.06.2015, asserting his rightful claim for placement above respondent No. 3 in the gradation list. However, no action was taken by the concerned authorities in response to these representations. In view of the continued inaction on the part of the respondents, the petitioner was constrained to approach this Court by filing Writ Petition (S) No. 4203/2016, seeking redressal of his grievance. During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, the representation submitted by the petitioner was finally decided by respondent No. 2 vide order dated 28.03.2017. However, the said order once again rejected the claim of petitioner, erroneously stating that the petitioner had been selected from the supplementary list while respondent No. 3 had been selected from the main list, and therefore the petitioner could not be granted seniority above respondent No. 3. When the writ petition came up for hearing on 15.06.2017, this Court took note of the order dated 28.03.2017 and was pleased to dismiss the petition as infructuous, while granting liberty to the petitioner to challenge the subsequent order. In furtherance of the liberty so granted, the petitioner submitted a fresh and detailed representation before respondent No. 1, pointing out that seniority ought to be determined based on merit and not the classification of the selection list, and reiterating that the petitioner, having secured higher marks than respondent No. 3, was legally entitled to be placed above him in the gradation list. To the utter shock and dismay, respondent No. 1 vide impugned order dated 11.09.2018, rejected the representation filed by petitioner in a wholly mechanical and perfunctory manner, stating that the issue had already been decided by a speaking order dated 28.03.2017. The impugned order is devoid of any independent reasoning or consideration of the subsequent facts, documents, or representations filed by the petitioner, including the documentary proof of higher marks. The impugned order is thus a non-speaking order and fails to meet the minimum standards of administrative fairness. 3. The impugned order is devoid of any independent reasoning or consideration of the subsequent facts, documents, or representations filed by the petitioner, including the documentary proof of higher marks. The impugned order is thus a non-speaking order and fails to meet the minimum standards of administrative fairness. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned action of the respondents, in refusing to properly place the petitioner above respondent No. 3 in the gradation list, despite clear evidence of superior merit, is arbitrary, illegal, discriminatory, and suffers from non-application of mind. The rejection of the claim of petitioner by a non-speaking order dated 11.09.2018, merely referring to an earlier rejection dated 28.03.2017, reveals complete lack of reasoning and is thus violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is settled law that arbitrary state action is antithetical to the guarantees of equality. The order under challenge is devoid of any analysis of the relevant facts or application of the governing service rules, specifically Rule 12(1)(a) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961 (hereinafter "the 1961 Rules"), which explicitly mandates that seniority of direct recruits shall be determined on the basis of the order of merit in which they are recommended, irrespective of the date of joining. The petitioner was selected through the same examination conducted by the MPPSC in 1992, and he scored 1278 marks, while private respondent No. 3, belonging to a reserved category, scored only 1091 marks. The petitioner, though appointed from the wait-list in the unreserved category, is still a direct recruit as per law, and his placement in the merit list, being higher, entitles him to seniority over a candidate placed below in marks, irrespective of main list or supplementary list. Rule 12(1)(a) of the 1961 Rules is explicit in that seniority is to be determined based solely on the order of merit in which candidates are recommended. There is no distinction made therein between main list and wait-list candidates, provided that both were recommended through the same examination, as is the case herein. The respondents' act of giving precedence to administrative categorisation over statutory merit norms is unsustainable in law. The very concept of a wait-list is an administrative mechanism to fill vacancies due to non-joining of main list candidates. The respondents' act of giving precedence to administrative categorisation over statutory merit norms is unsustainable in law. The very concept of a wait-list is an administrative mechanism to fill vacancies due to non-joining of main list candidates. However, once a candidate from the wait- list is appointed, and the marks of all candidates are available, then seniority must follow the rule of merit. Moreover, the State of Madhya Pradesh and the State of Chhattisgarh, through their respective General Administration Department orders have affirmed the correct interpretation of Rule 12(1)(a), confirming that a candidate from the wait-list, if he has higher marks, should be placed above candidates with lower marks from the main list. This interpretation by the competent State authorities, in conformity with the rule and settled law, leaves no scope for contrary administrative decisions. The petitioner was first made aware of his incorrect placement in the gradation list only in 2009. Thereafter, he immediately raised a representation in 2011. Upon denial due to lack of evidence of marks, the petitioner obtained relevant documents through RTI in 2012 which for the first time clearly established that he had secured higher marks than private respondent. He filed fresh representations in 2014 and 2015, all of which culminated in the impugned rejection dated 11.09.2018. Every gradation list which wrongly places the petitioner below private respondent No. 3 continues to perpetuate an illegality and causes recurring prejudice to the petitioner. The illegality is not cured by the mere passage of time. Promotions, pay fixation, and career advancement have all been adversely affected. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of R. Ranjith Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu , 2025 SCC Online SC 1009 has unequivocally held that seniority must be fixed solely on the basis of marks obtained in the qualifying examination, and that any deviation from this norm is violative of Articles 14 and 16. 4. It is further submitted by learned counsel for petitioner that seniority in public service cannot be determined arbitrarily or based on administrative expediency when a statutory provision clearly prescribes merit as the sole criterion. Further, under Section 69 of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 1999, the conditions of service applicable prior to the appointed day (i.e., prior to state bifurcation) cannot be altered to the disadvantage of any employee without the prior approval of the Central Government. Further, under Section 69 of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 1999, the conditions of service applicable prior to the appointed day (i.e., prior to state bifurcation) cannot be altered to the disadvantage of any employee without the prior approval of the Central Government. In the instant case, any departure from Rule 12(1) (a) to the prejudice of the petitioner is directly in violation of this statutory protection. The petitioner further submits that he is entitled to all consequential benefits including seniority, pay fixation, promotion, and all service-related benefits from the date his seniority would have been fixed had the rules been correctly applied. This is a clear case where the statutory rights of petitioner have been overridden by an arbitrary and mechanically passed order. When the rule is clear, and the facts undisputed, particularly the higher merit of petitioner, there is no justification for placing him below private respondent No. 3. In view of the foregoing submission, it is prayed that the impugned order dated 11.09.2018, being non-speaking, irrational, arbitrary, and illegal, is liable to be set aside by this Court. The petitioner is entitled to be placed above private respondent No. 3 in the gradation list based on his superior merit in the qualifying examination. 5. Learned State counsel opposes the submission made by learned counsel for petitioner and would submit that the instant writ petition, as framed and filed by the petitioner, is devoid of substance and merit, and is therefore liable to be dismissed in limine. The contention of the petitioner that he had secured higher marks than respondent No. 3 and hence ought to have been placed above him in the seniority/gradation list is wholly misconceived, baseless and untenable in law. The said claim fails to consider the legal and factual position governing seniority under the relevant service rules. It is further submitted that respondent No. 3 belongs to the Scheduled Tribe category and was appointed through the main select list, whereas the petitioner was appointed from the waiting list in the General category. As per the settled position of law and the applicable rules, namely Rule 12(1)(a) of the Rules, 1961, the seniority of directly appointed candidates is to be determined based on the order of merit in which they are recommended for appointment, irrespective of the date of their joining. As per the settled position of law and the applicable rules, namely Rule 12(1)(a) of the Rules, 1961, the seniority of directly appointed candidates is to be determined based on the order of merit in which they are recommended for appointment, irrespective of the date of their joining. Furthermore, it is categorically provided that candidates selected in an earlier selection process shall rank senior to those selected subsequently. Therefore, the name of petitioner has rightly been placed below respondent No. 3 in the gradation list, and the same is in consonance with the statutory provisions. It is also submitted that the petitioner has approached this Court with inordinate delay. It is well settled in law that any claim relating to seniority must be raised within a reasonable time, typically within 3-4 years. In the present case, the petitioner has remained silent for over two decades despite the fact that respondent No. 3 has consistently been shown senior to him in all gradation lists issued since 1998. The petitioner did not challenge or raise any objection to these gradation lists at the appropriate time. In the gradation list as on 01/04/1998, the petitioner appears at Serial No. 142, and respondent No. 3 is at Serial No. 129. This list has attained finality and remained unchallenged for over 20 years. It is pertinent to submit that after the reorganization of the State and formation of Chhattisgarh, fresh gradation lists were issued from time to time. In each of these lists, the petitioner has continuously been placed below respondent No. 3. The petitioner has now sought to assail the settled seniority position after an inordinate and unexplained delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a catena of decisions, has consistently held that delay and laches are valid grounds for refusing relief in writ jurisdiction. The belated claim of petitioner is, therefore, hit by delay and laches and deserves to be rejected on this ground alone. It is further submitted that during the pendency of the instant writ petition, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 11/12/2020 before the Director General of Jail & Correctional Services, Raipur, seeking correction of his position in the gradation list and consequential promotion. After due consideration and examination of the service record of petitioner and prior representations, the said representation was rightly rejected by the competent authority vide communication dated 24/02/2021. After due consideration and examination of the service record of petitioner and prior representations, the said representation was rightly rejected by the competent authority vide communication dated 24/02/2021. It was clarified therein that the petitioner was appointed on 03/08/1995 from the wait-list of the General category in the State Services Examination, 1992, and as per the established norms, the seniority of wait-list candidates is to be fixed after all the candidates of the main list, including those from the reserved categories. The Jail Headquarters, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal, had earlier also rejected a similar claim of the petitioner vide letter dated 03/03/2017. In view of the foregoing submissions, it is reiterated that the seniority of the petitioner has been determined strictly in accordance with the relevant service rules and judicial principles. There is no illegality, arbitrariness, or violation of rights in the action of the respondents. The writ petition suffers from gross delay, is devoid of merit and substance, and deserves to be dismissed with costs. Hence, it is prayed that this Court may kindly be pleased to dismiss the writ petition in the interest of justice. 6. Learned counsel for respondent No. 3 supports the submission made by learned State counsel and would submit that the present writ petition is wholly misconceived, grossly delayed, and devoid of any merit. The petitioner challenges the action of the respondent department in placing him below respondent no. 3 in the seniority list for the post of Assistant Jailor. The said challenge, however, is fundamentally flawed in law and on facts, as the petitioner was appointed from the wait list after the respondent no. 3, who was selected in the main merit list and was appointed and joined the post much earlier. It is submitted that the Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission (MPPSC) issued an advertisement in the year 1992 for recruitment to 42 posts of Assistant Jailor, out of which 25 posts were for General category and 17 for Scheduled Tribe (ST) candidates. After conducting the recruitment process, a merit list dated 04.11.1993 was published, followed by a wait list of 10 candidates. Respondent No. 3 was placed at Sl. No. 27 in the merit list (in the ST category), while the petitioner was placed at Sl. No. 5 in the wait list. Respondent No. 3 was issued an appointment order dated 06.05.1994 and joined his duties at Central Jail, Raipur on 28.05.1994. Respondent No. 3 was placed at Sl. No. 27 in the merit list (in the ST category), while the petitioner was placed at Sl. No. 5 in the wait list. Respondent No. 3 was issued an appointment order dated 06.05.1994 and joined his duties at Central Jail, Raipur on 28.05.1994. On the other hand, due to the non-joining or resignation of one candidate, a vacancy arose in the General category, pursuant to which the petitioner was issued an appointment order only on 03.08.1995 and joined later on 30.08.1995. Both appointment orders clearly stipulated that seniority would be as per the merit list received from the Public Service Commission. As per Rule 12(1)(a) of the Rules, 1961, seniority of direct recruits is determined by the order of merit recommended by the PSC, irrespective of the date of joining. It further stipulates that candidates appointed pursuant to an earlier selection shall rank senior to those appointed from subsequent selections. Therefore, as respondent no. 3 was selected in the main list and appointed earlier, he is rightly placed senior to the petitioner, who was appointed later from the wait list. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner accepted his placement in the seniority list below respondent no. 3 and remained completely silent for over 15 years. It was only in 2011 that he first raised a grievance regarding his seniority, which was rightly rejected by the department vide order dated 23.02.2012, and reaffirmed again on 28.03.2017. The belated claim of petitioner is, thus, hit by the doctrine of laches and acquiescence. Respondent No. 3 was promoted to the post of Jailor on 06.08.2009, much prior to the petitioner raising any grievance. Therefore, any change in the seniority list post-promotion is legally impermissible, especially when the petitioner himself has since been promoted and has never challenged his own promotion or the process. The petitioner has selectively arrayed only respondent No. 3 as a contesting respondent while deliberately omitting 15 other ST candidates from the merit list published on 04.11.1993, against whom he essentially seeks seniority. This amounts to suppression of material facts and renders the petition liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties. The petitioner relies on a document obtained under RTI (Annexure P/10) purportedly showing interview marks. However, this document lacks any official seal, covering letter, or authentication from the RTI authority and appears to be self-fabricated. This amounts to suppression of material facts and renders the petition liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties. The petitioner relies on a document obtained under RTI (Annexure P/10) purportedly showing interview marks. However, this document lacks any official seal, covering letter, or authentication from the RTI authority and appears to be self-fabricated. The manipulation of official records cannot be the basis for seeking judicial relief. The issues raised in the present case have already been settled in Rajendra Kumar Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others (W.P. No. 12845/2022 decided on 18.12.2023) , wherein the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that wait-listed candidates cannot claim seniority over candidates selected in the main merit list, and cannot seek retrospective seniority from a date prior to their entry into service. The entire writ petition proceeds on the misplaced premise that the petitioner, appointed from the wait-list after more than a year of the original selection, is entitled to be placed above regularly selected candidates. This claim is contrary to service rules, settled law, and administrative practice. Moreover, the reliefs claimed, seeking to amend a 1993 merit list and revise seniority after over two decades, are wholly untenable. The competent authorities, after due consideration of the merit list and applicable rules, have repeatedly rejected the claims of petitioner. The gradation lists were never challenged by the petitioner until the filing of the present writ petition in 2018. It is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pawan Pratap Singh & Others v. Reevan Singh & Others, (2011) 3 SCC 267 and further reiterated in Amit Singh v. Ravindra Nath Pandey (C.A. No. 8324-8327/2022) that seniority cannot be claimed from a date when the candidate was not even borne in the cadre and retrospective seniority is permissible only in exceptional circumstances which are absent in the present case. In light of the above, it is submitted that the petitioner has failed to make out any case for interference by this Court. The challenge to seniority is hit by delay, barred by settled rules, and contrary to judicial precedent. Respondent No. 3 has been rightly placed in the seniority list as per law and has already been promoted in 2009. The challenge made by petitioner at this belated stage is not only without merit but also mischievous and deserves to be dismissed with costs. Respondent No. 3 has been rightly placed in the seniority list as per law and has already been promoted in 2009. The challenge made by petitioner at this belated stage is not only without merit but also mischievous and deserves to be dismissed with costs. It is, therefore, prayed that this Court may be pleased to dismiss the writ petition in limine, and hold that the seniority of respondent No. 3 is legal, valid, and in accordance with the rules. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the documents enclosed along with the petition. 8. The present writ petition has been filed assailing the order dated 11.09.2018 (Annexure P/1), whereby the representation of the petitioner seeking rectification of his position in the seniority/gradation list was rejected by respondent No. 1 on the ground that the issue stood concluded by an earlier speaking order dated 28.03.2017. The petitioner contends that the impugned order is non-speaking, arbitrary, and passed without due consideration of relevant documents and facts, including his superior marks in the selection process conducted by the Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission (MPPSC) in 1992. The primary relief sought is that the petitioner be placed above respondent No. 3 in the seniority list on account of his higher merit. 9. Upon perusal of the pleadings and documents placed on record, facts emerge as undisputed are that both the petitioner and respondent No. 3 were selected through the same selection process conducted by the MPPSC for the post of Assistant Jailer. Respondent No. 3, a Scheduled Tribe (ST) candidate, was selected from the main list under the reserved category and was appointed vide order dated 06.05.1994. The petitioner, a General category candidate, was placed at serial number 5 in the wait-list and was appointed later, vide order dated 03.08.1995, following the non-joining of another general category candidate. Respondent No. 3 secured 1091 marks and was placed at serial number 3 in the main ST list, while the petitioner secured 1278 marks, but was not in the main list due to the higher cut-off of the general category. The grievance regarding incorrect placement in the gradation list was first raised in 2011 and has continued through various representations and proceedings until the filing of the present petition in 2018. 10. The grievance regarding incorrect placement in the gradation list was first raised in 2011 and has continued through various representations and proceedings until the filing of the present petition in 2018. 10. The determination of seniority in the present case hinges on Rule 12(1)(a) of the Rules, 1961, which reads as under : "The seniority of a person directly appointed to a post according to rules shall be determined on the basis of the order of merit in which they are recommended for appointment irrespective of the date of joining. Person appointed as a result of an earlier selection shall be senior to those appointed as a result of a subsequent selection." 11. From the plain reading of the rule, it is clear that seniority is to be determined on the basis of the order of merit in the respective list, i.e., the main or wait list, through which a candidate is recommended for appointment. Importantly, the rule does not prescribe inter se comparison of merit between candidates selected under different categories (General/ST) or between those from the main list and the wait list unless they form part of a common list of equal consideration. The argument raised by petitioner that he had obtained higher marks than respondent No. 3 and is, therefore, entitled to seniority over him, overlooks a crucial legal distinction. While it is not in dispute that the petitioner obtained higher marks, it is equally admitted that he was placed in the wait list of the General category candidates, whereas respondent No. 3 was in the main list of the ST category candidates. Their selection was under distinct categories, with different merit thresholds. As such, the selection was not inter se but intra-category. Under the Rules of 1961, merit refers to the order of recommendation within the relevant category of selection. The recommendation from the wait list is not equivalent to that from the main list unless specifically stated by rule, circular, or binding authority. 12. The Supreme Court in Pawan Pratap Singh (supra) has held that retrospective seniority cannot be claimed by a candidate from a wait list, as they are not part of the original selection and are appointed only upon the occurrence of a vacancy. Relevant paragraph is quoted as under : “45. 12. The Supreme Court in Pawan Pratap Singh (supra) has held that retrospective seniority cannot be claimed by a candidate from a wait list, as they are not part of the original selection and are appointed only upon the occurrence of a vacancy. Relevant paragraph is quoted as under : “45. From the above, the legal position with regard to determination of seniority in service can be summarised as follows: (i) The effective date of selection has to be understood in the context of the service rules under which the appointment is made. It may mean the date on which the process of selection starts with the issuance of advertisement or the factum of preparation of the select list, as the case may be. (ii) Inter se seniority in a particular service has to be determined as per the service rules. The date of entry in a particular service or the date of substantive appointment is the safest criterion for fixing seniority inter se between one officer or the other or between one group of officers and the other recruited from different sources. Any departure therefrom in the statutory rules, executive instructions or otherwise must be consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (iii) Ordinarily, notional seniority may not be granted from the backdate and if it is done, it must be based on objective considerations and on a valid classification and must be traceable to the statutory rules. (iv) The seniority cannot be reckoned from the date of occurrence of the vacancy and cannot be given retrospectively unless it is so expressly provided by the relevant service rules. It is so because seniority cannot be given on retrospective basis when an employee has not even been borne in the cadre and by doing so it may adversely affect the employees who have been appointed validly in the meantime.” 13. It is further an admitted fact that the petitioner was appointed only on 03.08.1995, more than a year after respondent No. 3 was appointed on 06.05.1994. His name was not part of the main merit list and his appointment was conditional upon a vacancy arising due to non-joining by a main list candidate. This administrative contingency reinforces that the petitioner was not originally "recommended" in the sense intended under Rule 12(1) (a), but was only recommended later due to subsequent vacancy. His name was not part of the main merit list and his appointment was conditional upon a vacancy arising due to non-joining by a main list candidate. This administrative contingency reinforces that the petitioner was not originally "recommended" in the sense intended under Rule 12(1) (a), but was only recommended later due to subsequent vacancy. The attempt made by petitioner to claim seniority on the basis of higher marks fails to consider that the marks must be assessed within the framework of the respective category of candidate. The marks secured by a Scheduled Tribe candidate are not directly comparable to those secured by a General category candidate due to distinct reservation criteria, relaxed cut-offs, and category- wise merit determination. It is well settled that such cross- category comparisons for purposes of seniority are impermissible. 14. This Court also finds merit in the objection raised by the respondents regarding delay. The petitioner was appointed in 1995. The gradation list, reflecting respondent No. 3 as senior, was published as early as 1998. The petitioner first raised a representation only in 2011, nearly 16 years later, and filed the present writ petition only in 2018. By that time, respondent No. 3 had already earned promotions and served in higher posts. 15. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Amrit Lal Berry vs. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi & Others , (1975) 4 SCC 714 has held as under : “17. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has relied on Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India [ (1970) 1 SCC 84 : (1970) 2 SCR 697 ] where, because rights of persons who had benefited from allegedly illegal seniority rules for a long time would be disturbed, this Court dismissed a petition under Article 32 on the ground of inordinate delay in seeking relief. This Court said there (at p. 712): [SCC p. 97, paras 32, 33] “It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. We are not anxious to throw out petitions on this ground, but we must administer justice in accordance with law and principles of equity, justice and good conscience. We are not anxious to throw out petitions on this ground, but we must administer justice in accordance with law and principles of equity, justice and good conscience. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years.” 16. In the matter of Shiba Shankar Mohapatra & Ors. vs. State of Orrisa & Ors. , (2010) 12 SCC 471 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “ 18 . The question of entertaining the petition disputing the long-standing seniority filed at a belated stage is no more res integra. A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra [ (1974) 1 SCC 317 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 137] considered the effect of delay in challenging the promotion and seniority list and held that any claim for seniority at a belated stage should be rejected inasmuch as it seeks to disturb the vested rights of other persons regarding seniority, rank and promotion which have accrued to them during the intervening period. A party should approach the court just after accrual of the cause of complaint. While deciding the said case, this Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments, particularly in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [ (1969) 1 SCC 110 ] , wherein it has been observed that the principle on which the court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on the ground of laches or delay, is that the rights, which have accrued to others by reason of delay in filing the writ petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for delay. The Court further observed as under : (Tilokchand case [ (1969) 1 SCC 110 ] , SCC p. 115, para 7) “7. … The party claiming fundamental rights must move the Court before other rights come into existence. The action of courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person moving the Court.” 19 . … The party claiming fundamental rights must move the Court before other rights come into existence. The action of courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person moving the Court.” 19 . This Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar case [ (1974) 1 SCC 317 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 137] also placed reliance upon its earlier judgment of the Constitution Bench in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [ (1970) 1 SCC 84 ] , wherein it has been observed as under : (Rabindranath Bose case [ (1970) 1 SCC 84 ] , SCC p. 97, para 33) “33. … It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years.” 20 . In R.S. Makashi v. I.M. Menon [ (1982) 1 SCC 379 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 77] this Court considered all aspects of limitation, delay and laches in filing the writ petition in respect of inter se seniority of the employees. The Court referred to its earlier judgment in State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [ AIR 1964 SC 1006 ] , wherein it has been observed that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought, may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution can be measured. The Court observed as under : (R.S. Makashi case [ (1982) 1 SCC 379 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 77] , SCC pp. 398-400, paras 28 & 30) “28. … ‘33. … we must administer justice in accordance with law and principles of equity, justice and good conscience. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years. …’ [Ed. : As observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84 , p. 97, para 33.] *** 30. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years. …’ [Ed. : As observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84 , p. 97, para 33.] *** 30. … The petitioners have not furnished any valid explanation whatever for the inordinate delay on their part in approaching the court with the challenge against the seniority principles laid down in the Government Resolution of 1968. … We would accordingly hold that the challenge raised by the petitioners against the seniority principles laid down in the Government Resolution of 22- 3-1968 ought to have been rejected by the High Court on the ground of delay and laches and the writ petition insofar as it related to the prayer for quashing the said Government Resolution should have been dismissed.” 21 . The issue of challenging the seniority list, which continued to be in existence for a long time, was again considered by this Court in K.R. Mudgal v. R.P. Singh [ (1986) 4 SCC 531 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 6 : AIR 1986 SC 2086 ] . The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 532 & 536, paras 2 & 7) “2. … A government servant who is appointed to any post ordinarily should at least after a period of 3 or 4 years of his appointment be allowed to attend to the duties attached to his post peacefully and without any sense of insecurity. … *** 7. … Satisfactory service conditions postulate that there should be no sense of uncertainty amongst the government servants created by writ petitions filed after several years as in this case. It is essential that anyone who feels aggrieved by the seniority assigned to him should approach the court as early as possible as otherwise in addition to the creation of a sense of insecurity in the minds of the government servants there would also be administrative complications and difficulties. … In these circumstances we consider that the High Court was wrong in rejecting the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents to the writ petition on the ground of laches.” (Emphasis added) 22 . … In these circumstances we consider that the High Court was wrong in rejecting the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents to the writ petition on the ground of laches.” (Emphasis added) 22 . While deciding K.R. Mudgal case [ (1986) 4 SCC 531 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 6 : AIR 1986 SC 2086 ] , this Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Malcom Lawrence Cecil D'Souza v. Union of India [ (1976) 1 SCC 599 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 115 : AIR 1975 SC 1269 ] , wherein it had been observed as under : (Cecil D'Souza case [ : 1976 SCC (L&S) 115 : AIR 1975 SC 1269 ] , SCC p. 602, para 9) “9. Although security of service cannot be used as a shield against administrative action for lapses of a public servant, by and large one of the essential requirements of contentment and efficiency in public services is a feeling of security. It is difficult no doubt to guarantee such security in all its varied aspects, it should at least be possible to ensure that matters like one's position in the seniority list after having been settled for once should not be liable to be reopened after lapse of many years at the instance of a party who has during the intervening period chosen to keep quiet. Raking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of some time.” (Emphasis added) 23 . In B.S. Bajwa v. State of Punjab [ (1998) 2 SCC 523 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 611] this Court while deciding the similar issue reiterated the same view, observing as under : (SCC p. 526, para 7) “7. … It is well settled that in service matters the question of seniority should not be reopened in such situations after the lapse of a reasonable period because that results in disturbing the settled position which is not justifiable. There was inordinate delay in the present case for making such a grievance. This alone was sufficient to decline interference under Article 226 and to reject the writ petition.” (Emphasis added) 24 . There was inordinate delay in the present case for making such a grievance. This alone was sufficient to decline interference under Article 226 and to reject the writ petition.” (Emphasis added) 24 . In Dayaram A. Gursahani v. State of Maharashtra [ (1984) 3 SCC 36 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 341] , while reiterating the similar view this Court held that in absence of satisfactory explanation for inordinate delay of 8-9 years in questioning under Article 226 of the Constitution, the validity of the seniority and promotion assigned to other employee could not be entertained. 25 . In P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. [ (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22] this Court considered the case where the petition was filed after a lapse of fourteen years challenging the promotion. However, this Court held that the aggrieved person must approach the Court expeditiously for relief and it is not permissible to put forward stale claim. The Court observed as under : (SCC p. 154, para 2) “2. … A person aggrieved by an order promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion.” The Court further observed that it was not that there was any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor was it that there could never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after certain length of time. It would be a sound and wise exercise of jurisdiction for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the court to put forward stale claim and try to unsettle settled matters. 26 . A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Sudama Devi v. Commr. [ (1983) 2 SCC 1 ] ; State of U.P. v. Raj Bahadur Singh [ (1998) 8 SCC 685 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 252] and Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh [ (2003) 1 SCC 335 ]. 27 . 26 . A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Sudama Devi v. Commr. [ (1983) 2 SCC 1 ] ; State of U.P. v. Raj Bahadur Singh [ (1998) 8 SCC 685 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 252] and Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh [ (2003) 1 SCC 335 ]. 27 . In Dinkar Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra [ (1999) 1 SCC 354 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 216] this Court held that delay and laches in challenging the seniority is always fatal, but in case the party satisfies the Court regarding delay, the case may be considered. 28 . In K.A. Abdul Majeed v. State of Kerala [ (2001) 6 SCC 292 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 955] this Court held that seniority assigned to any employee could not be challenged after a lapse of seven years on the ground that his initial appointment had been irregular, though even on merit it was found that seniority of the petitioner therein had correctly been fixed. 29 . It is settled law that fence-sitters cannot be allowed to raise the dispute or challenge the validity of the order after its conclusion. No party can claim the relief as a matter of right as one of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the court is guilty of delay and the laches. The court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage agitation of stale claims where the right of third parties crystallises in the interregnum. (Vide Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [ (1975) 4 SCC 285 : AIR 1974 SC 2077 ] ; State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan [ (1976) 2 SCC 895 : AIR 1975 SC 2190 ] ; Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig [ (2000) 2 SCC 48 ] ; Inder Jit Gupta v. Union of India [ (2001) 6 SCC 637 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1083] ; Shiv Dass v. Union of India [ (2007) 9 SCC 274 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 395] ; A.P. SRTC v. N. Satyanarayana [ (2008) 1 SCC 210 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 161] and City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala [ (2009) 1 SCC 168 ] ). 30 . v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala [ (2009) 1 SCC 168 ] ). 30 . Thus, in view of the above, the settled legal proposition that emerges is that once the seniority had been fixed and it remains in existence for a reasonable period, any challenge to the same should not be entertained. In K.R. Mudgal, this Court has laid down, in crystal clear words that a seniority list which remains in existence for 3 to 4 years unchallenged, should not be disturbed. Thus, 3-4 years is a reasonable period for challenging the seniority and in case someone agitates the issue of seniority beyond this period, he has to explain the delay and laches in approaching the adjudicatory forum, by furnishing satisfactory explanation.” 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Malcom Lawrence Cecil D’Souza vs. Union of India , (1976) 1 SCC 599 has held as under : “8. The matter can also be looked at from another angle. The seniority of the petitioner qua Respondents 4 to 26 was determined as long ago as 1956 in accordance with 1952 Rules. The said seniority was reiterated in the seniority list issued in 1958. The present writ petition was filed in 1971. The petitioner, in our opinion, cannot be allowed to challenge the seniority list after lapse of so many years. The fact that a seniority list was issued in 1971. in pursuance of the decision of this Court in Karnik case would not clothe the petitioner with a fresh right to challenge the fixation of his seniority qua Respondents 4 to 26 as the seniority list of 1971 merely reflected the seniority of the petitioner qua those respondents as already determined in 1956. Satisfactory service conditions postulate that there should be no sense of uncertainty amongst public servants because of stale claims made after lapse of 14 or 15 years. It is essential that anyone who feels aggrieved with an administrative decision affecting one seniority should act with due diligence and promptitude and not sleep over the matter. No satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the petitioner before us for the inordinate delay in approaching the Court. It is no doubt true that he made a representation against the seniority list issued in 1956 and 1958 but that representation was rejected in 1961. No satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the petitioner before us for the inordinate delay in approaching the Court. It is no doubt true that he made a representation against the seniority list issued in 1956 and 1958 but that representation was rejected in 1961. No cogent ground has been shown as to why the petitioner became quiescent and took no diligent steps to obtain redress.” 18. Further, in the matter of Vijay Kumar Kaul vs. Union of India , (2012) 7 SCC 610 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : 23 . It is necessary to keep in mind that a claim for seniority is to be put forth within a reasonable period of time. In this context, we may refer to the decision of this Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. [ (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22 : AIR 1974 SC 2271 ] wherein a two-Judge Bench has held thus : (SCC p. 154, para 2) “2. … It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.” 24 . In Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan [(2006) 4 SCC 322 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 791 : AIR 2006 SC 1581 ] this Court had held thus that: (SCC p. 325, para 6) “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports [ (1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769 ] . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.” 25 . In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala [ (2009) 1 SCC 168 : AIR 2009 SC 571 ] this Court has opined that : (SCC p. 174, para 26) “26. … One of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the High Court is guilty of unexplained delay and the laches. Inordinate delay in moving the court for a writ is an adequate ground for refusing a writ. The principle is that the courts exercising public law jurisdiction do not encourage agitation of stale claims and exhuming matters where the rights of third parties may have accrued in the interregnum.” 26 . From the aforesaid pronouncement of law, it is manifest that a litigant who invokes the jurisdiction of a court for claiming seniority, it is obligatory on his part to come to the court at the earliest or at least within a reasonable span of time. The belated approach is impermissible as in the meantime interest of third parties gets ripened and further interference after enormous delay is likely to usher in a state of anarchy. 27 . The acts done during the interregnum are to be kept in mind and should not be lightly brushed aside. It becomes an obligation to take into consideration the balance of justice or injustice in entertaining the petition or declining it on the ground of delay and laches. It is a matter of great significance that at one point of time equity that existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and paves the path of extinction with the passage of time.” 19. It is thus clear from the aforesaid pronouncements that claims relating to seniority must be raised promptly. It is a matter of great significance that at one point of time equity that existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and paves the path of extinction with the passage of time.” 19. It is thus clear from the aforesaid pronouncements that claims relating to seniority must be raised promptly. Delay defeats equity, particularly in service matters where others’ rights may be adversely affected. 20. Another important aspect that cannot be ignored is that the petitioner has selectively impleaded only respondent No. 3. However, from the selection list, it is evident that there were several other ST candidates who were appointed through the same main list and could also be affected by the claim for revised seniority. The failure to implead them renders the petition defective for non-joinder of necessary parties. Relief affecting seniority cannot be granted in isolation without hearing all those potentially impacted. 21. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Public Service Commission vs. Mamta Bisht , (2010) 12 SCC 204 has held under : “10. In Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P. [ (1984) 4 SCC 251 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 704 : AIR 1985 SC 167 ] and Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B. [ (2009) 1 SCC 768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119] , it has been held that if a person challenges the selection process, successful candidates or at least some of them are necessary parties.” 22. In the matter of Indu Shekhar Singh vs. State of U.P. /b>., (2006) 8 SCC 129 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “22. Seniority, as is well settled, is not a fundamental right. It is merely a civil right. (See Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana [ (2003) 5 SCC 604 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 737], SCC para 49 and also Prafulla Kumar Das v. State of Orissa [(2003) 11 SCC 614 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 121] .) 23. It is a well-established proposition in service jurisprudence that the right to seniority is not a fundamental right. However, seniority constitutes a vital aspect of a civil right arising from statutory rules, administrative instructions, or service regulations governing the terms and conditions of employment in public service. It is a well-established proposition in service jurisprudence that the right to seniority is not a fundamental right. However, seniority constitutes a vital aspect of a civil right arising from statutory rules, administrative instructions, or service regulations governing the terms and conditions of employment in public service. While the denial or fixation of seniority may not ipso facto invoke the violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14 or 16, any action relating to alteration, refixation, or revision of seniority must nonetheless conform to the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. Whenever a representation is made challenging the seniority position of an employee, particularly one that seeks to disturb an existing gradation list, it is imperative that all persons likely to be adversely affected by such representation are treated as necessary and proper parties to the proceedings. The competent authority, even in the realm of administrative decision-making, is duty-bound to issue notice and provide an opportunity of hearing to those individuals whose seniority may be impacted as a consequence of any proposed revision. Failure to do so results in a clear violation of audi alteram partem, a cardinal principle of natural justice. A gradation list or seniority list, once finalized and acted upon, attains a degree of finality and cannot be unsettled casually or unilaterally, especially not to the prejudice of those who were not given an opportunity to contest or respond. Any administrative or judicial order affecting the inter se seniority of civil servants without impleading or hearing the affected parties is liable to be quashed on the ground of procedural impropriety and violation of natural justice, regardless of the merits of the underlying claim. Moreover, in service law, the re-fixation of seniority must adhere strictly to the applicable service rules such as Rule 12(1)(a) of the Rules, 1961, and no executive authority can bypass the statutory safeguards or due process merely on grounds of administrative convenience. Accordingly, any disturbance in the settled seniority position or alteration in the gradation list without putting affected employees on notice, allowing them to present their case, and duly considering their submissions, would render the action legally unsustainable and vitiated. 24. As per Rule 12 of the Rules, 1961, the seniority of direct recruits is to be determined based on the order of merit in which candidates are recommended for appointment by the recruiting authority. 24. As per Rule 12 of the Rules, 1961, the seniority of direct recruits is to be determined based on the order of merit in which candidates are recommended for appointment by the recruiting authority. The select list represents the list of candidates who have been formally recommended for appointment on the basis of merit in the selection process. Appointment orders are ordinarily issued in accordance with the order of merit reflected in this select list. In contrast, the supplementary list or wait list comprises candidates who, although having participated in the selection process, were not initially recommended for appointment owing to non-availability of vacancies or due to their lower position in merit within their respective categories. The inclusion of a name of candidate in the wait list is contingent and conditional, and does not by itself confer any vested right to appointment. Such candidates are considered for appointment only in the event a candidate from the select list fails to join or a vacancy arises subsequently due to non-joining, resignation, or any other valid administrative reason. Therefore, a person appointed from the supplementary or wait list cannot claim parity or equivalence with a candidate appointed from the original select list, particularly for the purposes of fixation of seniority. The very nature of the wait list is subordinate and incidental to the select list, and its operation is circumscribed by the doctrine of exigency and vacancy. Consequently, any claim by a wait-listed candidate for seniority over a candidate appointed from the main list is legally untenable, unless the applicable service rules or recruitment notification explicitly provide otherwise. 25. A candidate whose name appears in the wait list (supplementary list) and who is subsequently appointed only on account of the non-joining or disqualification of a candidate from the main select list, cannot be treated at par with those who were formally recommended and offered appointment in the first instance. The principle governing such appointments is that a wait-listed candidate can be offered appointment only if a selected candidate fails to join, and not because of any entitlement flowing from the selection process itself. Accordingly, a candidate appointed from the wait list must be placed en bloc below all candidates whose names appeared in the main select list, irrespective of the category to which such candidates belong. Accordingly, a candidate appointed from the wait list must be placed en bloc below all candidates whose names appeared in the main select list, irrespective of the category to which such candidates belong. The wait-listed appointee cannot claim a right to be placed above or between the main list candidates based on marks or category, since the right to be considered for seniority arises only from formal selection and recommendation in the select list, not merely from performance in the examination. Further, Rule 12(1) (a) of the Rules, 1961, provides that seniority shall be determined based on the order of merit in which candidates are recommended, irrespective of the date of joining, is applicable only to those candidates who were included in the main select list. This rule has no application to candidates appointed from the wait list, as they were not initially recommended for appointment but were considered later under contingent circumstances. Therefore, in terms of legal and administrative propriety, a candidate who is appointed from the wait list must be placed below the last candidate included in the original select list, without regard to the relative marks or categories of the candidates. To hold otherwise would amount to disturbing the settled seniority structure and would defeat the very purpose of maintaining a category-wise merit-based select list. 26. While the impugned order dated 11.09.2018 is brief and refers to the earlier speaking order dated 28.03.2017, it cannot be said to be per se illegal or in violation of natural justice. It affirms a prior reasoned decision which had already considered the claims of petitioner and found them untenable. It is settled law that administrative orders can rely upon previous detailed decisions if no new material changes the outcome. 27. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit in the present writ petition. The petitioner was selected from the wait list of the General category, and appointed more than a year after respondent No. 3, who was selected from the main list of the Scheduled Tribe category. The selection, recommendation, and subsequent appointment of both candidates were made under different categories, on the basis of intra-category merit. As such, no inter-category comparison of marks can be made for the purpose of determining seniority. The interpretation of Rule 12(1)(a) as urged by the petitioner is misconceived and unsupported by law. The selection, recommendation, and subsequent appointment of both candidates were made under different categories, on the basis of intra-category merit. As such, no inter-category comparison of marks can be made for the purpose of determining seniority. The interpretation of Rule 12(1)(a) as urged by the petitioner is misconceived and unsupported by law. Moreover, the claim suffers from gross and unexplained delay, and is further vitiated by the non-joinder of necessary parties. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate any illegality or arbitrariness in the impugned order dated 11.09.2018. 28. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.