JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Appellant/Plaintiff has preferred this first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of impugned judgment and decree dated 13/08/2019 passed by the 8 th Additional District Judge, District Durg in Civil Suit No. 28-A/2013 whereby plaintiff’s suit for specific performance of contract and permanent injunction has been dismissed, however, the trial Court has granted decree for refund of sale consideration of Rs. 7,00,000/- along with interest of 6% per annum in favour of the plaintiff. (For the sake of convenience, the parties will hereinafter be referred to as per their status and ranking given in the plaint before the trial Court.) Facts of the Case 2. Plaintiff filed a civil suit stating inter alia that defendant No. 1 is the son of defendant No. 2 and grandson of defendant No. 3 (who died during the pendency of the suit on 22/11/2013 and four legal heirs of hers were substituted and brought on record) and the suit land bearing Khasra No. 492 area 1.23 hectares situated at Village Patora, Tahsil Patan, District Durg was originally owned by defendants No. 2 and 3, however, defendant No. 1 showed a copy of registered power of attorney executed by defendants No. 2 and 3 in his favour on 18/09/2012 to the plaintiff and entered into an agreement of sale on 27/11/2012 with regard to the suit land for a sale consideration of Rs. 10,30,000/-, out of which, Rs. 7,00,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to defendant No. 2 as advance amount and it was agreed that defendant No. 1 will get the sale deed registered in favour of the plaintiff within three months. Thereafter, defendant No. 1 lodged a report regarding missing original rin pustika and a notice was published by the plaintiff in local newspaper, however, defendants No. 2 and 3 published an objection to the said notice and plaintiff was constrained to issue legal notice on defendants No. 1 to 3 for specific performance of contract and that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract which was replied by defendants No. 1 to 3 and it appeared that they wanted to evade performance of their part of the contract and also wanted to grab the advance amount. Therefore, plaintiff brought a suit for specific performance of contract dated 27/11/2012 and permanent injunction. 3. Defendant No. 1 filed his written statement opposing the plaint averments stating thereby that plaintiff and his friends had coerced defendant No. 1 to prepare a forged and fraudulent power of attorney on the basis of which the agreement to sale dated 27/11/2012 was entered into and registered. He has further stated that plaintiff has not paid any advance amount to either of the defendants. 4. Defendants No. 2 and 3 filed joint written statement and took a similar stand as defendant No. 1 stating that they did not know anything about the agreement to sale dated 27/11/2012 and even got to know about the forged power of attorney on 13/12/2012 and got it cancelled thereafter and further stated that they have not received any money from the plaintiff in the form of earnest money/sale consideration for the suit land. 5. Learned trial Court framed as many as 8 issues and answered them as stated below :- 6. In sum and substance, the trial Court, though recorded findings and answered issues No. 1, 2 and 3, with respect to execution of agreement dated 27/11/2012 for sale of suit land and payment of advance amount of Rs. 7,00,000/- in favour of the plaintiff, but declined to grant decree for specific performance of contract in his favour and only granted decree for refund of sale consideration of Rs. 7,00,000/- with interest of 6% per annum to the plaintiff, however, the said relief was not sought by him. Submission of the Parties 7. Mr. Kshitij Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, would make the following submissions :- (i) that, the trial Court has committed grave legal error in not granting decree for specific performance of contract in favour of plaintiff and further erred in granting decree for refund of sale consideration amount of Rs. 7,00,000/- as the discretion conferred upon the trial Court by virtue of unamended Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter, “the Act of 1963”) should be exercised reasonably, based on judicial principles and it cannot be exercised arbitrarily as the conduct of the defendants ought to have been considered while exercising discretion under unamended Section 20 of the Act of 1963. He would rely upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of P. Devsingamani v. S. Sambandan , (2022) 14 SCC 793 to buttress this submission. (ii) that, the ground of hardship, on passing of the decree of specific performance of contract, has to be specifically pleaded by the defendants in light of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Narinderjit Singh v. North Star Estate Promoters Limited , (2012) 5 SCC 712 and the same must also be proved by leading evidence, but the defendants have neither pleaded the ground of hardship nor they have adduced any evidence in this regard. The defendants have only and only denied the execution of the agreement to sale dated 27/11/2012 and have alleged that the said agreement was forged and fraudulent, however, there is no averment in their written statements about any hardship in case the decree of specific performance of contract is granted by the trial Court, which they did not foresee at the time of entering into agreement to sale. (iii) that, since the defendants did not plead about the ground of hardship and did not lead any evidence to prove the factum of hardship, the trial Court also did not frame any specific issue in this regard. Therefore, the finding recorded by the trial Court, that plaintiff is not entitled for decree of specific performance of contract on the ground that since during the pendency of the suit, defendant No. 3 had died and four of her legal heirs have been brought on record, dispute may arise in future with regard to allotment of the property amongst the shareholders, is perverse and unsustainable, as the death of defendant No. 3 occurred on 22/11/2013 i.e. during the pendency of the suit and it would not have any impact on the agreement to sale which was entered into between the parties prior to that on 27/11/2012. He would rely upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matters of Parswanath Saha v. Bandhana Modak, 2024 SCC Online 3834 and Prakash Chandra v. Angadlal, (1979) 4 SCC 393 in this regard. He would rely upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matters of Parswanath Saha v. Bandhana Modak, 2024 SCC Online 3834 and Prakash Chandra v. Angadlal, (1979) 4 SCC 393 in this regard. (iv) that, the finding recorded by the trial Court that since defendant No. 3 has died and her legal heirs have been brought on record, they would also have a share in the suit land and as such, dispute is likely to occur in future with regard to identification of the suit land is perverse as the particulars of the suit land have clearly been recorded in the agreement to sale and further the objection with regard to insufficient description and identification of suit land has not been taken in the written statement, which ought to have been pleaded and proved by the defendants before the trial Court, as has also been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matters of Angadlal (supra). (v) that, the trial Court has legally erred in exercising discretion against the plaintiff holding that during the course of final argument, plaintiff has sought alternative relief of refund of sale consideration amount as the said alternative relief claiming refund of sale consideration amount would not create a bar in granting relief of specific performance of contract in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of R.C. Chandiok v. Chuni Lal , (1970) 3 SCC 140 , as such, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is liable to be set aside. 8. None appeared on behalf of respondent/defendant No. 1, though served. 9. Mr. Parth Shrivastava, learned counsel for respondents/defendants No. 2 and 3 (now, his legal heirs) would submit that considering the fact that defendant No. 3, who was one of the owners of the suit land, has died on 22/11/2013 i.e. during the pendency of the civil suit and now, four of her legal heirs have been substituted in her place, the trial Court has rightly declined to grant decree for specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiff holding that grant of decree of specific performance of contract in his favour would cause hardship to the defendants. He would rely upon the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the matters of K. Nanjappa v. R.A. Hameed , (2016) 1 SCC 762 , K. Prakash v. B.R. Sampath Kumar , (2015) 1 SCC 597 and Parswanath Saha (supra) and submit that the instant appeal is liable to be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein- above and went through the record with utmost circumspection. Point for determination 11. The point for determination involved in this first appeal preferred by the appellant/plaintiff is as follows :- “Whether the trial Court has rightly exercised discretion conferred by virtue of unamended Section 20(2)(b) of the Act of 1963 and thereby, refused to grant decree for specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiff, as the same would cause hardship to the defendants ?” Discussion and Analysis 12. In order to consider the aforesaid point for determination, it would be appropriate to notice the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi , (2019) 3 SCC 704 wherein their Lordships have laid down five material questions that are required to be gone into for grant of relief of specific performance, which state as under :- “7. It is a settled principle of law that the grant of relief of specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief. The material questions, which are required to be gone into for grant of the relief of specific performance, are: 7.1. First, whether there exists a valid and concluded contract between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property. 7.2. Second, whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract and whether he is still ready and willing to perform his part as mentioned in the contract. 7.3. Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in what manner he has performed and whether such performance was in conformity with the terms of the contract. 7.4. 7.3. Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in what manner he has performed and whether such performance was in conformity with the terms of the contract. 7.4. Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff against the defendant in relation to suit property or it will cause any kind of hardship to the defendant and, if so, how and in what manner and the extent if such relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff; 7.5. Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any other alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest money, etc. and, if so, on what grounds.” Findings of the trial Court 13. In the instant case, the trial Court has framed issues for determination where issues No. 1, 2 and 3, with respect to execution of the agreement dated 27/11/2012 for sale of suit land and payment of advance money of Rs. 7,00,000/-, have been decided in favour of the plaintiff. Similarly, in issue No. 3, the trial Court has categorically held that defendants No. 1 to 3 have committed breach in performing their part of the contract. The trial Court also decided issues No. 6 and 7 against the defendants and has held that defendants have failed to prove that the power of attorney dated 18/09/2012 was forged and they have also failed to prove that the subject agreement was executed under fear and coercion. However, the trial Court has exercised discretion as conferred under Section 20 of the unamended Act of 1963 and declined to grant decree for specific performance of contract in favour of plaintiff and in alternative has granted decree for refund of earnest money (though that was not claimed by the plaintiff) by recording the following findings in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the impugned judgment :- 14. A careful perusal of the aforesaid findings recorded by the trial Court would show that though the trial Court has held that since defendant No. 3 died during the pendency of the civil suit and she has been substituted with four legal heirs, dispute with regard to their share would likely to arise and it may create future difficulty and while the trial Court refused to grant decree for specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiff but proceeded to hold that during the course of the final argument, plaintiff has prayed that even though he has not claimed relief of refund of sale consideration in his plaint but in alternative, he would have no objection if he is granted decree for refund of sale consideration. Discretion exercised by the trial Court under Section 20 of the unamended Act of 1963 15. It is evident from the record that the trial Court refused to grant the relief of specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiff by exercising its discretion conferred under unamended Section 20(2)(b) of the Act of 1963, which provides as under :- “20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance – (1) XXX XXX (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance:- (a) XXX XXX XXX (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff, or (c) XXX XXX XXX” 16. Section 20(1) of the Act of 1963 (unamended) provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal. Therefore, before exercising its judicial discretion and refusing to grant specific performance of contract, the trial Court ought to have considered whether the performance of the contract would involve hardship upon the defendants, which they did not foresee, and whether its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff, as provided under unamended Section 20(2)(b) of the Act of 1963. 17. 17. At this stage, it would be pertinent to note that the Act of 1963 has been substantially amended with effect from 01/10/2018 and the effect of amendment to Section 20 has changed the substratum of the Act and the Courts under the amended provisions are bound to enforce the specific performance of a contract as a rule, subject to limited exceptions. However, the Supreme Court in the matter of Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 355 has held that the said amendment shall have prospective effect and shall not apply to the transaction which took place prior to coming into force of the amendment w.e.f. 01/10/2018. In the instant case, since defendants No. 2 and 3 executed power of attorney in favour of defendant No. 1 with respect to suit land on 18/09/2012 and the agreement to sale was entered into between the parties on 27/11/2012, therefore, the provision contained under unamended Section 20 of the Act of 1963 would apply. Factum of hardship 18. It is the case of the plaintiff that no plea of hardship has been taken by the defendants in their written statement stating that specific performance of contract would involve hardship for the defendants, which they did not foresee at the time of entering into agreement to sale, whereas they were required to plead and establish the said factum of hardship by leading evidence. 19. In this regard, the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Narinderjit Singh (supra) may be noticed herein profitably wherein their Lordships have emphasized the need for pleading of hardship and producing evidence to prove the said plea and have held as under :- “26. In the present case, the appellant had neither pleaded hardship nor produced any evidence to show that it will be inequitable to order specific performance of the agreement. Rather, the important plea taken by the appellant was that the agreement was fictitious and fabricated and his father had neither executed the same nor received the earnest money and, as mentioned above, all the courts have found this plea to be wholly untenable.” 20. Similarly, in the matter of Beemaneni Mahalaxmi v. Gangumalla Appa , (2019) 6 SCC 233 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held as under :- “15. Similarly, in the matter of Beemaneni Mahalaxmi v. Gangumalla Appa , (2019) 6 SCC 233 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held as under :- “15. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellant that if the decree for specific performance of the contract is passed after number of years, it would cause undue hardship to the defendant – vendor and the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of P.R.Deb[ P.R. Deb and Associates v. Sunanda Roy , (1996) 4 SCC 423 ]is concerned, it is required to be noted that in the written statement the defendant has not pleaded any hardship to be caused if the decree of specific performance of the contract is passed against the defendant vendor. 16. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of A. Maria Angelena v. A.G. Balkis Bee , (2002) 9 SCC 597 , is required to be referred to. In the aforesaid case, the vendor sought to raise the plea of hardship for the first time before this Court and this Court did not permit the vendor to raise such a plea of hardship by observing that as no plea as to hardship if relief for specific performance is granted was raised by the defendant vendor in written statement nor any issue was framed that the plaintiff purchaser could be compensated in terms of the money in lieu of decree for specific performance, such plea cannot be entertained for the first time in appeal by way of SLP, more so, when there are concurrent findings that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract has been recorded by the lower courts. Therefore, the plea raised on behalf of the vendor on hardship cannot be permitted to be raised now, more particularly when no such plea was raised/taken in the written statement.” 21. Therefore, the plea raised on behalf of the vendor on hardship cannot be permitted to be raised now, more particularly when no such plea was raised/taken in the written statement.” 21. In the instant case, defendants have only pleaded that the agreement to sale was forged and fraudulent, however, there is no pleading in their written statement whatsoever with regard to hardship suffered by them, if the relief of specific performance is granted in favour of plaintiff, which they did not foresee at the time of entering into the agreement of sale and further, the plea of hardship ought to have been proved by the defendants by leading evidence, which they have failed to do before the trial Court and have taken the express plea at this stage of the appeal after the trial Court has declined to grant decree for specific performance of contract in favour of plaintiff holding that it would cause hardship on the defendants and as such, it cannot be accepted at this stage, when it was neither pleaded before the trial Court nor any evidence was led by the defendants to prove the same. Non-framing of issue by the trial Court 22. Since the defendants did not take any plea in their written statement that if decree for specific performance is granted in favour of plaintiff, it would cause hardship to the defendants and neither they have led any evidence to prove the said fact of hardship, as such, the trial Court also did not frame any issue in this regard and simply by recording the finding that since defendant No. 3 died during the pendency of the suit and four of her legal heirs have been brought on record, dispute is likely to occur in future and that would involve hardship for the defendants, refused to grant decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiff. 23. In the matter of Beemaneni Mahalaxmi (Supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have highlighted the point of framing of issue based on the pleading of the parties. Similarly, in the matter of Parswanath Saha (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court, relying upon the decision rendered in the matters of Ferrodous Estates (Pvt.) Ltd. v. P. Gopirathnam (Dead), 2020 INSC 586 and Prakash Chandra v. Narayan , (2012) 5 SCC 403 , have held as under :- “12. Similarly, in the matter of Parswanath Saha (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court, relying upon the decision rendered in the matters of Ferrodous Estates (Pvt.) Ltd. v. P. Gopirathnam (Dead), 2020 INSC 586 and Prakash Chandra v. Narayan , (2012) 5 SCC 403 , have held as under :- “12. In Ferrodous Estates (Pvt.) Ltd. v. P. Gopirathnam (Dead) & Ors., 2020 INSC 586, this Court held as under: “28. … Section 20, as it then stood, makes it clear that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary; but that this discretion is not arbitrary but has to be exercised soundly and reasonably, guided by judicial principles, and capable of correction by a court of appeal - see section 20(1). Section 20(2) speaks of cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. Significantly, under clause (a) of sub-section (2), what is to be seen is the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract. Even “other circumstances under which the contract was entered into” refers only to circumstances that prevailed at the time of entering into the contract. It is only then that this exception kicks in - and this is when the plaintiff gets an unfair advantage over the defendant. Equally, under clause (b) of subsection (2), the hardship involved is again at the time of entering into the contract which is clear from the expression “which he did not foresee”. This is made clear beyond doubt by Explanation II of section 2 0 which states that the only exception to the hardship principle contained in clause (b) of sub-section (2) is where hardship results from an act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract. In this case also, the act cannot be an act of a third party or of the court - the act must only be the act of the plaintiff. Clause (c) of sub-section (2) again refers to the defendant entering into the contract under circumstances which makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance. Here again, the point of time at which this is to be judged is the time of entering into the contract.” (Emphasis supplied) 30. Clause (c) of sub-section (2) again refers to the defendant entering into the contract under circumstances which makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance. Here again, the point of time at which this is to be judged is the time of entering into the contract.” (Emphasis supplied) 30. The High Court seems to have been carried away by the fact that in the written statement the defendants did plead that hardship would be caused if they would be asked to execute the Sale Deed of the suit property. 31. The Trial Court had not framed any issue as regards hardship that may be caused to the defendants. It is also pertinent to note that the High Court concurred with the Trial Court on all other issues but thought fit to reverse the decree only on the ground that if the defendants are asked to execute the Sale Deed of the suit property, i.e., the residential house they would be rendered shelterless. 32. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this Court in Prakash Chandra v. Narayan , (2012) 5 SCC 403 , wherein para 17 of the report, it has been held: “17. The question as to whether the grant of relief for specific performance will cause hardship to the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, being a question of fact, the first appellate court without framing such an issue ought not to have reversed the finding of the trial court while concurring with it on all other issues with regard to the appellant's entitlement to relief for specific performance of contract.” 33. Thus, in view of the aforesaid the High Court committed an error in taking the view that the plaintiff is not entitled to the decree for specific performance as the same would cause hardship to the defendants. 34. The High Court seems to have overlooked the fact that the question of hardship in terms of Section 20(2)(b) of the Act, 1963 read with explanation (2) bears reference to hardship, which the defendant did not foresee at the time of entering into the contract. 34. The High Court seems to have overlooked the fact that the question of hardship in terms of Section 20(2)(b) of the Act, 1963 read with explanation (2) bears reference to hardship, which the defendant did not foresee at the time of entering into the contract. In other words, the issue of hardship would come into play only if it is established by cogent evidence that Late Prabha Ranjan Das who executed the Agreement of Sale was unable to foresee the hardship at the time of entering into the contract. 35. The explanation elucidates the point of time at which the hardship has to be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract, except where the hardship has been caused from an act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract.” 24. In the instant case, since it was nowhere pleaded by the defendants in their written statement that grant of specific performance to the plaintiff would cause hardship to them as covered under unamended Section 20(2)(b) of the Act of 1963, therefore, no such issue was framed by the trial Court and further the defendants also did not lead any evidence in this regard to prove the fact of hardship. Issue of Identification 25. It has been held by the trial Court that since defendant No. 3 has died during the pendency of the civil suit and thereafter, four of her legal heirs have been impleaded as a party/defendant in the suit and since the suit land including other lands which were originally owned by defendants No. 2 and 3 jointly, would now be shared between defendant No. 2 as well as legal heirs of defendant No. 3, therefore, the issue of identification would arise in future and it will cause great hardship to the defendants. 26. In this regard, the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Angadlal (supra) may be noticed herein profitably wherein it has been held that since objection with regard to identification of the suit property was not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage and proceeded to grant relief of specific performance. It has been observed by their Lordships as under :- “11. It has been observed by their Lordships as under :- “11. It is then urged on behalf of the respondents that the land is not sufficiently defined in the plaint and cannot be identified, and, therefore, no relief can be granted to the appellant. That objection was not raised in the pleadings, and we see no reason why it should be allowed to be raised at this stage. On the contrary, it appears that the parties were never in doubt as to the identity of the land over which they were in dispute.” 27. As such, in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Angadlal (supra), since in the instant case, no such pleading of dispute with regard to identification of suit land was taken by the defendants in their written statement, the trial Court also could not have recorded the finding that dispute with regard to identification may arise in future and that would cause hardship to the defendants. The said finding recorded by the trial Court is perverse and bad in law. Relief of refund of sale consideration 28. The trial Court, though declined to grant the decree for specific performance of contract in favour of plaintiff, but held that during the course of final argument, plaintiff had stated that he would not have any objection if he would be granted the alternative relief of refund of sale consideration, and proceeded to grant decree of refund of sale consideration of Rs. 7,00,000/- along with 6% interest in favour of the plaintiff. 29. It is appropriate to mention here that plaintiff did not claim the relief of refund of sale consideration in his plaint and Section 22(2) of the unamended Act of 1963 mandates that no relief under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 22 shall be granted by the Court unless it has been specifically claimed and it is well settled that merely because plaintiff has prayed for alternate relief during the course of argument, that would not bar him from claiming the main relief of specific performance of contract, which he had originally claimed for and particularly for the reason that he has objected to the decree of refund of sale consideration passed by the trial Court by filing this appeal, which would show his genuine conduct. 30. 30. In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of R.C. Chandiok (supra) may be noticed wherein it has been held as under :- “7. …. This illustrates the rule that a party cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. These propositions are so well known that no possible exception can be taken to them. In the present case, however, the above rule cannot apply because the appellants had, by Consistent and unequivocal conduct, made it clear that they were not willing to accept the judgment of the trial court as correct. It has already been mentioned at a previous stage that after the decision of the trial court the appellants had even applied on March 31, 1958 for an injunction restraining the respondents from selling or otherwise disposing of the plot as it was apprehended that they were trying to do so. It was stated in this application that the plaintiffs would be preferring an appeal but it would take time to secure certified copies. An appeal was in fact preferred and seriously pressed before the High Court on the relief relating to specific performance. 8. This relief is discretionary but not arbitrary and discretion must be exercised in accordance with the sound and reasonable judicial principles. We are unable to hold that the conduct of the appellants, which is always an important element for consideration, was such that it precluded them from obtaining a decree for specific performance.” Conclusion 31. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we have reached to the following conclusions :- (i) That, there exists a valid and concluded contract between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit land bearing Khasra No. 492 area 1.23 hectares situated at Village Patora, Tahsil Patan, District Durg for consideration of Rs. 10,30,000/- out of which Rs. 7,00,000/- has already been paid by the plaintiff and the remaining amount of Rs. 3,30,000/- has to be paid after preparation of new rin pustika (title deed) by the defendants, which has to be paid at the time of registration of sale deed. (ii) That, plaintiff has performed his part of the contract and paid sale consideration of Rs. 7,00,000/- to the defendants and the remaining amount of Rs. 3,30,000/- has to be paid after preparation of new rin pustika (title deed) by the defendants, which has to be paid at the time of registration of sale deed. (ii) That, plaintiff has performed his part of the contract and paid sale consideration of Rs. 7,00,000/- to the defendants and the remaining amount of Rs. 3,30,000/- has to be paid at the time of registration of sale deed as the original rin pustika (title deed) has been lost as per the sale agreement (Ex. P/1). (iii) That, though there is not a specific finding by the trial Court with regard to the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract but as per paragraph 10 of the plaint read with paragraph 12 of the affidavit filed by the plaintiff under Section 18(4) of the CPC along with his cross-examination as well as legal notice filed by him (Ex. P/4), there is sufficient evidence available on record to hold that plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and he is still ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. (iv) That, the trial Court has ignored the mandate of Section 20(2)(b) of the Act of 1963 which clearly provides that in the case where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant, which he did not foresee at the time of entering into the contract, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff, the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. In the matter of Ferrodous Estates (supra), the Supreme Court has clearly held that under clause (b) of subsection (2) of unamended Section 2 of the Act of 1963, the hardship involved is again at the time of entering into the contract which is clear from the expression “which he did not foresee”, and is also clear from Explanation 2 of Section 20(2) of the Act of 1963 which clearly states that the question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract. It is not the case of the defendants herein that hardship has been caused to them because of the act of the plaintiff and the only hardship which has been assumed and explained by the trial Court is that since defendant No. 3 died during the pendency of the civil suit, therefore, on account of other legal heirs substituted on her behalf would also have a share in the suit land and due to that, dispute is likely to occur in the future, however, that cannot be a ground to invoke jurisdiction under unamended Section 20(2)(b) of the Act of 1963. As such, we are of the considered opinion that the plea of hardship provided under unamended Section 20(2)(b) of the Act of 1963 has neither been taken by the defendants in their written statement nor any issue has been framed by the trial Court in this regard and further no evidence has been led by the defendants to prove the factum of hardship. Moreover, the particulars of the suit land and khasra number have clearly been stated in the agreement to sale, thus, there was no dispute with regard to identification of the suit land as has been assumed by the trial Court. Furthermore, plaintiff did not pray for the relief of refund of sale consideration in the plaint and even otherwise, claiming alternate relief of refund would not bar him from getting the main relief which he is otherwise entitled to. Therefore, the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in refusing to grant the decree of specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that it would cause hardship to the defendants in future. 32. The discretion exercised by the trial Court in refusing to grant relief of specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiff and granting alternative relief of refund of sale consideration cannot be said to be reasonable and based on judicial principles rather it has been exercised arbitrarily and perversely. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree dated 13/08/2019 passed by the trial Court, only to the extent of refusing specific performance of contract and granting relief of refund of sale consideration amount of Rs. 7,00,000/- to the plaintiff, is hereby set aside, keeping the other findings intact. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree dated 13/08/2019 passed by the trial Court, only to the extent of refusing specific performance of contract and granting relief of refund of sale consideration amount of Rs. 7,00,000/- to the plaintiff, is hereby set aside, keeping the other findings intact. The plaintiff is held entitled for specific performance of contract and it is also directed that on payment of remaining sale consideration amount of Rs. 3,30,000/-, defendants will execute the sale deed of suit land bearing Khasra No. 492 area 1.23 hectares situated at Village Patora, Tahsil Patan, District Durg in favour of the plaintiff within 30 days from the date of drawing of decree failing which, upon deposit of the aforesaid balance sale consideration amount in civil court deposit, the trial Court will execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within the next 30 days. 33. Accordingly, this first appeal is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. No cost(s). 34. A decree be drawn-up accordingly.